The Middle East Journal

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
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Editor's Note

As a result of the November 1992 election of Arkansas governor Bill Clinton to replace George Bush as president, the first Democratic administration in 12 years assumes responsibility for US domestic and foreign policy on January 20, 1993. Middle East aficionados naturally are curious about possible new directions Clinton may take toward the region, and about the prospects for policy changes during 1993 and beyond. Historical experience seems to argue in favor of the Clinton administration continuing current policies. Since the end of World War II, the presidency has alternated between the two dominant political parties only five other times: in 1953, 1961, 1969, 1977, and 1981. None of these previous changes of administration, however, produced dramatic shifts in overall US policy toward the Middle East. The primary reason for this consistency was the Cold War: For more than 40 years, there persisted a bipartisan consensus on the desirability of containing the influence of the Soviet Union. As long as containment remained the principal aim of US policy in the region, other objectives necessarily were subordinated to this goal.

The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 separate countries at the end of 1991 removed the previous ideological rationale for US policy in the Middle East. Washington is still in the process of assessing the implications of this development and adjusting to the altered international and regional environment. Under the circumstances, the Clinton administration will need to fashion creative policies that are responsive to a wide range of Middle East issues, including, but not limited to, the following: Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, civil wars, drought and famine in the Horn of Africa, conventional and nonconventional arms control, pressures for democratization, environmental pollution problems, human rights abuses in friendly regimes, international assistance for economic restructuring,

normalization of relations with Iran and Libya, oil price and production stability, political reconstruction in Afghanistan and Lebanon, and resolution of the situation in Iraq, where the United States has provided an open-ended commitment to protect most Kurds and Arab Shi'i Muslims from aerial attacks by their own government. On the level of bilateral relations, it is likely, of course, that the pattern of mutually cooperative ties that have evolved between the United States and some Middle Eastern countries, in particular Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, will persist in the next four years. It is also obvious, however, that political developments underway in several countries—including Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan and the republics of Central Asia, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, as well as whatever entity emerges out of negotiations over the status of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip—will require the United States to give careful consideration to the restructuring of bilateral relationships.

The articles in this issue provide fresh insight into some of the regional and country-specific issues that are likely to challenge the new Clinton administration during its first year in office. The initial article is an updated adaptation of the keynote address that Richard Falk presented at the Middle East Institute's Annual Conference in October 1992. Falk argues that no matter who the president is, US policy toward the Middle East is shaped by long-term "structural interests," which he defines as a determination to maintain Western access to Persian Gulf oil and a commitment to the security of Israel. Unexpected "situations," or crises, and the personal style of individual presidents, says Falk, affect the means the United States employs to preserve its structural interests, but the interests themselves endure.

Falk suggests that an emerging structural interest in the aftermath of the Cold War is a US resolve to prevent any other extra-regional power from projecting its influence in the Middle East. An intriguing question, which Falk does not address, is whether the major European countries will acquiesce to US domination of the area in the absence of any Soviet threat. As Pia Christina Wood, the author of the second article, demonstrates in her assessment of President François Mitterrand's policies, France is one country that desires to enhance its own influence in the region. According to Wood, when Mitterrand came to power in 1981, he believed that the Israeli and US perception of France as being "pro-Arab" limited his country's ability to play a substantive role in the Middle East peace process. Thus, Mitterrand tried to implement a more even-handed policy that stressed relations with both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. France's involvement in Lebanon during 1982–84, however, exposed the inherent contradictions of—and helped to undermine—Mitterrand's efforts to pursue a more balanced policy vis-à-vis Israeli and Palestinian interests.

Although France along with Israel, Syria, and the United States have experienced major policy failures because of their intervention in Lebanon, the real victims of that country's 15-year civil war have been the Lebanese themselves. Only since 1990, when implementation of the Ta'if accord began, has there

been reason for optimism about Lebanon's political reconstruction, although developments during the past year are a reminder that the situation remains volatile and the country's future uncertain. Civil society obviously cannot be reconstituted unless there is reconciliation among Lebanon's numerous sectarian communities. In the third article, Judith Harik provides valuable insights into the prospects for communal reconciliation. In May 1991, Harik surveyed more than 300 high school students in the Druze area to discern attitudes concerning their identity and toward the state—whose authority virtually disintegrated during the civil war—and other Lebanese groups. Based on responses to a structured questionnaire, Harik found that Druze youth, contrary to conventional assumptions, identified with values that are supportive of Lebanon as a unified country with a secular government, and that they expressed generally tolerant views of other religious groups.

While the multiple consequences of civil strife have preoccupied Lebanon since 1975, farther south along the Mediterranean coast, in Egypt, the long-term issue has been management of the economy. In the fourth article, Sami Baroudi examines the performance of one aspect of the economy, agricultural exports. Baroudi concludes that both the quantity and monetary value of major export crops such as cotton, rice, and onions have declined since 1975 because of government policies, including price controls and foreign exchange regulations. Unfavorable policies, says Baroudi, have discouraged farmers by limiting, or even eliminating, producer profits and have resulted in valuable cotton land being converted to clover or other crops.

The last article in this issue looks at Iraq from a novel angle: its postage stamps. Donald Reid examines how Iraqi president Saddam Hussein has used images on postage stamps to convey his vision of Iraq to the country and to the world. The author's plates of representative stamps vividly demonstrate the value of stamps as propaganda tools.

Before signing off, I should mention that our editorial assistant for the past two and a half years, Catherine Grosso, will be leaving after this issue. Cathi has done a superb job, for which the entire staff is grateful. Although she will be missed, we share her excitement of going to Jerusalem, where she will be working with the Middle East Council of Churches. Elisa Coghlan, a 1992 graduate of George Washington University, joins the staff as our new editorial assistant. Elisa was an intern with the journal in spring 1991 and worked as a library assistant in the Middle East Institute's George Camp Keiser Library during the summers of 1991 and 1992. Also contributing to this issue were Nancy Wood, our editorial volunteer, and two interns: Jane Ann Burdick, Brigham Young University, 1993; and Douglas Nelson, St. Olaf College, 1992.

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
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
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
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
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CAN US POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST CHANGE COURSE?

Richard Falk

ONE way to pose the issue of future US foreign policy toward the Middle East is to speculate on whether, and in what respect, it makes a difference who was elected president in November 1992. These days, one is struck most of all by the general lack of public concern about foreign policy. In the presidential debate of October 15, 1992, only one of more than eleven questions touched on foreign policy; that question was the most poorly phrased and elicited disappointing responses from the three candidates. They were asked, "What should be the US participation in the new world order?"—as if one existed. A more pointed question, it seems, would have been to President George Bush: "What ever happened to the new world order that we heard so much about during the Persian Gulf crisis?"

Recently Thomas Pickering, the US ambassador to the United Nations during the 1991 Gulf war, responded to a question along this line by saying, "It's been put back on the shelf." This answer, presumably, means "we don't want to talk about it anymore," possibly because there is currently an overwhelming political sense that the people of the United States seek a president for the United States, not for the world. That view is reinforced almost certainly by the feeling that the aftermath of the Gulf war is not something to be proud of nor to call attention to, particularly since Saddam Hussein's longevity as head of state will, in all likelihood, exceed that of George Bush, which is not something that could have been anticipated a couple of years ago.

Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University. *This article is an updated adaptation of his keynote address delivered at "Middle East 1992," the 46th Middle East Institute Annual Conference, held October 16–17, 1992, in Washington, DC.*

INTERESTS AND SURPRISES

To get some perspective on US foreign policy prospects in the Middle East, it may be helpful to draw a few conceptual distinctions. In considering the relationship of the United States to the Middle East, three levels of analysis or approach seem useful. First, and perhaps most significantly, is what can be termed the structural level. Assuming that the basic interests of the United States in the Middle East are enduring, they evolve slowly over time but without any significant relationship to elections in this country or to swings in public mood. Within this framework the attempt to maintain a favorable political relationship to Gulf oil represents the predominant structural reality, together with the apparent permanence of the US commitment to the security of the Israeli state. The means of upholding these structural interests, but not the interests themselves, are the subject of periodic debate. No other interests in relation to the region have acquired this structural status.

There is now, however, apparently looming on the horizon a new emergent structural interest that is an aspect of the post-Cold War setting—namely the United States' resolve not to allow any other extra-regional or non-Middle Eastern state to exert significant influence within the area. One of the features associated with the end of the Cold War has been the displacement of the only other non-Middle East contender for influence in the region. For the first time in more than a century, there is no extra-regional rivalry in the Middle East. France and Britain, of course, during the colonial period were friendly rivals, although not so friendly at times. After World War II, the United States tried to prop up the British, and to some extent the French, but was always somewhat ambivalent as to whether it wanted to sustain the British role in the region or replace them as the predominant extra-regional influence. In the course of that process, however, the Soviet Union became a major player in the region, and a new rhythm of rivalry among outsiders took shape. What is now happening, and it is definitely a new phase, is the sense that the United States is there alone and it will not welcome anyone else from without.

This post-Cold War development will influence the way diplomacy toward the region is carried out, and it may also have an effect on the degrees of self-determination that are available to various countries and peoples in the region. Bernard Lewis argues in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article that it is the first time that the region will have a sufficient degree of autonomy to exert control over its own future, and, as he puts it somewhat scornfully, it will be the first time that the region and its leadership will be faced with the need to be responsible for their own future.[1] Lewis insists that the United States, unlike the other earlier extra-regional actors, lacks an imperial appetite, and will not impose its presence in the sort of intrusive manner associated with either the colonial period or the

1. Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992).

Cold War rivalry. Such speculation will need to be tested, and its accuracy will depend on whether challenges to US structural interests in the Middle East arise and are taken seriously, and also on the attitude of the US political leadership toward interventionary diplomacy.

The second level of analysis is what can be termed situational. The Middle East is notable for being full of big surprises. Such an acknowledgment is a way of saying that US experts have not exhibited a convincing grasp of the complexities of the region, and seem unable to anticipate crucial developments. It is easier to talk about surprises than failures of understanding, particularly if as an expert one is paid to understand things. Looking back over recent times, the Iranian Revolution, the hostage crisis, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait all have taken regional specialists by surprise. These recurrent, and at times traumatic, surprises have challenged US foreign policy and its leadership to fashion responses on an ad hoc basis. It is quite possible that President-elect Bill Clinton also will wake up one day to an unpleasant surprise of magnitudes comparable to the preceding. Without extending the political imagination beyond the realm of plausibility, one possibility would be to discover that the Ukraine has, after all, sold nuclear warheads to Iran; there are indications that a covert nuclear arms race is already underway in the region. Then what? Less remote, but also serious, would be the ascent to power of a militant, anti-Western Islamic leadership in a key country in the region—perhaps Egypt.

Reflecting on the Gulf crisis, whether Saddam Hussein was enticed or his invasion actually astonished US policymakers on August 2, 1990, is something that only historians will be able to assess once government papers are fully available. Certainly the invasion was treated by the White House as if it was a shock to expectations, and the intensity of response immediately made the region a global focus of attention. Situations spiraling out of the complexities of the Middle East are bound to create periodic crises that challenge the defense of US structural interests, and one would anticipate the emergence of new situational challenges in the period just ahead.

The third level of analysis is one of personal style. Not everyone in the White House would have continued to coddle Saddam Hussein as long and ardently as the Bush administration did; nor would everyone have encouraged Iraq to serve as an engine of war to shatter "Islamic fundamentalism" as the Reagan-Bush administration did by tilting toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War; nor would every president have continued the pro-Baghdad policy (up to the eve of the invasion of Kuwait) in the face of Hussein's brutality toward his own people—climaxing in the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish villages in Iraq—and given the evidence that he was trying hard to make his country a nuclear power.

The pattern of patronizing a regional tyrant and then demonizing him as an occasion for intervention is not peculiar to the Middle East. The saga of Manuel Noriega in Panama bears a disturbing resemblance to the rise and fall of Saddam Hussein as an object of US benevolence and then hostility. Indeed, even during

the final stages of the Gulf war, when the concern of US policymakers shifted back to the possibility of Iran emerging as a regional threat and political Islam generating a regional challenge, it was frequently mentioned in the newspapers that the smart thinking in the Pentagon and the White House was to regard Saddam Hussein as "the lesser of evils." It was believed by such bureaucrats that the interests of the United States had abruptly shifted from the destruction of Iraq's military capability to the prevention of the breakup of Iraq as a unified state. In other words, given the personal style of the Bush presidency, a very cynical kind of balance of power geopolitics dominated this recent phase of US foreign policy toward the region. This might, however, be altered in the future.

Perhaps, one can say, looking ahead to the Clinton presidency, that there will be less of a disposition to be as cynical in the manipulation of regional forces to uphold US structural interests. At the same time, however, the structural logic is not likely to change, so any president, despite important differences in personal style or in ethical orientation, is likely to feel considerable pressure to manipulate regional forces to uphold Western concerns about oil and to safeguard Israel. There is no reason to expect any shift in US foreign policy as a result of a change of leadership in Washington, except that the turbulence of the region is almost certain to produce some unwelcome surprises during the next four years, and in the context of crises there are always policy choices that will be exercised in a manner that responds to the differing personal styles of political leaders and their main advisors.

One example of the issue of personal style can be gleaned from former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's press secretary, who spoke at Princeton University not long ago. In his speech, the official said that Gorbachev was convinced that if Ronald Reagan had been president during the Gulf crisis it could have been resolved differently. He described witnessing a phone conversation between Gorbachev and Bush a few days before the UN Security Council's 15 January deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. After the conversation, Gorbachev turned to this man and said, "Oh, if that had only been Ronald Reagan, I'm convinced I could have persuaded him that we really had a solution that would avoid any need for war."

ISSUES AND LAND MINES

In the next few years, a number of substantive issues and problems are likely to emerge in the region that will cause difficulties for the United States. There is, first of all, the Middle East peace process itself. The Bush administration deserves enormous credit for using its diplomatic leverage to initiate this process and to create, for the first time, at least the illusion that the United States is even-handed in the Israeli-Palestinian setting. One can argue that withholding loan guarantees and putting pressure on the government of Yitzhak Shamir was a move toward even-handedness rather than the achievement of it. US foreign policy still

remained overwhelmingly oriented toward upholding its commitment to Israel as a strategic partner in foreign policy and as a rigidly maintained commitment that has become a virtual imperative of domestic policy. The US-Israeli relationship is sustained not only by regional concerns, but is also driven as strongly by domestic forces.

It remains uncertain whether the peace process under the auspices of the George Bush-James Baker framework was really ever intended to do more than de-escalate the conflict on a state-to-state level. Is the main objective to resolve the Israeli-Syrian territorial dispute centering on the Golan Heights, and along the way force the Palestinians to swallow an autonomy arrangement that effectively renounces rather than realizes self-determination? It is difficult to do more than speculate at this stage, but the available evidence is far from encouraging.

The danger for any future US president, and for the public as well, is to confuse a bargain between unequal negotiating partners with a solution. A solution entails the real achievement of Palestinian self-determination, which means a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state under Palestinian leadership, democratically selected without any interference on the part of Israel. Whether such a leadership reflects direct or indirect participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization is, again, something for the Palestinian people to decide by free and fair elections.

A bargain, in contrast to a solution, resembles a solution in the sense that the parties give their formal approval, but it lacks the elements that would remove the core grievance from a conflict. Those negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian people may, for whatever reasons, feel that a bargain is better than nothing and that it is the best result that can be achieved at the time. Some would argue for a phased agreement starting with a measure of self-rule in the occupied territories that in the second stage would be superseded by a political arrangement amounting to the establishment of a Palestinian state. From this perspective, the agreement is a bargain that is proposed, in time and under certain conditions, to become a solution.

The main point, however, is that a bargain that withholds sovereignty from the Palestinian people will not hold, and will be repudiated by the Palestinians as a reflection of improper negotiations. It is in the interests of all sides involved in the peace process to move toward a solution that forgoes the temporary advantages of unequal bargaining positions, but to date neither the Israeli government, nor the US government, seems to appreciate this, and both seem intent on pushing the Palestinians toward acceptance of a bargain with only vague assurances that its acceptance would be followed in a number of years by a somewhat better bargain—that is, by more autonomy but not statehood. The Bush-Baker approach has encouraged the peace process, even to the extent of giving some support to genuinely representative Palestinian participation, but the diplomacy of Washington has not gone nearly far enough in the direction of

associating Palestinian-Israeli "peace" with self-determination for the Palestinian people.

The intimations of the Clinton presidency are even more discouraging. During the campaign, Clinton criticized the Bush administration for withholding loan guarantees from the Shamir government and for siding with the Palestinians and the Arabs more generally. Accordingly, one is not surprised to learn that the Palestinians apparently prayed that Bush win the presidential election, and Israeli hardliners were similarly committed to the Clinton camp. Clinton does not seem prepared—as Bush also did not—to use US leverage to forge a genuine Israeli-Palestinian solution, evidently seeking to confuse the issue by imposing on a weakened and divided Palestinian movement a bargain that could be presented as a solution, most optimistically a kind of repetition with the Syrians of the Camp David process that locates the Palestinian concern at the margins of a state-to-state accommodation. Whether this kind of hardball diplomacy will succeed is uncertain. The Palestinians may not acquiesce if the bargain is truly unsatisfactory, and if their prospects of self-determination in the near future are not at least maintained in some kind of credible form. Even if the Palestinian negotiators accept such a bargain and put a happy face on the outcome, it is not certain that the Palestinian people would accept it, and it is already evident that some strong rejectionist tendencies exist among the Palestinians. Whether the Syrians would be willing to play a role comparable to the Egyptians at Camp David, cutting a deal that breaks any effective linkage with Palestinian self-determination, has not yet been established.

There are several encouraging factors in the background that cut against the more pessimistic drift of this analysis. Yitzhak Rabin's credibility as a political leader in Israel depends on carrying through the peace process to some sort of solution, and there is a strong element of Israeli domestic opinion that wants to resolve the Palestinian issue at this stage in a manner that endures. A further factor that may be even more important is the shifting technology of war in the region. It is not at all certain that another Arab-Israeli war will be a war that could be won at acceptable costs by either side. If one postulates the availability of accurate, long-range missiles to the main states in the region, it is probable that enormous damage would be done behind the lines, even to the side that prevails on the battlefield. In other words, the technologies that are being sent to the region are increasingly undermining war as an option; even "successful" war may no longer serve as an effective instrument of policy. This could have radical, even revolutionary, implications for the future of the region.

In the Cold War period, war was no longer an effective instrument for resolving conflicts in the North, despite the great hostility between East and West encompassing antagonistic ideological and political orientations of elites in Moscow and Washington. There was a clear understanding—and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 underscored this—that war would, indeed, be a disastrous means of resolving conflict. Such an understanding does not yet exist in relation

to the Middle East, and certainly has not existed in the past. The Gulf war is the latest example of an attempt by Western-oriented interests to rely upon war as an effective instrument despite the existence of other policy choices. The alternative was to rely on containment diplomacy and sanctions as a coherent alternative. These were the essential elements of the US grand strategy that had guided the West during the Cold War. In the Third World, however, that policy of restraint has not seemed necessary. Military intervention has been the predominant policy in the settling of serious conflict in the region.

The second area that is significant, of course, is the solidifying of support for the security of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and maintaining their pro-Western orientations. Here the outlook seems rather favorable and untroubling in the years ahead. There is, however, the question of what happens if radical Islam spreads? What if nuclear warheads are acquired by revisionist elites at the political helm of states in the region? Even if they are not acquired, what if long-range missiles are deployed and are reinforced with a more militant diplomacy? What if Iran exerts its regional muscle in a less blundering way than Iraq's last attempt? These questions, each remote on its own, point to dangers that could force President-elect Clinton to confront major challenges to US regional ascendancy, including the protection of the status quo among Gulf states. Should such a challenge come about it would challenge a Clinton administration's capacity to sustain a low-visibility foreign policy. In contrast, a Bush administration might well have welcomed such a challenge to its structural interests in the region, creating a pretext for abandoning the constraints and frustrations of a high-visibility domestic policy.

There exists a kind of incoherence just beneath the surface of policy discourse in the United States. One of the things that everyone in political life currently agrees on is the importance of sustaining a low-visibility foreign policy in the years ahead, and concentrating political energies and resources on the United States. At the same time, if the US government seeks to maintain regional ascendancy in the face of the turbulence that exists in the Middle East, it is quite likely that a challenge will come along that either will be ignored—thereby putting structural interests at risk—or that will lead to the abandonment of a low-visibility foreign policy in the course of opting for a major commitment to the region. Could a Clinton administration walk away from this kind of conflict situation? President Reagan managed to do it in 1983 when he removed US troops from Lebanon after a truck bomber killed more than 280 marines. Could a Democratic president have done that? Will a Clinton presidency have the political space to withdraw rather than descend anew into the quagmire? It was, in the case of Lebanon, an appropriate withdrawal, but it required a president who was rather unafraid of criticism by the military or from the political Right.

A third problematic area is the professed commitment to regional stability at the same time that there is a domestically driven commitment to sell arms to the region. How can a leading government, on the one hand, claim that it wants

regional moderation and maximum stability—in order to maintain its regional interests at the lowest possible cost—while on the other hand, struggle to promote arms sales to enhance influence, reduce trade deficits, and satisfy pressure by arms producers at a time of shrinking defense budgets at home. In other words, if the US government genuinely seeks a low-visibility foreign policy in the Middle East it seems peculiar to compete with others to sell destabilizing weapon systems to countries in the region, especially while linked to the persisting commitment to ensure that Israel enjoys a technological superiority that makes its overall military capability greater than that of its combined potential Arab adversaries. How can that dynamic be sustained without an arms race that is both expensive and dangerous? There are many masters of spin control in Washington, but whether even the most inventive can really reconcile this kind of post-Gulf war arms policy with the hope of keeping the behavior of conflicting political forces within acceptable limits is rather Pollyannaish, to put it mildly.

The fourth policy area is the commitment to democracy and human rights as part of the post-Cold War foreign policy consensus. Governor Clinton as a candidate was very critical of President Bush for not doing enough: in Bosnia; in Somalia; for generally doing too little in response to the challenges posed by humanitarian crises, and, by implication, by doing too little in the aftermath of the Gulf war to ensure a more democratic destiny for the people of Iraq. One of the most irresponsible aspects of the Gulf war policy was the initial encouragement given to the Kurds and Shi'a to revolt and the later abandonment of any support for their claims of self-determination or for the defense of their human rights when the US government shifted foreign policy gears and gave precedence to a regional commitment to preserve at all costs the unity of Iraq, even to welcome the stability of the Baath regime.

Despite its criticisms of the Bush administration, a Clinton administration may not understand fully what doing enough would entail in these humanitarian settings. Doing enough in Bosnia, according to specialists, would require a huge commitment of resources and energies over a period that could stretch into years; just to get food reliably to Sarajevo could require a military force of 300,000 or more. In other words, doing enough with respect to democracy, human rights, and humanitarian crises is radically inconsistent with a low-visibility foreign policy. Again, one cannot have it both ways. The Clinton camp may have painted itself into a corner by its criticism of the Bush administration on these matters. What will it do when confronted, as surely it will be, by crises of this magnitude?

There is an unresolved and dangerous situation arising from the use of irresponsible rhetoric in support of democracy and human rights, as well as an insufficient appreciation by politicians in this country that intervention on behalf of these goals is virtually a mission impossible. The record of performance is very poor by intervenors all over the world. Too often, intervention produces a quagmire generating commitments that engage capabilities in a major way, and can also quickly become a test of political leadership that cannot be lost.

There is another related troublesome aspect of the Clinton program in this regard: its emphasis and promise to provide the United States with military capabilities that would result in more flexible and more mobile conventional forces. Such priorities amount to code language for a better capacity to intervene. The United States does not need this kind of enhanced global mobility and flexibility for its own national security if conceived in territorial terms and, therefore, it seemingly contradicts a fundamental commitment to the maintenance of a low-visibility foreign policy. It is increasingly difficult to intervene, especially in the Middle East, given current levels of military technology, without embarking on a serious and costly engagement.

CONCLUSION

These are some of the serious land mines implicit in the current US political consensus that is, above all, dedicated to a low-visibility foreign policy. These land mines are present on the terrain of US foreign policy toward the Middle East and may actually explode in the aftermath of diplomatic successes, such as a peace process that somehow miraculously produces a Palestinian solution. Should self-determination be achieved by the Palestinians, why not by the Kurds? Why not on behalf of other captive nations in the region?

One of the legacies of the colonial period is a series of artificial states in the region that encompass large ethnic minorities that increasingly conceive of themselves as captive nations. Ironically, if a Palestinian state were to emerge it would be one of the few states in the region with a relatively homogeneous ethnic national identity that could provide a foundation for a democratic future. Of course, a democratic model of this sort for a Palestinian entity would be extremely threatening to the autocratic regimes in the Gulf, which accounts for some of their ambivalence over the years toward the Palestinian movement. As a result, no matter which direction one takes with respect to these main issues, one thing is certain: the relative serenity of the current phase of the US relationship to the region is unlikely to persist.

A fear exists among some observers that a Clinton administration is likely to approach the region too naively, just as there is the conviction that the Bush administration approached the region too cynically. Policy alternatives reflecting both innocence and cynicism are likely to be imposed on the region by the US government in the years ahead as the foreign policy bureaucracy makes the transition from one leadership to another. There is likely to be continued suffering for many of the peoples of the region; thus, we must acknowledge that the way geopolitics has been practiced—whether by the United States or the Soviet Union or the British or the French—has involved great cruelty over the decades, and even centuries, to the peoples of the region. Those who are ethically concerned beyond the geopolitical and strategic dimensions of foreign policy should seek to

understand the concrete impact of policy choices and proposals on people, and not just the abstract logic of geopolitics and strategic interests.



FRANCE AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: THE MITTERRAND POLICIES, 1981–1992

Pia Christina Wood

ARAB leaders generally viewed the election of President François Mitterrand in May 1981 with some apprehension. Mitterrand's personal sympathies toward Israel were well known. He had visited the country on numerous occasions and, through the Socialist International, had established particularly close relations with members of the Israeli Labor Party. Furthermore, he stated that an active French role in the region—which he wanted to pursue—was contingent upon an improvement in Franco-Israeli relations.[1]

Since 1968, French foreign policy in the Middle East had increasingly focused on the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. President Charles de Gaulle had first warned of the potential problems of the Palestinian refugees, and successive French presidents regarded the unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict not only as a major factor in the region's turmoil, but also as a threat to France's economic and political interests in the region. Consequently, all French governments have sought to create policies toward Israel, the Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the overall peace process that support French economic, security, and political interests.

Presidents Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had perceived the advocacy of certain rights for the Palestinian people to be the best means of supporting French interests, which included the protection of access to Middle East oil, arms sales to the region, regional security through a just peace settlement, and the maintenance of French political influence and independence.

1. See related remarks by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson in *Le Monde*, May 28, 1981.

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Although both presidents repeatedly declared their support for Israel's right to exist, Pompidou also supported "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." Giscard d'Estaing had called for a *patrie,* self-determination for the Palestinians, and sponsored the European Community's (EC) 1980 Venice Declaration.[2]

French policies under Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, however, antagonized both the United States and Israel. The United States believed that European "interference" might undermine its own efforts, while Israel adamantly opposed any French participation because of its relations with Arab countries. Thus, US and Israeli policies threatened France's political objective of playing an active role in an area of the world deemed vital to French interests. French policy under Mitterrand has been a constant attempt to maintain French involvement in the affairs of the region—particularly the Palestinian-Israeli conflict—despite the role of the United States as the dominant outside power.

OVERVIEW

Mitterrand's initial strategy was to strike a balance by strengthening France's relationships with Israel and the United States. To demonstrate France's shift in policy, Mitterrand announced his intention to visit Israel, expressed support for the Camp David peace process, and strongly criticized Giscard d'Estaing's leadership on the Venice Declaration. His strategy was to be two-pronged: first, improve relations with Israel, and, second, support the US-sponsored peace process while maintaining France's reputation as an independent player. In his view, good relations with Israel would allow France to increase its influence in the region and support French "grandeur" and rank. This improvement in relations with Israel, however, was not to be accompanied by a decrease in support for the Palestinians. Instead, Mitterrand believed that the best way to protect French interests was to give greater support to both sides.

Mitterrand's disapproval of the Venice Declaration had been based on his support for the Camp David accords. In his view, the declaration was too ambitious and undermined the US approach. He felt the "step-by-step" approach had a much better chance of success than an immediate global solution to the crisis. In his view, a comprehensive peace was desirable, but impossible in the short term because too many players were unwilling to compromise. The end of hostilities between Egypt and Israel, as demonstrated in the Camp David treaty,

2. The declaration included the following major elements: the right of all countries to live in peace; the right of the Palestinian people (not refugees) to self-determination; the need for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to end its settlement policy; the need for all parties to be involved in the peace negotiations, including the PLO, "which will have to be associated with the negotiations." For the full text, see *European Political Cooperation* (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1988), pp. 127–31.

was, therefore, an important first step in the right direction.[3] In addition, he felt it was not the role of the Europeans or France to impose a solution based on the principles laid out in the Venice Declaration, but instead to encourage negotiations between the concerned parties.

Despite his early efforts to formulate a policy of "balance," by 1987 Mitterrand had distanced France from Israel again and placed greater emphasis on relations with the PLO. His government believed that moderate Palestinians, led by PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, were vital to any peace negotiations and that championing their cause might open the door to a greater French voice in the peace process. Contacts between the French government and Arafat increased and, in 1989, Mitterrand received Arafat in Paris after the latter had renounced terrorism and accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338. The 1991 Persian Gulf War complicated French policies because Arafat supported Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, while France participated in the multinational coalition that defeated Iraq. In addition, the war galvanized the US pursuit of a negotiated peace between the Palestinians and Israelis, leading to the 1991 Madrid conference and subsequent peace talks. With the dominant role of the United States, France and Europe were once again excluded from playing influential roles.

The French government had supported earlier US-led peace efforts, but at the same time had continued to issue a variety of statements designed to balance France's many interests. Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson described France as an important interlocuteur between Israel and the Arab world because of its good relations with the different sides. In addition, France was a solid partner of the United States, but certainly not its ambassador to the Middle East.[4] To counter the impression that France had joined the US-Israeli camp, Mitterrand constantly emphasized France's absolute independence in foreign affairs and his strong support for the rights of the Palestinians.[5]

In 1981, Cheysson severely weakened any possible EC role in the peace process (and gained Israeli approval) when he stated, "There will not be a French project, there will not be a French initiative as long as we are in office, nor will there be a European project or a European initiative."[6] In contrast to Giscard d'Estaing's emphasis on a comprehensive settlement and participation in the peace process within an EC framework, the Mitterrand government thought that an independent national foreign policy would be a vehicle more likely to achieve France's political objectives.

3. François Mitterrand, *Ici et maintenant* (Paris: Fayard, 1980), pp. 272–3. In 1981, Mitterrand stated that he was the only head of a major political party in France to publicly support Camp David. See interview with the *New York Times*, June 4, 1981.

4. *La politique étrangère de la France*, June 10, 1981, p. 28.

5. *Le Monde*, May 30, 1981.

6. *Le Monde*, December 9, 1981.

TROUBLE IN THE BALANCE

The difficulties in following a policy that purported to be even-handed toward Arab states and Israel quickly became evident. Strong support for the Palestinians and privileged relations with Arafat and the PLO were key elements in France's *politique arabe*. Mitterrand supported the right of the Palestinians to a state and the necessity for Israel both to discontinue the building of settlements and to withdraw from the occupied territories. Contacts between high-ranking French officials and PLO representatives were frequent, and the PLO office in Paris enjoyed official (but not embassy-level) recognition. By meeting with Arafat in Beirut in 1981, Cheysson demonstrated France's concern for the Palestinian cause, gave credibility to the PLO, and acknowledged that the PLO represented (albeit in France's view not solely) the Palestinian people. Furthermore, in December 1981 Cheysson declared that a Palestinian state was inevitable.[7]

France's double friendship was not jeopardized by the Palestinians, but by the Israelis, whose actions served to frustrate the French policy of balance. In early June 1981, Israeli jets bombed and completely destroyed Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor, which was being built with aid from France. (A French technician was killed in the operation.) Although France condemned the raid, it did not wish to alienate Israel to the extent that its goal of rapprochement would be jeopardized. For this reason, France refused to condemn Israel in the United Nations and did not press for sanctions. It judged that the raid was important enough to postpone, but not to cancel, a planned visit to Israel by Mitterrand.

A number of other disturbing events followed the Osiraq raid. In late June 1981, the Israeli Labor Party, which Mitterrand supported, was defeated by Menachem Begin's incumbent Likud Party, which held a more intransigent attitude on the Palestinian issue. The bombing of Beirut by Israeli jets on 18 June and the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981 served only to further strain relations between France and Israel. France strongly condemned both incidents, and once again Mitterrand postponed his trip to Israel to demonstrate his disapproval. He still refused, nevertheless, to abandon the trip altogether. Cheysson observed that "if one is interested in peace in the Middle East . . . it seems to us to be a strange way to promote peace to start with breaking with one of the two parties. . . . "[8] Mitterrand did, however, indicate his disapproval of Israel's actions and at the same time reinforce France's good relations with the Arabs and Palestinians by strongly supporting the Fahd Plan, put forward in August 1981; also, he chose Saudi Arabia rather than Israel for his first presidential visit abroad.[9]

7. *Le Monde*, December 6–7, 1981.
8. *La politique étrangère de la France*, February 20, 1982, p. 48.
9. The Fahd Plan consisted of eight points. Point seven stated that "all states in the region should be able to live in peace," which some interpreted as tacit recognition of the state of Israel.

In addition to the shift in French policy toward better relations with Israel, Mitterrand supported the US effort to create a multinational force to oversee the evacuation of the Sinai according to the provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Participation by the Western Europeans, however, posed a number of problems. On the one hand, Israel was determined that European participation be on the basis of Camp David and not on the basis of either the Fahd Plan or a separate European peace initiative as provided for in the Venice Declaration. On the other hand, the Arabs were also critical of any European role, which, in their view, would legitimize Camp David.

Initial contacts between the United States and the Europeans did not hold out much promise until Mitterrand announced at the Williamsburg Summit, in October 1981, that France would be willing to participate in the multinational force to the Sinai. After the European Political Cooperation meeting in late October 1981, Cheysson announced that both France and Italy had agreed to participate.[10]

Mitterrand's acceptance of a French role dovetailed with his strategy to gain influence in the region by stressing rapprochement with Israel and approval for the step-by-step Camp David process. Equally important was France's desire to support Egypt, particularly in the wake of the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat on October 6, 1981. For these reasons, France was willing to lobby actively in the EC for participation in the multinational force despite general opposition from the Palestinians and the Arab world.

In March 1982, Mitterrand's long-awaited trip to Israel finally took place. The visit gave substance to France's objectives of improving the Franco-Israeli relationship and reasserting French influence in the region. Although following a different route from that of Giscard d'Estaing, who maintained a "Gaullist" distance from Israel and supported a role for the EC, Mitterrand's policy of even-handedness was based, nevertheless, on the same ambition: an independent and active French role in the Middle East. When asked whether his visit signified a change in French foreign policy, Mitterrand responded that "the change is in my presence. . . ."[11]

Despite the emotional appeal of the visit, however, Mitterrand's famous address to the Knesset demonstrated his adherence to supporting both parties to the conflict. After reaffirming the necessity for the Arab states to recognize Israel's right to exist, Mitterrand declared, "Dialogue supposes that each party can obtain its full legal rights, which for the Palestinians as well as for the others can, at the appropriate moment, signify a state."[12] Although Israel did not accept the French view of the Palestinian question, Mitterrand's visit was considered a diplomatic victory for both governments.

10. *Le Monde,* October 28, 1981.

11. *La politique étrangère de la France,* March 4, 1983, p. 62.

12. For the full text of his speech, see François Mitterrand, *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1986), pp. 335–46.

WAR IN LEBANON, 1982–84

The newfound accord between Israel and France proved to be short-lived when Israel launched its invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Mitterrand's initial condemnation of the attack was not categorical, but as the extent of the invasion became clear, and French interests in Lebanon appeared jeopardized, he hardened his position. The new balance in France's policies, it seemed, was not only detrimental to Franco-Arab relations, but also failed to provide France with any influence over Israel. Tensions increased as Mitterrand condemned "without reserve" Israeli actions in Lebanon and opposed the convening of the European Economic Community-Israel Council of Cooperation.

Mitterrand followed these actions with statements designed to demonstrate his disapprobation of Israel: the West Bank must be the center for a future Palestinian state; Arafat was welcome in France and an Arafat-Cheysson meeting would be acceptable; and the killing occurring in Beirut was unacceptable just as had been the massacre at Oradour by the Germans.[13] Contacts between high-level French officials, including Cheysson and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, and PLO officials increased. In turn, Israeli prime minister Begin categorized France as a country where anti-Semitism was rampant and opposed the participation of French forces in a proposed multinational force to evacuate Palestinian fighters from Beirut.

Discussions about the possibility of sending an international force to Lebanon began when the Israeli army first moved beyond its 40-kilometer self-declared "security zone" and advanced to the outskirts of Beirut, where it laid siege to the city, effectively trapping PLO forces and others. Mitterrand, at this point, undertook an active diplomatic role designed to bring about a peace settlement, the withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon and the preservation of the country's integrity, and the protection of the PLO and Arafat. On 24 June, France proposed a UN resolution that called for the simultaneous withdrawal of both Israeli and Palestinian forces from Beirut, a plan that would allow the Palestinian forces trapped in the city to escape. Lebanese armed forces along with a UN force would interpose themselves between the two sides, thus neutralizing the city. The United States vetoed the French proposal in the Security Council.

Undaunted, French and Egyptian officials at the United Nations worked together to draft a Franco-Egyptian initiative that called for a simultaneous Israeli and Palestinian withdrawal, the association of the PLO with negotiations, and the simultaneous and mutual recognition of all parties. Under threat of a US veto, the draft resolution was effectively tabled. Despite disagreement with Washington, France recognized that only the United States could convince the Israelis to allow

13. See statement on Oradour in interview with WAFA, the Palestinian press agency, cited in Albert Bourgi and Pierre Weiss, *Liban: La cinquième guerre du Proche-Orient* (Paris: Editions Publisud, 1983), p. 118.

Palestinian fighters to leave Beirut. For this reason, France supported a plan by US envoy Philip Habib that called for the creation of a multinational force to oversee the evacuation of PLO forces. Under US pressure, Israel finally agreed to French participation. Ultimately, the operation was a success, and the French government achieved two of its major objectives: participation in the operation to support its claim to great power status and the preservation of the moderate PLO faction.

Underlying France's diplomatic activity to protect the Palestinian forces and the PLO was a distinctive analysis of their role. In the French view, the moderate faction of the PLO under Arafat's leadership was in danger of annihilation, and, if eliminated, the leadership could be taken over by radical factions that might resort to terrorism rather than political dialogue. For this reason, the French believed it was imperative to protect the PLO in Beirut as a political force to assure future peace negotiations. In addition, the preservation of Arafat's forces would ensure a French link to the peace process and garner approval from the moderate Arab governments. The same reasoning applied later in November 1983 when Arafat and his forces were surrounded by Syrian troops in Tripoli. In this case, the United States finally agreed with France that the PLO be evacuated under the UN flag with a French naval escort.

Although Mitterrand's government believed it essential to participate in the US-led multinational force to Lebanon, it also recognized that coordination with the United States might undermine its claim to an independent foreign policy in the region. As a result, France supported certain US actions while also following an aggressively independent diplomatic agenda and maintaining a well-publicized distance from US policies with which it did not agree. For example, Mitterrand gave lukewarm support to the September 1982 proposal of President Ronald Reagan that called for full autonomy for the Palestinians in five years but rejected an independent state. Because he was skeptical of the chances for its success and disagreed with Reagan's assessment of the PLO, Mitterrand only said that "the position of Ronald Reagan seems to be oriented in the direction that we have defined."[14] Israel rejected the Reagan Plan, and subsequent events in Lebanon—especially the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila by Lebanese allies of Israel—pushed the plan onto the back burner where it was soon forgotten.

It was over the issue of the Palestinians and the PLO that the French government most ardently sought to distance itself from the United States and Israel. Mitterrand repeatedly stressed that France, the EC, and Egypt and the other Arab nations agreed that the PLO must be preserved. This position was not accepted by Israel nor, at least initially, by the United States. Mitterrand also unsuccessfully attempted to convince the EC to declare the PLO "an essential interlocuteur" for the Palestinians. Cheysson stated that "the Palestinian people

14. *Le Monde*, September 4, 1982.

must have in the negotiations a representative to speak for them. This representative, in our view, is the PLO. This means that the PLO should not be annihilated and dishonored in the wake of the crushing military defeat that has just struck it."[15]

Despite France's strong condemnation of the Israeli invasion, and active diplomacy to save the PLO and find a peaceful solution to the conflict, Franco-US cooperation angered many Arab and Palestinian factions. It soon became clear that France's strategy of emphasizing its own national diplomacy and being selective in its cooperation with the United States would not protect France from Arab charges of Western imperialism. The extent to which Arab factions linked the United States and France became apparent after the multinational force returned to Lebanon in response to the Sabra and Shatila massacres.

Both presidents Mitterrand and Reagan had agreed that the multinational forces should return. Unfortunately for France, however, this led to the perception that it supported the ultimate aims of the US government—the control of Lebanon by the Amin Gemayel government. France had joined the US-sponsored force with very different intentions and perceptions of the Lebanese crisis and the future of the Palestinians. While the Reagan administration analyzed the conflict in East-West terms, France believed regional rivalries were the most important factors in the conflict. In the French view, peace could only be achieved through a national reconciliation between the different factions. In addition, the French government linked the conflict in Lebanon to the Palestinian problem, insisting that one could not be solved without the other.

The first nine months of 1983 were marked by active French diplomacy. A parade of high-ranking French officials traveled to Arab states and Israel, while Mitterrand received numerous heads of state in Paris. Meetings also continued with Arafat and the PLO; Cheysson had met with Arafat in Tunis in October 1982 and again in July 1983. Unfortunately, France's role as mediator was untenable. Arafat refused to accept UN resolution 242, which implied recognition of Israel, and Prime Minister Begin categorically refused to consider any role for the PLO in peace negotiations.

To maintain its distance from the United States, the French government emphasized its support for Palestinian self-determination, the association of the PLO with negotiations, the separateness of commands of the multinational contingents, and its disapproval of the 17 May Israeli-Lebanese accord of 1983. Despite criticisms of US policy, however, France never explicitly disassociated itself from the United States, and the obvious consultation taking place between the two countries added to the perception of French backing of US diplomacy. For example, during a visit to Paris by Secretary of State George Shultz, Mitterrand declared that "the question of the Middle East, including Lebanon,

15. *La politique étrangère de la France,* June 20, 1982, p. 190.

was discussed in depth. The views of Paris and Washington appear very close."[16] US-French cooperation seriously jeopardized France's reputation as an independent player and antagonized many Arabs.[17] As a result, French forces in Lebanon increasingly became the target of attacks by Lebanese militia. Fifty-eight French paratroopers were killed in the truck bombings of October 1983.[18]

The multinational force deployment to Lebanon following the Sabra and Shatila massacres proved to be a disaster for French foreign policy for two reasons. First, it revealed the limits of Mitterrand's policy of "balance"; a position of interlocuteur based on championing the Palestinian cause and becoming Israel's best friend in Western Europe was simply not possible. France did not have the means to demand concessions from either the Arabs or Israelis. Second, France's fundamental foreign policy goal of independence in the Middle East was compromised by its close cooperation with the United States. The dilemma for the French government, however, was that if it did not participate in US-led actions, it might be excluded from the region. By 1984, it became clear that France's trade-off between an active presence and independence had led to a major foreign policy disaster. In March, the French contingent of the multinational force withdrew from Lebanon and Mitterrand backed away from the United States to restore France's independent reputation and to improve relations with the Arab world.

THE PEACE PROCESS, 1984–87: STAGNATION

After the 1984 French withdrawal from Lebanon, Franco-US consultation over Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict diminished considerably; France reasserted its independence and the attention of both countries was diverted to other issues, including terrorism and the Iran-Iraq War. Mitterrand's refusal to allow US planes to enter French airspace on their way to attack Libya in 1986 demonstrated his willingness to oppose US policies that he felt undermined French relations with the Arab world. In addition, France, whose participation in the multinational force gained it the antipathy of Syria and most of the Lebanese factions, expended a great deal of energy on reestablishing good relations in the Arab world. Mitterrand was determined not to let his policy of balance undermine France's politique arabe.

16. *Le Monde,* December 16, 1982.

17. Syria's foreign minister, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, stated that "the role of France beside the Americans reminds us of the time when one practiced 'la politique de la canonnière.' " *Le Monde,* September 28, 1983.

18. See Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsback, *The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982–1984* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991); John MacKinlay, *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), pp. 69–110.

In July 1984, Mitterrand visited King Hussein of Jordan and expressed a preference for direct negotiations between the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but nevertheless also supported the king's appeal for an international conference. In November, he traveled to Syria to meet with President Hafiz al-Asad and restore a working relationship between the two countries. He explained that "there were events that found us on different sides. So you have to decide, do you talk or do you remain frozen in hostility, that is what we have done—establish a dialogue. . . . [T]o the extent that Syria can contribute to ending the Lebanese civil war, who can object."[19]

Cordial relations and numerous meetings between French and PLO officials continued. The link between Mitterrand's government and Arafat had been mutually beneficial. France's privileged ties to a major party to the Arab-Israeli conflict allowed it at least some diplomatic influence, particularly since the United States refused to have any contact with the PLO. In addition, Arafat on numerous occasions used his connections in the Arab world to mediate between the French government and Lebanese groups over French hostages in Lebanon.[20] Arafat gained credibility from the French government's willingness to meet with PLO members and hoped that France would be able to influence the United States and thus, Israel.[21]

The French effort to improve relations with the Arab world coincided with an amelioration of Franco-Israeli ties, which had suffered as a result of the invasion of Lebanon. Israeli elections held in 1984 resulted in a Labor-led national unity government. In the French view, Labor leader Shimon Peres held out the best chance for peace because he accepted the land for peace principle. In December 1984, Peres traveled to Paris to meet Mitterrand, with whom he had developed personal ties through the Socialist International. It was the first official visit by an Israeli leader to France in 20 years. Thereafter, the two leaders consulted regularly, Peres believing that France could play a constructive role in the peace process.[22]

In Peres's two years as prime minister in the national unity government, the peace process proceeded with fits and starts. In February 1985, King Hussein announced a Jordanian-PLO accord based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 and with a provision for an international conference. In October 1985, Peres agreed to a modified version of Hussein's proposal for an international peace conference. Unfortunately, agreement could not be reached over the issue of Palestinian representation, and in 1986, the peace process was dealt two major blows: King

19. *New York Times,* November 29, 1984.

20. For a discussion of Arafat's role, see Pierre Fauvier and Michel Martin-Roland, *La décennie Mitterrand* vol. 2. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991), part 8, chapter 3, pp. 411–51.

21. See Arafat statement in *Le Monde,* March 9, 1985.

22. In one of his numerous trips to Paris, Peres stated that France "could speak to both sides . . . and had earned a lot of confidence in the Arab world and with us." *Le Monde,* October 27, 1985.

Hussein suspended the Amman accord and expelled PLO representatives from Jordan, and Yitzhak Shamir became prime minister of Israel.

Although Shamir opposed the land for peace principle and the concept of an international conference, French policy throughout these developments concentrated on actively consulting with all parties, supporting the regional peace initiatives, and persuading all sides that compromise was essential.[23] Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas met numerous times with Peres, King Hussein, Shamir, Arafat, and Egyptian president Husni Mubarak but failed to break the numerous deadlocks among the many different parties.

By the beginning of 1987, with the peace process stagnant, the French government endorsed strongly the idea of an international peace conference. On February 23, 1987, the foreign ministers of the EC (supported by France) released a declaration calling for an international conference to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, in an address to the Israeli Knesset, also pressed for an international conference that would bring together the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the interested parties. He carefully added that the outside powers would not have the power to arbitrate, but could guarantee any solution reached in the negotiations.[24]

Although the French stressed on numerous occasions that the international conference would not impose a solution on the parties involved, Israel remained unconvinced. Shamir adamantly opposed an international conference that in his view did not oblige the Arabs to acknowledge the existence of Israel and distanced them from bilateral negotiations with the Israeli government. Equally important was his belief that an international conference held under UN auspices would be highly disadvantageous to Israel, given the positions of the majority of its members regarding the conflict.

To a large degree, the French and EC initiatives reflected their concern over a stagnating peace process that might lead to regional instability. In their view, an international conference might fill the vacuum caused by US disinterest in the peace process—the US government was embroiled in the Iran-contra scandal—and Shamir's hard-line policies toward the Palestinians. In addition, France's permanent membership in the UN Security Council would allow it, in Mitterrand's words, to "tenir son rang." Despite France's active diplomacy, its ability to shape the debate or push the peace process forward was limited by its lack of leverage over any of the parties. By 1988, Shamir's extremist policies toward the Palestinians and the intifada had alienated the French government. As a result, France once again placed emphasis on its relationship with the PLO.

23. *Le Monde*, March 10, 1985.
24. *Le Monde*, November 3, 1987.

ARAFAT AND THE PALESTINIANS, 1987–1990

The intifada returned the Palestinian issue to the top of the international agenda, and the repressive Israeli response helped shift international support in favor of the Palestinians. It also served as a catalyst for King Hussein to sever in July 1988 all legal and administrative ties to the West Bank. Hussein's decision, in turn, removed the Jordanian option from the political agenda and galvanized the PLO leadership. After a great deal of debate, Arafat launched a diplomatic initiative that reinvigorated the peace process and led to US-Palestinian consultations.

The French government responded to the intifada and Arafat's diplomatic offensive by engaging in a more active diplomacy. Angered by Israel's intransigence and oppressive measures in the occupied territories, the French government emphasized its support for the rights of the Palestinians and adopted a harder line toward Israel. The French representative at the United Nations continually voiced opposition to Israeli expulsions and beatings of Palestinians and to Palestinian deaths. France voted in favor of Security Council resolutions that condemned Israel's violations of the 1949 Geneva convention that called for the respect of the civilian populations in territories occupied as a result of war. Mitterrand, in an interview on Israeli television, sharply criticized Israel's handling of the intifada: "[T]his daily killing . . . has become insupportable, unacceptable."[25] He called for an international conference.

During Israeli president Chaim Herzog's visit to Paris in October 1988, Mitterrand again stressed the right of the Palestinians to a patrie where they could build the structures of a state. He also supported Israel's right to exist and called for the convening of an international conference. A Shamir visit to Paris in February 1989 was fruitless given that Israel continued to reject negotiations with any member of the PLO, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and the convening of an international conference.

Mitterrand's sharp criticism of Israel was accompanied by a show of support for Arafat and the PLO and by several disputes with the United States. In January 1988, the French government decided to upgrade the PLO bureau to "délégation générale de Palestine." Arafat's meeting with Foreign Minister Dumas in September 1988, after Arafat addressed the European Parliament, was also an important gesture of support. Although Dumas repeated France's long-standing position of security for Israel and the right of the Palestinians to choose their own destiny, it was clear that he wished to emphasize that the PLO and Arafat were, in the French view, valid interlocuteurs. Arafat's declaration of independence for the State of Palestine in November 1988 was given greater credibility by Mitterrand's statement of support. Although he did not extend diplomatic recognition, Mitterrand explained that, in principle, he had no objections but that

25. *Le Monde*, February 27, 1988.

recognition must be founded on independent authority with control over the territory and population, a criterion that had not been satisfied.[26]

As the Mitterrand government sought to encourage Arafat and the PLO to further moderate their position, France clashed with US policies that favored Israel. Not only did the United States veto in 1988 almost all UN Security Council resolutions that condemned Israeli practices in the occupied territories, but the Reagan administration also vetoed a resolution in February that had called for an international conference. Prime Minister Chirac strongly criticized the decision, declaring that the veto represented a "bad appreciation of things on the part of the United States."[27] In December, Mitterrand harshly criticized Secretary of State Shultz's 29 November decision to deny Arafat a visa to address the United Nations; as a result, Mitterrand supported the decision to hold the session in Geneva to allow Arafat to speak.[28] It was not until the US decision to open talks with the PLO on 14 December that France found anything positive to say about US actions.

Of all France's gestures of support for Arafat, perhaps most important was Mitterrand's face-to-face meeting with him on May 2, 1989. Dumas explained that Arafat's acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338, his explicit recognition of Israel, and his renunciation of all forms of terrorism (as stated at a press conference in Geneva on December 14, 1988), had satisfied France's conditions for an invitation. France also made it clear that the invitation was contingent on a clarification of Arafat's position on the Palestinian National Charter that called for the destruction of Israel. On the first day of his visit to Paris, Arafat announced that the charter was *caduc,* null and void.[29]

For the French government, the decision to meet Arafat was based on several considerations. First, it wished to confirm the PLO's recognition of Israel, and its renunciation of terrorism and the Palestinian National Charter, and encourage further moderation. Second, Arafat's reception in Paris would provide him with greater international recognition and respectability, which was particularly important in light of the Reagan administration's decision to open talks with the PLO in late December 1988. Third, the meeting served to increase French and European pressure on Israel to enter into talks with the PLO and on Arafat to consider the Shamir government's May 1989 peace initiative that included Palestinian elections in the occupied territories.

Despite strong criticism from the Israeli government and some members of the French Jewish community, Mitterrand stood firm, stating that his decision to host Arafat did not mark a change in French foreign policy, but was in line with his speech given in Israel in 1982. He pointed out that not only did he support the security of Israel, but also the right of the Palestinians to a patrie. He voiced his

26. *Le Monde,* November 24, 1988.
27. *Le Monde,* February 6, 1988.
28. *Le Monde,* December 2, 1988.
29. *Le Monde,* May 5, 1989.

skepticism concerning Shamir's proposal for free elections because their authenticity could be jeopardized by the presence of the Israeli military. He ended with a firm warning: "And you see, the foreign policy of France, it is decided in Paris, it is decided here, it does not depend on others. . . . France does not live under a protectorate and will not let anyone dictate her decisions. This holds true for this affair, as well as for others."[30]

Arafat had supported strongly France's proposals for an international conference under UN auspices and stated on numerous occasions that France should play an important role in the peace process.[31] Clearly, the French government believed that its own status in the Middle East would be enhanced if Arafat and the PLO achieved greater credibility as the key organization representing the Palestinians. Mitterrand further assisted Arafat in his search for credibility in April 1990 by hosting talks between former US president Jimmy Carter and Arafat in Paris. Despite French diplomacy, it remained clear that only the new US presidential administration of George Bush had the power to move the peace process forward.

As the United States began to pursue negotiations more vigorously, France found itself once again on the sidelines. The Bush administration did not favor an international conference, preferring instead direct talks between the parties, a position that effectively marginalized Paris.[32] Nevertheless, the active diplomacy conducted by the French government and the Mitterrand-Arafat meeting did serve in the short-run to enhance France's "presence" in the Middle East peace process. In the long run, however, the political benefits for France were limited because the Israeli-Palestinian issue was completely overshadowed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND THE MADRID CONFERENCE, 1990–92

Although Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not linked initially to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, the two conflicts quickly became connected after Saddam Hussein stated that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait must be accompanied by an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Mitterrand, while demanding that Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, did agree that all the problems in the region were interlinked and should be addressed simultaneously through an international conference.[33] This perception formed the basis of France's peace

30. For the full text of the press conference, see *Le Monde*, May 20, 1989.
31. See for example the interview with Arafat in *L'Express*, April 28, 1989.
32. *Le Monde*, November 17, 1988.
33. For an analysis of France and the Persian Gulf War, see Pia Christina Wood, "François Mitterrand and the Persian Gulf War: The Search for Influence," *French Politics and Society* 11, no. 3 (Summer 1992).

initiatives throughout the crisis and led, once again, to major disagreements with the United States.

For the French government, the Persian Gulf crisis presented the international community with an opportunity to make progress on solving other regional problems, including the Palestinian issue. France undertook a diplomatic effort to keep the ideas of a linkage between the two conflicts and an international conference alive. At the same time, a strong French commitment to an international conference, sharply opposed by the United States, reflected both France's independent foreign policy and its politique arabe.

To underline the French *différence* and to demonstrate France's commitment to solving the gamut of regional problems, Mitterrand proposed his own peace plan in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1990. In stage three of his four-part plan, he called for dialogue between the parties—Lebanese, Palestinians, and Israelis—involved in other Middle East problems. Although the phrase international conference was not mentioned, the implication was clear.[34] As expected, the United States, Great Britain, and Israel reacted with hostility to what they perceived to be linkage, an attitude that eventually prevented the acceptance of the French peace plan (or any subsequent version) at the United Nations.

As the crisis unfolded, the international conference became a major point of contention between France and the United States. Washington's intransigence over this issue completely frustrated the French. While agreeing that no link should be made between an Iraqi withdrawal and an Israeli withdrawal, Mitterrand believed that the opportunity to settle other problems in the region should be seized. The differing viewpoints led to increased tensions between the two governments and bitter remarks. Mitterrand acidly commented that "France is a faithful friend, but nobody dictates to her. . . . I respect Mr. Bush but I do not feel myself to be in the position of a second-class private obliged to obey his commander-in-chief."[35]

As the deadline for Iraq's withdrawal approached, Mitterrand attempted a last-ditch effort to avoid war and realize one of his major objectives—the international conference. On January 14, 1991, he proposed a draft resolution in the United Nations that was divided into two distinct sections to resolve the debate over linkage.[36] As expected, Washington still considered the proposal to include linkage and, therefore, refused to discuss the plan at all. Faced with US opposition and Iraq's complete lack of interest, the French initiative died.

During the war, the Franco-US disagreement over the international conference and the Arab-Israeli peace process was put on the back burner as priority was given to defeating Iraq. It was clear that one of Mitterrand's major reasons for

34. For full text of the plan, see *Le Monde*, September 28, 1990.
35. *Le Monde*, January 6–7, 1991.
36. *Washington Post*, January 15, 1991.

participating in the multinational coalition was to obtain a voice in the peace process that would follow the end of the war. With Iraq's surrender, however, France clashed again with the United States over the international peace conference and the role of Arafat and the PLO.

France's support for Arafat and the PLO remained strong both during and after the Persian Gulf crisis. Although the French government disapproved of Arafat's show of support for Saddam Hussein, it recognized that Arafat had a difficult choice to make given Hussein's popularity among many Palestinians. Hussein's linkage and his consistent references to double standards had returned the Palestinian question to center stage, an opportunity Arafat felt he could not ignore. In addition, Arafat's link to Hussein was considered to be one path that the French government might use to defuse the crisis. Arafat met both Cheysson and Dumas to discuss the issue of Western hostages in Iraq and ways to avoid war.[37]

With the end of the war, Mitterrand moved quickly to convince the United States that the PLO was still the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and must be consulted in all negotiations. At a March 1991 meeting held in Martinique between presidents Mitterrand and Bush, Mitterrand not only reiterated his support for Arafat and the PLO but also reminded Bush that UN resolutions called for both a state of Israel and an independent Palestine: "It would be historically absurd to refuse a people all form of identity."[38]

Mitterrand's intervention on behalf of the PLO was accompanied by his support, albeit lukewarm, for the US-sponsored peace process based on direct bilateral negotiations in a regional conference. In fact, France had little choice. Although support for the US proposals did not guarantee a role for France or Europe in the peace process, a lack of support certainly would end any possible participation. As a result, Mitterrand affirmed that France would do everything to facilitate US secretary of state James Baker's peace initiatives as long as UN resolutions and the rights of the Palestinians were recognized. For France, the key to possible influence remained Arafat and the PLO.

Recognizing that Arafat and the PLO might be excluded from all aspects of the negotiations, Dumas met with the PLO leader in April 1991, despite an EC decision to freeze all contact with high-level PLO officials. The Dumas-Arafat meeting was held for several reasons: to restore some credibility to Arafat and the PLO as valid representatives of the Palestinians; to present France as the intermediary between the PLO and the United States; and, to avoid being left out

37. Josette Alia and Christine Clerc, *La guerre de Mitterrand: la dernière grande illusion* (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1991), pp. 54–9, 133–5. When Iraq announced that it would free all French hostages, numerous charges were made that France had made a separate deal. This was denied by the French government. Arafat announced that he had been France's envoy. See the Arafat interview, *L'Express*, November 23, 1990, p. 19.

38. *Le Monde*, March 16, 1991. He also stated, "Yasser Arafat remains to my knowledge the head of the PLO and the PLO to my knowledge a representative organization."

of the diplomacy of the peace process at a time that the United States was clearly leading the way.[39]

Despite French support for the PLO and greater international acceptance of Arafat throughout 1991, the major stumbling block for France continued to be Israel's rejection of either French or European participation in a regional conference. Franco-Israeli relations, in particular, had reached a new low following a series of acrimonious exchanges. In response to the October 1990 shooting deaths of Palestinians on the Haram al-Sharif, France supported strong condemnation of Israel at the United Nations. This position, combined with meetings between French officials and Arafat, and French insistence on an international conference under UN auspices, antagonized Israel. In turn, Israel accused France of having helped Iraq modify its Scud missiles to hit Israel, and rejected both an international conference and French-European participation in any peace negotiations.

The formation of the new right-wing Likud government in June 1991, with its championing of "Greater Israel," did little to improve Franco-Israeli relations.[40] As Bush and Baker increased their pressure on Israel to attend a peace conference, France confined its diplomacy to supporting the United States, encouraging PLO moderation, and demanding EC participation. Despite Israel's acceptance of EC representative Hans Van den Broek as an observer at the October 1991 Madrid conference, both the EC and France remained outside the negotiations.

Between the Madrid conference and the June 1992 elections in Israel, only limited progress was recorded in the peace negotiations. French support for the US-led process continued, but without any appreciable enthusiasm. Dumas agreed to Baker's proposal to set up multilateral negotiations on such issues as refugees, security and arms control, distribution of water resources, regional economic development, and the environment, but insisted that any meetings between Arabs and Israelis be only preparatory in nature. In Dumas's view, substantial progress in the bilateral talks, which appeared unlikely under Shamir's government, was a prerequisite for any multilateral negotiations.[41] French pessimism over the stagnating peace talks disappeared in the wake of the Labor Party's electoral victory. Mitterrand sent congratulatory messages to new prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and new foreign minister Shimon Peres. The French government was particularly pleased by the appointment of Peres, a known Europeanist. His close ties to France held out the possibility for a greater French role in the peace process.

At the express invitation of Bush, bilateral peace talks reconvened in Washington on August 24, 1992. By mid-September there was cautious optimism

39. See comments by Dumas, *Le Monde,* April 24, 1991.
40. See comments by Foreign Minister Dumas, *Le Monde,* July 2, 1991.
41. *Le Monde,* November 5, 1992.

that agreements could be reached between both Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and Syria. Neither French nor European representatives were at the discussions. Even in the multilateral talks, France and the EC had been unable to assert any appreciable influence. On 9–11 September, Peres, who supported augmenting the importance of the multilateral talks and creating a ministerial-level steering committee, visited Paris and suggested that Dumas use his influence to gain Syrian participation. France, ambitious to play a greater role in the peace process, readily agreed. Dumas secretly visited Syria on 14 September but was unable to convince Asad to attend multilateral talks.[42]

Despite this setback, Dumas declared that France would try to play a useful role. "You heard Mr. Peres in Paris, and Israeli leaders, call on France to play a role in the [Middle East] conflict. It's true that today new things are happening in the peace process. Everywhere that France can be useful it will try to be."[43] The United States, however, considered the French initiative unhelpful interference and complained to Rabin. He, in turn, reproved the initiative and made it clear that only the US-sponsored negotiations in Washington were valid: "All sorts of mediators aren't relevant to the negotiations and aren't authorized to speak in Israel's name."[44] Thus, Mitterrand was no more successful than his predecessors in overcoming the limits inherent in France's Middle East policy, and France's absence from the negotiating table in Madrid in 1991 and again in Washington in 1992 underlined this continuing problem of securing an important role in the Middle East peace process.[45]

CONCLUSION

Over the past decade, Mitterrand's attempts to make France a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process met with numerous problems. Perhaps most important was Israel's hostility toward a French role because of France's strong friendship with Arab countries and its outspoken support for the Palestinian cause. France also lacked the economic and political power to convince either the PLO or a reluctant Israel to begin serious negotiations. The United States remained the only country able to influence Israel, which meant that the peace process could move forward only when a US administration was fully engaged. Finally, active US diplomacy made it necessary for France to support the United States or risk being completely marginalized.

Recognizing these problems and constraints, the Mitterrand government followed a nuanced strategy, searching for compromises that would satisfy all the key players. This approach, however, was inherently flawed. The Likud party, bitterly opposed to any negotiations with the PLO or land for peace, refused to

42. *Washington Post,* September 20, 1992.
43. *Washington Times,* September 16, 1992.
44. *Washington Post,* September 20, 1992.
45. For Mitterrand's assessment of France's non-role, see *Le Monde,* October 23, 1991.

countenance any role for France. Ironically, in light of Mitterrand's early overtures to Israel, it soon became apparent that France's strongest link to the peace process was Arafat and the PLO.

Franco-US relations also ebbed and flowed, reflecting different approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Mitterrand cooperated with the United States during major crises—Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War—in order to protect France's status as a great power, but, after 1984, he strongly criticized the United States for not supporting a peace process based on an international conference under UN auspices. Despite international and Palestinian support for the latter, the United States insisted on bilateral talks in the context of a regional conference. Thus, the Madrid conference and the subsequent peace negotiations held in Washington highlighted France's difficulty in resisting US dominance in the peace process.

It may be tempting to characterize Mitterrand's policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a failure, but a more careful evaluation of the relative success or failure of French policy reveals a mixed picture. Certainly Mitterrand's strategy to play a key mediating role in the peace process was largely unsuccessful. Mitterrand, like his predecessors, however, can claim legitimately to have maintained a strong presence despite obvious limitations imposed on France by virtue of its middle-power status. France's willingness to support and "legitimize" Arafat and the PLO cannot be dismissed in assessing Arafat's long march to recognizing Israel, accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338, renouncing all forms of terrorism, and approving Palestinian participation at the Madrid conference. In fact, Mitterrand's support for the rights of the Palestinians, self-determination, and a Palestinian state helped keep it in the forefront of international issues. In this sense French foreign policy can be considered a success.

Mitterrand occasionally sought to use EC diplomacy to support French policies in the Middle East, and despite French support for the participation of the EC in the recent peace negotiations, the history of European political cooperation in the Middle East suggests that a common foreign policy or a European identity remains elusive. Member governments, particularly France, continue to bypass the EC in order to pursue national foreign policies. At best, the EC will continue to participate as an observer in the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

The Persian Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the June 1992 elections in Israel have provided a new state of affairs in the Middle East, and one that is already showing signs of influencing the peace process. Although the future of French relations with Israel, the PLO, and the United States is uncertain, recent history offers some clues. Franco-Israeli relations have already improved because of Labor's 1992 victory. Closer ties, however, are not likely to open the door to a significantly greater role for France.

In late November 1992, Mitterrand visited Israel for the second time and held talks with Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Rabin. Although he supported

Israel's proposals for elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and promised to propose a $1.23 billion EC fund for economic development projects in the region, Mitterrand reaffirmed his support for the PLO and a Palestinian state. "I seem to recall that a Palestinian state was recognized by the United Nations at the same time as Israel was created. . . . [Palestine] has the same right [as Israel]."[46]

As in the past, the United States and Israel agree that the Europeans do not need to play a significant role in the peace negotiations. In addition, the civil war in Yugoslavia has diverted the attention of France and the EC away from the Middle East—a situation that is unlikely to change in the near future. French support of the US-led peace process will also continue as long as some progress is recorded. Mitterrand has stated that he supports the current negotiations, but will almost certainly return to the idea of an international conference if the peace process stagnates or if the Clinton administration proves less committed to the present path.

Mitterrand's strong support for Arafat and the moderate faction of the PLO is the most likely constant. Throughout the 1991–92 negotiations, France maintained discreet ties to the PLO, which it believes eventually must be allowed to participate directly in the peace process. For example, Palestinian leader Faisal al-Husseini has met with Roland Dumas, and Ahmad Kurei, director of the PLO's economic department, held talks with Serge Boidevaix, the secretary-general of the Quai d'Orsay. Political support also has been accompanied by financial support; in 1992, Paris allocated 13 million francs for technical and cultural cooperation with the occupied territories.[47] The French government's support for chairman Arafat remains a key element in its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His brush with death in the Libyan desert in April 1991, however, and the infighting between Fatah and HAMAS in the Gaza Strip in 1992 raise concerns that France's relations with the Palestinians might be too narrowly dependent on Arafat and the Fatah organization.



46. *Washington Times,* November 27, 1992.
47. *Le Monde,* July 25, 1992.

PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY AND STATE AMONG LEBANON'S DRUZE YOUTH

Judith P. Harik

LEBANON'S Druze minority is well known for its assertive behavior whenever its autonomous rights are jeopardized by the central authorities. Repeatedly they have compensated for a lack of numbers with solidarity and a military prowess that have permitted them to play important political roles, often to the discomfort of the governments under which they have lived. When, in recent times, Druze-led forces opposed Maronite Christian political domination, their actions were seen as yet another demonstration of the Druze's uncompromising championship of parochial prerogatives. The extra-legal civil administration established in the Druze heartland in 1983, after a victorious but ruinous battle with the Maronite Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese army, is still functioning, albeit at a reduced level. The civil administration seemed to exemplify the time-honored Druze pattern of withdrawal, seclusion, and self-reliance in the face of a hostile environment.

Although other Lebanese communities also established their own versions of "the state," the Druze's behavior, along with the closed and secretive nature of their confessional group, raises doubts about their eventual assimilation into the modern state. With the spread of governmental authority—although still exceedingly spotty—to the Druze canton,[1] it seems appropriate to ask to what degree this minority's assertiveness can be channeled toward cooperation and dialogue with other groups to restructure Lebanon's sectarian political system. Since it is

1. From 1983 to 1991, Druze police and militia patrolled Druze areas, gathering taxes and collecting road tolls, which went to the extra-legal Druze civil administration that provided public services. See Judith Harik, "Change and Continuity in the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983–1990," forthcoming in *Middle Eastern Studies*.

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reasonable to assume that the Druze will have considerable political impact on the reconciliation process, it seems important to assess their political views and values after the prolonged civil war, the extent to which they actually identify with the state, and the political roles they might play in the future.

The literature about the Druze cite three factors that have contributed to an erosion of their traditional particularism: the Druze's promotion of their Arab roots in order to legitimize their entry into the mainstream Arab nationalist movement that emerged in Syria in the 1920s[2]; espousal of various nationalisms and ideologies after the independence of the particular nation-states in which they resided[3]; and adaptation to the political institutions and socioeconomic forces of the new states. Kais Firro sees the last as the major factor determining new Druze attitudes, identities, and values.[4] If Druze perspectives and values offer evidence of the impact of these variables, have these factors also eroded traditional "Druzism" as Firro affirms? If so, how will the Druze's present and future participation in Lebanese politics be affected?

METHODOLOGY

Data relevant to the Druze's political perceptions was gathered from April 7 to May 15, 1991, by use of a questionnaire containing structured and open-ended questions. It was administered to 325 male Druze high school students enrolled in the senior classes of all but two of the high schools in the districts of Alay, al-Shuf, and al-Matn in the province of Jabal Lubnan.[5] Most empirical studies focusing on communal values and political behavior in Lebanon have sampled students in the large, urban universities that enroll the nation's elite.[6] Because this study concerns a close-knit, rural mountain community, it was felt that a more

2. See Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 151–67; Kamal S. Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London: I.B. Taurus and Company, 1988), pp. 48–56, 214.

3. See Annie and Laurent Chabry, *Politique et minorités au Proche-Orient: les raisons d'une explosion* (Politics and minorities in the Near East: The causes of an explosion) (Paris: Editions Maisonneuve and Larose, 1984), pp. 211–12.

4. Kais Firro, "The Druze in and between Syria, Lebanon and Israel," in Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, eds., *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 185–7.

5. The objective was to cover as many schools as possible in order not to sacrifice representativeness. It was, therfore, deemed necessary to limit the scope of the study to one sex because of the limitations of financial resources. It is presumed, however, that girls of the same age group would share values similar to those of their brothers and cousins.

The two schools omitted could not be sampled because of time constraints. Since telephone communications were lacking in most towns and villages, scheduling appointments was impossible, necessitating several visits to each institution.

6. See for example Nafhat Nasr and Monte Palmer, "Alienation and Political Participation in Lebanon," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8 (1977); Hilal Khashan, "The Revival of Pan-Arabism," *Orbis* (Winter 1991); idem, "The Political Values of Lebanese Maronites," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4 (December 1990).

representative sample could be obtained by including students in both the public and private schools in the geographical areas where the Druze are concentrated.

Private schools in Lebanon tend to attract more middle and upper income students, while lower class students generally attend the public schools. Although statistics on the current class composition of the Druze community are not available, one study on class formation among the Druze of Mount Lebanon revealed that the upper class, composed of landowners and entrepreneurs, remains small; it also estimated that a petite bourgeoisie, primarily composed of small shopkeepers and producers, makes up more than 50 percent of the population.[7] The study on which this article is based—for which information was collected on the 325 respondents' economic status, based on fathers' occupations—reveals the following class distribution: upper, 9.5 percent (30 respondents); middle, 50.5 percent (159 respondents); lower 40 percent (126 respondents). The lower class is not fully represented because a larger proportion of students in this class drop out of school before graduating to take up various trades.

When the above results were correlated with attendance at private or public schools the results generally conformed to the expected pattern: 84 percent of low income and 75 percent of middle income respondents were in the free public schools, while only 15 percent of low and 25 percent of middle income respondents were enrolled in private schools. A different trend, however, was found among upper income students. Of the 30 upper income students, 66 percent (20 students) were enrolled in public schools. An investigation into the matter revealed that half the upper income students were enrolled in the Ba'aqlin public school, a model school with good library and laboratory facilities updated by the Druze civil administration's Education Committee. The other 10 upper income students had no private schools in the area of their residence; transportation inconveniences and security risks might also have been factors influencing families to keep their children in public schools near home instead of sending them to private schools farther away. Despite this unexpected trend among higher income respondents, when a father's occupation and the school attended were cross tabulated, chi-square was .03499 at the 0.05 level of significance, revealing a high correlation between these indicators of socioeconomic status.

The contextual and methodological problems generally familiar to the conduct of survey research in Arab countries occurred during this study. The location and nature of the research made it necessary to contact Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) officials regarding the project and its aims. Because this author had been conducting research on the party's civil administration in the Alay, al-Shuf, and al-Matn areas for several years, and had established a cooperative relationship with officials, it was assumed that few, if any, problems would arise. The

7. Nazi Richani, "The Druze of Mount Lebanon: Class Formation in a Civil War," *Middle East Report*, January-February 1990, pp. 27–30.

head of the PSP's Education Committee, however, objected to a question designed to determine respondents' clan origin—either Junblati or Yazbaki.[8]

Most scholars today regard these clans as superficial identities manipulated by both Druze *zu'ama* for political purposes and by clan clients for favors. During the war years, however, the Junblats stressed community unity and played down clan divisions. Recent Syrian efforts to promote Yazbaki leader Talal Arslan apparently were taken very seriously by PSP leader Walid Junblat, who includes members of the rival clan among his closest associates.[9] Because of the obvious sensitivity of this topic, it was thought best to withdraw the question on clan origin rather than antagonize helpful officials. Since the survey was not based on random or selective sampling of schools, but on coverage as complete as possible of all the schools in Druze areas, it is reasonable to conclude that the proportion of Yazbakis and Junblatis surveyed were consistent with clan divisions in the local population.

One of the problems encountered by researchers conducting behavioral studies in the Middle East concerns Arab cultural norms that compel friendliness and hospitality to strangers. Thus, answers to survey questions may be provided, but they may not always be honest. In addition, the Druze are known to be adept in *taqiyya,* or dissimulation, which they historically practiced on outsiders as a means of individual and group protection. Special care was taken, therefore, to improve the chances of valid responses. It was assumed that respondents would be more open and honest if the survey was administered by people from their own community. Thus, the fieldworkers trained to administer the questionnaire were Druze graduate students who were assisted by one of the teachers in each school. Although this author often accompanied them, she generally did not attend the polling session. By eliminating the novelty of a foreign presence, it was hoped that a more familiar and relaxed atmosphere would prevail, thus encouraging seriousness and cooperation.

Although the views of the young people sampled cannot be assumed to represent those of the entire community, their ideas and values reasonably can be construed to fall within the mainstream, given the community's cohesive nature and the importance of family-transmitted values. As such, the sample comprises an acceptable cross-section of the Druze community for the purposes of this study.

8. For the origins of the Junblati-Yazbaki division, see Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), pp. 9–11, and Faris Ishtai, *Al-Hizb al-Taqaddumi al-Ishtiraki wa dawruh fi al-siyasa al-Lubnaniyya, 1949–1975* (The Progressive Socialist Party and its role in Lebanese politics, 1949–1975), vol. 1 (Al-Mukhtarah: Al-Dar al-Taqaddumiyya, 1989), pp. 57–9.

9. All parliamentary representatives associated with Walid Junblat are Yazbakis, as are most of his closest advisors.

WHO ARE THE DRUZE?

Although the Druze are an Islamic sect, their faith radically departs from orthodox Islam in its doctrine of transmigration of souls (*tanasukh*), its rejection of prayer, fasting, and holy days (except for al-Adha), its lack of shrines and places of worship, and its notion that the community owes devotion to its imam rather than to a secular leader.[10] The Fatimid Shi'i establishment viewed such tenets as subversive and close to heresy and, therefore, ruthlessly suppressed the Druze. Forced underground, they closed the sect to outsiders not long after its founding. This move probably contributed to the feeling of distinctiveness that seems to preclude, for the most part, Druze assimilation of external religious and social ideologies.[11] According to Robert Betts, the Druze's sense of separateness is central to their beliefs and has kept them apart from other communities by preference. Except for about 1 percent of the elite male population, Betts estimates that interaction with other groups has been minimal.[12] Indeed, in areas of Druze concentration, a large majority of villages are inhabited only by Druze; a minority of Druze live in villages that also include Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, and Sunni Muslims. This clustering has sustained their relatively continuous social distance from others, and is believed to play a primary role in the maintenance of the territorial, social, and political separateness of the community. The custom of endogamous marriage also perpetuates the Druze social system, because, by marrying within the extended family and prohibiting marriage outside the sect, political and communal solidarity can be sustained.[13]

In addition to these characteristics, Albert Hourani found that the Druze were the most "compactly" organized of the Lebanese communities, not only because of their enduring feudal structure with its gradation of ranks, but also because of the organization of their religious institutions.[14] The Council of Initiates, or Uqqal, which heads the religious hierarchy, was organized in the fifteenth century, and continues to unite the Druze under its spiritual guidance. The religious institution, however, is subordinate to the politically powerful leaders of the dominant clans, whose legitimacy remains ascriptive.[15]

10. Sami Makarem, *The Druze Faith* (New York: Caravan Books, 1974), p. 11. Also see idem, "The Hidden Imams of the Ismailis," *al-Abhath* 21 (June 1969); idem, *Adwa' ala maslak al-tawhid* (Insights on unitarian philiosophy) (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1966); and Abbas Abu Salih and Sami Makarem, *Tarikh al-Muwahhidin al-Duruz al-siyasi* (The political history of the Unitarian Druze) (Beirut: Al-Majlis al-Durzi li al-Buhuth wa al-Inma', 1973).

11. Randa Aboul-Hosn, "National Political Ideologies and Communal Identity among the Druze in Lebanon" (Master's thesis, American University of Beirut, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, 1989).

12. Robert Brenton Betts, *The Druze* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 36.

13. Najwa Alamuddin and Paul Starr, *Crucial Bonds: Marriage among the Druze* (New York: Caravan Books, 1980), p. 35.

14. Albert Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 67–8.

15. Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*, p. 229.

TABLE 1
Preferred Self-Identity Group

	1ST n = 258*	2ND n = 254	3RD n = 280	4TH n = 266	5TH n = 232	Total	Rank
Druze Community	33	6	11	6	1	57	1
International Socialists	26	7	11	5	2	51	2
Lebanese Society	17	13	7	6	2	45	3
Arab Nation	19	15	3	7	1	44	4
Greater Syria	6	9	4	1	13	30	5

The procedure used in developing the ranking is as follows: percentages indicated in the output were weighted by the order of respondent's choice as listed in the questionnaire. The first choice was given 100 percent; second, 50 percent; third, 33.5 percent; fourth, 25 percent; and fifth, 20 percent. These weighted percentages were then added to develop what is referred to as total weighted percentage upon which the ranking is based in this table.
*n = number of respondents

Although few Druze laymen know details of the faith, the community is sustained spiritually by moral and ethical precepts that encourage the protection and nurturing of its bonds, thus, ensuring its survival in hostile environments. Among the seven principles of the faith are truthfulness to a member, mutual aid, protection of a fellow Druze—even if he or she is unknown or distant, and individual support for the community in times of danger.[16] The Druze are also exhorted to promote fellowship among themselves and to extend hospitality to each other in order to vitalize community bonds. The wealthy are advised to care for the poor, who at the same time are instructed not to take undue advantage of those who help them. This structure of taking care of one's own enhances group cohesion and limits outside interference. The Druze also are well known for their cultural associations that promote awareness of their Druze heritage. In addition, there are at least five major Druze charitable societies in Lebanon.[17] Junblat's PSP and the civil administration both provide educational and medical aid, small loans, and other assistance to needy persons.

Further evidence of Druze solidarity is provided by Samir Khalaf's 1969 study of Lebanese family associations, organizations that provide direction and support for formerly close-knit families suffering the disassociative effects of urbanization and secularization. The Druze apparently were less affected by these trends than other groups, so they established few such associations; they also appeared later among the Druze than they did among other sects. According to Khalaf, the reason for the small presence of these associations among the Druze,

16. Nejla Abu-Ezzedin, *The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith and Society,* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), pp. 123–4.
17. Aboul-Hosn, "National and Political Ideologies," p. 18.

TABLE 2
Group Affinities

	1ST n = 235*	2ND n = 238	3RD n = 238	4TH n = 251	5TH n = 240	Total	Rank
Druze of Lebanon	34	15	3	3	3	57	1
Lebanese Arab Nationalists	32	9	8	6	4	51	2
Christian	11	14	9	2	5	41	3
Muslim	7	4	20	7	1	38	4
Middle East Druze	17	8	5	7	7	31	5

See Table 1 for procedure used to develop rankings.
*n = number of respondents

is that "they are comparatively more cohesive and clannish and their primordial structure is sustained by stronger primordial affinities."[18]

Few of the above characteristics and affinities typify only the Druze community, but there is little doubt that the Druze do possess a better preserved, less urbanized, and more traditional local peasant culture than some of their neighbors. If their cohesion and solidarity promote inwardness, exclusivity, and reinforce older values, as suggested in the scholarly literature, it seems unlikely that modern identities, values, and political attitudes could take deep root among them.

Several dimensions of the Druze community were drawn from the characteristics presented above and incorporated into the survey questionnaire so that the intensity of the respondents' awareness or attachment to them could be measured. These elements include Druze identity, Druze consciousness, group cohesiveness and solidarity, intergroup perception, and group political values. Respondents' perceptions and values can be considered remarkably consistent since no significant correlations were found for father's occupation, mother's sect, school attended, or length of time resident in Druze areas to their relationship to group values and attitudes, despite the fact that the data obtained were subjected to repeated manipulations.

Druze Identity

An individual's perceived membership in various groups and the importance he or she attributes to it reveals considerable information about self-identity. Respondents, therefore, were asked to rank in terms of the priority of their attachment a number of groups that the literature specifies as being particularly important to the Druze. (See tables 1 and 2.) Their responses were weighted to

18. Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 174.

reflect the results of the ranking process. The primacy of Druze identification is validated in both tables, calling to mind Khalaf's remark that kinship, fealty, and confessional loyalties still supersede those of the nation, state, or party in Lebanon.[19] The ranking of international socialists as second in importance in table 1 indicates that ideological identifications that are secular and leftist in orientation are important. Druze are, in fact, concentrated in leftist parties that uphold socialist values and demand secularism in public life.[20] Since these parties also strongly espouse pan-Arabism, the respondents' choice of Lebanese Arab nationalists for second place in table 2 demonstrates an ideological consistency. A 1976 study of student political alienation and activism in Lebanon also found a strong propensity for ideological direction among Druze students. This data revealed that the Druze—92.9 percent of respondents—were more united in their criticism of the Lebanese government for its "lack of ideology" or political drift, than any other sect.[21] The perceived ideological weakness of the government contrasted sharply with the Lebanese and Arab nationalist doctrines that were introduced and validated by Druze leaders of both clans.

Although the Arslan family played an important pan-Arab role under the French mandate, its influence after Lebanon's independence was superseded by that of Kamal Junblat, whose intellectual abilities and secure political position within the community and state permitted him to propound a version of socialism, the value of which he was able to demonstrate by interpretations based on his own understanding of the inclusive and universal attributes of the Druze faith. The result was a syncretization of the compatible elements of traditional Druzism with modern action theories associated with secular states.[22]

Junblat's goal was to improve his community's position in what was considered an unjust political system. In this respect, his socialist views were not "totally at odds with his communal perceptions and concerns," nor was his behavior as eccentric as one scholar suggests.[23] On the contrary, given the primary goal of political equality for his small community—necessary before he could assume a more important national role—Junblat's adaptation of socialism, like that of many leaders of disadvantaged minority groups elsewhere, was elemental and canny.

19. Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," *Middle Eastern Studies* 4, no. 3 (1968), p. 264.

20. Firro, "The Druze in and between," p. 190.

21. See Nasr and Palmer, "Alienation and Political Participation," p. 501.

22. Kamal Junblat, "The PSP and Evolution" and "The State System: Social and Political Democracy," in Afif Farraj, ed. and trans., *Revolution in the World of Man* (Ba'qlin: National Center for Research and Studies, 1990), pp. 20–39 and 85–98; idem, *Al-Dimuqratiyya al-jadida* (The new democracy) (Beirut: Lajnat al-Turath al-Qa'id al-Shahid Kamal Junblat, 1987); idem, *Pour un socialisme humain* (For a humane socialism) (Beirut: Progressive Socialist Party, 1983); Ali Ahmad Yunis, *Kamal Junblat, sira fikriyya, 1943–1977* (Kamal Junblat's thoughts, 1943–1977) (Beirut: Lajnat al-Turath al-Qa'id al-Shahid Kamal Junblat, 1979).

23. Farid el-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt: The Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, no. 2 (1988), p. 185.

The Druze leader used both socialist and pan-Arab ideologies to articulate and aggregate opposition interests and to promote support for his view of Lebanese nationalism.[24] By decrying a lack of social and political justice in the Maronite-dominated state—in whose cabinets he and his representatives served—and pointing to Maronite connections with France and Israel, Junblatt villified as tools of imperialism the politically dominant Christians and the sectarian political system that excluded him and his community from the highest political offices. Since the sympathies of the rival Arslan clan lay with politically powerful Maronite leaders, Junblat cast the Arslans in the same boat. Such attacks were phrased in sufficiently general terms so as not to give his words a sectarian caste. This permitted him to play the role of national opposition spokesman and to broaden his appeal, especially among the disorganized Sunni groups.

Junblat's efforts to end the confessional structure of the state ultimately led to his death and his cause was taken up by his son Walid, who inherited his father's political roles along with the family fiefs.[25] Under Walid Junblat's leadership, political socialization in the Druze community was formalized and intensified, especially after the 1983 mountain war when Druze areas came under the PSP's control.

In 1986, the PSP commissioned civics texts written by a group of mostly Druze teachers for elementary, intermediate, and secondary school grades. The need to impart to youth the "humanistic social values" and goals of "the Teacher," Kamal Junblat, is clearly stated in the introduction to these books. The format used for lessons on socialism is consistent: distillations of Marxist precepts are followed by criticisms of capitalism, with "socialism under a cooperative system" put forward as the proposed solution.[26] Kamal Junblat had expressed this same formula in several of his writings.[27] These emphases, of course, are not found in the widely used Ministry of Education texts.[28] This programmed and consistent ideological indoctrination in daily lessons—in addition to reinforcing new identities—presented the PSP as the natural vehicle for fulfilling community political hopes and demands.

The importance of a national Lebanese identification for Lebanon's Druze is demonstrated by respondents' perception of groups on the immediate national

24. Kamal Junblat, "Al-Barnamaj al-marhali li al-ahzab wa al-qiwa al-wataniyya wa al-taqaddumiyya" (The party's transitional program and the national and progressive forces), *al-Anba'*, August 28, 1975, p. 38; idem, *Fi majra al-siyasa al-Lubnaniyya* (In the path of Lebanese politics) (Beirut: Lajnat al-Turath al-Qa'id al-Shahid Kamal Junblat, 1978), p. 137, 145; idem, *Lubnan wa harb al-taswiyya* (Lebanon and the war of compromise) (Beirut: Progressive Socialist Party, 1977).

25. See for example Walid Junblat, "Thawabit al-nidal al-taqaddumi fi Lubnan" (The constants of progressive struggle in Lebanon), *al-Anba'*, May 12, 1980, p. 20.

26. *Al-Tanshi'ah al-wataniyya* (National upbringing), first intermediate class, vol. 6, 1986, pp. 16–33. In the third intermediate text, vol. 8, pp. 55–7, students are exhorted to "surpass capitalism and move to a new system which realizes sufficiency and justice."

27. See Junblat, *Pour un socialisme humain;* idem, "Why Am I a Socialist?" and "The PSP," in *Revolution,* pp. 17–19 and 20–39.

28. These texts were compared to corresponding texts of the *al-tarbiya al-madaniyya* (national education) series (Beirut: Sharikat al-Nashr al-Tarbawi al-Lubnani, 1982).

TABLE 3
Cherished Attributes of Druze Community Ranked by Degree of Pride

	1ST n = 299*	2ND n = 302	3RD n = 293	4TH n = 300	5TH n = 302	Total	Rank
Religious Steadfastness	28	11	6	4	4	52	1
Religious Beliefs	22	18	3	3	5	51	2
Community Solidarity	26	13	5	2	5	50	3
Secular Values	17	6	9	6	4	41	4
Bravery	6	3	11	10	3	32	5

See Table 1 for procedure used to develop rankings.
*n = number of respondents

scene—Christians more than Muslims—as being closer to them than fellow Druze in Israel and Syria. Interaction in the Lebanese arena, regardless of sect, appears to take precedence over Druze concerns elsewhere. The importance of the national context is also seen in the choice of Lebanese nationalists as more important than Arab or Syrian nationalists. (See Table 1.) These findings lend credence to Firro's claim that identification with various modern ideologies and nationalisms is an important twentieth-century change for the Druze.[29]

Students also were presented with a question aimed at gauging identification with Arabism and Phoenician particularism. This is a controversial issue in Lebanon because Maronites tend to emphasize ancient Phoenician history while other groups emphasize the Arab past.[30] When asked about the importance of Arab identity, 42 percent said it was more important then the Phoenician, 30 percent said the two were of equal importance, and 27 percent said it was less important.[31] The Druze had joined this battle with a set of history books to "correct" the official Ministry of Education texts, which placed undue stress on the Phoenician aspects of Lebanon's national identity in an attempt to emphasize its separateness from the Arab world.[32] At the same time, the Druze felt that their role in Lebanon's early history had been misrepresented by attributing to them a nation-building role in cooperation with Maronites. Although these perspectives were important to the Maronite community, they offended the Druze.

It might be assumed, therefore, that the respondents would strongly support the Arab view of history, given their pride in their Arab roots and their identification with Arab nationalists. The responses, however, indicate a tempered appraisal that confirms an earlier finding that, unlike the Sunnis, the Druze

29. Firro, "The Druze in and between," pp. 185–7.
30. The debate is explained in Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*, pp. 200–2.
31. Total does not add up to 100 percent because of rounding error.
32. For the position of the PSP on Arab nationalism and Lebanon, see Rashid Hasan, *Al-Hizb al-Taqaddumi al-Ishtiraki fi Daw Mithaqihi* (The PSP in light of the National Pact) (n.p.: Progressive Socialist Party, n.d.), p. 75–7, and Ishtai, *Al-Hizb al-Taqaddumi al-Ishtiraki*, vol. 1, p. 329.

TABLE 4
Druze Consciousness: Affiliation of Most Admired Lebanese Political Figure

	1ST n = 300*	2ND n = 278	3RD n = 252	Total	Rank
Druze	81	25	10	115	1
Maronite	12	18	17	47	2
Sunni	2	3	4	9	3
Greek Orthodox	5	1	1	7	4
Shi'a	0	1	1	2	5
Other	0	0	0	0	—

See Table 1 for procedure used to develop ranking.
*n = number of respondents

do not deny the importance of Lebanon's unique Phoenician heritage, but, unlike the Maronites, they revere their Arab roots.[33] It was Kamal Junblat's view that the importance of the Phoenician heritage lies in its contribution, along with that of other Near Eastern peoples, to a rich Arab heritage of which all Lebanese can be proud.[34] The responses seem to echo such a sentiment and may indicate the development of a Lebanese identity synthesizing both universal and particular cultural attributes.

In another question, the respondents were given the choice of freedom, equality, social justice, and religious values and asked to rank them in terms of their importance as personal values. It was assumed that social justice, the goal of many minority groups and heavily emphasized by PSP spokesmen during the war years, would be their first choice. The respondents, however, placed freedom first by a considerable margin, and gave secondary ranks to equality and social justice, with religious values placing far below the others. Over the centuries, the Druze have defended fiercely their freedom against the incursions of central powers, and apparently the respondents still cherish the idea of living freely according to their own beliefs and ways.

The low rank given to religious values supports opinions expressed by early Western travelers who observed that the Druze, in comparison with other confessional groups, were not particularly interested in religion, a characteristic that still endures, according to observations made by contemporary scholars.[35] Kamal Junblat mentioned that the Druze were a cultural community more linked by social relations, mores, and cultural ties than religion and that this was what

33. On the latter, see Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*, p. 205.
34. Kamal Junblat, "The People: The Lebanon of Tomorrow," *Revolution*, p. 107.
35. For a summary of Western impressions, see Iliya Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711–1845* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 25. For more contemporary assessments, see Betts, *The Druze*, p. 64, and Haim Blanc, "Druze Particularism: Modern Aspects of an Old Problem," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (1952), p. 318.

distinguished his community from others.[36] Probably owing to the lack of religious ritual and places of worship, the average Druze individual has little cause to think much about his or her religion. A study that queried Lebanese college students on their sectarian consciousness found that only 7 percent of Druze described themselves as very religious, while 51.1 percent said that they were mildly religious and 42.2 percent said that they were not at all religious—a higher percentage for this choice than that made by any other sect.[37]

Druze Consciousness

To determine what it is about their community that gives them the most pride, the respondents were asked to rank community attributes in order of their importance. (See table 3.) The weighted data reveals that Druze youth take the most pride in the religious beliefs of their group and in their steadfastness in preserving and defending their religion. Although this result seems to conflict with the socialist and secular attachments expressed by the group, in fact, religion is the primary bond among Druze. While their religious distinctiveness remains a deep source of community pride, it apparently does not affect significantly the individual's personal beliefs, perhaps because matters of faith may simply be left to the Uqqal. Druze solidarity was the third choice, while bravery, supposedly high in the collective consciousness, and noted as a salient group characteristic by most observers, was chosen least.[38]

An open-ended question directed students to rank by preference the three Lebanese political personalities whom they most admired. (See table 4.) As expected, the results supported Firro's suggestion that no erosion of traditional institutions had taken place among Lebanese Druze.[39] The weighted results demonstrated that the respondents overwhelmingly favored leaders of their own sect, followed by Maronite notables, who it seems, are the most popular non-Druze political figures among the respondents. When the data were broken down to reflect information about the individuals listed, it was found that Kamal and Walid Junblat were most admired, receiving 215 and 191 mentions, respectively. They were followed by Maronite Samir Jaja, the Lebanese Forces commander who led the invasion into the Druze heartland in 1983, and former army head General Michel Awn, each with 69 mentions. Rejection of the rival Yazbaki clan was clearly shown when both Faisal and Talal Arslan received no mentions at all, and their deceased father, Amir Majid, received only 30 mentions. Unlike other Lebanese communities, Druze political unity apparently has not

36. Kamal Jumblat, *I Speak for Lebanon* (London: Zed Press, 1982), pp. 38–9.

37. Nasr and Palmer, "Alienation and Political Participation," table 3, p. 502.

38. On bravery as a collective characteristic, see for example, Colonel Churchill, *Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years' Residence from 1842–1852,* vol. 1 (London: Saunders and Otleys, 1953), p. 314; on bravery as a value see Makarem, *The Druze Faith,* p. 3.

39. Firro, "The Druze in and between," p. 193.

been weakened by competition between rival clans or political factions. During the 1983 mountain war, it was demonstrated clearly that only Junblat's forces could protect the community and represent its will vis-à-vis other groups and the state; the Arslan clan had been discredited by its connections with the government of Amin Gemayel.

The data also provide evidence concerning Druze consciousness of Maronites. The latter's leaders were chosen much more often by the respondents than the leaders of other sects. After Awn and Jaja, former president Chamille Chamoun, a Maronite from Dayr al-Qamar in the Shuf—"neighbor and favorite enemy," as Walid Junblat once remarked—had 56 mentions. Antoun Saada, the Greek Orthodox founder of the Syrian National Socialist Party (SNSP), received 28 mentions and Bishara al-Khuri, a Maronite and the first president of the Lebanese republic, received 17. Bashir Gemayel, the assassinated Maronite president-elect and founder of the Lebanese Forces militia, received 16. Among Sunni figures Ma'ruf Saad, leader of the Nasirist party based in Sidon, and former prime minister Rashid Karami received 7 and 12 votes, respectively.

The selection of Awn and Bashir Gemayel can be interpreted to indicate an appreciation of the strong, nationalistic roles played by these men in attempting to protect the independence of Lebanon in the face of perceived Syrian encroachment. Walid Junblat was among the most vociferous in calling for Awn's release from the French embassy, where he was sequestered after his defeat in October 1990 by combined Lebanese and Syrian troops. Despite his surrender and exile to France several months later, Awn captured the respect of nationalistic youth of all sects. Furthermore, in 1991, Jaja joined Junblat in demands concerning the integration of their militias into the regular army. Animosity toward the Syrians, whose presence in Druze areas is greatly resented, an awareness of continued Maronite political influence and how it might be used to further Druze ends, and the perceived commonality of nationalistic goals may therefore underlie the favorable view of Maronite leaders.

Druze Cohesion

The literature on the Druze suggests a cohesiveness of almost legendary proportions. Thus, the responses indicating that respondents evince considerable openness toward other groups is surprising. In fact, in-group trust versus out-group suspicion, typical of minorities, and which has given rise to explanations of Druze political behavior based on taqiyya, seems open to doubt given the responses to this questionnaire statement: "I would trust members of my own sect more than I trust others, the same as I trust others, or less than I trust others." Only 30 percent placed most confidence in sect members. Sixty-five percent indicated that they would trust Druze the same as others and five percent said less than others. Asked whether, given homes of equal comfort and convenience, they would prefer to live among their own sect, in an area where the

sects are mixed, or had no preference, the responses indicated that the clustering of Druze homes claimed by Betts as typical and illustrative of their exclusiveness, was no longer relevant.[40] Twenty-four percent revealed that given the choice, they would prefer to live among mixed sects, while fifty-nine percent had no preference. Only 18 percent preferred to live among their own sect.[41]

Another indication of social openness was found in responses to this question: "Do you believe that non-Druze should receive aid from a Druze welfare organization?" Eighty-six percent of the respondents answered affirmatively. When asked whether they agreed, agreed with reservations, or did not agree with the statement that "Life is likely to be happier when one marries within one's own sect," only 49 percent gave an unreserved yes, a result that indicates some questioning of one of the most important Druze religious principles.

Although marred by the small number of respondents (98), a 1989 survey of Druze members of the PSP, SNSP, and Lebanese Communist Party to determine the strength of ideological and party attachment—as opposed to community values and principles—yielded results consistent with those obtained in this 1991 survey. When the responses to several questions on Druze cohesion in the 1989 survey are compared with the answers to similar questions in this one, a very high coincidence of responses is found, although the party members on average were older, variously employed, were of low socioeconomic status, and actively engaged in politics. For instance, in 1989 when asked whether they would prefer to reside in a mixed sect area, a Druze area, or "don't care," of 96 responses, 53 indicated that they did not care, 36 said mixed, and only 7 said that they preferred a Druze area. On the subject of marriage to a non-Druze, out of 57 answers, 10 said no, 27 said yes, and 20 said that it "would depend on different factors."[42]

These do not appear to be the responses of an exclusive group nor of an insecure minority, and, in fact, they differ greatly from responses given by Maronite college students when asked similar questions.[43] The Druze, unlike the Maronites, are not in immediate danger of an erosion of political power and are, as one study notes, "capable of effective bargaining with dominant groups."[44]

Druze Solidarity

Two questions were formulated to probe the solidarity of the Druze. In the first, respondents were asked if they supported initiatives to improve contacts with other Middle Eastern Druze. Among respondents, 54 percent said yes, 37 percent had no opinion and 9 percent said no. This less than enthusiastic response

40. Betts, *The Druze,* p. 36.
41. Total does not add up to 100 percent because of rounding.
42. Aboul-Hosn, *Political and National Ideologies,* table 14, p. 83 and table 12, p. 80.
43. Khashan, "Political Values," p. 735.
44. Walter P. Zenner and Maurice N. Richter, Jr., "The Druzes as a Divided Minority Group," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 7, no. 3 (Summer 1972), p. 193.

TABLE 5
Intergroup Perceptions: Sects by Degree of Preference
(Percent)

	Sunnis n = 272*	Shi'a n = 273	Maronites n = 273	Greek Orthodox n = 270	Greek Catholics n = 270	Druze n = 275
Warm	18	16	24	21	22	82
Neutral	34	26	33	32	30	13
Cool	49	59	44	47	48	5

Some totals do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding.
*n = number of respondents

is consistent with the low ranking given to their affinity to other Middle Eastern Druze in table 2, and contrasts with Firro's finding of a "growing affirmation of Druze solidarity."[45] Perhaps if Lebanese Druze or those in other countries faced a threat, the responses would have shown stronger community solidarity. In the current regional political environment, however, attention to other groups in Lebanon seems to be more compelling.

In another question the students were asked if they had been old enough during the 1983 war, whether they would have defended their community with arms, supported the war effort, or done nothing. As expected, 83 percent said that they would have fought, which is consistent with the Druze's long tradition of tight military organization and readiness to fight off interference by central authorities.[46] These results are similar to a study of Druze militarism that found correlations between social estrangement and participation: "[T]he most striking result was that almost all of the Druze respondents who were socially estranged were also politically active."[47]

The PSP transmitted to Druze youth through various programs a militant awareness of Lebanon's predicament and the Arab cause. For example, lesson 12 of the Druze civil administration's second intermediate *al-Tanshi'ah* text presents the evils of foreign occupation and lauds resistance during the Israeli invasion of 1982. The lesson following, "Betrayal of Country and People," criticizes Maronite forces and Zionists while praising a readiness to defend the homeland.[48] Lessons are written in a fervently nationalistic style, and for the most part do not

45. Firro, "The Druze in and between," p. 222.
46. Between 1899 and 1910, six armed insurrections were staged by Druze against various Ottoman practices. See Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, p. 152.
47. Nasr and Palmer, "Alienation and Political Participation," p. 513, explain that even more than the Shi'a, the Druze remain the most traditional and politically excluded of Lebanon's major sects.
48. *Al-Tanshi'ah al-wataniyya*, second intermediate, pp. 67–71, 72–5.

refer to the Druze.[49] Besides the daily study of these texts, all secondary school students in Druze areas received military training. This training was formalized in 1989 by a required textbook prepared by the PSP and covering such subjects as strategy, the use of weapons, and mapmaking.[50] "Progressive Scouts of the Martyr Kamal Junblat" engage in paramilitary training and are described in every civics text as models of discipline and loyalty. Progressive youth groups also exist in several universities, where they attempt to raise members' consciousness of party issues.

Nevertheless, when respondents were asked if they would like to join a political party, out of 318 responses received, only 38 percent answered yes and 62 percent said no. When asked in an open-ended question to explain their answers, 37 percent said that they would join because they believed in party goals, while 49 percent had little faith in party goals, and 13 percent said the only reason they would join would be to avoid trouble with the party. These negative responses contrast with the admiration expressed for the political leaders of the communities and illustrate the low esteem of parties. Their responses probably also reflect distaste for the militarism the students have experienced, and disapproval of the corrupt behavior of some party members and their various exactions over the years.

Intergroup Perceptions

Attitudes toward other sects reveal the degree to which the Druze are apprehensive about them or would be willing to interact with them in a normal fashion. Positive perceptions of other Lebanese communities would be an important step toward eventual reconciliation and normalization of mountain life. Respondents were asked to express their sentiments of "warmth" or "coolness" toward various sects by referring to a thermometer drawn next to the question and divided into degrees from 0, equaling coldest, to 100, equaling hottest. They were asked to assign a numerical temperature reading to each group listed. The weighted results shown in table 5, indicate that an old Druze adage, "to the Sunnis 50 curses, to the Shi'a 40, to the Christians 30,. . . to the Jews 20," retains some validity. The elevation of the Maronites as the group to which respondents feel least cool most likely stems from a long tradition of neighborliness; the two communities have shared the mountains over the centuries. Moreover, they also share common apprehensions about the Muslim majority and the growing Shi'i population.[51] Kamal Junblat had claimed that the extreme positions of some

49. Ibid., pp. 78–9. An exception to this is the inclusion of Druze rebel chief Sultan al-Atrash among Vietnamese and Palestinian freedom fighters in the section on national liberation.

50. Progressive Socialist Party, Training Section *Al-Tarbiya al-askariyya* (Military education), (Ba'qlin: Al-Dar al-Taqaddumiyya li al-Nashr, 1989).

51. Khashan, "Political Values," p. 735.

Muslims were very damaging to Lebanon's fragile balance because they aroused reactionary Maronite fears and fanaticism.[52]

The relative coolness toward the Sunnis was not unexpected, given their historic abhorrence of Druze heterodoxy and the refusal of Sunni Ottoman overlords to give legal status to the sect. It was not until 1948, when a personal status law providing official recognition and protection of the sect by the Lebanese state was drawn up by Druze members of parliament, clergymen, and jurists that the possibility of religious persecution under the auspices of the central authority was ended.[53]

These findings are significant, not so much because they reveal old prejudices, but because of the lack of extremism toward any one sect demonstrated in the choices made. A relatively even coolness prevails. This may be because the Junblats forged links with progressive elements in each community while at the same time rubbing elbows in different cabinets with conservative and moderate leaders of the various confessional groups. Such flexibility may be the basis of what Peter Gubser calls "situational selection"—a variation of taqiyya whereby a Druze may identify himself or herself with another's position for self-benefit.[54] This survey's findings may reveal the intergroup perceptions that make this practice easier, and which, if channeled through strong state institutions, could produce an important role for the Druze in structuring the essential compromises required in a pluralistic society.

Political Values

A number of questions measured respondents' attitudes toward issues associated with pan-Arabism in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The responses demonstrated strong agreement with some extreme pan-Arab positions such as hostility toward the West and Zionism, as well as advocacy of Arab solidarity. Respondents' disappointment with Arab governments that did not support Iraq in the Gulf crisis is illustrated in their responses. Only 2 percent of respondents endorsed Arab-Western cooperation against Iraq, while 65 percent felt that Arab governments should have joined Iraq's side against the West. A further 22 percent felt that they should have considered their countries' best interests, and 12 percent felt that neutrality would have been the best choice.[55] This is consistent with the choice of Arab nationalists as the group with whom

52. Kamal Junblat, "The People," *Revolution,* p. 108. Salibi, *House of Many Mansions,* p. 214, points out that extremist Shi'ism calls attention to the Druze's own brand of particularism, which is not in their interest.

53. Aharon Layash, *Marriage, Divorce and Succession in the Druze Family* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982), p. 33, claims that this legislation is the Middle East's most progressive family law, affording free testament and legal equality to women.

54. Peter Gubser, "Druze of Lebanon and Syria," in R.D. McLauren, ed., *The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 115.

55. Total does not add up to 100 percent because of rounding.

TABLE 6
Preferred Distribution of Political Power among Sects
(Percent)

	Druze n = 292	Maronites n = 289	Greek Orthodox 2 = 285	Catholics n = 285	Armenians n = 284	Sunnis n = 288	Shi'a n = 284
More Power	83	6	34	31	33	8	10
Same Power	12	27	47	49	44	54	40
Less Power	5	67	18	20	23	38	50

respondents most readily identify, their Druze identity excluded. (See Table 2.) When questioned on their expectations that a unified Arab nation could actually supersede the states of the Middle East—"Despite repeated setbacks, do you still believe in Arab unity?"—56 percent answered affirmatively and 44 percent negatively, indicating that a large minority had reservations about the practicality of this goal. Political realism was also indicated in the importance respondents gave to Phoenician as compared to Arab history. Thus, although Arab nationalism among the Druze remains an emotional issue, the daily concerns of the immediate political environment seem to focus their attention on state politics.

Table 6 presents the results of a question that asked respondents to assess the political power of various Lebanese communities and to indicate whether the Lebanese political system attributed too much, the right amount, or too little political power to each of the national groups. The responses show a distinct difference between the affective attitudes displayed in table 5 and discriminations made on the basis of group political interests in table 6. Thus, while Maronites were more warmly rated than other groups in the former exercise, in this table, 67 percent of respondents thought their power should be reduced. In contrast, Sunnis, who were treated coolly in table 5, are thought to have just about the right amount of power. Druze aversion to Shi'i political claims are second only to the dislike of similar Maronite claims. Overall, the Shi'a are the least preferred group in both dimensions tested. Bett's explanation that Druze have never lived among Shi'a, but disdain the substandard conditions of their villages in the south, may explain this reaction, as might the confrontation between the PSP and the Shi'i Amal movement in West Beirut in 1984.[56]

It is noteworthy that respondents clearly distinguish between Maronites and other Christian sects, who, like themselves, are relatively few in number and, therefore, are also politically deprived. The considerable support for an increase

56. Betts, *The Druze*, pp. 20, 56.

in the power of these marginal communities may be due to the fact that they pose no threat to Druze interests. Respondents also accorded them more warmth than either of the Muslim sects, as seen in table 5.

When the data of both tables 5 and 6 are considered, it seems that neither coolness nor warmth toward a particular sect determines political judgments about them; those judgements apparently are made on the basis of the Druze's well-being. A feeling of some social warmth for Maronites does not prevent their being targeted as a continual political obstacle to Druze aspirations. Likewise, a general coolness toward Sunnis would not, as it did not in the past, obstruct an alliance with them against the Maronites. Thus, the responses substantiate observations that the pragmatism of Druze political behavior is based to a large extent on parochial interests. This social and political ambiguity does not serve the Druze poorly in the Lebanese political arena, however, since it permits them to play a pivotal balancing role.

A considerable number of respondents refrained from answering the questions of which the results are summarized in tables 5 and 6. This reveals the sensitivity with which respondents view confessional topics. Many were quite forthright in their objections to selecting among sects. This reluctance was observed in most schools to varying degrees, and in a few instances, after reading these particular questions, the school directors had to be reassured about the author's scholarly objectives before the survey was permitted. Randa Aboul-Hosn, in a survey she conducted, noted a similar reticence on the part of respondents whom, she claims, manipulated discussion in order to avoid the topic of sectarian sentiments.[57]

The strong support shown for a fairer share of political power for their community reveals the sense of purpose with which the Druze approach this vital topic. When respondents addressed the question of whether or not they were satisfied with having Druze representation in the government remain proportional to their number, 80 percent answered no. Approximately 90 percent of respondents said that they agreed that "confessionalism should be ended in Lebanon": 65 percent strongly agreed and 24 percent agreed, 5 percent did not care, 3 percent disagreed, and 3 percent strongly disagreed. Moreover, when asked how they would prefer their religious affiliation to appear on their Lebanese identity card, 79 percent responded that religious affiliation should not be mentioned on the Lebanese identity card. Only 19 percent would choose to be identified "as a Druze" and 1.5 percent "as a Muslim."

One question in the survey sought to investigate the relative strengths of national and community attachments. Since the end of the mountain war in 1983, the PSP has used the historic castle of Bayt al-Din, which was built by the Maronite Shihabi amir, Bashir II (1788–1840), as a symbolic opposition center, calling it "The Peoples' Palace." This action demonstrated that the building,

57. Aboul-Hosn, "National and Political Ideologies," p. 118.

which was the summer home of several past presidents, had been liberated from its Maronite political context. The removal of the national flag from the monument and the hoisting of the five-colored Druze flag, the Islamic flag, and the PSP's banner, as well as the establishment of the Druze civil administration within the castle compound, were taken as evidence of Druze hostility toward the state and of its separatist inclinations. Answers given to the question of "which flag would you prefer to see flying over Bayt al-Din," however, showed 71 percent in favor of the national flag. Of the remaining respondents, 18 percent favored the PSP flag, 10 percent the Druze flag, and 1 percent the Islamic flag. This response may indicate a desire to see the end of such defiant gestures, and to see the state assume its proper duties. It may also show that few Druze wish to perpetuate what some have called the "Druze canton."

The Druze appear to take advantage of rather than play what Salibi terms the "great confidence game," that is, the two-faced championing of secularization by Lebanon's religious communities, most of whom stand to lose if it occurs.[58] Druze religious judges use state machinery to enforce religious-legal norms and base their judgments on both religious and statute law. Furthermore, they apparently would welcome civil legislation supporting or even superseding religious law.[59] Abolishing confessionalism would not threaten the religious foundation of Druze society, and it could only gain through the establishment of political equality for all sects.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Druze identity, attachment to basic community values, and group solidarity remain as strong as ever at the close of the twentieth century. These traits are seen in the religious pride of the Druze, their virtually unanimous and adamant agreement on community political goals, and by loyalty to the Junblats, who will probably continue to lead the community in the foreseeable future. The unity thus achieved permits a maximization of sect influence on the policy level, in strong contrast to the divided Shi'i and Maronite communities and to the unorganized Sunnis.[60]

On the other hand, Druze identity has not prevented the adoption of new national identities and ideologies. In fact, it has actually fostered them. By

58. Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*, pp. 55–6. *Sharia* of the Sunnis and Shi'a may only be administered by sect members. While the Maronites have no problem with personal status legislation, they stand to lose politically if secularization occurs.

59. Layash, *Marriage, Divorce and Succession*, p. 16. Shaykh Mirsil Nasr, head judge of the Druze religious courts, confirmed this position in an interview in Beirut, July 19, 1991.

60. For example, during 1991 the PSP played a leading role in efforts to restructure the history and civics curricula in the national school system. Their education conference, held on July 13, 1991, in Beirut, gathered academics, government officials, and party notables, including representatives of the Lebanese Forces. PSP position papers on education were presented at the government's Council for Reconstruction and Development seminar held at the American University of Beirut, June 1, 1991.

personalizing and promoting these ideas as philosophically derived truths that did not conflict with the basic tenets of Druzism and even highlighted them, Kamal Junblat gave them the approval that was essential to their legitimization within his community. Druze socialism, for instance, seems more than a mere instrument of political opportunism or an updated version of taqiyya, but at the same time it offers less than promised by the radical revolutionary rhetoric in which it is often couched. The real importance of Druze socialism, however, lies in the fact that it could provide a moderate national reform role for the Druze. This role could mollify both the Christian and Muslim camps, since it permits criticism of conservative Muslims without being anti-Islam, and of conservative Christians without appearing as "Islamic" (and threatening) as do some other opposition forces.

However strong the role of the Junblats might have been in articulating and promoting the new ideologies so assiduously promoted by the party through its various institutions, it would be a mistake to assume that political doctrines of little intrinsic worth could be foisted on the community and endure, or that the respondents mindlessly repeated party slogans in their answers. Since respondents were vehement in their acknowledgement of the importance of civic secularism, it seems that roots nurtured in confessional soil can support the new doctrinal grafts without breaching the foundations of the community's faith or its solidarity.

Furthermore, a degree of innate social tolerance or openness supportive of civic secularism was observed in responses concerning Druze cohesion, which contradicts the notions of their exclusiveness found in the literature. Although their religious beliefs set the Druze apart, the adoption of new nationalisms—both Arab and Lebanese—promotes an inclusiveness that is not at variance with the community's primordial attitudes or goals, and, therefore, has not eroded them. Nor is such openness a new phenomenon for the community. Commenting on the uniqueness of Lebanon under Ottoman rule, and the commanding role the Druze played at that time, Salibi notes that a "Druze mountain society existed which was so confident of the impregnability of its tribal solidarity that it had no reserve about having Christians living in its midst in steadily increasing numbers, and in the full enjoyment of religious and social liberties."[61] It seems that as long as Druze are free to live in accordance with the norms and values of their sect, they do not hesitate to foster open and amicable relations with other groups wishing to live among them. Conversely, where doubts and prejudices are expressed, they are political rather than socio-cultural. Thus, their primordial ties seem to present no basic attitudinal impediment to reconciliation processes nor are they intrinsically subversive to the Lebanese state.

Arguments concerning the effect parochial attachments might have on the degree to which the Druze are able to transfer loyalty to the Lebanese state,

61. Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*, p. 163; Harik, *Politics and Change*, pp. 41–5.

therefore, somewhat beg the question. In fact, asserting that loyalty to Lebanon should prevail as a political motivator cannot invalidate the actual contribution of the Druze's parochial attachments, since democracy serves both universalistic and particularistic interests. In the case of the Druze, the particular mix of such loyalties produces a paradox whereby Lebanon's most traditional community is at the same time quite politically progressive in regard to certain civic attitudes.

Lebanon's Druze realize that it is only within the state framework, if secularization of the political system eventually occurs, that they will be able to regain the power they feel is their due. Until that time, although they are politically underprivileged, their share of power among Lebanon's confessional communities is unlikely to be diminished, nor can their confessional autonomy be assailed. Because fundamental issues of security theoretically have been settled, reform of the system in which they find themselves is the key issue for the Druze, as illustrated by the virtually unanimous responses concerning sectarian issues and the abolition of confessionalism. This consistent and uncompromising insistence on community rights and political equality makes it unlikely that this key demand—reform of the system—will be modified until a reformed state again takes up its duties. Nevertheless, the PSP's conciliatory approach to some policy issues and their willing acquiescence in 1991 to governmental efforts to extend state control over Druze areas make it seem likely that the typical Druze adversarial stance might be somewhat relaxed in the post-civil war period. The Druze appear anxious to show that their nationalistic feelings can overcome the political animosities of the past, that is, if their rights and traditions receive due consideration in the evolving political institutions of the second Lebanese republic.

EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS SINCE 1973

Sami Baroudi

THE overall performance of Egypt's agricultural exports since 1973 has been extremely problematic. Although certain export crops, principally citrus fruits, have performed relatively well, in general, long-term export trends have been dismal. Several factors have all contributed to the weak performance of agricultural exports: the low quality of many exports; the enormous quantities of lost output, especially of perishable produce like tomatoes; the inadequacy of information on supply and demand conditions in foreign markets; and a dramatic rise in the domestic consumption of agricultural commodities. Each of these problems could have been resolved, however, if government policy had been aimed at removing impediments to private enterprise in the spheres of agricultural production and agricultural exports.

Despite persistent government rhetoric about *infitah,* official programs since the early 1970s have continued to affect agriculture adversely, effectively impeding dramatic improvement in the export performance of each of Egypt's main export crops. Removing all government restrictions on private production and private exports, including government intervention in the foreign exchange market, would have raised prices for growers of internationally tradeable crops—mainly cotton, rice, citrus and other fruits, and many vegetables—where domestic prices invariably have been lower than international prices. Higher prices for farmers would have stimulated exported-oriented production, curtailed domestic consumption, and forced inefficient exporters who could not pay the higher prices to exit the export market.

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If government policy had been aimed at encouraging a fairly large number of competitive private farmers and firms to dominate all aspects of production and export, success in the export sphere might have followed. Such a policy would have promoted the entry of new private capital and talent into agricultural production and exports and hastened the exit of inefficient producers and exporters who failed both to minimize the size of their lost output and to supply export markets with consistently high-quality commodities at competitive prices and in sufficient quantities. This article will demonstrate that since 1973 the Egyptian government's policies toward the agricultural private sector, in general, and toward private exporters of agricultural commodities, in particular, tended to have negative consequences.

THE MACRO VIEW: THE DETERIORATION IN THE REAL TERMS VALUE OF EGYPT'S AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

Between 1965 and 1991, the dollar value of agricultural exports dropped from around $267.5 million to a meager $504,000.[1] Looking at Egyptian pound (LE) figures between 1965 and 1990, one finds that the nominal value of agricultural exports rose by a mere 300 percent—from LE 158.7 million to LE 635.9 million.[2] The agricultural price index that measures inflation in the agricultural sector, however, increased by 900 percent—from 100 to a little more than 1,000.[3] The major discrepancy between the increase in the nominal value of agricultural exports and the increase in the agricultural price index provides another indicator of the serious deterioration in the real terms value of agricultural exports. Moving to volume figures, one finds that Egypt's cotton exports dropped from about 319,750 metric tons to about 60,000 metric tons, while the volume of Egypt's other main agricultural exports dropped from 555,283 metric tons to about 355,705 metric tons.[4]

Despite a serious decline in the overall volume (and real terms value) of Egypt's agricultural exports, Egypt continues to export a wide variety of agricultural commodities. For most of the agricultural commodities exported, however, the volume of exports per commodity has become quite small. The challenge confronting the Egyptian agricultural export economy has never been to find new agricultural crops to export, but to expand the level of exports of existing cultivated crops.

1. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), *Yearbook of Annual Statistics* (Cairo), selected years, 1973–1991; and *Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO] Trade Yearbook* (Rome), selected years, 1973–1991.
2. CAPMAS, *Yearbook of Annual Statistics,* selected years, 1965 and 1990.
3. CAPMAS, *Yearbook of Annual Statistics,* 1989, p. 249.
4. CAMPAS, *Annual Trade Statistics* (Cairo), selected years, 1965 and 1990.

Cotton Exports

Since its cultivation was introduced on a massive scale—more than 150 years ago—until the late 1980s, raw cotton was Egypt's leading agricultural export. Since 1973, and especially since 1980, however, raw cotton's share in total agricultural exports has declined continuously.[5] For example, in 1989, the dollar value of cotton exports slightly exceeded that of citrus fruits, the second largest export crop. In 1990 and 1991, however, the dollar value of citrus fruit exports surpassed that of cotton; citrus fruit exports amounted to around $140 million and $154 million in 1990 and 1991, respectively, while cotton exports were valued at around $123.5 million and $77 million, in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Raw cotton's share of exports stood at 68 percent in 1980, but dropped to around 25 percent in 1990 and 15 percent in 1991.[6] This decline resulted from a serious deterioration in the volume of raw cotton exports, as well as from limited increases in the exports of a number of horticultural products, principally citrus fruits.

Three major factors account for the deterioration in the volume of Egypt's raw cotton exports: increased domestic consumption of raw cotton, encouraged by the artificially low price government factories paid for raw cotton[7]; serious declines in raw cotton yields because of government price controls; and the shifting of land from the production of cotton to the production of Egyptian clover (*berseem*).[8] The distortions in the system of relative agricultural prices that discouraged the production of several high export value crops, such as cotton, and encouraged the production of an internationally non-tradeable commodity such as berseem triggered the problem in decreased export volume. These distortions, in turn, resulted from the selective application of price controls on agricultural crops. Historically, cotton and rice had the most rigid price controls, while berseem always remained free of price controls.[9]

5. *FAO Trade Yearbook,* selected years, 1973–1990; and CAPMAS, *Annual Trade Statistics,* selected years, 1973–1990.

6. *FAO Trade Yearbook,* selected years; and CAPMAS, *Annual Trade Statistics,* selected years, 1973–1991.

7. The artificially low price for raw cotton that the government paid to the farmer was passed to the spinning industry in the public sector, therefore, providing this industry with an implicit subsidy. Although figures on the amount of this implicit subsidy vary, one informed source estimated it to be around $430 million for 1989. Shamil Abaza, *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi,* March 14, 1990. See also Adil Muhammad Lahittah, *"Al-qutn al-Misri yasqut an arshih"* (Egyptian cotton falls off its throne), *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi,* April 30, 1990, pp. 14–20.

8. The area sown with cotton dropped from a little over 1.5 million feddans in 1972 to well under 1 million feddans in 1990. (1 feddan = 1.038 acres = .42 hectares.) CAPMAS, *Yearbook of Annual Statistics,* 1972 and 1990; CAPMAS, *Annual Trade Statistics,* 1972 and 1990; US Department of Agriculture/Foreign Agricultural Services, Cairo Desk (USDA/FAS-Cairo), *Agricultural Situation Report: Egypt* (Cairo); USDA/FAS-Cairo, *Annual Situation Report: Egypt* (Cairo); USDA/FAS-Cairo, *Cotton Report: Egypt* (Cairo), selected years, 1981–1989.

9. See the interview with Yusuf Wali, minister of agriculture and land reclamation, in *al-Ahram,* December 29, 1989.

How serious are the implications of the deterioration of relative price in cotton exports to Egypt's export economy? The answer depends on how one views Egypt's comparative advantage within the agricultural sector: Does Egypt continue to enjoy a comparative advantage in the export of cotton, or would its agricultural export economy be better served by substituting other crops for cotton in the export mix?

Although the debate persists over comparative advantages within the Egyptian agricultural sector, two main views have emerged. One view holds that under conditions of free farmgate prices—the prices paid to the farmer—Egypt does not possess a comparative advantage in the production of wheat, because both cotton and horticultural crops yield greater returns (at international prices) than wheat.[10] The drive to expand wheat production, especially in the 1960s and 1970s—even at the expense of more traditional export items—therefore, could not be justified on economic grounds. The drive for increased wheat production was clearly based on an elusive quest for food self-sufficiency. Luckily, by around 1986–87, Egyptian policymakers became aware of the danger that freeing the price of wheat posed to the production of export crops, which had major controls over their prices and their export. Concern that expanding the total acreage sown in wheat would further reduce the production of several Egyptian export crops contributed to the launching of the 1986–87 agricultural reforms, which increased the number of deregulated crops (at the farmgate level). The decline in cotton production, however, so far has not been sufficient to push the government in the direction of freeing the price of raw cotton.

Another conclusion, far less firmly established, is that Egypt has a greater comparative advantage in the export of horticultural products than in the export of cotton. At least one highly empirical study noted that Egypt would benefit by shifting land from the production of cotton to the production of horticultural crops.[11] Several other studies, however, have been more cautious, noting that,

- none of the horticultural products whose production was recommended instead of cotton enjoy free access to foreign markets to the same degree as cotton;
- horticultural products—principally fruits and vegetables—require more sophisticated channels of export because of their far greater perishability;

10. Interestingly enough, a 1980s study co-authored by Minister of Agriculture Wali reached this conclusion. Yusuf Wali and Hassan Khidr, "Dirasa iqtisadiyya li-siyasat tashji' al-sadirat al-Misriyya" (An economic study of the policy of encouraging Egyptian exports), unpublished study presented to the National Conference on Exports held in Cairo in July 1985 and organized by the Egyptian Export Promotion Center.

11. Alexander Swaris, "Cropping Patterns, Food Security and Exports" in *Summary and Proceedings: Fourth Economic Workshop on the Promotion of Egyptian Exports of Horticultural Crops,* Agricultural Development System/Economic Working Paper (ADS/EWP) no. 63, 1982. The ADS/EWPs were prepared by US economists from the University of California, Davis, and Egyptian economists. The entire series can be found at the Development Information Center (DIC) of the United States Agency for International Development office in Cairo.

- stockpiles of raw cotton can be built, or depleted, in reaction to international price movements, while this cannot be done with horticultural products;
- price volatility is higher in the case of horticultural products.[12]

To these qualifiers with regard to the greater profitability of horticultural exports (compared to cotton), one can add the following basic observations. First, Egypt has wide latitude in deciding how to export its cotton—raw cotton, cotton yarn, or finished textiles—and the export mix can be changed in response to international demand. Second, horticultural exports can be dramatically expanded without shifting any land from the cultivation of cotton by increasing yields, reducing the high levels of post-harvest losses for virtually all horticultural products, and shifting land from the production of the internationally nontradeable berseem. Third, because of government price controls, cotton yields have been extremely low, even in relation to other yields, which makes it easier to understate the relative profitability of cotton. Fourth, Morocco, which had been in the lead of nations emphasizing the development of a strong horticultural exports industry, especially in citrus fruits and tomatoes, lately has been encouraging large-scale growers of citrus fruits not to replant aging citrus fruit orchards but rather to turn the land into the production of cotton, primarily for export. Although the Moroccan experience is probably an exception, it casts serious doubt, nevertheless, on the notion that citrus fruits are always superior to cotton. Under the proper set of policies toward agriculture, and its export sector, cotton can still make an important, and even indispensable, contribution to Egypt's exports.

Rice Exports

The importance of rice in Egypt's export economy increased dramatically in the first thirteen years of the republic (1952–1965). This positive phase with regard to the production and export of rice, however, came to an abrupt end in the second half of the 1960s. The period since 1965—and especially since 1974—has seen a serious deterioration in the volume of rice exports as yields stagnated and domestic consumption rapidly expanded.[13] The stagnation in yields can be

12. See, for example, Mohammed A. El-Shennawi, "Conclusions and Recommendations from the Conference on the Development of Egyptian Agricultural Exports," in *Summary and Proceedings: Fourth Economic Workshop on the Promotion of Egyptian Exports of Horticultural Crops*, ADS/EWP no. 72. For a brief summary of the arguments made for and against shifting land from cotton to the production of horticultural products, mainly for export, see Sami Afifi Hatim, *Al-Iqtisad al-Misri: Bayn al-waqi' wa al-tumuh* (The Egyptian economy: Reality and aspiration) (Cairo: Al-Dar al-Misriyya al-Lubnaniyya, 1988), pp. 255–62.

13. Between the early 1950s and the mid-1960s, there was a very impressive growth in yields due to the greater regularity of water supplies and the shift toward high yield varieties of rice. Between 1952 and 1965, the average yield for rice grew from 1.4 metric tons per feddan to about 2.4 metric tons per feddan. CAPMAS, *Yearbook of Annual Statistics*, selected years.

attributed to the government's failure to improve the structure of incentives for rice growers. Tight controls over farmgate rice prices remained in effect until the mid-1980s. The agricultural reforms of 1986–87 improved the situation for rice growers by allowing them to sell up to 50 percent of their rice output on the open market at prices well above the procurement price at which the government continued to buy half of the rice output from the farmers. It was not until late 1991 that the Ministry of Agriculture finally abandoned the policy of forcefully procuring rice from the farmers. Under new policy guidelines announced by Minister of Agriculture Yusuf Wali in 1991, government purchasing agencies are supposed to pay farmers the prevailing prices for whatever rice output they acquire from them.[14]

The domestic market for rice is not free because the government continues to procure and sell about half of the rice output in government stores at subsidized prices. The rapid increases in domestic consumption of rice can be attributed, at least in part, to the subsidy. The rapid rates at which domestic rice consumption rose in the latter part of the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, have led many experts to conclude that Egypt will become a net importer of rice on a large scale.[15]

In light of Egypt's huge food and overall trade deficit, the government has been trying to lift the subsidy. Yet, most evidence indicates that the government has been timid in its efforts to limit domestic rice consumption by phasing out the rice subsidy.[16] It also took the government a long time to allow market forces to determine farmgate rice prices. At least until 1991, this combination of inadequate incentives for rice growers to increase yields—and hence output—and subsidized prices for that part of the rice output sold in government stores created a situation of great imbalance between rice production and consumption. The main victim of this situation—besides the farmers—has been Egypt's agricultural export economy, which suffered tremendously, especially in the infitah period, as a result of the deterioration of rice exports.

Onion Exports

Onion exports followed a pattern similar to that of rice exports. In the 1950s and early 1960s, onion exports showed some growth as a result of government efforts to reduce the country's overwhelming reliance on cotton exports. Between 1971 and 1988, however, onion exports experienced a precipitous 84 percent decline in volume and real terms value.[17] Here again, the combination of rapidly

14. In a speech on December 25, 1991, President Husni Mubarak reiterated his support for freeing all agricultural prices. *Al-Ahram,* December 22, 1991, p. 1.

15. "Al-Aruz yadkhul da'irat al-khatar" (Rice enters the danger zone), *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi,* February 22, 1986, p. 12.

16. Ibid.

17. CAPMAS, *Annual Trade Statistics,* selected years.

rising rates of domestic consumption, the lack of significant growth in the size of the area cultivated with onions, the relative stagnation in onion yields, and the failure to reduce the levels of post-harvest losses was responsible for the serious deterioration in onion exports.

One very important indicator of the deteriorating performance of Egypt's onion exports is the serious decline in the export-output ratio, which dropped from a very respectable 15 percent in 1971 to a mere 2.2 percent in 1990.[18] The government's main response to the rising levels of domestic onion consumption has been to divert onions from exports to domestic consumption.

Private sector onion exports never have been completely banned. Nevertheless, government policies severely curtailed private sector access to the international markets for onions. These policies included a government-imposed export quota system that allocated a greater share of exports to the public sector trading companies than to private exporters, exchange rates applicable to exporters that until the emergence of the unified exchange rate in October 1991 were lower than the market rate, and heavy taxation of export earnings. The deterioration in the volume (and real terms value) of Egypt's onion exports must be seen as an unfortunate development since international demand for the particular brands of white, medium-sized onions that dominate Egyptian onion exports remains quite robust, especially in Middle Eastern and Western European markets.

Garlic Exports

Garlic exports experienced some growth between the early 1950s and the mid-1960s. Since 1965, however, garlic exports have almost collapsed for reasons similar to those that caused cotton, rice, and onion exports to drop sharply. In the case of garlic, however, yields were not a problem. The 1990 realized garlic yield—8 metric tons per feddan—was not significantly lower than the yield of 9 metric tons per feddan the World Bank had projected.[19] Despite the growth in yields, the volume of garlic exports dropped from 10,546 metric tons in 1971 to 3,486 metric tons in 1989 (and was a mere 1,247 metric tons in 1988). For the same years, the nominal value of garlic exports increased from LE 2,409,000 to only LE 2,663,000 at a time of rapidly rising domestic inflation, clearly revealing a most serious decline in the real terms value of garlic exports. This decline can be attributed to a dramatic rise in domestic garlic consumption since 1973 and to the slow growth in the size of the area cultivated in garlic.

18. Ibid., and CAPMAS, *Yearbook of Annual Statistics,* selected years.

19. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), *Egypt: Issues of Trade Strategy and Investment Planning* (Washington, DC, 1984), no. 6521EGT.

Potato Exports

Potato exports were spared the serious declines in volume (and real terms value) that other agricultural exports have experienced since the mid-1960s, especially after 1973. In a period characterized by the overall dismal and deteriorating performance of the agricultural export economy, potato exports represented one of the very few bright spots, citrus fruit exports being another. In volume terms, potato exports grew from about 61,400 metric tons in 1971 to about 154,400 metric tons in 1990.[20] The area cultivated with potatoes more than tripled between 1972 and 1988, while potato output more than quadrupled. Perhaps most impressive of all, has been the important growth in potato yields from 6.8 metric tons per feddan in 1971 to about 10 metric tons per feddan in 1990.[21] In 1990, the realized yield for potatoes came fairly close to the World Bank projected yield of 10.5 metric tons per feddan for that year.[22]

Because of increases both in the yield and the area cultivated with potatoes, exports of this commodity grew substantially, notwithstanding the significant decline in the export-output ratio between 1971 and 1990. Despite its decline, the export-output ratio for potatoes remained relatively high—8.4 percent in 1988—especially when compared with the export-output ratios for rice, onions, garlic, citrus fruits, and tomatoes.[23]

In seeking an explanation for the relative success in expanding the volume and real terms value of Egypt's potato exports, especially at a time of rising domestic consumption of potatoes, one must take account of a number of factors. It is noteworthy that Egyptian authorities pursued—despite some notable inconsistencies—liberal policies with regard to the importation of potato seeds. Not only did the private sector have virtually complete freedom in importing potato seeds, but the government also imported significant quantities of quality British seeds on behalf of private growers. Prior to the short-lived attempt in 1990 to foster the domestic development of potato seeds through a ban on seed imports, British seeds were uniformly used in production for both the local market and for export.[24] The yield results have been quite impressive.

The Egyptian government also allowed the private export sector to dominate potato exports to free currency areas virtually unhindered. By the late 1980s, the private sector made more than 95 percent of potato exports to the Middle East, Europe, and North America. The role of the public sector external trading companies was reduced to exporting potatoes to the East European markets via barter or bilateral payment accords. Where quality mattered a great deal—as in

20. CAPMAS, *Annual Trade Statistics,* selected years.
21. USDA/FAS-Cairo, *Agricultural Situation Report,* selected years.
22. IBRD, *Egypt: Issues of Trade Strategy and Investment Planning.*
23. CAPMAS, *Yearbook of Annual Statistics,* and CAPMAS, *Annual Trade Statistics,* 1989.
24. The ban on potato seed imports did not last beyond 1990.

exports to the European Community, especially Britain—the Egyptian government refrained from interfering with private sector exports.

Great Britain, the largest importer of Egyptian potatoes, followed its long liberal tradition of allowing imports of basic foodstuffs into the British isles virtually duty-free.[25] As demand for Egyptian potatoes grew, British authorities did not show the slightest inclination of reversing this trend. On the contrary, London has been encouraging Cairo to expand its potato and other vegetable and fruit exports to the British market to reduce the size of the bilateral trade deficit between Britain and Egypt. In a nutshell, the sources of the relative success of the potato export industry can be traced to two main elements: the fact that the private sector dominated potato production and exports, and the existence of a liberal trading regime covering the import of potato seeds to Egypt and the export of Egyptian potatoes to the European market, especially Britain.

Egypt's potato export industry, however, faces certain threats, and the trend toward expanded exports can be easily, and quickly, reversed if domestic potato consumption continues to rise at current rates. Further increases in yields and in the area cultivated in potatoes will be difficult, albeit not impossible, to achieve. The government must seek to arrest the continuous declines in the export-output ratio for potatoes, otherwise, the volume of potato exports will begin to drop. Potato exports need not follow the path of rice, where ultimately all the gains in productivity were absorbed by mushrooming domestic consumption.

Tomato Exports

For more than two decades, Egypt has been portrayed as possessing all the necessary ingredients for the expansion of its tomato exports. Nevertheless, the great hopes that have been pinned on Egypt's tomato exports clearly remain unfulfilled.[26] Multiple problems continue to plague this particular export industry. Although Egypt is a very large producer of fresh tomatoes—during the 1980s it accounted for about 4.6 percent of global tomato production—it exports only an insignificant fraction of what it produces.[27] The volume of tomato exports was almost 15,000 metric tons in 1990. This volume is lower than what Egypt could export and what international markets could absorb. The basic problem with tomato exports is one of extremely low export-output ratios—under 1 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[28]

The extremely low export-output ratio is a direct consequence of two main problems: the extremely high level of post-harvest losses (approaching 50

25. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat,* June 14, 1990, p. 4.

26. Both the volume and value of tomato exports remained relatively small throughout the 1980s and in the early 1990s.

27. See Ali Megahid, "Fresh Vegetables Exporting Channels: An Example of Tomatoes," in *Summary and Proceedings: Fourth Economic Workshop on the Promotion of Egyptian Exports of Horticultural Crops,* ADS/EWP no. 70, p. 6.

28. CAPMAS, *Annual Trade Statistics,* selected years.

percent), and the high level of domestic consumption of fresh tomatoes, encouraged, at least in part, by government subsidies and controls over the domestic retail price of tomatoes. The key to increasing the volume of Egypt's tomato exports lies in the adoption of concerted measures aimed at substantially reducing the level of post-harvest losses and moderating domestic consumption. Both objectives can be attained by eliminating all remaining controls on domestic retail prices and on exports. Completely freeing tomato retail prices and exports is likely to raise the price for the farmer, which also will raise the retail price and, hence, moderate domestic consumption. More importantly, the higher prices charged by the farmers to the exporters—when the two are not the same—will provide major incentives for the latter to make the investments in methods of transportation and storage necessary to minimize the amount of lost output. For example, the practical measures that exporting firms can adopt to assure entry to foreign markets include using cardboard boxes—instead of straw crates—for transporting tomatoes, because straw crates leave the tomatoes exposed to the elements, and building or leasing specially cooled areas to store the tomato boxes prior to export. The adoption of such measures will become more economical when the exporters are paying higher prices to the farmers.

Several studies have attributed the problems that have plagued Egypt's tomato export industry to two main domestic sources[29]: the policies of the Egyptian government toward a whole myriad of issues ranging from domestic pricing policies to attitudes toward private exporters, and the failure, so far, of private exporters to find satisfactory solutions to the problems usually associated with the export of a highly perishable product such as tomatoes.[30] Government policy has been identified in a number of studies as having played a critical role in substantially eroding Egypt's ability to maintain the volume of its tomato exports, to say nothing of drastically expanding such a volume.[31] In relation to the dismal performance of the tomato export industry, the following charges have been leveled against the Egyptian government. First, until recently, authorities used to ban tomato exports during periods of perceived shortages in the domestic supply of tomatoes. Such bans played a significant role in eroding the confidence of foreign buyers in the ability of Egyptian exporters to meet their export obligations. The tomato export bans were motivated by a short-sighted policy aimed at maintaining domestic (retail) tomato prices at levels well below international

29. See for example, Richard Simmons "Feasibility of Exporting Fresh Winter Tomatoes from Egypt to Western Europe," in *Summary and Proceedings: Fourth Economic Workshop on the Promotion of Egyptian Exports of Horticultural Crops,* ADS/EWP no. 19; idem, "Feasibility of Exporting Winter Tomatoes to the EEC under Changing Market Conditions," in *Summary and Proceedings: Fourth Economic Workshop on the Promotion of Egyptian Exports of Horticultural Crops,* ADS/EWP no. 60; and Megahid, "Fresh Vegetable Exporting Channels."

30. Although the Egyptian government has always sought to regulate tomato exports, sometimes with disastrous consequences, the actual export process was left primarily to the private sector. Simmons, "Feasibility of Exporting Fresh Winter Tomatoes," p. 16.

31. Ibid., p. 17.

prices. Second, the Ministry of Supply continues to resort to the practice of buying a substantial part of the tomato crop, thus reducing the volume available for export. According to most observers, a substantial part of the tomato crop handled by the Ministry of Supply is lost and, therefore, never reaches the domestic consumer. Third, the exchange rate system, the government's tax policy,[32] bureaucratic hurdles to private exports, and government attitudes toward private investment in agriculture and agricultural infrastructure have acted as major impediments to the entry of private entrepreneurs and private capital, en masse, into the agricultural exports sphere.

While admitting to the adverse role played by government policy, a number of studies also have pointed to another major problem, namely, the failure of Egyptian private exporters to overcome the problems associated with exporting a highly perishable product like tomatoes. The privately controlled tomato export industry has been described as being dominated by a fairly large number of small exporters, with each handling only a small volume of exports; hence, private sector firms could not benefit from economies of scale.[33] Furthermore, the methods employed for storing, grading, and shipping tomatoes have been described as quite rudimentary, and as having greatly contributed to quality problems. Finally, private tomato exporters have been characterized as being generally unaware of market conditions abroad, except for prevailing prices. Although the basic premise on which such a critique of the performance of the private sector in the tomato (and other highly perishable horticultural products) export sphere is correct, through a process of internal restructuring, the private exports sector, nevertheless, could have overcome effectively the problems associated with exporting highly perishable products had government policy toward it been different.

Citrus Fruit Exports

At one point, great hopes were pinned on the export of Egypt's citrus fruits. Although these hopes, by and large, were not fulfilled, they were not completely dashed as was the case with tomato exports. With regard to citrus fruit exports, the record is a mixed one. The volume of citrus fruit exports increased from virtually null in the mid-1960s to about 112,000 metric tons in 1988, and has risen modestly ever since.[34] Most of the gains in export volume were realized, however, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1975, for example, the volume of citrus fruit exports was at a record high of 209,000 metric tons; 1975 was an exceptional year

32. Private exporters, for example, could not benefit from the drawback system under which public sector firms and firms in the industrial sector were to be reimbursed for all the taxes they paid on imported inputs. See, *inter alia,* Megahid, "Fresh Vegetable Exporting Channels."

33. Swaris, " 'Cropping Patterns, Food Security and Exports."

34. *FAO Trade Yearbook,* 1991. Orange exports were valued at $154 million in 1991.

and the export volume realized in that year has not been approximated in any subsequent year.

The key to the past attainment of rapid increases in export volume lay in Egypt's ability to keep increases in domestic consumption well below increases in domestic production of citrus fruits. During the 1980s, increases in domestic consumption of citrus fruits outstripped increases in domestic production (while the level of post-harvest losses remained about the same), causing the export-output ratio to drop until it hit a low of 8 percent in 1990. In a nutshell, increased domestic consumption of citrus fruit played the leading role in accounting for the deterioration in the volume of citrus fruit exports in the 1980s. Until 1988, exporting citrus fruits was a public sector monopoly. Thus, the government found it relatively easy to respond to the increase in domestic demand for citrus fruits by diverting to the domestic market a substantial part of the citrus fruit output destined for export.[35] One should not, however, blame the decline in the volume of citrus fruit exports solely on rising domestic consumption. The lack of substantial growth in the size of the area cultivated with citrus fruits—largely because government policy did not encourage the shifting of land to citrus fruit production—the failure to bring down the high levels of post-harvest losses for citrus fruit output, and the failure to increase significantly citrus fruit yields all contributed to the decline.

CONCLUSION

The overall trends in the production and export of Egypt's main export crops should not be hard to discern. In overall volume and real terms value, agricultural exports have dropped since 1965, especially since 1973. At the individual product level, there were certain variations in export performance, with cotton performing the worst and citrus fruits the best. There is, nevertheless, significant room for improved export performance for each of Egypt's main export crops, including citrus fruits.

A different set of policies toward the private sector could have gone a long way toward improving the dismal performance of Egypt's agricultural exports. It has been shown statistically that the deterioration in the real terms value of agricultural exports could have been fully reversed if substantial progress had been made toward resolving four central problems: the low rates of growth in yields for export crops (and, in the case of cotton, the deterioration in yields); the high levels of post-harvest losses; the relatively high levels of domestic consumption of agricultural commodities (maintained, in part, by government subsidies); and the shifting of land away from the production of cotton and other high-value export crops in favor of the production of the internationally non-tradeable berseem.

35. *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi,* August 23, 1982, pp. 36–7.

TABLE 1
Hypothetical Value for 1990 Agricultural Exports under Assumptions of Higher Yields, Lower Post-Harvest Losses, and Larger Area Cultivated with Main Export Crops
(in thousands)

Crop	Cultivated Area (Feddans)	Total Output (Metric Tons)	Volume of Exports (Metric Tons)	Export-Output (Percent)	Value of Exports (LE)
Cotton	61,114	724.1	196.37	27.12	781,576.16
Rice	847	2,710.4	237.16	8.75	64,981.84
Onions	102	1,081.2	214.07	19.80	100,188.32
Potatoes	217	2,256.8	471.67	20.90	219,798.78
Tomatoes	407	4,273.5	871.79	20.40	317,330.02
Garlic	33	297.0	40.69	13.70	31,046.47
Citrus	271	2,195.1	680.48	31.00	577,047.89
Other					118,841.00
				Total	2,210,810.50

Under assumptions of higher yields, substantial increases in the export-output ratios for main export crops, and a shift in the use of land from berseem to high-value export crops, there would have been about a fourteen-fold increase in the nominal value of agricultural exports between 1965 and 1990, an increase that is considerably higher than the tenfold increase in the agricultural price index (which measures inflation in the agricultural sector). Table estimates are based on World Bank projections for 1990. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Egypt: Issues of Trade Strategy and Investment Planning* (Washington, DC, 1984), no. 6521EGT.

Table 1 shows a hypothetical value for 1990 agricultural exports, derived from a scenario that assumes the following: the attainment of certain yield targets identified in a 1984 World Bank study; significant increases in the export-output ratios for all main export crops, accruing in small measure from a moderation in domestic consumption, but principally from a major reduction in post-harvest losses; and the shifting of 150,000 feddans from the production of berseem to the production of main export crops, especially cotton, as a result of a partial correction of the distortions in the system of relative agricultural prices.[36]

The deterioration in the real terms value of agricultural exports could have been reversed more fully if government policy toward the agricultural sector succeeded in creating the conditions necessary for realizing the objectives, specified above, pertaining to yields, size of area cultivated with main export crops, and the level of exports from the enhanced output. The above scenario for reversing the deterioration in the real terms value of Egypt's agricultural exports

36. In our scenario, the 150,000 feddans shifted away from berseem is reallocated among main export crops in the following manner: cotton, 100,000 feddans; rice, 10,000 feddans; onions, 10,000 feddans; potatoes, 10,000 feddans; tomatoes, 5,000 feddans; garlic, 5,000 feddans; citrus fruits, 10,000 feddans.

does not specify an increase in the overall size of the cultivated area via land reclamation; increasing cultivatable areas through land reclamation programs is not a necessary condition for reversing the deterioration in agricultural exports. Nevertheless, under the right set of conditions pertaining to yields, type of crops grown, and especially export-output ratios from any newly reclaimed lands, a successful land reclamation program could have made an important contribution to the development of Egypt's agricultural exports in the post-1973 period. By the consensus of observers, however, the real contribution of newly reclaimed desert areas to agricultural exports and agricultural output remains small.[37] In actuality, Egyptian policy has failed on the two fronts of protecting agricultural exports from the old lands and developing agricultural exports from any newly reclaimed areas; this dual failure can be attributed to government policy toward the private sector in agriculture.

The basic failure of the government lay in its unwillingness to pursue a set of policies aimed at freeing private sector access to the international agricultural markets. Freeing exports would have been the most effective means to bring domestic prices up to their international equivalents. Higher agricultural prices would have provided farmers with the necessary incentives to increase yields, return land from the production of berseem to the production of main export crops, and expand production of export crops on new lands. High prices also would have encouraged growers and exporters to minimize the levels of post-harvest losses and put pressure on domestic consumers to rationalize their consumption of agricultural products.

37. IBRD, *Egypt: Issues of Trade Strategy and Investment Planning*; USDA/FAS-Cairo, *Agricultural Situation Report*, selected years, 1981–89.

THE POSTAGE STAMP: A WINDOW ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ

Donald Malcolm Reid

As a result of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war, President Saddam Hussein came to personify Iraq, or at least the Iraqi regime, in the minds of most Americans. Portraying him as the epitome of evil—another Hitler—helped President George Bush rally support for the war against Iraq. Inside Iraq, Hussein has, indeed, personified his country since taking over as president in 1979. The stamps of Iraq—like its monuments, posters, textbooks, museums, and media—provide revealing evidence of Hussein's image as a larger-than-life leader and of the road modern Iraq has traveled.[1] Around the world, stamps are a form of propaganda through which governments project selected images, and they are too illuminating a source to be left only to the philatelist.

By their frequency of appearance or absence, symbols of Sunnis and Shi'a, Arabs and Kurds, and ancient Mesopotamian and classical Islamic themes document the unending construction and reconstruction of modern Iraqi identity.

1. For a historical perspective on the use of stamps in Islamic countries, see Harry W. Hazard, "Islamic Philately as an Ancillary Discipline," in James Kritzeck and R. B. Winder, eds., *The World of Islam* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1960), pp. 199–233; Donald M. Reid, "Egyptian History through Stamps," *Muslim World* 62 (1972); and idem, "The Symbolism of Postage Stamps," *Journal of Contemporary History* 19 (1984). On a popular level, *Aramco World* occasionally publishes well-illustrated articles on the stamps of Arab countries. For Iraqi cultural history, see Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968–89* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), which makes some reference to postage stamps; and Samir al-Khalil, *The Monument: Art, Vulgarity and Responsibility in Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For general background to the issues of cultural and historical representation, see Bernard Lewis, *History Remembered, Recovered, Invented* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), and E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

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For example, the earliest Iraqi stamps from the 1920s reflected British domination and efforts to install the Hashimite monarchy, while following the 1958 revolution stamps reflected the rise to prominence of the military and the Baath Party. Iraqi postage stamps also provide a useful gauge of the intermittent interplay of local territorial nationalism, pan-Arabism, and Islam in official ideology.

POSTAL PORTRAITS, MILITARY THEMES, AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY

Saddam Hussein has reigned supreme on Iraqi stamps since 1979. He was not, however, the first Iraqi ruler to saturate stamps with his own portrait. Following a precedent set by Queen Victoria in 1840, when she appeared on the world's first postage stamp,[2] Iraq's kings under the British-dominated monarchy between 1921 and 1958 had done the same. Placing rulers on postage stamps was a natural extension of the practice—dating back to ancient Greece and Rome—of showing the ruler's portrait on coins as a symbol of sovereignty. After 1840, other European monarchs followed Britain's example of carrying this tradition over to their stamps. Putting one's name on coins and having it recited in the *khutba* during Friday prayers were the two traditional symbols of Islamic sovereignty. With the exception of Iranians,[3] however, Islamic rulers generally shied away from using their portraits on stamps until the early twentieth century. Such portraits would have seemed too close to the idolatry against which Islam had first defined itself. Instead, a *tughra* (a stylized royal signature), a coat of arms, or a crescent and star often took pride of place on early stamps.[4]

An Ottoman sultan, Mehmed V, first appeared on a stamp in 1914.[5] In the 1920s, when most of the Middle East was under Western imperial rule, other rulers followed suit. King Faysal I, the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, whom the British made king of Iraq in 1921, first appears on stamps in 1927 wearing a *kufiyya* (plate 1:8). Later stamps project him also as a Westernized ruler, in coat and tie (plate 1:9). Faysal's son and grandson, Ghazi and Faysal II, respectively, also appeared on Iraqi stamps during their reigns; one can even see Faysal II grow up on succeeding issues. Because they were farther removed than Faysal I from their family's desert roots, Ghazi and Faysal II appeared only in Western coat and tie or military uniform.[6] Ironically, Faysal II honored the army with a set of stamps in January 1958, a scant six months before it overthrew him.[7]

2. *Scott 1993 Standard Postage Stamp Catalogue*, 4 vols. (Sidney, OH: Scott Publishing Co., 1992), Great Britain, 1. Following standard practice, *Scott* numbers cited here are for lists for each country, with page and volume numbers omitted. In this article, *Scott* citations with no country mentioned are for Iraq.

3. *Scott*, Iran, 27.

4. *Scott*, Turkey, 1, 8, 95.

5. *Scott*, Turkey, 270.

6. *Scott*, 61, 102, 110, 139.

7. *Scott*, 181–4.


The new government of General Abd al-Karim Qasim continued using existing stocks of stamps, but with *al-jumhuriyya al-Iraqiyya* (the Iraqi republic) overprinted across the late king's face (plate 1:10). The first stamps designed by the Qasim government appropriately displayed a soldier against the flag.[8] Military themes have predominated ever since. One example are the Martyrs Day stamps, issued annually since 1982 to honor the war dead. Several Martyrs Day stamps display the "Monument of Saddam's Qadisiya Martyrs," a 150-foot mosque's onion dome split in half.[9]

The larger-than-life figure of Qasim, the first of four military rulers between 1958 and Hussein's accession in 1979, dominated Iraqi stamps until his overthrow in 1963 (plate 2:11). The image of "the great leader," always in uniform, towering above his soldiers represents that of a dictator claiming to embody the popular will. One stamp celebrates Qasim's recovery from an assassination attempt, an effort in which a young Saddam Hussein participated.[10] This cult of the great leader is qualitatively different from the staid royal portraits both on earlier Iraqi and on British and other European stamps.

The Arif brothers, who ruled successively from Qasim's overthrow in 1963 until 1968, wore military uniforms in their infrequent appearances on stamps. Hussein's immediate predecessor, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr appeared both in uniform and in civilian coat and tie. The infrequency of Bakr's appearance on stamps probably reflects Hussein's growing power behind the scenes and his reluctance to foster a personality cult centered on the patron and ally he intended to succeed.

Although Bakr appeared alone on stamps several times in the first years after the 1968 coup that brought the Baath to power, a revealing stamp from 1976 shows Hussein embracing the president, suggesting where the real power already lay (plate 1:1). Bakr appeared one last time on a 1979 set in which "Struggler President Saddam Hussain received the leadership banner from the Father Leader Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakir" (plate 1:2). Once he had become president, Hussein exploited the stamps to foster a cult of personality as pervasive as that of Qasim. Although Hussein rose to power as a civilian activist in the Baath without ever serving in the military, Bakr had made him a general. As president, Hussein frequently appeared in uniform on stamps. On some stamps he is a war hero in the battle against Iran (plate 1:4). In addition to his image as a military leader, Hussein also depicts himself as father figure, pious Muslim, and master builder: he extends a paternal embrace to a child (plate 1:3); he touches the Kaaba's black stone on a pilgrimage to Mecca (plate 1:5); he wields a shovel to reconstruct the city of Basra after the war with Iran (plate 1:6). Sometimes he is a civilian president in coat and tie, and occasionally he dons a kufiyya as a traditional Arab leader (plate

8. *Scott*, 228.
9. *Scott*, 1,159.
10. *Scott*, 258.


REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
150 FILS
4th ANNIVERSARY OF OIL NATIONALIZATION
1
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
100 FILS
2
IRAQ
28 نيسان
29 APRIL
100 FILS
3
Republic Of Iraq
100 FILS
THE FIRST QADISSIYA BATTLE
4
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
POSTAGE
25 FILS
PILGRIMAGE 1401
5
IRAQ
Basrah Re.construction
Great Campaign Ends 14/6/1989
100 FILS
6
IRAQ
500 Fils
7
8
IRAQ
15 FILS
9
10
PLATE 1


الجمهورية العراقية
6 FILS
REPUBLIC of IRAQ
3 ANNAS
POSTAGE REVENUE
IRAQ
الجمهورية العراقية
POSTAGE
20 REPUBLIC ٢٠
FILS OF IRAQ
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
الجمهورية العراقية
25 FILS
3rd ANNIV. OF 18 NOV. REVOLUTION
العراق
IRAQ
100 FILS POSTAGE
POSTAGE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ الجمهورية العراقية بريد
25 FILS
2nd ANNIVERSARY OF OIL NATIONALISATION
70 FILS POSTAGE
IRAQ العراق
POSTAGE
90 fils
IN MEMORY OF BILAT AL -SHUHADA SCHOOL VICTIMS
150 FILS IRAQ العراق
مدرسة بلاط الشهداء
POSTAGE
13.10.1987
IN MEMORY OF BILAT AL -SHUHADA SCHOOL VICTIMS
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
الجمهورية العراقية
POSTAGE
120 FILS
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
PLATE 2

1:7). Beginning in 1984, commemorative stamps marked Hussein's every birthday (plate 1:3).

In the last two decades, Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba, Syria's Hafiz al-Asad, and Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat came close to Qasim and Hussein in promoting cults of personality. Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi appeared occasionally, and Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasir, Sudan's Jaafar al-Numayri, and the presidents of Algeria seldom appeared on their country's stamps. In contrast to the more flamboyant Sadat, his cautious successor, Husni Mubarak, has kept a lower profile and refrained from putting his portrait on any stamps.

FROM "COLONIAL PICTURESQUE" TO TURATH

Saddam Hussein inherited from the stamps of previous regimes a variety of possible symbols for defining and promoting a national identity for Iraq. The Ottoman stamps—first issued in 1863 and used in the region until World War I—reflected the view from Istanbul and promoted Ottoman, not Iraqi, symbols. The British military authorities who succeeded the Ottomans used stocks of captured stamps from 1917 to 1923, overprinting them in English with *Baghdad* (later *Iraq*), *In British Occupation*, and a unit of value in the annas and rupees of British India. When Britain granted Iraq qualified independence in 1932, the only immediate indication on the stamps was the change from annas and rupees to fils and dinars (plate 1:9).

The first stamps designed specifically for Iraq reflected the need British officials felt to construct an identity for the mandate, whose borders had been defined by British conquest, diplomacy, and imperial interest. The decision to make the stamps bilingual—in English and Arabic—set a precedent that Iraqi stamps still follow. Because of the legacy of imperialism, the stamps of Western countries need only the national language to bear their propaganda to audiences at home and abroad. Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, however, add a Western language to reach international audiences; even the Islamic Republic of Iran uses English on its stamps.

Before settling on Faysal's portrait as the national symbol for stamps, the British designed a set whose style can be called "colonial picturesque,"[11] a genre that became popular in other colonial settings throughout the Middle East and beyond. The scenes selected for the 1923–25 Iraqi set evoke a quaint "Oriental" land as viewed by Western romantics and travelers: *gufa*s (round goat-skin boats) on the Tigris River, a stylized palm tree, a rider from the camel corps, a Sunni and a Shi'i mosque, Babylonian and Assyrian reliefs, and the great arch of Ctesiphon (plate 2:12).

This Iraqi set exploits three types of colonial picturesque images: mosques to symbolize Islam, colorful natural and human "scenery," and pre-Islamic—in this

11. *Scott*, 1–13.

case, "Mesopotamian"—antiquities. The choice of a Sunni mosque was obvious since Sunnis dominated the government under both the Ottomans and the British (and would continue to do so under the independent monarchy and the revolutionary governments). Including the Shi'i mosque of al-Kazimayn—the burial place of the seventh imam—was a gesture to the Shi'i Arab majority that predominated from Baghdad south.

The mostly Sunni Kurds of the northwest—divided by language from the dominant Sunni Arab minority—received no recognition on this set comparable to the Shi'a. Assyrian antiquities are sometimes shown on the stamps, but although they occupy the heartland of ancient Assyria, the Kurds do not identify with the Assyrians. If they identify with any ancient historic people at all, the Kurds—who speak an Indo-European language related to Persian—look to the Medes, enemies of the Semitic-speaking Assyrians. Usually opposed to the Arab-dominated government in Baghdad, the Kurds received scanty and ambiguous recognition on stamps only in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Mesopotamian antiquities component of the 1923–25 set reflected Western fascination with the Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian remains that Leonard Woolley and other Western archaeologists were uncovering at the time. The arch of Ctesiphon, one of the pre-Islamic motifs, could have become problematic after independence, because it represents an Iranian Sassanid achievement. The arch does appear, however, in a 1967 set promoting tourism.[12] Unlike the Sumerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians, Iranians still exist today; perhaps only a specialist would remember the arch as an Iranian achievement.

The camel corps, the goat-skin boats, and palm trees were commonplace in Iraq in the 1920s, but Iraqis of the day would not have chosen them spontaneously to symbolize their country-in-the-making. Not until the 1960s did the revolutionary governments of rapidly modernizing Iraq begin promoting *turath,* or heritage, celebrating local folk customs that in some cases were about to vanish. A 1967 set, "Folklore," depicts men and women in regional costumes; two years later, the journal *al-Turath al-sha'bi* (Popular folklore) was founded.[13]

Folklore became an obsession with Hussein. He saw it as a means of popular appeal to Kurds, Shi'a, and smaller minority groups, while also bringing them together in a larger Iraqi unity. For example, stamps promoted the regional spring festivals in Mosul and elsewhere that celebrated local dress, dance, music, crafts, and colloquial poetry. *Scott* describes even a set showing flowers as "Local Flowers."[14] In 1971, during a lull in the conflict with the Kurds, stamps made the symbolic cultural concession of honoring the Kurdish—and also Iranian—new year festival of Now Ruz. The portrayal of the legendary blacksmith Kawa taming a serpent on one Now Ruz stamp is a remarkable official recognition of Kurdish

12. *Scott,* 456.
13. *Scott,* 443–9; and Baram, *Culture,* p. 31.
14. *Scott,* 1,103–8.

folklore.[15] Unlike the stamps promoting tourism—with pictures of a magic carpet over Baghdad and Sindbad the Sailor—the spring festival and folklore stamps were intended for local consumption.[16] Many modern folkways were assumed, with or without historical evidence, to have descended directly from ancient Mesopotamia.

Except for the Lion of Babylon in a 1941–42 set,[17] the stamps of the independent monarchy after 1932 avoided ancient Mesopotamian symbols. The lure of the colonial picturesque faded as British control receded, in part because identification of modern Iraq with ancient Mesopotamia was slow to take root among Iraqis themselves. Under President Qasim, ancient Mesopotamian symbols suddenly appear full-blown on stamps. This occurrence was in keeping with his support for Iraqi territorial nationalism and his attempt to hold Nasir and the pan-Arab Baathists at bay. Mesopotamian history, which had received more emphasis in school texts after the overthrow of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani's Arab nationalist government in 1941, was beginning to take root. Qasim's stamps display the new national emblem he selected, the Akkadian sun—an eight-pointed star with radiating light waves between its points (plate 2:13). The similar eight-pointed star of Ishtar was even added to the national flag.

As Arab nationalists, the Arif brothers dropped the star of Ishtar from the flag and stamps, and, with one exception,[18] did not use the Akkadian sun on stamps. Mesopotamian themes appeared only rarely, such as for International Tourist Year, on a set depicting Hammurabi and celebrating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and on stamps commemorating the new Baghdad Museum.[19]

After 1968, the stamps of the Baathist regime reflected its complex but determined attempt to embrace a Mesopotamian heritage without abandoning the Baath's commitment to Arab nationalism. Hussein advertised international festivals held at Babylon, where he reconstructed parts of the ancient city of Nebuchadnezzar (plate 2:15). Stamping the bricks with his own name like the ancient ruler, Hussein became the new Nebuchadnezzar, the conquerer of Jerusalem who carried off the Jews into Babylonian captivity. Hussein appropriated unprecedented funds for regional antiquities museums, excavations, and the reconstruction of Mesopotamian sites in an attempt to bring diverse Iraqis together as common heirs of ancient Mesopotamia.[20] Although Hussein's stamps retain some images similar to those first selected by the British in the 1920s, their symbolism has been transformed: colonial picturesque has been transmuted into turath, while Mesopotamian artifacts have evolved from Western archaeologists'

15. *Scott,* 532, 591.
16. *Scott,* 805, 591, C15. See "Mosul's Spring Festivals," pp. 30–40, and "Folklore and Mesopotamian Culture," pp. 53–60 in Baram, *Culture.*
17. *Scott,* 84.
18. *Scott,* 305.
19. *Scott,* 344, 418–20, 452–6.
20. Baram, *Culture,* pp. 41–52.

and tourists' delights into treasured symbols of modern Iraqis' proud and ancient heritage.

REVOLUTIONARY SYMBOLS OF "THE PEOPLE" AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Since 1958, the stamps commemorating Iraq's numerous revolutions—or strictly speaking, coups—have alternated between great leader portraits and symbolic images of the triumphant "people"—soldiers, industrial workers, peasants, white-collar professionals or officials, and women in both traditional and modern garb (plate 2:14). The influence of the Soviet school of socialist realism is clearly evident. The Soviet Union pioneered the use of broken chains and rising suns as revolutionary symbols, and Iraqi stamps picked up on these, as well as on the flaming torch, as universal symbols of revolution.

Oil derricks introduce a jarring note on one stamp in a 1941–42 set that was otherwise rooted in the colonial picturesque tradition.[21] This particular image portrayed Iraq's aspiration to be something more than a quaint land of oriental folkways, Mesopotamian antiquities, venerable mosques, and a transplanted Hashimite monarchy. By the 1950s, Faysal II's stamps proudly advertised the symbols of modernity that oil revenue was helping to buy: new bridges, dams, pipelines, factory machinery, airplanes, and telegraph lines.[22] The stamps of later revolutionary regimes also made extensive use of these symbols of industrial modernity, particularly the oil industry; stamps celebrate the anniversaries of Iraq's nationalization of oil in 1972, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and oil pipelines.

The most striking Iraqi stamp design of all may be the set commemorating the nationalization of the oil industry in 1972 (plate 2:16). Capsulizing five millenia of history, it shows a Sumerian prince and other Mesopotamian antiquities (including an Assyrian lion), the spiral minaret of the Malwiyya mosque of Samarra, and concludes with symbols of the oil industry and a pair of arms reaching skyward from a pool of oil. Interestingly, the arrangement of the symbols in rough chronological progression from left to right reflects the order of English rather than Arabic reading.

ARAB NATIONALISM

Unless his kufiyya can be read as an Arab nationalist symbol, Faysal I's stamps give no hint of the role he played in the early pan-Arab movement. The British decision to switch from the Greek-derived Western term *Mesopotamia* to the Arabic *al-Iraq* indicates recognition of Iraq's predominantly Arab character.

21. *Scott*, 98.
22. *Scott*, 161, C1.

A set of Faysal II stamps honoring the sixth Arab Engineers Conference held in Baghdad in 1955 reflects the loose pan-Arabism associated with the Arab League since its founding in 1945.[23]

Only one of Qasim's stamps suggests any interest in Arabism, and even that speaks only of taking "complete Iraqi unity" and "tying it to Arab and Islamic brotherhood."[24] Arabism came into its own on the stamps of his successors, the Arif brothers. Commemorations of Arab League anniversaries, pan-Arab conferences of professional groups, and other Arab themes have abounded ever since.

Egypt, Jordan, and Syria all issued stamps commemorating the eleventh-century Islamic ruler Salah al-Din,[25] who came from Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. Surprisingly, Iraq has not. The discrepancy is probably not because this hero of Arab nationalism was a Kurd—after all, Hussein has named a province for him—but, rather, perhaps because Salah al-Din's battles were not fought in Iraq. While Salah al-Din has no Iraqi stamp, a 1979 stamp honors Sati' al-Husri, the educator and ideologue who developed a pan-Arab curriculum for Iraqi schools in the interwar period.[26] Other stamps project an Arab national feeling back into pre-Islamic times by celebrating the clash at Dhi Qar of Arab tribesmen with Persian regulars and Arab tribal allies.[27] Since 1968, the Baathist regime has also issued one stamp after another celebrating anniversaries of the Baath and its party congresses.

Dedication to the struggle against Israel, however nominally, and to the cause of Palestine is a symbolic litmus test of Arab nationalism, but only since 1965 have Iraqi stamps met the test. A 1965 issue commemorated the 1948 massacre of Palestinian villagers at Dayr Yasin.[28] The image of a bloody dagger sticking in a map of Palestine was a pan-Arab design that other Arab countries also used for the occasion.

Iraq portrayed its costly 1980–88 war with Iran as but one phase of an ancient Arab national struggle. Recalling the battle in which an Arab Muslim army vanquished the Iranian Sassanids in 637 A.D., the Iran-Iraq War became "Saddam's Qadissiya" (plate 1:4). One set mourns the death of Iraqi children from an Iranian missile that hit the Bilat al-Shuhada' School. On one stamp, the clawed paw of an Iranian beast holds aloft the bloody head of a child (plate 2:19); another shows an in-coming missile labeled *Khomeini* and a protesting red "No!"—in English only (plate 2:18). Ironically, Iraq's al-Hussein missile, celebrated on other stamps,[29] caused similar loss of life among Iranian civilians. Stamps celebrated the 1988 Iran-Iraq cease-fire as an Iraqi victory,[30] then showed

23. *Scott*, 161.
24. *Scott*, 296.
25. *Scott*, Egypt, 401; Syria, 549; Jordan, 1,295.
26. *Scott*, 937.
27. *Scott*, 1,109.
28. *Scott*, 372.
29. *Scott*, 1,362.
30. *Scott*, 1,368.

a towering Hussein reconstructing Faw and Basra (plate 1:6).

ISLAMIC THEMES

Aside from the picturesque mosques during the mandate and the monarchy, explicitly Islamic themes first appear on Iraqi stamps in the 1960s under the Arifs, along with the simultaneous appearance of Arab nationalist themes. Many of these stamps could be read as either Arab nationalist or Islamist, but with little appeal to Shi'a or Kurds in any case. Fewer stamps than one might expect celebrate early Baghdad and the great Abbasid age.[31]

First the Arifs and then the Baathist regime issued stamps commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday and the Islamic New Year. These appeared nearly every year from 1965 through 1972, and again from 1977 through 1982.[32] Stamps celebrating the *hajj* were also issued in 1978, 1979, and 1981.[33] The insecurity of the Arifs and of the Baathist regime in its first few years may account for the first flurry of stamps with these religious themes. The resurgence of Shi'i political activism in the mid-1970s may help account for the resumption of the religious theme in 1977. By 1981, when the war with Iran was going badly and Hussein made the hajj, the need to tap religious sources of support was obvious.

It can be argued that "Saddam's Qadissiya" stamps had religious as well as Arab nationalist appeal in some Sunni circles; the original seventh-century battle was not just a victory of Arabs over Persians, but also of Muslims over unbelievers. In 1986, the year the Iranians overran Faw and threatened Basra, the Qadisiyya set enlisted an explicitly Shi'i symbol (plate 2:17). An Arab warrior with "Allahu Akbar" on his shield—after the invasion of Kuwait the words would be added to the Iraqi flag—brandishes the magical Dhu al-Fiqar, the two pointed sword the Prophet acquired at the battle of Badr; it could put out both eyes of an enemy at once. Passed on to Ali ibn Abi Talib, the sword became a Shi'i symbol.[34] Other stamps in the set depicted Iraq's al-Hussein missile, which was named for the third Shi'i imam, whose name the Iraqi president conveniently shares.[35] Hussein further bid for Shi'i support with a genealogy tracing his line back to Hussein ibn Ali. Stamps also celebrated the Shi'i shrine at Najaf and the 1920 "revolution," which was primarily a Shi'i tribal uprising against the British.[36] Except for the Dhu al-Fiqar stamps and the split mosque dome of the martyrs monument, Islamic themes are few on the stamps during the later years of the Iran-Iraq War. Perhaps Hussein had become his own deliverer. As noted earlier,

31. *Scott,* 304.
32. *Scott,* 384, 431.
33. *Scott,* 895.
34. Khalil, *Monument,* p. 11.
35. *Scott,* 1,362.
36. *Scott,* 553, 1,423.

from 1984 on, annual stamps commemorated his own birthday—not that of the Prophet.

NON-IDEOLOGICAL AND INTERNATIONAL THEMES

It would be wrong to leave the impression that all of Iraq's stamps were highly charged with ideology. Many stamps were issued that had little propaganda content, such as those depicting fish, birds, fruits, and flowers. Stamps commemorating the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, participation in the Olympics, and other sporting events merely express normal national pride.

Iraq also used its stamps to project the image of a good international citizen by commemorating anniversaries of the United Nations, UNESCO, UNICEF, Interpol, the International Labor Organization, and the Red Cross-Red Crescent societies. Doves and olive branches, long universalized as symbols of peace, appeared frequently. International themes could, of course, be put to use politically, as in a 1985 set showing the Geneva Convention, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and other symbols in protest against the deaths of Iraqi prisoners in Iran.[37]

Not surprisingly, Iraq had no wish to advertise on its stamps its dependence on either superpower. The Soviet-Iraqi alliance went uncommemorated; and, unlike Egypt and several other Arab countries,[38] in 1970 Iraq did not commemorate the centenary of Lenin's birth. In contrast to the fierce anti-Americanism of Libyan and Iranian stamps in the 1980s, the United States, with one minor exception,[39] does not figure negatively on Iraqi stamps even when US-Iraqi relations were poor. At the same time, the United States does not figure positively on the stamps as relations improved in the later 1970s and 1980s.[40]

In 1982, Iraq commemorated the Israeli raid that destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor, the propaganda value presumably outweighing the pain of remembering the humiliation (plate 2:20). Anti-Israeli themes also included a 1989 stamp showing a crowd of demonstrators supporting the "Palestinian Uprising until Victory."[41] A 1989 commemorative honoring the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) shows King Hussein of Jordan and presidents Saddam Hussein, Husni Mubarak, and Ali Abdallah Salih of Yemen with clasped hands triumphantly raised aloft. In February 1990, a stamp celebrated the first anniversary of the ACC, just five months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to the collapse of

37. *Scott,* 1,198–1,201.

38. *Scott,* Egypt, C126; Syria, C454; Lebanon, C648.

39. *Scott,* 833. This 1977 set, with a design shared by a number of Arab countries, asks "Who killed [Lebanese Druze leader Kamal] Junblatt?" Barely visible at the top are tiny caricatures representing the United States, Britain, and Israel.

40. Unfortunately, *Scott*'s 1993 edition does not list Iraqi stamps issued after 1989, and this author has no information on any Iraqi stamps that might have been issued since the invasion of Kuwait.

41. Not listed in *Scott.*

the organization.[42] Iraq's stamps provide only minimal information on its relations with Kuwait. The occasional maps of Iraq on stamps sometimes clearly imply recognition of Kuwait's separateness, but at other times do not.[43] In 1972, an Iraqi commemorative celebrated the opening of the Rumayla oil field along the disputed Iraq-Kuwait border.[44]

CONCLUSION

Iraqi postage stamps provide a significant gauge of the images that Saddam Hussein wanted to project and of Iraq's turbulent political course through the twentieth century. The stamps illustrate the ever-changing interplay of local territorial nationalism, pan-Arabism, and Islam in the struggle to define Iraq's identity. They broadcast Iraq's determination to become a modern industrial and military power, but also its desire for recognition as a bona fide member of the world community.

The view of Saddam Hussein's Iraq that postage stamps provide is necessarily incomplete and distorted. It is an official view from the center and the top, not from outside, from the provinces, or from below. Restricted though that view may be, it is a significant part of the cultural and political history of a country that few outsiders have been able to study first-hand in recent years and whose conflicts with its neighbors, Israel, and the West have brought it to the forefront of contemporary Middle Eastern and world affairs.



42. *Scott*, 1,383. The 1990 stamp is not listed in *Scott*.
43. *Scott*, 865, 779.
44. *Scott*, 648.



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Chronology

July 16, 1992-October 15, 1992

ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and South Asia; Western Europe; Central Eurasia*
FT, *Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia

1992

July 16: Israeli minister of housing and construction Binyamin Ben Eliezer announced a week-long freeze on new housing contracts in Israel and the occupied territories. [7/17 NYT, WP]

In several outbursts in the Gaza Strip, Fatah and Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) members opened fire on each other, ending a three-day truce. Twelve Palestinians were injured in the clashes. [7/17 WP]

July 17: In Nablus, a standoff between Israeli soldiers and about 2,000 Palestinian students at al-Najah University ended when six Palestinians—Majid al-Masri, Nasir Awayiz, Yasir Badawi, Abdallah Abd al-Qadir, Bil'il Duwayqat, and Mahmud Ta'ib—agreed to Israeli demands that they surrender and submit to "voluntary exile" in Jordan for three years. The standoff had developed four days earlier when the Israeli army surrounded the university during campus elections and demanded to search any person leaving the campus.

Israeli authorities lifted the 24-hour curfew in Nablus. [7/18 WP, 7/20 FBIS]

July 19: In Jerusalem, US secretary of state James Baker and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin held talks on the Middle East peace process. It was the first stop on a five-nation Middle East tour by Baker. He also planned to visit Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. [7/20 NYT, WP]

Israel announced plans to review all decisions concerning new construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that had been approved by the government of former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir. The cabinet also confirmed the Ministry of Housing and Construction's week-long moratorium on construction contracts. [7/20 NYT]

July 20: US secretary of state Baker and Israeli prime minister Rabin continued talks on the Middle East peace process and US loan guarantees.

Baker also held meetings with members of the Palestinian delegation to bilateral Middle East peace talks, led by Faisal al-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi. [7/21 NYT, WP, FT]

July 21: In Cairo, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and Israeli prime minister Rabin held meetings on bilateral Middle East peace talks, as well as the US-Russian-sponsored multilateral negotiations. It was the first meeting between Egyptian and Israeli heads of state in six years. At the conclusion of the meetings, Mubarak announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit Israel at a convenient time in the future. [7/21 FBIS, 7/22 WP]

In Yaabad near Janin, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Muhammad Khalil Kab'ah, 30. [7/23 FBIS]

July 22: US secretary of state Baker met with Egyptian president Mubarak in Cairo and with

Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad in Latakia, Syria. [7/23 WP]

According to Qol Yisrael, Mahmud Abu Hasan, the head of the Black Panthers in Janin, was killed in a gunfight between three alleged members of the Black Panthers and the Israeli army. [7/24 FBIS]

July 23: The Israeli government announced that after reviewing its records, it would freeze construction on some 6,880 new housing settlements and several highways in the West Bank and Gaza Strip while, at the same time, allowing the completion of more than 8,700 new housing units already under construction. It also approved the construction of 1,686 new apartments in the Jerusalem area. [7/23 FBIS, 7/24 WP, FBIS, JP]

Israeli authorities barred Palestinian peace talk delegates Ahmad Shraym and Hisam Abu Bakr from leaving the West Bank via the Allenby Bridge. Seven other members of the delegation declined to cross in solidarity with Shraym and Bakr. [7/24 FBIS]

July 25: At the conclusion of two days of talks in Damascus, the foreign ministers of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and the head of foreign relations for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) endorsed the continuation of Middle East peace talks, but noted that they did not see a significant change in the policies of the new Israeli government. [7/26 WP]

July 29: Authorities allowed the Institute of Arab Studies, headed by Faisal al-Husseini, to reopen for the first time in four years. [7/30 FBIS]

July 30: In Jerusalem's Old City near the Dung Gate, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Salah Karim, 24, after he attacked two Israeli policemen with a knife, killing Rishon Pinhas Dadi, 39. [7/31 JP]

July 31: In an interview with *Ha'aretz*, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat offered to meet with Israeli prime minister Rabin to talk about peace. It was the first time in 10 years that Arafat agreed to be interviewed by an Israeli newspaper. [8/1 WP]

Aug. 2: Israeli soldier Daniyel Derzy, 20, died in Beersheba's Soroka Hospital from wounds sustained in clashes with Palestinians in Khan Yunis the preceding night. [8/5 FBIS]

In Khan Yunis, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Usama Najar during a gunfight. Israeli officials said that Najar had been "wanted" on charges of killing Palestinian collaborators and wounding an Israeli in 1991. [8/3 WP]

Aug. 3: Qol Yisrael reported that Teddy Kolleck, the Israeli mayor of Jerusalem, announced that he would not sign any more demolition orders for Palestinian homes until the Israeli government reformed the process through which Palestinians obtained building permits so that it mirrored the process for Israeli Jews. [8/5 FBIS]

Israeli prime minister Rabin appointed Itamar Rabinovich, an Israeli expert on Syria, to head the Israeli negotiating team meeting with Syrian negotiators in bilateral Middle East peace talks. [8/4 WP]

Aug. 4: During a gunfight, Israeli soldiers shot and killed three unidentified "Arabs" who crossed illegally into the West Bank from Jordan. [8/5 NYT]

Aug. 6: Israel announced a two-week moratorium on the allocation of "state land" for privately financed construction of Jewish settlements. Settlers had announced plans to continue construction as scheduled in defiance of government bans. [8/7 NYT]

In Jerusalem, about 5,000 Israeli settlers and their supporters demonstrated against cuts in government-supported settlement construction by the Rabin government. [8/7 WP, FBIS]

Aug. 9: At Kiryat Arba, settlers protesting new Israeli government policies illegally completed construction on a house and barricaded themselves in it to avoid arrest by Israeli soldiers. The settlers agreed to leave the house when they were granted two weeks to obtain a building permit. Ten Israelis were arrested during the confrontation. [8/10 WP]

At least 13 families from the Forum for Jerusalem, a coalition of Jewish groups dedicated to taking over Palestinian homes in the Old City of Jerusalem, moved into seven houses in the Muslim quarter. The Jewish families reportedly had lived in the houses previously and had vacated them for repairs. [8/10 NYT, FBIS]

Aug. 10: Palestinian human rights groups announced that based on an exam by Edward McDonough, a US pathologist sent by Physicians for Human Rights, Mustafa Mahmud Abd al-Hadi Barakat's death on 4 August resulted from an asthma attack that was "brought about by conditions in detention." Barakat had been detained in Tulkarm the day before he died. [8/11 NYT]

In Gaza, unidentified assailants stabbed and killed suspected collaborators Hasan al-Akbati and Jamal Sahir. [8/11 FBIS]

The Bush administration announced that all of the parties to bilateral Middle East peace talks had agreed to reconvene in Washington on 24 August for the sixth round of talks. [8/11 NYT, WP]

Israel announced plans to grant diplomatic status to the European Community representative in charge of economic and humanitarian aid for Palestinians in the occupied territories. It had previously refused to do so. [8/11 FBIS]

Aug. 11: Following two days of meetings at US president George Bush's home in Kennebunkport, Maine, Bush and Israeli prime minister Rabin returned to Washington to announce their agreement on a five-year $10 billion package of US loan guarantees for Israel. The package had been delayed for more than a year because of disagreements between Israel and the United States over the possible use of the monies for settlement of the occupied territories. [8/12 WP]

Aug. 12: At a background briefing in Washington, Israeli prime minister Rabin alleged that two weeks earlier Syria had test fired Scud-C ballistic missiles, allegedly acquired from North Korea. Rabin also

said Syria was planning to manufacture the missiles in the future. The Scud-C has a longer range than the more prevalent Scud-B, but it is not considered as accurate. [8/14 WP]

Mazin al-Yusuf, Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) representative in Lebanon, denied reports that PLF leader Muhammad al-Abbas [Abu Abbas] had been arrested by Iraqi authorities while traveling from Baghdad to Amman. A separate report from a spokesman also claiming to represent the PLF confirmed the arrest and called on Iraq to release Abbas. [8/13 FBIS]

Aug. 13: In the Gaza Strip, unidentified assailants murdered suspected collaborator Ahmad Masman, 27. [8/14 FBIS]

Aug. 17: The *Washington Post* reported that the preceding week in a private meeting with American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) leaders in Washington, Israeli prime minister Rabin criticized the organization for its extensive intervention in US-Israeli diplomacy and blamed it for leading the previous Israeli government into a confrontation with the Bush administration over US-backed loan guarantees. [8/17 WP]

In Gaza, representatives of Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Arab Liberation Front signed a "Charter of National Honor." Among other measures, the charter established a Supreme National Command to replace the Unified National Command of the Uprising and sharply denounced the murder of suspected Palestinian collaborators in Gaza. [8/19 FBIS]

Aug. 20: *Ha'aretz* reported that Israeli Construction and Housing Ministry director-general Arye Bar had warned Israeli building contractors to cease construction in settlements in the occupied territories or face nonpayment by the government of existing bills. [8/20 FBIS]

Aug. 21: At least four Palestinians working with the Palestinian delegation to bilateral Middle East peace talks in Washington were prevented from leaving the West Bank by way of the Allenby Bridge on the grounds that they were too young to leave without special permits. In protest, the entire delegation returned to Jerusalem. [8/21 FBIS, 8/22 NYT, WP]

Aug. 23: The Israeli Prime Minister's Office announced a series of "goodwill gestures" toward Palestinians including the following: the release of some 800 Palestinian prisoners who had served more than two-thirds of their terms and had not been convicted of attacks that resulted in casualties; the opening of some homes and streets that had been sealed for political reasons by the Israeli army; and the loosening of restrictions on Palestinians entering Israel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to allow those older than 50 to enter without a permit. [8/24 FBIS, NYT]

Palestinian delegates to bilateral Middle East peace talks reached agreement with Israeli authorities and departed for the next round of talks in Washington. [8/24 NYT]

Aug. 24: In Washington, the sixth round of bilateral Middle East peace talks opened. They were the first talks since the election of the Labor-led government in Israel.

Israeli prime minister Rabin retracted an expulsion order issued on 2 January by former Israeli prime minister Shamir against 11 Palestinians accused of inciting terrorism in the occupied territories. The Palestinians were sentenced instead to six-month administrative detentions. Rabin noted that Israel was not abandoning deportation as a form of punishment. [8/25 NYT, WP, FBIS]

Aug. 25: In bilateral talks in Washington, Israeli negotiators presented the Palestinian delegation with a set of proposals leading to the establishment of an elected Palestinian "administrative council" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The council would be responsible for running many aspects of daily life, but would not have legislative powers. Palestinian negotiators stated that while they welcomed Israel's acknowledgement of the need for an elected Palestinian assembly in the occupied territories, they continued to have substantial disagreements with Israel over the function of the body.

In talks with Syrian negotiators, Israel conceded for the first time that UN resolution 242 applied to the Golan Heights. [8/26 NYT, WP, FBIS]

Aug. 26: In Janin, Israeli soldier Eliahu Avram, 29, and Palestinians Wala Alawna, 25, Ibrahim Sa'id Ibrahim al-Zarqa', 21, and Ibrahim Salman Ibrahim Jalamani, 18, were killed in an hour-long gunfight. The fight erupted when an Israeli undercover army unit raided a house in order to arrest the Palestinians. Alawna lived in the house and was not wanted for arrest. [8/27 NYT, WP, FBIS]

Aug. 27: Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi announced that the Palestinian negotiating team had studied the Israeli proposal on elections for an administrative council in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and had concluded that the proposal was unacceptable because it did not yield a "meaningful transfer of authority" to the Palestinians. Ashrawi said the two delegations would continue negotiations based on the Israeli and Palestinian proposals. [8/28 NYT]

Aug. 29: Israel Television Network reported that Usama Basyuni, 26, and Muhammad Abu Jurjiyya, 25, had been killed in the Gaza Strip in the preceding days. [9/1 FBIS]

Aug. 30: The body of Muhammad Afara, 20, was brought to al-Nasir Hospital in Khan Yunis. He had been kidnapped by unidentified assailants two nights earlier. [9/1 FBIS]

Aug. 31: In Khan Yunis, unidentified assailants shot and killed alleged collaborator Zaqi Qadda, 30. [9/1 FBIS]

Sep. 1: Israeli negotiators in Washington reported that the preceding day Syria had presented them with a document in which it formally committed to reaching a peace settlement with Israel and ac-

knowledged Israel's security concerns. Israeli officials noted that Israel disagreed with many parts of the text, but welcomed the "change in tone." [9/2 NYT]

Voice of Palestine (Algiers) broadcast Call No. 86 of the Unified National Command of the Uprising. [9/2 FBIS]

Sep. 3: The Israeli Housing Ministry announced that there had been almost a complete halt in housing sales in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following a late July cutback in government subsidies and government-sponsored construction. [9/4 NYT]

Sep. 9: In a speech before the Israeli Knesset, Israeli prime minister Rabin said that Israel was willing to return part of the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria. [9/10 NYT]

Sep. 10: In the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers killed Ahmad Abu Ishiban and Ataya Abu Samadan in gunfighting. [9/11 FT, FBIS, JP]

Sep. 12: *Al-Dustur* (Amman) published the text of the Palestinian plan for self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [9/14 FBIS]

Sep. 14: In Washington, Israel presented Syria with a framework for talks on a bilateral peace agreement. [9/15 NYT]

French foreign minister Roland Dumas traveled unexpectedly to Latakia, Syria, to meet with Syrian president Asad about Israeli-Syrian negotiations. [9/16 WP]

Al-Hamishmar reported that in the preceding week in London, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres met with Jordanian king Hussein and, during the meeting, held a telephone conversation with Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Sharaa. Peres denied that either exchange had taken place. [9/15 FBIS]

Sep. 15: Israeli police announced that on 28 August they had arrested Palestinian Rashid Zahada, 21, on charges of poisoning food in an Israeli grocery store in which he worked. [9/16 NYT]

Multilateral Middle East peace talks addressing arms control reconvened in Moscow. [9/16 FT]

Sep. 16: Syrian president Asad made an unexpected visit to Egypt to meet with President Mubarak about bilateral Middle East peace talks. [9/17 NYT]

Sep. 22: Voice of Palestine (Algiers) broadcast an addendum to Call No. 86 of the Unified National Command of the Uprising. [9/23 FBIS]

Israeli delegation member Uri Lubrani reported that the Lebanese delegation to peace talks had informed the Israelis that they believed Israeli aviator Ron Arad, who was shot down in Lebanon in 1986, was still alive, but that they did not know who was holding him or where he was being held. [9/23 NYT, FBIS]

In Jerusalem, an unidentified Palestinian shot and killed Israeli soldier Avinoam Peretz after the soldier attempted to arrest him. [9/23 NYT]

Sep. 23: Israeli officials announced that Israeli prime minister Rabin had delayed plans to cancel the law forbidding contact with members of the PLO. [9/24 NYT]

Sep. 24: Israeli, Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian delegates ended the sixth round of bilateral Middle East peace talks in Washington after agreeing to reconvene for another month-long session on 21 October. [9/25 NYT, WP]

Sep. 27: *Davar* reported that Israeli authorities had announced plans to lift a 25-year-old ban on the distribution of *al-Ittihad,* a newspaper published by Israel's Communist Party, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [9/28 FBIS]

Oct. 1: Israeli radio reported that in response to an Israeli request, Egyptian president Mubarak had agreed to intervene personally in Israeli-Syrian negotiations. [10/2 NYT]

Oct. 3: The *New York Times* reported that between 3,000 and 5,000 Palestinians in eight Israeli Prison Authority-controlled prisons had been participating in a hunger strike for one week. The prisoners were demanding better living conditions and less frequent use of solitary confinement. Some prisoners in Israel Defense Force-run prisons also participated in the hunger strike. [10/3 NYT]

Oct. 5: The US Congress passed a foreign aid bill containing $10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel. [10/7 NYT]

Oct. 7: In Gaza Strip, at least 90 Palestinians were injured when Israeli soldiers fired at several thousand people demonstrating in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners involved in an 11-day hunger strike. [10/8 NYT]

Oct. 8: After day-long meetings in Jerusalem between Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa and Israeli prime minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres, Peres announced that Israel had agreed to meet during multilateral peace talks with Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but not with any who lived in East Jerusalem. Peres reiterated that Israel would not negotiate with Palestinian National Council members. [10/9 NYT, WP]

Oct. 10: At least one Palestinian was killed in clashes in the occupied territories between demonstrators and Israeli soldiers. Palestinians continued mass demonstrations in support of prisoners on the fourteenth day of a hunger strike. [10/11 NYT, WP]

In Bayta, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Amr Ahmad Abdallah Hamayil, 23, after he reportedly refused to stop throwing stones. [10/13 FBIS]

Oct. 11: Palestinian prisoners announced that they would suspend their hunger strike for one week in response to an Israeli promise to investigate living conditions in the prisons. [10/12 WP]

At an Israeli settlement in Gaza, Israeli Amitza Ben Haim, 45, was killed by an unidentified assailant reported to be a Palestinian. [10/12 NYT, 10/13 FBIS]

During a demonstration in al-Nusayrat refugee camp in Gaza, Ziad Dghiash, 13, was shot and killed by Israeli soldiers. [10/12 NYT, WP]

Oct. 12: Israeli soldiers shot and killed Ra'id Fadl, 17, and Muhammad Abu Arqub, 17, who illegally crossed from Jordan into the West Bank. The men were not carrying firearms. [10/13 FBIS]
Oct. 13: Faraj Susi, 13, died from injuries sustained in preceding days when an Israeli soldier shot him with a rubber bullet. [10/14 WP]
Oct. 14: Israel Radio reported that Palestinian prisoner Hussein Nimr Asad Ubaydat of East Jerusalem died of a heart attack after participating in the two-week hunger strike. [10/15 NYT, FBIS]

In Khan Yunis, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Tahsin Abu Shahmah, 16, while attempting to break up demonstrations. [10/15 FBIS]
Oct. 15: Unidentified assailants stabbed and killed Israeli Shimon Avraham, 35, at Moshav Perazon, three miles north of Janin. [10/16 NYT]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

See also, Regional Affairs

1992

July 17: Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television reported that Armenia had established diplomatic relations with Georgia. [7/23 FBIS]

In Azerbaijan, Firuz Gusayn Ogly Abbasbeyli was appointed minister of communications. [7/21 FBIS]
July 25: Azerbaijan's Talysh People's Party was founded. [7/31 FBIS]
July 30: The *Financial Times* reported that fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh had resulted in more than 100 deaths in the preceding two days. Armenia reportedly regained control over five villages in the Mardakert district of the disputed enclave. [7/30 FT]

Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan appointed Khosrov Haratuian prime minister, relieving Vice President Gagik Haratuian of the ministry. [7/31 FBIS]
Aug. 1: In Rome, the fourth round of prepatory talks of the Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)-sponsored Minsk conference on Nagorno-Karabakh convened. [8/4 FBIS]
Aug. 4: Tajikistan president Rakhman Nabiyev dismissed Alidzhan Solibayev from his position as chairman of the Republican National Security Committee and appointed Shakhob Sharipov. [8/5 FBIS]
Aug. 5: Both Armenia and Azerbaijan reported dozens of casualties when fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh spread to the area around Artsvashen and Krasnoselsk in Armenia. [8/6 WP]
Aug. 10: The *New York Times* reported that according to both Armenian and Azerbaijani sources, Azerbaijani troops had captured Artsvashen. [8/10 NYT]
Aug. 13: The *Financial Times* reported that, according to the KGB and other unidentified diplomatic sources, Afghan Hezb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was training and arming anti-Nabiyev forces in Tajikistan. Allegedly, 300–400 fighters had been trained in the camps. [8/13 FT]
Aug. 15: The government of Nagorno-Karabakh resigned and announced plans to create a ruling committee to govern for the duration of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. [8/17 NYT]
Aug. 16: At least 44 people were killed and 26 wounded in renewed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. [8/17 NYT]

In Kurgan-Tyube, Tajikistan, fighting erupted between armed groups supporting and opposing the government of President Nabiyev. [8/25 FBIS]
Aug. 17: Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan won a parliamentary no-confidence vote, stemming from three days of protests in Yerevan over Armenian losses in Nagorno-Karabakh. [8/18 FT]
Aug. 19: In Kyrgyzstan, at least 50 people were killed by an earthquake measuring approximately 10 on the Richter scale. [8/21 NYT]
Aug. 27: Following day-long talks in Alma-Ata, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders reportedly signed a cease-fire agreement for the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. It was scheduled to go into effect on 1 September. [8/28 WP, FT]

Separately, Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan agreed to a 60-day cease-fire agreement as proposed by Mario Rafaelli, chairman of the CSCE-sponsored Minsk conference for the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. [8/28 FBIS]

TASS reported that six people were killed and twenty wounded when Azerbaijani fighter planes bombed Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. [8/28 FT]
Aug. 30: Tajikistan president Nabiyev relieved Prime Minister Akbar Mirzoyev of his post, reportedly in response to Mirzoyev's request. [8/31 FBIS]
Aug. 31: Opposition members seized control of the presidential palace in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and took government officials hostage. The group demanded the resignation of President Nabiyev. [9/1 FBIS, NYT]
Sep. 1: In Dushanbe, protestors demanding the resignation of President Nabiyev released several hostages seized the previous day, but continued to stage large demonstrations at the presidential palace. [9/2 FBIS, NYT]
Sep. 2: In Dushanbe, protestors released the remaining 35 hostages they had seized on 31 August, after the hostages agreed to resign their government positions.

The Tajikistan parliament passed a no-confidence vote against President Nabiyev. [9/3 NYT]
Sep. 4: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan announced plans to send troops to the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border to help control the cross-border arms and drug trade. [9/5 NYT]

Sep. 7: Armed opposition members detained Tajikistan president Nabiyev in the Dushanbe airport and forced him to resign. [9/8 FBIS, NYT]
Sep. 8: The *Washington Post* reported that in Kurgan-Tyube, several hundred people had been killed during fighting the preceding week between forces supporting and opposing the government. [9/8 WP]
Sep. 13: Officials announced a cease-fire in Kurgan-Tyube. [9/15 FBIS]
Sep. 21: Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov was named acting prime minister of Tajikistan. [9/21 FBIS]
Sep. 23: Azerbaijan and Armenia allegedly agreed to a two-month cease-fire, scheduled to go into effect the following day. [9/24 WSJ]

The *New York Times* reported that the Azerbaijani military had launched a major new offensive from the southern and eastern borders of Nagorno-Karabakh on 19 or 20 September and that casualties from ensuing clashes had been extensive. [9/23 NYT]
Sep. 25: The *New York Times* reported that intense fighting continued in Nagorno-Karabakh with the death toll from recent fighting surpassing 500. [9/25 NYT]
Sep. 26: Fighting erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh as the alleged cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan collapsed. [9/27 WP]
Sep. 28: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that "two factions" in Lomonosovo, Tajikistan, had seized Russian tanks and missiles and captured five soldiers. [9/28 WSJ]
Sep. 29: Russia sent about 800 reinforcements to Dushanbe to help defend against attacks on several barracks and arms depots maintained by about 10,000 Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan.

Officials reported that several hundred people had been killed in the preceding week in fighting in Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube. [9/30 NYT]

Assa-Irada (Baku) reported that Azerbaijan and Indonesia established diplomatic relations. [9/30 FBIS]
Sep. 30: In Dushanbe, Russian troops seized control of the airport. [10/1 FT]
Oct. 1: In Baku, the Pennzoil Company signed an agreement with Azerbaijan for rights to develop an off-shore oil field in the Caspian Sea. [10/2 WSJ]

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan had been founded. [10/5 FBIS]
Oct. 3: Fighting continued in southern Tajikistan causing hundreds of people to flee the region. [10/4 NYT]
Oct. 9: Armenia and Turkmenistan established diplomatic relations. [10/16 FBIS]
Oct. 11: Kazakhstan's Nationalist Movement-Azat, National Democratic Party-Zheltosan, and Republican Party announced plans to merge into a new Republican Party-Azat, under the leadership of Kamal Ormantayev. [10/14 FBIS]

Petroleum Affairs

See also, Regional Affairs Iraq

1992

Sep. 17: At meetings in Geneva, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ministers agreed to freeze production at about 24.5 million barrels per day. Kuwait continued to be permitted to increase production. [9/18 WSJ, FBIS]

Ecuadoran president Sixto Duran-Ballen announced that Ecuador would withdraw from OPEC. Officials previously had speculated that Ecuador would withdraw because of the $2 million annual membership fee and because the cartel refused to allow Ecuador to produce more than 320,000 barrels per day. [9/18 WP, 9/19 NYT]

Regional Affairs

See also, Lebanon, Morocco

1992

July 20: In Geneva, Saudi and Yemeni officials met to arrange formal negotiations aimed at resolving ongoing border disputes between the two nations. [7/21 FT]
July 30: Saudi and Kuwaiti officials reported that Iran had decided to confiscate some 132 Iraqi military and civilian planes that had been flown to Iran to escape allied bombing during the 1991 Gulf war. Iran claimed that the value of the planes would go toward several hundred billion dollars in damages owed Iran by Iraq as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. [7/31 NYT]
July 31: The Sudan News Agency (SUNA) reported that Sudan had announced plans to close its embassy in Tunisia. [8/3 FBIS]
Aug. 12: The UN Security Council voted to maintain sanctions against Libya for its refusal to extradite Libyan citizens Lamen Khalifa, Abd al-Basset Ali Meghrabi, and four others to Britain, France, or the United States for questioning regarding their alleged roles in the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 and Union de Transports Aériens (UTA) Flight 772 over Niger in 1989. Sanctions had been imposed on 15 April as called for by Security Council Resolution 748. [8/13 WP]
Aug. 25: Iran and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on building a pipeline for shipping Central Asian gas to Europe via Turkey. [8/27 FT]
Aug. 31: Baku Radio reported that Morocco and Azerbaijan had established diplomatic relations. [9/2 FBIS]
Sep. 1: Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) established diplomatic relations. [9/2 FBIS]
Sep. 10: In response to a Gulf Cooperation Council communiqué deploring Iran's "virtual annexation" of Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf in recent months,

Iran restated its claim of sovereignty over the island. The island had been administered jointly by Iran and Sharjah, a member of the UAE, since 1971. The feud was reignited, however, in August when Iranian authorities refused to allow a ship carrying passengers from Sharjah to dock and unload. [9/11 FT, FBIS]

Sep. 12: The Arab League met for its ninety-eighth ordinary session. [9/15 FBIS]

Sep. 16: The *Financial Times* reported that China had announced plans to boycott the next round of talks among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council on limiting the sale of conventional arms to the Middle East. China was protesting a US decision to sell F-16 fighter planes and other arms to Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. [9/16 FT]

Sep. 17: *L'Express* reported that the United States was protecting Libyan defector Majid Giaka, who had provided US investigators with important information on the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Giaka allegedly worked as an intelligence officer in the Libyan Arab Airlines office in Malta at the time of the bombing. US officials declined to confirm the report. [9/18 WP]

Sep. 19: Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Sharaa delivered a letter from Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in an effort to ease the conflict between Iran and other Gulf states over control of Abu Musa. Asad reportedly urged Rafsanjani to settle the dispute in accordance with international law. [9/20 NYT]

Sep. 23: Iran and the UAE agreed to hold talks on 27 September on the dispute over Abu Musa. [9/24 FT]

Sep. 25: In a statement to the *Washington Post*, Libyan treasury minister Muhammad Bukhari said Libya was willing to agree to the trial of Khalifa and Meghrabi by "an international panel of judges" and based on "rules of evidence and examination of witnesses similar to US law." He repeated Libya's rejection of demands that the suspects be extradited to Britain or the United States for trial. Bukhari also said Libya would allow international inspection of sites in Libya suspected of producing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. [9/26 WP]

Sep. 27: In Abu Dhabi, officials from Iran and the UAE began negotiations on sovereignty over Abu Musa. [9/28 FT, FBIS]

Sep. 28: Talks between Iran and the UAE over control of islands in the Persian Gulf ended abruptly over whether to include Tunb al-Kubra and Tunb al-Sughra on the agenda. The UAE considered them part of the conflict, but Iran denied there was any legitimate dispute concerning the two smaller islands. [9/29 WP, FT]

Sep. 29: In Riyadh, Saudi and Yemeni military officials opened negotiations on the border dispute between their countries. [9/29 FBIS]

Sep. 30: Qatari officials reported that Saudi troops had attacked a Qatari border post killing two soldiers and capturing a third. Saudi Arabia denied the report, saying the deaths had occurred during a fight between Saudi and Qatari Bedouins in Saudi territory. [10/1 FBIS, NYT]

Oct. 1: Qatar suspended a 1965 border agreement with Saudi Arabia. Shortly afterwards, Saudi troops seized control of the disputed border post at al-Khufus and expelled its occupants. [10/2 NYT]

Oct. 3: Qatar demanded that Saudi forces withdraw from al-Khufus border post. [10/4 NYT]

Oct. 4: *Kaztag* (Alma-Ata) reported that Kazakhstan and the UAE had established diplomatic relations. [10/5 FBIS]

Oct. 6: Iraqi troops allegedly attacked the Bahr Hushan border post in Kuwait. [10/8 FT]

Oct. 11: After two days of talks in Damascus, electricity and industry ministers from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey approved a plan to connect the electrical grids of their countries. The plan initially was endorsed in 1989. [10/12 FT, 10/14 FBIS]

Western Sahara

1992

Aug. 11: Brahim Hakim, Polisario member and former foreign minister of the so-called Saharan Democratic Republic, defected to Morocco. [8/12 FBIS]

Aug. 24: United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that the UN plan to hold a referendum in Western Sahara was on the verge of failure and that the disputing parties appeared unwilling to cooperate in a solution. [8/25 FT]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia

1992

July 19: At least 60 people were killed and more than 300 wounded in clashes between pro-government forces and Hezb-e-Wahdat guerrillas in Kabul. [7/20 NYT]

July 20: At least 12 people were killed when fighting between Hezb-e-Wahdat and Ittehad-e-Islami continued for the third day. [7/21 FBIS]

July 21: Supreme Council spokesman Muhammad Asif Mohsini announced that Ittehad-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Wahdat had signed a cease-fire agreement. He reported that 70 people had been killed in three days of fighting between the two groups. [7/22 FBIS]

July 27: In a meeting with President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the leaders of Hezb-e-Wahdat in Kabul, Iranian deputy foreign minister for Asian affairs Allaedin Boroujerdi urged the parties to end

the factional fighting and asserted that Iran did not support only the opposition factions. [7/28 NYT]

Aug. 2: Public Health Minister Najibullah Mujaddedi resigned his post, charging that President Rabbani and Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud were interfering unnecessarily in his work.

Hezb-e-Islami leader Yunis Khales withdrew from the ruling Leadership Council, charging that President Rabbani had violated the transition agreement by including Hezb-e-Wahdat in the council. [8/3 FBIS]

In Kabul, bomb attacks by both the Hekmatyar and Khales factions of Hezb-e-Islami killed 14 people and wounded 97 before a cease-fire was arranged. [8/3 FT, FBIS]

Aug. 4: Opposition forces resumed attacks on Kabul, breaking the cease-fire that had been in effect since the evening of 2 August. At least 11 people were killed in the attack. [8/5, 8/6 FBIS]

Aug. 6: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar rocketed Kabul. [8/7 FBIS]

Aug. 9: At least 30 people were killed in continued rocket attacks on Kabul by Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar. The preceding day at least 24 people had been killed. [8/10 NYT, FBIS]

West of Kabul, Ittehad-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar renewed battles. [8/10 WP]

Aug. 10: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar forces staged a 12-hour attack on Kabul, causing some 1,000 casualties. Observers said it was the biggest attack on the city since the beginning of the civil war. [8/11 NYT, FBIS, WP, 8/13 FBIS]

Aug. 11: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar forces bombed Kabul for the seventh consecutive day. [8/12 WP]

Aug. 13: Hezb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said he would agree to a 24-hour cease-fire to allow foreigners to evacuate Kabul under the condition that all Hezb-e-Islami prisoners in Kabul were released; the evacuation took place via ground rather than air; an armed force supervised the cease-fire; and the government and other militias agreed to his terms. [8/14 FT, 8/17 FBIS]

At least 100 people were killed when Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar guerrillas continued launching rockets against Kabul. It was estimated that more than 1,200 people had been killed in the preceding week. [8/14 NYT, WP]

Aug. 14: Government troops quelled attacks by opposition rebel factions and Kabul was quiet for the first time in more than a week. [8/15 FT]

President Rabbani asked Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar to leave the government and dismissed Prime Minister Abdul Sabur Farid—the faction's senior representative in the interim government. [8/17 FT, 8/18 WP]

Aug. 16: In an interview with the *Financial Times*, Pakistani prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif criticized long-time protegé Gulbuddin Hekmatyar for his continuing attacks on Kabul. Nawaz Sharif accused Hekmatyar of violating the April Peshawar accord that established the structure of the interim government. [8/17 FT]

Aug. 19: Government troops reportedly launched a major offensive against Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar forces in an effort to quell their attacks on Kabul. [8/20 WP]

Aug. 20: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar forces attacked a convoy of Uzbek militiamen north of Kabul. It was the first such attack reported in the north. [8/21 NYT]

Aug. 23: The interim government asked the United Nations to turn over former president Muhammad Najibullah, who had been hiding in the UN compound since April. [8/24 NYT]

Aug. 24: Bulgaria, France, and Italy closed their embassies in Kabul and evacuated their staff by way of Mazar-e-Sharif. The United Nations had evacuated its foreign staff the preceding day. [8/25 NYT]

Aug. 25: Vice President Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi and Hezb-e-Islami leader Khales announced plans to travel to Kabul from Peshawar to negotiate a cease-fire between the government and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar. [8/26 FT]

Aug. 26: Polish and Yemeni diplomats evacuated Kabul. [8/27 NYT]

Aug. 27: Fighting continued throughout Kabul.

The government declared a 10-hour unilateral cease-fire beginning on 28 August to allow people to perform Friday prayers in a "calm atmosphere." [8/28 FBIS]

Pakistan announced that all parties had agreed to a 72-hour cease-fire. [8/28 FT]

Aug. 28: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar guerrillas violated a temporary truce and attacked a Russian evacuation plane attempting to pick up Russian diplomats and their families. [8/29 NYT, 8/31 FBIS]

Aug. 29: Radio Pakistan Network reported that following 10 days of negotiations, a 12-point cease-fire agreement had been signed and implemented in Kabul. [9/1 FBIS]

Aug. 30: In Kabul, residents filled the streets during the first lull in fighting between government and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar forces in more than three weeks. [8/31 NYT, FBIS]

Sep. 3: In the Hindu Kush mountains north of Kabul, more than 450 people, including many who had recently fled Kabul, were killed in flash floods. [9/4 WP]

Sep. 5: The International Committee of the Red Cross reported that as many as 2,000 people had been killed and 9,000 injured in the previous month's clashes in Kabul. [9/6 NYT]

Hezb-e-Islami leader Khales reported that the withdrawal of militias from Kabul, as called for under the 29 August cease-fire agreement, had started on 3 September. [9/8 FBIS]

Sep. 6: The United Nations issued an urgent appeal for relief aid for victims of the 3 September flash floods. [9/7 WP]

Sep. 7: In a public park in Kabul, Sayed Sakander, Muhammad Gul, and Muhammad Rifit were hanged. According to the Defense Ministry, the

men confessed to murder, looting, and robbery. The trial, however, was not open to the public. The government said the hangings were an example to deter crime. [9/8 FT]

Sep. 13: Provincial Commander Hayat Khan reported that "a neutral Afghan buffer force" had moved government forces and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar guerrillas out of positions to the south of Kabul as part of attempts to bring an end to fighting there. [9/14 FT]

Sep. 15: Three missiles struck neighborhoods west of Kabul. [9/16 FBIS]

Sep. 18: According to the Afghan News Agency, President Rabbani, Hezb-e-Islami leader Hekmatyar, Ittehad-e-Islami leader Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, and Harakat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami leader Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi agreed to call a *shura,* before 28 October—when the mandate for the interim government was to expire—to elect a new government. [9/21 FBIS]

Sep. 19: Although Ittehad-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Wahdat reached a cease-fire agreement, fighting continued in parts of Kabul. [9/21 FBIS]

Sep. 22: Authorities arrested former vice president Muhammad Rafi as he was trying to leave the country. [9/23 FBIS]

Sep. 25: President Rabbani appointed the following cabinet members:

Abdul Wahed Sorabi, *Commerce*
Muhammad Yaqub La'li, *Mines and Industries*
Ahmad Nazar Balkhi, *Social Affairs*
Eshaq Gowhari, *Revival and Rural Development*
Yaqub Barakzai, *Public Health* [9/28 FBIS]

Sep. 30: The Saudi embassy reported that Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faysal held talks with Hezb-e-Islami leader Hekmatyar, Hezb-e-Islami leader Khales, and President Rabbani, as part of efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting in Kabul. [10/1 FBIS]

Oct. 3: In Herat Province, Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar forces attacked forces allied with the government. [10/5 FBIS]

Oct. 5: A Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar spokesman reported that battles between his organization's forces and those of Abdul Rashid Dostam in Herat and Baghlan provinces continued. [10/6 FBIS]

Algeria

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Iraq

1992

July 17: In Algiers, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) supporters tried to stage a demonstration against the jailing of their leaders on 15 July but they were prevented by the army. [7/18 WP]

July 18: In Lakhroussa, police shot and killed Shaykh Azzidine, an alleged FIS activist. [7/19 WP, 7/21 FBIS]

Gunfighting continued for the second day between soldiers and an "unknown armed group" in a forest in the east. [7/19 WP]

July 19: Prime Minister Belaid Abdesselam announced the members of his cabinet:

Khaled Nezzar, *Defense*
Lakhdar Brahimi, *Foreign Affairs*
Abd al-Hamid Mahi Behi, *Justice*
Muhammad Hardi, *Interior and Local Communities*
Ahmad Djebbar, *National Education*
Abd al-Nour Keramane, *Mines and Industry*
Brahim Chibout, *War Veterans*
Muhammad Elias Mesli, *Agriculture*
Sassi Lamouri, *Religious Affairs*
Faruk Tebbal, *Housing*
Muhammad Seghir Babes, *Health and Population*
Maamar Benguerba, *Labor and Social Affairs*
Djelloul Baghli, *Vocational Training*
Abd al-Wahab Bakli, *Tourism and Handicrafts*
Habib Chaouki Hamraoui, *Culture and Communications*
Abd al-Kadir Khomri, *Youth and Sports*
Tahar Allan, *Post and Telecommunications*
Mokhtar Meherzi, *Transportation*
Hacene Mefti, *Energy*
Mokdad Sifi, *Equipment*

Abdesselam appointed himself minister of economy. [7/20 FBIS]

July 20: Abd al-Rahman Hadj Nacir, governor of the central bank, resigned and was replaced by Abd al-Wahab Kermane. [7/21 FT]

July 21: Former prime minister Sid Ahmad Ghozali was appointed ambassador to France. [7/21 FBIS]

July 25: The six-member commission investigating the 29 June assassination of former president Muhammad Boudiaf released the initial results of its investigation. The commission charged the government with "blameworthy and criminal instances of negligence" and said the murder was planned by persons high in the government. It also said that complicity by FIS in the murder was not evident. [7/29 NYT]

In al-Khroub, three people were killed when a bomb exploded. [7/28 FBIS]

July 27: In Algiers, for the fourth time in a week, a bomb, allegedly placed by FIS supporters, exploded. [7/28 FT]

Aug. 1: Authorities reported that two policemen were shot and killed in separate incidents in Algiers. [8/3 FBIS]

Aug. 9: Authorities closed the offices and seized copies of *Le Matin, La Nation,* and *al-Djezair al-Youm* on the grounds that the publications damaged the interests of the country. [8/10 FBIS]

Aug. 13: The government announced plans to undertake "drastic measures" to prevent political activities in mosques. [8/20 NYT]

Aug. 26: A bomb exploded at the international terminal of the Houari Boumedienne Airport in Algiers, killing at least eight people and wounding

more than one hundred. A second bomb exploded at the Air France office in downtown Algiers, but police had safely evacuated the building before the explosion. A third bomb was defused in the Swissair office. No one claimed responsibility for setting the bombs. [8/26 FBIS, 8/27 NYT, FT, FBIS, 8/28 FBIS]

Sep. 3: Agence France-Presse reported that authorities had arrested security officers Majber Abd al-Wahab and Syaeh Sadik in connection with the 29 June assassination of Muhammad Boudiaf. A total of 23 security personnel had been arrested during the course of the investigation. [9/3 FBIS]

Sep. 5: The Ministry of Interior and Local Communication suspended the publication of *Barid al-Sharq* on the grounds that it published false information. [9/10 FBIS]

Sep. 16: Government authorities reported that they had formed a committee to determine import priorities with particular attention to food stuffs, medical products, and building materials. [9/17 FT]

Oct. 1: ENTV (Algiers) reported that security forces had arrested four persons allegedly affiliated with FIS in connection with the airport bombing of 26 August. [10/2 FBIS]

Oct. 7: Interior Minister Muhammad Hardi lifted the ban on *Le Matin, La Nation, al-Djezair al-Youm,* and *Liberté*. [10/8 FBIS]

Oct. 12: Diplomatic relations were established with Slovenia. [10/16 FBIS]

Bahrain

See also, Iraq

1992

July 20: The Foreign Ministry announced plans to establish diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Belize. [7/22 FBIS]

Cyprus

1992

Aug. 26: The UN Security Council passed resolution 774 reaffirming all previous UN resolutions on the conflict in Cyprus and restating the UN commitment to reuniting the island. [8/28 FBIS]

Sep. 9: A UN spokesman reported that Denmark had announced plans to withdraw its 340-person peacekeeping force by the end of 1992, and that Austria said it would reduce its forces by 10 percent in the same time period. [9/10 FBIS]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1992

July 17: The People's Assembly passed a law ordering the death penalty for members of "terrorist groups." The law endorsed a broad definition of terrorism, including such actions as "spreading panic." [7/18 WP]

July 27: In Dayrut, unidentified assailants allegedly representing Islamists killed an 8-year-old boy and a policeman. It was the second such attack in three days. In the first attack one policeman was wounded. [7/28 FT]

Middle East Watch released "Behind Closed Doors: Torture and Detention in Egypt," a 200-page report documenting extensive use of torture by Egyptian security police and charging the government with sanctioning human rights violations. [7/28 WP, FT]

July 28: Bahaiddin Ibrahim, the assistant to the interior minister, denied charges made in the Middle East Watch report released the preceding day. Ibrahim said that police who violated human rights were tried and, if found guilty, put in jail. [7/29 FT]

Aug. 7: *Al-Wafd* (Cairo) reported that authorities had imposed a curfew in Dayrut for three consecutive weeks. [8/12 FBIS]

Aug. 8: In Dayrut, Islamists and police clashed after the Islamists opened fire on the police. [8/10 FBIS]

Aug. 20: Police shot and killed Salim al-Amir Faramani while arresting him for his alleged role in sectarian clashes in Asyut Governate. [8/24 FBIS]

Aug. 23: In Manqabad, Asyut, seven people were killed in a shootout between police and persons allegedly involved in sectarian clashes. [8/24 FBIS]

Oct. 1: Diplomatic relations were established with Croatia. [10/2 FBIS]

Oct. 6: In Dayrut, three people were killed and ten injured when a bomb exploded on a train at the station. [10/6 FBIS, 10/7 FBIS]

Oct. 7: Authorities reported that a fourth person had died from the bomb attack on a train at Dayrut station the preceding day. [10/8 FBIS]

Oct. 12: An earthquake measuring 5.9 on the Richter scale struck Egypt, killing at least 370 people and injuring at least 3,300. [10/13 NYT, WP, FBIS]

Oct. 14: Earth tremors struck Cairo causing several buildings to fall. [10/15 WP, FBIS]

For the first time since the 1990–91 Gulf crisis and war, Jordanian king Hussein traveled to Egypt. Hussein went to offer condolences to the victims of the 12 October earthquake. [10/15 FT]

Oct. 15: The Interior Ministry announced that the death toll from the 12 October earthquake had reached 520. [10/15 FBIS]

Iran

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey

1992

July 24: British authorities ordered the deportation of Iranians Mehdi Sayed Sadeghi, Mahmoud Meh-

di Soltani, and Ghassem Vakhshiteh on charges that they threatened national security. Some reports linked the men to death threats against Salman Rushdie, the author of *Satanic Verses*. [7/25 NYT]

Aug. 14: British authorities announced that on 4 August, Britain had ordered Iranian embassy first secretary Ali Rajabi to leave the country. [8/16 NYT]

Aug. 15: The government ordered three Britons to leave Iran for "illegal activities." [8/16 NYT]

Aug. 29: A bomb exploded in the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery 10 miles south of Tehran. The grave of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is there. [8/30 WP, 8/31 FBIS]

Sep. 8: An earthquake measuring 5.6 on the Richter scale struck Firuzabad, killing one person. A second earthquake measuring 4.0 struck Golbaf. No deaths were reported in the Golbaf earthquake. [9/9 NYT]

In Tehran, at least three people were killed and ten injured when Iranian soldiers and Tehran police fought for control of a disputed building. [9/10 NYT]

Sep. 9: Unidentified US officials reported that in Zaghreb, Croatia, on 4 September, officials had intercepted an Iranian plane loaded with arms and military personnel. Iranian officials had reported that the plane was carrying humanitarian aid to be shipped overland from Zaghreb to Bosnia and Hercegovina. The arms shipment violated a year-old UN-sponsored arms embargo in the region. [9/10 NYT, WP]

Sep. 10: At a press conference in Beijing, President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Chinese prime minister Li Peng announced that China had agreed to build a nuclear power plant in Iran. It would be the first nuclear plant of its size in Iran. Both countries said the plant would be open to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. [9/11 NYT]

Sep. 17: In Berlin, assassins shot and killed four Iranian Kurds, including Sadegh Sharafkandi, 54, secretary-general of the Iranian Democratic Party of Kurdistan; Fattah Abdouli, the party's European representative; and Homayoun Ardalan, its German representative. Exiled Kurdish leaders and German police linked the assassins to the Iranian secret service, but the Foreign Ministry denied any involvement in the assassination. [9/19 NYT, 9/21 FBIS]

Sep. 22: On Arshadabad Street in Tehran, demonstrators protested when the government demolished 30 brick houses. In another location in Tehran, protestors, allegedly demonstrating against the government, set fire to a police station and municipal vehicles. [9/23 NYT]

Sep. 23: US Pentagon officials reported that Russia was selling two or three submarines to Iran, as well as 24 SU-24 bombers and spare parts. [9/24 NYT]

Sep. 25: Russian Foreign Trade Ministry official Vladimir Pakhomov announced that plans to sell three submarines to Iran were postponed indefinitely because of differences over trade payments. The United States and Western Europe had been lobbying for the cancelation of the sale. [9/26 WP]

Oct. 2: The *Washington Post* reported that Russia had sold Iran at least one diesel submarine and that the vessel was en route to Iran. [10/2 WP]

Oct. 10: The Mojahedin-e Khalq took responsibility for a bomb explosion near the shrine of Ayatollah Khomeini in Behesht-e Zahra cemetery. [10/16 NYT]

Oct. 15: For the second time in a week, a bomb exploded near the old bazaar. The bomb killed the man accused of planting it. [10/16 NYT]

The Mojahedin-e Khalq claimed responsibility for setting a bomb that exploded at the headquarters of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in Tehran. [10/16 FBIS]

Iraq

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Turkey

1992

July 16: UN spokesman François Giulani reported that Ravuma Dakia, a UN guard from Fiji stationed in northern Iraq, had been shot to death in his sleep by an unidentified assailant. [7/17, 7/18 WP]

July 18: In Baghdad, Rolf Ekeus, the head of UN efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, warned Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahaf that Iraq faced the risk of attack if it did not comply fully with the Gulf war cease-fire agreement. Ekeus reported that the talks were unproductive but then agreed to extend his visit when Iraqi officials said he could meet with Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Foreign Minister Ahmad Hussein the following day. [7/19 NYT]

July 19: UN envoy Ekeus concluded talks with Iraqi officials and left Baghdad reporting that Iraq continued to refuse to allow UN inspectors in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in Baghdad.

UN inspectors continued surveillance outside the ministry where they had been since 5 July when they were refused entry into the building. [7/20 NYT]

Iraq reportedly proposed to allow inspectors from "neutral" countries into the ministry, but continued to ban the US members of the inspection team from entering. [7/20 WP]

July 20: In Sulaymaniyya, a car bomb exploded outside UN offices, injuring two UN guards. It was the third attack in a month against UN concerns in northern Iraq. [7/21 WP]

In Baghdad, demonstrators protested against the United States and the UN inspection programs. [7/21 WSJ]

July 22: In Baghdad, UN inspectors withdrew from their watchposts outside of the Ministry of Agri-

culture and Irrigation because of "the threat of violence and totally inadequate Iraqi security protection." The inspectors had been monitoring the building for eighteen days. UN envoy Ekeus said the UN inspectors would not leave Iraq altogether. [7/23 NYT, WP]

July 24: The *New York Times* reported that on 22 July, Iraq had used fixed-wing aircraft to bomb Shi'i dissidents in the south. [7/24 NYT]

The *Washington Post* reported that "independent sources" had confirmed that during the first two weeks of July, the government had ordered the residents of Adl and al-Salaam, in the southern marshes, to evacuate the towns and, subsequently, had ordered them to burn their homes to prevent any residents from returning. The source also said that a 10:00 PM to 5:00 AM curfew had been enforced throughout the south. [7/24 WP]

July 26: After several days of negotiations, UN envoy Ekeus and Iraq's UN representative Abd al-Amir al-Anbari reached a compromise agreement allowing UN arms experts to inspect the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in Baghdad. The agreement, which ended a 21-day standoff, specified an inspection team that did not include citizens of any country that participated in the 1991 war. The United States criticized the agreement, but did not formally protest it. [7/27 NYT, WP]

July 28: In Baghdad, a UN inspection team led by Rolf Ekeus began inspecting the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. [7/29 NYT]

The *New York Times* reported that, according to foreign diplomats in Baghdad, on 26 July the government had arrested about 600 merchants and had executed at least seven of them as part of a campaign to stop speculators and profiteers. A later report in the *Washington Post* said that as many as 40 merchants were executed. [7/28 NYT, 8/3 WP]

Unidentified gunmen attacked UN barracks in Sulaymaniyya. No injuries were reported. [7/29 NYT]

July 29: In Washington, US secretary of state James Baker met with a group of Iraqi opposition leaders including Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani and Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masud Barzani. [7/30 WP]

In Baghdad, UN inspectors completed their search of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation without finding incriminating material related to the Iraqi ballistic missile program. [7/30 NYT, WP]

July 30: The *New York Times* reported that UN officials, Western diplomats, and Kurdish leaders had accused the government of carrying out a series of car bombings and grenade attacks against international aid organizations in the Kurdish-controlled areas in the north. [7/30 NYT]

The *Financial Times* reported that Iraqi troops had surrounded Shi'i strongholds in the southern marshlands and were using ground attack aircraft in efforts to defeat the rebels. [7/30 FT]

President Saddam Hussein named Foreign Minister Ahmad Hussein minister of finance, and promoted Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahaf from secretary of state for foreign affairs to minister of foreign affairs. Hussein also appointed Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur minister of higher education and scientific research. [7/30 FBIS, 7/31 WP]

Aug. 1: PUK official Kamal Fuad reported that 29 people were killed during fighting on 30–31 July between guerrillas from his organization and others from the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. [8/2 NYT]

Aug. 2: In Baghdad, an unidentified gunman shot at a UN guard standing in front of the Palestine Hotel. The guard escaped uninjured. [8/3 NYT]

Aug. 6: Cultural Minister Hamid Yusuf Hammad reported that the government had decided not to allow UN inspectors to enter any of its ministries. [8/7 NYT]

The Voice of the People of Kurdistan reported that government troops had bombed Kurdish positions in the Kirkuk Governate on 4–5 August. [8/7 FBIS]

Aug. 7: Government helicopters bombed alleged PUK strongholds in Garawah village. [8/11 FBIS]

A UN inspection team headed by Nikita Smidovich of Russia arrived in Baghdad. [8/8 WP]

Aug. 8: In Kufa, Grand Ayatollah Abd al-Qassim Khui, 92, the most senior Shi'i scholar of theology, died. [8/10 WP, FBIS]

Aug. 9: The *Washington Post* reported that, according to Enzio Gianni Murzi of Italy, the head of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) program in Iraq, since July the government had been obstructing UNICEF efforts to distribute food and medicine in Iraq by failing to grant travel and residency permits to UN staff. [8/9 NYT]

Aug. 11: At a special meeting of the UN Security Council, Britain, France, and the United States accused Iraq of conducting a "systematic military campaign" against the Shi'a in southern marshlands and warned Iraq to halt the campaign or face possible intervention. The three countries also repeated demands that Iraq renew an agreement with the United Nations allowing UN guards and relief workers to enter Iraq. [8/12 NYT, WP]

Aug. 12: In a statement read by an announcer on national television, President Hussein presented a new campaign against merchants whom he accused of deepening the suffering of the masses of Iraqis. He said executions would continue in order to "protect the majority from the minority." [8/13 WP]

US Department of Defense officials refuted reports by the Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) that Iraq had deployed tank, artillery, and infantry battalions to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border near Safwan. [8/13 FT]

A large explosion destroyed the governor-general's office in al-Kut. Unidentified opposition members claimed responsibility for the attack and

alleged that hundreds of government officials had been killed. [8/14 FBIS]

Aug. 17: In Baghdad, the UN inspection team led by Nikita Smidovich canceled plans to visit a military ministry considered off limits by Iraq. The team conducted inspections at an undisclosed site instead. [8/18 NYT]

Aug. 18: Britain and France announced their readiness to participate in a Bush administration plan—proferred repeatedly during the preceding weeks—to create a "no-fly" zone, south of the thirty-second parallel, to protect Shi'i dissidents from air attacks by the government. The protectorate had not yet been implemented by the United States. [8/19 NYT]

In an interview with the *Washington Post,* UN representative Anbari warned that the US-led plan to create a "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq could lead to chaos in Iraq and neighboring countries. [8/20 WP]

In Bahrain, UN inspection team leader Nikita Smidovich reported that Iraq had provided new information on its ballistic missile program, as well as improved security to his team during their 11-day stay in Iraq. He also noted that the officials did not interfere with their inspections. [8/19 WP]

Aug. 19: SAIRI reported fighting between rebels and government troops in the south. The organization had made similar claims repeatedly since the end of the 1991 Gulf war. [8/20 NYT]

Aug. 20: In an Iraq News Agency broadcast, an unidentified government spokesman said Iraq would resist any effort by the United States and its allies to control the movement of its warplanes. [8/21 WP, FBIS]

Iraqi authorities invited politicians from UN Security Council nations to travel to Iraq to examine conditions in the southern marshes. [8/22 WP]

Aug. 21: Iraqi authorities again refused to renew the agreement with the United Nations allowing UN guards and relief workers to work in Iraq. The agreement had expired on 30 June. [8/22 WP]

Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Sharaa reported that Syria had rejected all plans by Britain, France, and the United States to establish a "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq on the grounds that it would violate Iraq's "territorial integrity." [8/23 NYT]

Aug. 24: In Sulaymaniyya, two rocket-propelled grenades allegedly were fired at the UNICEF building, but missed their target and hit a PUK office building. [8/27 FBIS]

The *Financial Times* reported that Algeria, Iran, and Yemen, as well as Syria, had issued statements in opposition to the US-led plan to establish a "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq. [8/24 FT]

Aug. 25: US Pentagon spokesman Bob Hall reported that Iraq had moved all of its fixed-wing aircraft and some helicopters to areas north of the thirty-second parallel, allegedly in anticipation of a US-led plan to ban the flight of such aircraft in the south. [8/26 NYT]

Aug. 26: US president George Bush announced that the United States and its allies had ordered Iraq not to fly any aircraft south of the thirty-second parallel. Bush said the flight ban was needed to protect Shi'i dissidents from attack by the government and was sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution 688, which required Iraq to respect the human rights of its citizens. US Department of Defense officials alleged that Iraq had escalated attacks against dissidents hiding in southern swamps in preceding weeks. Iraqi UN representative Anbari called for a group of "wise men" to travel to southern Iraq to investigate conditions there. [8/27 NYT, WP]

Aug. 27: US fighter planes began regular sorties through southern Iraq to enforce the ban on Iraqi aircraft flying south of the thirty-second parallel.

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Baath Party condemned the US-led ban but did not challenge it. [8/28 NYT, WP]

The British Foreign Office confirmed that Iraq had arrested and detained Briton Michael Wainwright, 41, in May for entering Iraq without a visa. Iraq continued to detain Wainwright. [8/28 FT]

Aug. 28: Bush administration officials reported that they were preparing additional measures to undertake in the event that the Iraqi government continued to attack the Shi'i population in the south. [8/29 WP]

US fighter planes dropped leaflets on Iraqi bases in southern Iraq warning pilots not to fly south of the thirty-second parallel and not to lock on to US planes with anti-aircraft radars. [8/29 FT]

In an interview published in *Ha'aretz,* Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin warned that if Iraq were to bomb Israel, Israel would retaliate. [8/29 WP]

Aug. 30: The *New York Times* reported that there had been several reports in the preceding week of Iraqi government forces arresting and moving large numbers of Shi'a out of the south into military camps at places near Kirkuk. The reports were not independently confirmed. [8/30 NYT]

UN officials reported that on 27 August three UN guards had discovered a 2.2-pound bomb attached to their car after stopping at a government checkpoint. The guards safely defused the bomb. The officials also cited other incidents in the preceding weeks in which UN personnel or equipment had been attacked. [8/31 NYT, 9/1 FBIS]

Aug. 31: A UN inspection team led by Maurizio Ziffero of Italy arrived in Baghdad to continue investigations of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. [9/1 FT]

Sep. 1: Russian armed forces chief of staff Viktor Dubynin announced that Russia would send an antisubmarine ship and a tanker to the Persian Gulf "to take part in the mission of international peacekeeping forces" affiliated with UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. [9/2 WP]

Sep. 2: The UN Security Council voted to order all UN aid agencies to continue their efforts to provide

humanitarian aid to Iraqi citizens despite Iraq's refusal to renew the agreement allowing such action. [9/3 NYT]

UN inspection team leader Ziffero stated that Iraq's nuclear weapons program had been "neutralized" by the 1991 Gulf war and subsequent UN inspections. [9/3 WP, FT]

Sep. 3: Iraq arrested three Swedish engineers—Stefan Wihlborg, 32, Leif Westberg, 43, and Christer Stromgren—when they strayed into Iraqi territory while installing telecommunications equipment in northern Kuwait. [9/6 WP]

Sep. 5: In an interview south of Rabat, Moroccan king Hassan strongly criticized the allied ban on Iraqi flights in southern Iraq, warning that dividing the country into distinct zones could lead to the dismemberment of Iraq. [9/6 WP]

Sep. 6: Baghdad television reported that the RCC had announced an amnesty for all deserters in Basra, Missan, and Dhiqar provinces who turned themselves in before 24 September. [9/7 WP]

Sep. 7: UN inspection team leader Ziffero reported that Iraq had agreed to allow UN inspectors to undertake regular nationwide water tests to check for evidence that Iraq had resumed its nuclear program. [9/8 NYT, WP]

Sep. 8: President Hussein appointed Nizar Hamdun as Iraq's UN representative. He replaced Abd al-Amir al-Anbari, who had asked for a less demanding assignment. Anbari was appointed to represent Iraq at UNESCO in Paris. [9/9 NYT]

Sep. 9: Iraq denied reports by US Department of Defense officials that its army had been attacking and burning villages in the south. [9/10 FT]

Sep. 10: US Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams reported that two US F-16s had intercepted an Iraqi F-1 fighter jet north of the thirty-sixth parallel in restricted airspace. The plane retreated immediately and the Pentagon did not suspect hostile intent. [9/11 WP]

Sep. 12: Agence France-Presse reported that, according to Kurdish sources, the government was forcing some 2,000 Iraqi Kurds who lived south of the Kurdish-controlled area to leave their homes along the Iran-Iraq border. The army alleged that the families had members who fought with the Kurdish resistance. [9/14 FBIS]

Sep. 15: After months of negotiations, the KDP and the PUK agreed to merge their guerrilla forces to form a united force of about 30,000 troops under the command of the Kurdish National Assembly. [9/16 NYT]

Sep. 16: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that Iraqi government forces had been harassing, kidnapping, and attacking inhabitants of the al-Abyadh region in southern Iraq during the preceding days. [9/17 FBIS]

Sep. 17: According to unconfirmed reports from diplomats and other officials, the government executed 25 Iraqis for unspecified illegal currency transactions. [9/21 NYT]

Sep. 18: For the second time in a month, Trade Minister Muhammad Mahdi Salih traveled to Amman in an attempt to persuade Jordanian merchants to resume selling and shipping food to Iraq. Trade had almost ceased in the wake of the Iraqi government crackdown against Iraqi merchants. [9/21 NYT]

Sep. 20: Swedish officials said Iraq had sentenced the three Swedish communications engineers arrested on 3 September to seven years in prison for illegally crossing the Iraqi border from Kuwait. [9/21 NYT]

Sep. 21: A UN inspection team led by Bernard Brunner of Switzerland arrived in Baghdad to plan for the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons. [9/22 FBIS]

German courts sentenced three German steel executives to suspended sentences for illegally selling Iraq turbo-charged pumps for rocket engines before the 1991 Gulf war. [9/22 FT]

Sep. 23: In Irbil Governate in Kurdish-controlled Iraq, about 70 delegates from more than 30 groups that opposed the Hussein government met as part of an effort to negotiate a unified strategy to overthrow President Hussein. A group of 17 delegates was selected to continue the meeting. Most members of the group also had participated in a meeting in June in Vienna. [9/24 NYT, FBIS, 9/25 FBIS]

Sep. 24: The *New England Journal of Medicine* published a study by a group of researchers from Britain, New Guinea, Jordan, and the United States asserting that the death rate among Iraqi children under age five had tripled in the months following the 1991 Gulf war. The report blamed the rise on disease, malnutrition, and infant mortality. [9/24 WP]

Foreign Minister Sahaf said that the government did not object to a renewed UN relief operation for the Kurds in the north during the winter. [9/25 NYT]

Sep. 25: Iraqi officials requested permission to sell $4 billion of oil in order to pay for food and medical supplies. [9/26 WP]

Sep. 28: Opposition groups meeting in Irbil Governate concluded their meetings after agreeing to unite their efforts to overthrow President Hussein. [9/28 FBIS, 9/29 FT]

Oct. 2: The UN Security Council passed resolution 778, by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention, granting the United Nations permission to seize hundreds of millions of dollars of Iraq's frozen assets to pay for UN expenses in Iraq and to compensate victims of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. If a separate agreement was reached with Iraq, the authorization was to be canceled. [10/3 NYT, WP]

Oct. 4: The *Washington Post* reported that, according to diplomats and travelers from Baghdad, in mid-September Abd al-Wahid Shanin Rabat, Abd Mutliq Jiburi, and some 30 others had been assassinated, allegedly because of their efforts to organize opposition movements. [10/4 WP]

Oct. 7: Foreign Minister Sahaf submitted a letter to the UN special commission on the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction requesting that planned inspections be delayed until after the US presidential election to prevent US president Bush from fabricating a confrontation to win votes. The commission rejected the request. [10/9 WP]
Oct. 8: Two Iraqis in civilian clothing arrested US munitions expert Clinton Adam Hall and took him to Iraq after charging that he had crossed illegally into Iraq from Kuwait. [10/10 WP]
Oct. 10: Pakistani officials reported that Iraq had informed them of plans to prosecute a Pakistani citizen and a Philippine citizen who had disappeared from the Kuwait-Iraq border area on 20 August. [10/11 NYT]

Iraqi authorities released US munitions expert Hall, saying that "a certain confusion" led to his arrest. [10/11 NYT, WP]

Oil Minister Usama Hiti warned that Iraq would sue any bank that released Iraqi assets to the United Nations as called for in UN Security Council Resolution 778. [10/11 WP]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan

1992

July 23: Full diplomatic ties were reestablished with Austria. Relations were downgraded in 1986 when Kurt Waldheim was elected president of Austria. [7/24 JP]
July 28: Israeli officials agreed to allow US investigators to question former Israeli general Rami Dotan and Israeli citizen and US lawyer Harold Katz in connection with the diversion of $40 million of US military assistance funds. [7/29 WP]
July 29: The Vatican and Israel announced the formation of a commission to negotiate full diplomatic relations between them. [7/30 NYT]
July 30: In Hertzliya, an explosion in a military munitions factory killed three people and injured forty. [7/30, 7/31 WP, FBIS]
Aug. 2: Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin appointed two Israeli Palestinians as deputy ministers—Nawaf Masalha as deputy health minister and Walid Sadik as either the deputy interior minister or the deputy agriculture minister. These are the highest offices held by Palestinians since 1973, when Abd al-Aziz Zuabi served as deputy health minister. [8/3 WP]
Aug. 12: In Washington, US Democratic Party presidential candidate Bill Clinton met with Prime Minister Rabin. [8/13 WP]
Aug. 19: Israel and China signed a trade agreement. [8/20 WSJ]
Sep. 5: Israeli soldiers shot and killed German tourist Hans Thomas Peter Schaussen, 31, when he tried to cross illegally from the West Bank into Jordan. [9/6 WP, 9/8 FBIS]
Sep. 6: Finance Minister Avraham Shochat presented a NIS 98 billion budget to the cabinet. The central bank immediately criticized the budget. [9/7 FT]
Sep. 13: The Knesset issued a statement protesting the US sale of F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. US president George Bush had announced the sale the preceding day. [9/14 NYT]
Sep. 14: Israeli and US officials announced that the two countries were negotiating a military cooperation package, focusing on increasing Israeli access to US satellite intelligence and military equipment. The package was intended to offset the US decision to sell 72 F-15s to Saudi Arabia. [9/15 NYT]
Sep. 24: Yuval Ne'eman resigned as head of the Tehiya Party. [10/6 FBIS]

Authorities granted the Black Hebrews—a group of 1,300 who arrived in Israel in the 1970s claiming to be the true descendants of the Israelites—temporary resident status. It was the first step toward their citizenship. [9/25 WP]
Sep. 27: Prime Minister Rabin formally rebuked Education Minister Shulamit Aloni for stating to a newspaper on 25 September that Rabin would return the entire Golan Heights to Syria, and for speaking "too openly" on other topics. [9/28 NYT]
Oct. 4: An El Al Boeing 747 crashed into two apartment buildings in Duivendrecht, near Amsterdam, shortly after takeoff. The explosion from the plane caused fire to spread throughout the suburb, striking two nine-story apartment buildings and killing as many as 200 people. The crash was ascribed to mechanical problems. [10/5 NYT, FBIS, WP]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Egypt, Iraq, Israel

1992

July 16: The *Jordan Times* reported that the Progressive Jordanian Party, the Democratic Jordanian Party, and the Organization for Communist Laborers in Jordan had merged the previous day to form the Progressive Democratic Jordanian Party. [7/17 FBIS]
July 21: In Amman, US secretary of state James Baker and King Hussein met during the second leg of Baker's five-nation Middle East tour. Hussein reasserted that Jordan was respecting the UN-sponsored embargo on Iraq. Baker concurred that Jordan had tightened its enforcement of the ban. [7/22 WP]
Aug. 20: King Hussein had one kidney and one ureter removed at the Mayo Clinic in the United States after doctors found malignant cells in the ureter. [8/21 FBIS]

Sep. 8: The *New York Times* reported that in the preceding weeks Jordan had arrested a number of Islamists, including members of parliament Laith Shbailat and Yaqub Qarsh, on charges of possession of arms. [9/8 NYT]

Kuwait

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1992

Aug. 3: The United States and Kuwait started joint military exercises in Kuwait in a move that US secretary of defense Richard Cheney said was intended "to send a message" to Iraq but not to provoke it. [8/4 NYT, WP]

Aug. 9: Two US marines were killed when their helicopter crashed during joint training exercises near the northern border. [8/10 WP]

Aug. 14: Middle East Watch released a report documenting widespread rape, beatings, and other mistreatment of Asian servants by employers in Kuwait. The report alleged that some 2,000 such servants had fled their employers since March 1991. [8/14 NYT]

Aug. 22: The government announced that it had allocated $12 billion in excess of the annual defense allocation toward the purchase of advanced weapons and an overhaul of the armed forces. [8/24 FT]

Aug. 27: Kuwaiti authorities deported about 490 Iraqis, Jordanians, and Palestinians to Iraq. [9/2 FBIS]

Aug. 28: The Kuwait News Agency reported that the cabinet had scheduled general elections for 5 October. [8/29 WP]

Sep. 4: A group of 255 persons deported by Kuwait arrived in Safwan, Iraq. [9/9 FBIS]

Sep. 28: The Kuwaiti stock market reopened for the first time since the 1990–91 Gulf crisis and war. [9/29 FT]

Oct. 5: Two hundred seventy-eight candidates ran for posts in the 50-seat National Assembly in the first parliamentary elections held since 1986, when Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah closed the parliament and suspended the constitution. Only Kuwaiti men aged 21 years or older who could prove that their families had lived in Kuwait before 1921 were eligible to vote. Of Kuwait's 606,000 citizens and permanent residents, 81,400 were eligible to vote. [10/6 NYT, WP]

Oct. 6: The Interior Ministry reported that opposition candidates had won between 30 and 35 seats in the National Assembly and that in most regions more than 80 percent of the electorate voted. [10/6 FBIS, 10/7 NYT, WP, FT]

Oct. 7: Amir Jabir al-Ahmad announced that the newly elected National Assembly would meet for the first time on 20 October.

Prime Minister Saad al-Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah resigned from his post to allow the formation of a new government based on the elections. [10/8 FBIS]

Oct. 13: Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad reappointed Crown Prince Saad al-Abdallah prime minister despite calls from newly elected opposition members of parliament to separate the office of the crown prince from that of the prime minister. [10/13 FBIS, 10/14 NYT]

Oct. 14: A new group of 250 deportees arrived in Safwan from Kuwait. [10/15 FBIS]

Crown Prince Saad al-Abdallah and the National Assembly agreed to a plan whereby six members of the new cabinet would be elected members of the National Assembly. [10/15 FT]

Lebanon

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict

1992

July 21: In Bayt Yahun in Israel's self-declared "security zone," unidentified gunmen attacked an Israeli army unit, killing one soldier. [7/22 FBIS]

July 23: While in Syria as part of a Middle East tour, US secretary of state James Baker made an unannounced visit to Zahla to meet with President Ilyas Hrawi. During the visit, Baker reiterated the US position that Syria should withdraw its troops from the Beirut region by autumn 1992, as called for by the Ta'if accords, and discussed the Lebanese role in the Middle East peace process. [7/23 FBIS, 7/24 WP]

In Beirut near Mar Ilyas refugee camp, an unknown assailant shot and killed Fatah–Revolutionary Council (FRC) spokesman Walid Khalid. [7/23 FBIS, 7/24 NYT]

Israeli planes bombed alleged Hizballah positions in the Iqlim al-Tuffah region in retaliation for the death of an Israeli soldier in the 21 July guerrilla ambush. [7/24 NYT]

July 24: Information Minister Michel Samaha announced that parliamentary elections would be held by region on three dates: in the northern and eastern regions on 23 August, in Beirut and Mount Lebanon on 30 August, and in the south on 6 September. [7/25 WP]

July 25: The army seized the Lebanese Forces' headquarters in Beirut. [7/26 NYT, 7/27 FBIS]

July 29: In Baalbak, Hizballah guerrillas turned over a barracks to the army as called for in an agreement signed earlier in the week. [7/30 FBIS]

July 30: Israeli planes attacked alleged Hizballah strongholds in the south. [7/31 WSJ]

Aug. 2: Israeli fighter planes continued bombing raids in the south. [8/3 WP]

Aug. 4: An Israeli navy patrol shot and killed four members of the Islamic Jihad Organization during what officials from the organization called a routine naval exercise off the coast of Lebanon near Beirut. [8/7 FBIS]

Aug. 5: Israeli helicopters bombed a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine building in al-Rashidiyya refugee camp. [8/5 FBIS]

Aug. 10: In the Biqa Valley, unidentified gunmen ambushed Salam Muhammad al-Mukahhal, reportedly a member of the FRC.

Israel and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) continued artillery raids on locations in the south. [8/11 FBIS]

Aug. 11: The FRC stated that Salam Muhammad al-Mukahhal had not belonged to the movement, as reported after his assassination the preceding day. [8/12 FBIS]

Aug. 14: Phalange Party leader George Saadah announced that his party would not participate in scheduled parliamentary elections. [8/14 FBIS, 8/17 FBIS]

Aug. 17: The Phalange Party announced that Sami Khuwayri, a member of the party's consultative council, had resigned from the party in order to run for a seat in the parliament from Kasrawan District. [8/18 FBIS]

Aug. 18: *Der Speigel* correspondent Gabi Hilsson, 30, was killed when a bomb exploded in her car. No one claimed responsibility. [8/19 FBIS]

Aug. 21: Christian communities observed the first day of a three-day strike protesting the continued Syrian military presence during parliamentary elections. [8/21 FBIS, 8/22 NYT]

Aug. 23: The first round of parliamentary elections was held in the northern and eastern regions. Between 55 and 95 percent of Muslim voters participated; almost all Christians boycotted the voting in protest of the continued presence of Syrian troops. Christians were also protesting the refusal of the government to allow Lebanese who fled during the civil war to vote. They were the first parliamentary elections in 20 years. [8/24 NYT, WP, FT, FBIS]

Aug. 24: Hussein al-Husseini resigned as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and demanded that voting in Baalbak, his district, be annulled on the grounds that it was fraudulent. Hizballah candidates won more than twice as many votes as those on Husseini's ticket. [8/24 FBIS, 8/25 NYT, WP, FT, FBIS]

Aug. 25: The cabinet met to discuss allegations of fraud in the first round of parliamentary elections. [8/25, 8/26 FBIS]

Aug. 26: Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz and Telecommunications Minister George Saadah resigned from the cabinet because it did not postpone the second round of parliamentary elections. [8/27 FBIS]

Aug. 28: Christian groups began a second three-day strike protesting parliamentary elections. [8/29 FT]

Aug. 30: Amid a Christian-sponsored boycott and numerous allegations of vote fraud, the second set of parliamentary elections were held in the central region. [8/31 WP, FBIS]

Sep. 2: Unidentified assailants assassinated Fatah officer Hani Zuhayr al-Dubayki in Beirut. [9/3 FBIS]

In Latakia, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad met with President Ilyas Hrawi to discuss the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. [9/3 NYT]

Sep. 4: SLA commander Antoine Lahd announced that he had closed all roads leading from Israel's self-declared "security zone" and would keep them closed until 7 September to prevent residents from traveling to designated voting sites during the final round of parliamentary elections on 6 September. He also warned that any resident of the occupied zone who left to vote would not be permitted to return. [9/5 NYT]

Sep. 6: The final round of parliamentary elections took place in the south with more than 50 percent of eligible voters participating. Most Christian groups continued to boycott the elections and the SLA prevented voters in Israel's self-declared "security zone" from traveling to polling stations. [9/7 NYT, WP]

Sep. 9: The *New York Times* reported that, according to final nationwide election results, 59 Christian independents had won seats in the parliament, as well as 18 Amal supporters, 12 Hizballah candidates, 15 candidates aligned with former prime minister Salim al-Huss, 11 candidates aligned with former prime minister Umar al-Karami, and 8 candidates aligned with Defense Minister Michel al-Murr. There remained five Christian seats to be filled. [9/9 NYT]

Sep. 15: Gunmen kidnapped Phalange Party political bureau member Butrus Khawand in east Beirut. [9/15 FBIS]

Sep. 16: The cabinet accepted the resignations of Samir Jaja, Ahmad Sami Minqarah, Faris Buwayz, and George Saadah. The cabinet appointed Information Minister Samaha as acting minister of tourism, Justice Minister Nasri al-Maaluf as acting foreign minister, and Defense Minister Murr as acting minister of post and telecommunications. [9/17 FBIS]

Sep. 21: Three Hizballah guerrillas were killed in clashes with SLA and Israeli troops. Following the clashes, Israeli gunners bombarded Kfar Rumman, Zawtar, and Arabsalim. [9/23 NYT]

Sep. 29: Nine people, including a UN soldier from Ireland, were killed in clashes following a Hizballah attack on an SLA post in Rshaf. Israeli and SLA forces bombed towns north of Israel's self-declared "security zone" in retaliation. [9/29 FBIS, 9/30 NYT]

Oct. 4: Hizballah claimed responsibility for an attack on an SLA mechanized patrol in Bayt Yahun. Two people were killed in the attack and Israeli forces continued shelling villages in the surrounding area. [10/5 FBIS]

Oct. 11: Less than 15 percent of the electorate participated in by-elections for the five remaining Christian seats in parliament from the Kasrawan

District. Maronite leaders had called for a boycott. [10/12 FT]

Oct. 14: In a US district court, former hostages Joseph Cicippio and David Jacobsen sued Iran for $600 million on charges of "commercial terrorism for profit." The men accused Iran of orchestrating their abductions as part of a plan to recover millions of dollars frozen in the United States. [10/15 WP]

Many businesses participated in a one-day general strike called by the Confederation of Trade Unions. [10/15 WSJ]

Oct. 15: Prime Minister Rashid al-Solh submitted the resignation of his government to President Hrawi. [10/16 FBIS]

Libya

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs*

1992

Sep. 1: Col. Muammar al-Qadhafi reported that Libya was facing an economic crisis and could not afford to pay its employees. [9/2 WP, WSJ]

Morocco

See also, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1992

Aug. 10: King Hassan asked his government to resign so a new government could be formed to prepare for a general election. [8/11 FT]

Aug. 11: King Hassan appointed a new government:

Muhammad Karim Lamrani, *Prime Minister*
Moulay Mustafa Belarbi Alaoui, *Justice*
Driss Basri, *Interior Affairs and Information*
Abd al-Rahim Harrouchi, *Public Health*
Muhammad Berrada, *Finance*
Taieb Chkili, *National Endowment*
Bensalem Smili, *Maritime Fisheries and Merchant Marine*
Muhammad Kabbaj, *Public Works, Vocational, and Cadre Training*
Rachid Ghazouani, *Transport*
Abd al-Salam Ahizoun, *Post and Communications*
Othman Demnati, *Agriculture and Agricultural Reform*
Abdallah Belkziz, *Youth and Sports*
Moulay Zine Zahidi, *Commerce, Industry, and Privatization*
Abd al-Kabir Alaoui M'Daghri, *Religious Endowment and Islamic Affairs*
Muhammad Ouadghiri, *Employment, Handicrafts, and Social Affairs*
Moulay Driss Alaoui M'Daghri, *Energy and Mines*
Muhammad Alla Si Naceur, *Cultural Affairs*
Abd al-Rahman Bouftas, *Housing*
Hassan Abou Ayoub, *Foreign Trade, Foreign Investments, and Tourism*
Ahmad Charkaoui, *Foreign Affairs* [8/12 FBIS]

Aug. 20: King Hassan announced that the constitution had been amended and would be submitted to a popular referendum. He released the draft constitution. [8/25 FBIS]

Sep. 4: The Interior Ministry announced that 97 percent of the electorate participated in a referendum on the revised constitution and that more than 99 percent of the votes cast supported the new version. Outside observers at election booths said that it did not appear that such a large percentage of the electorate had voted. Residents of Western Sahara were included in the electorate. [9/5 WP, 9/8 FBIS]

Oman

See also, Petroleum Affairs

Pakistan

See also, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia

1992

July 17: Quami Mahaz-e-Azadi, Pakistan Workers Party, and Qammi Inqilabi Party joined to form the Awami Jamhoori Party. [7/20 FBIS]

July 29: US authorities brought charges of fraud, bribery, conspiracy, larceny, and racketeering against a number of former executives, shareholders, and associates of the defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), including the bank's founder, Pakistani Agha Hasan Abedi, former BCCI chief executive Swaleh Naqri, Saudi financier Ghaith Faraun, and US bankers Clark Clifford and Robert Altman. [7/30 FT]

July 30: The *News* (Islamabad) reported that at least 600 Pakistan People's Party (PPP) activists were arrested the preceding day on charges that they planned to participate in PPP protests on 30 July. [7/31 FBIS]

Aug. 1: Officials reported that monsoon rains had killed at least 34 people in the south. [8/2 NYT]

Aug. 5: In a speech to a rally in Kashmir, Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif said that Pakistan planned to free the Himalayan region of Kashmir from Indian rule. [8/6 FT]

Aug. 17: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that the government had dismissed 687 police officers in Sind Province because of their alleged ties to criminals. [8/17 WSJ]

*See "Regional Affairs" for events related to the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 and Union de Transport Aériens Flight 772 over Niger in 1989.

In a letter from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao, Pakistan formally proposed to hold talks on the Kashmir issue. Such talks were called for in Article 6 of the Simla Agreement, signed 20 years earlier, but had never been scheduled. The letter noted that Pakistan continued to support UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite on the issue. [8/18 FT]

Aug. 18: Pakistani and Indian officials met to hold talks on Kashmir. [8/19 NYT]

The *Nation* (Peshawar) reported that authorities had arrested four Israeli spies the preceding day in Peshawar. [8/20 FBIS]

Aug. 20: The National People's Party, Jamhoori Watan Party, Pakistan National Party, Pakistan Democratic Party, Awami Jamhoori Party, and Mazdoor-Kisan Party formed the National Democratic Alliance. [8/21 FBIS]

Sep. 12: The *New York Times* reported that at least 350 people, and possibly as many as 1,000, had been killed by torrential rains and flash floods during the preceding week in the North West Frontier Province, Punjab, and Kashmir. [9/12 NYT]

Kashmiri prime minister Sardar Abd al-Qayyum reported that more than 1,000 people were missing or had died as a result of the flooding. [9/13 NYT]

Sep. 15: As many as half a million people were evacuated from some 300 villages along the Indus River in the south as the river continued to swell from torrential rains in the northeast. [9/16 FT, WP]

Sep. 16: The government reported that more than 2,000 people had died in flooding during the preceding week. [9/17 WSJ]

Sep. 28: A Pakistan International Airlines flight crashed near Kathmandu, killing all 167 passengers. [9/29 FT]

Sep. 29: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that the National Bank of Pakistan had agreed to pay a $200,000 fine and to tighten its record-keeping practices, after being charged by the US Federal Reserve Board with violating US currency control laws in its US branches. [9/29 WSJ]

Oct. 10: A Sind court acquitted Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, on charges that he masterminded the murder of 29 people. This was the fifth acquittal handed down in a case involving Zardari. [10/12 FT]

Qatar

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1992

Aug. 10: Diplomatic relations were established with Guinea-Bissau. [8/11 FBIS]

Sep. 1: Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani reshuffled the Council of Ministers:

Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, *Defense*

Abdallah bin Khalifa Al Thani, *Interior*

Hamad bin Suhaym Al Thani, *Health*

Muhammad bin Khalifa Al Thani, *Finance, Economy, and Trade*

Ahmad bin Sayf Al Thani, *Justice*

Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabbur Al Thani, *Foreign Affairs*

Abdallah bin Khalid Al Thani, *Endowments and Islamic Affairs*

Ahmad bin Hamad Al Thani, *Municipal Affairs and Agriculture*

Isa Ghanim al-Kuwari, *Amiri Diwan Affairs*

Abdallah Salih al-Mani', *Communications and Transport*

Abd al-Aziz Abdallah Turki, *Education*

Ahmad Muhammad Ali al-Subay'i, *Electricity and Water*

Abd al-Rahman Saad al-Dirham, *Labor, Social Affairs, and Housing*

Abdallah bin Hamad al-Atiyah, *Energy and Industry*

Hamad bin Abd al-Aziz al-Kuwari, *Information and Culture* [9/2 FBIS]

Saudi Arabia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan

1992

July 23: During a week-long tour of the Middle East, US secretary of state James Baker traveled to Jiddah to meet with King Fahd about the peace process. [7/25 NYT]

July 27: In New York, Kamal Adham, the former head of Saudi intelligence, pled guilty to violating the New York State Holding Company Act by knowing that First American Bank was illegally held by Arab investors affiliated with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Adham agreed to cooperate in the state and federal investigations of the illegal takeover and to pay $105 million in fines. [7/29 WP]

July 29: US authorities brought charges of fraud, bribery, conspiracy, larceny, and racketeering against a number of former executives, shareholders, and associates of the defunct BCCI, including the bank's founder, Pakistani Agha Hasan Abedi, former BCCI chief executive Swaleh Naqri, Saudi financier Ghaith Faraun, and US bankers Clark Clifford and Robert Altman. [7/30 FT]

Sep. 3: Authorities beheaded 23-year-old Sadiq Abd al-Karim Malallah after he was found guilty of insulting Muhammad and the Quran. Human rights groups, including Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, protested the circumstances of the trial and the nature of the charges against Malallah. [10/1 WP]

Sep. 11: US president George Bush approved the sale of 72 F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. [9/12 NYT, WP]

Sep. 16: Abdallah bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh was appointed minister of justice. [9/18 FBIS]
Sep. 17: King Fahd appointed former justice minister Muhammad Ibrahim Jubair speaker of the Majlis. He was to appoint the remaining Majlis members on 23 September. [9/18 WP, FT]
Sep. 28: The *Washington Post* reported that in July, 107 religious scholars had submitted a 45-page memorandum to King Fahd criticizing Saudi foreign policy as well as its human rights record and its failure to follow *sharia*. [9/28 WP]

Sudan

See also, Regional Affairs

1992

July 19: Labor Minister George Kinga submitted his resignation. [7/21 FBIS]
July 30: The Revolution Command Council reappointed Dominic Kassiano as minister of labor and social security, and Galwak Deng Garang as minister of coordination of states' affairs. [7/31 FBIS]
Aug. 12: OXFAM, the Christian Aid and Christian Fund for Overseas Development, and the Norwegian Church Aid Group issued a report stating that an estimated 300,000 people in Juba had run out of food and faced "imminent starvation" if safe corridors for relief aid were not established by the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). [8/13 FT]
Aug. 17: SPLA relief organization director Elijah Malok Aleng announced that any UN relief workers flying into Juba did so at their own risk. [8/18 FT]
Aug. 20: The United Nations airlifted 40 tons of food and 5 tons of medicine to the people living in Juba. Relief shipments had been suspended on 16 July because of security threats. Juba was held by the government, but under siege by the SPLA. [8/21 FT]
Aug. 24: UN officials suspended food airlifts into Juba after the SPLA fired on a relief plane as it unloaded food. [8/26 FBIS]
Aug. 25: The United Nations resumed airlifting food aid to Juba. [8/26 FBIS]
Sep. 7: The United Nations halted airlifts to Juba for the third time in two weeks because of SPLA attacks. [9/8 FT]
Sep. 17: Following several days of meetings, UN official Jan Eliasson reported that he had reached agreement with government and rebel forces allowing flights of humanitarian aid to be flown safely into 20 locations in southern Sudan—9 rebel-held and 11 government-held. Juba was not one of the twenty sites. [9/18 NYT]
Sep. 22: US officials reported that the government had executed Andrew Tombe, 34. Tombe had been an employee of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for 10 years. He had been convicted of treason about 10 days before his execution. [9/23 NYT]
Sep. 23: Amnesty International released a special report calling on Sudan to halt secret, summary executions of persons suspected of sympathizing with the SPLA. [9/24 WP]
Sep. 30: The United Nations suspended its relief operations in the south after Burmese UN worker Miyut Maung and Norwegian journalist Helge Hummelvol were killed the preceding day under unknown circumstances. Two other UN workers also had disappeared. [10/1 NYT]
Oct. 1: The SPLA reported that it had found the bodies of UN workers Francis Ngure and Wilma Gomez next to their vehicle 43 miles north of the Ugandan border in Sudan. The two had been missing since 27 September. [10/2 NYT]
Oct. 6: The *Washington Post* reported that in mid-September, Sudan had requested permission from the United Nations to ship 20,000 tons of frozen beef to Iraq. The report noted that, according to the World Food Program, in the same period Sudan would need about 635,000 tons of food aid to feed its own population. [10/6 WP]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon

1992

July 21: Amnesty International released a report charging that Syria continued to hold thousands of political prisoners and that the prisoners continued to be subjected to severe human rights violations. [7/22 WP]
Aug. 27: In Damascus, state security courts began trials against about 600 political detainees, some of whom had been held in prison for more than 12 years. [11/1 Middle East Watch]
Sep. 22: *Al-Shuruq* (Tunis) reported that President Hafiz al-Asad had placed Defense Minister Mustafa Talas under house arrest, allegedly because he objected to allowing Rifat al-Asad, the president's brother, to return to Syria. [9/22 FBIS]

Tunisia

See also, Regional Affairs

1992

July 27: A military court reconvened the trial of 108 persons accused of involvement with the "Islamist Terrorist Network" and membership in al-Nahda. [7/29 FBIS]
July 31: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali appointed Hedi Mehni as minister of public health and Muhammad Fadl Khalil as minister of social affairs. [8/3 FBIS]

Aug. 30: A court sentenced 11 alleged leaders of al-Nahda to life in prison on charges that they were planning to overthrow the government and assassinate President Ben Ali. The leaders were tried with 279 other alleged al-Nahda members; most of the others received sentences of one to twenty years in prison. Middle East Watch criticized the verdicts on the grounds that allegations that government prosecutors had used torture in their investigations had not been answered. [8/31 WP, FBIS]

Turkey

See also, Regional Affairs

1992

July 30: Air force planes continued bombing alleged Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) camps in northern Iraq for the second consecutive day. [8/4 FBIS]

Aug. 8: In Corlu, at least 32 people were killed in a gas explosion at a textile factory. [8/9 WP]

Aug. 18: In Sirnak, PKK guerrillas attacked a number of public organizations and institutions, killing one policeman and two soldiers. Authorities encircled Sirnak and declared a state of emergency. [8/19, 8/20 FBIS]

Aug. 23: For the second time in five days, PKK guerrillas attacked gendarme stations and other public locations in Sirnak. Seven people were killed in the ensuing clashes. [8/24 FBIS]

Aug. 27: TRT Television Network (Ankara) reported that Turkey had established diplomatic relations with Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. [8/28 FBIS]

Aug. 29: The *New York Times* reported that Turkish air force planes had been bombing Kurdish villages in Iraq several times a week for at least three months. Turkey claimed there were PKK camps in the villages. [8/29 NYT]

Aug. 30: At least 43 PKK guerrillas and 10 government soldiers were killed in clashes at a Turkish border post near Semdinli. Since 15 August, at least 133 people had been killed in fighting between the government and the PKK. [8/31 WP]

Sep. 5: Soldiers shot and killed at least 36 PKK guerrillas in two separate incidents on Mount Ararat and in the eastern region of Ardhan Province. [9/6 WP]

Sep. 8: Islamic Republic News Agency reported that the Iranian air force had forced two Turkish fighter planes to land in Iran after they crossed the border in skirmishes with Kurdish guerrillas. An Iranian air force official denied the reports. [9/10 FBIS]

Sep. 9: The People's Republican Party (CHP) was reactivated. It had been banned in 1981. [9/16 FBIS]

Sep. 10: The Democratic Party "reopened"; it was banned after the May 1960 military coup. [9/11 FBIS]

Sep. 14: Following meetings in Tehran with Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Interior Minister Ismet Sezgin reported that Iran had agreed to work with Turkey on efforts to fight the PKK. [9/15 FT]

Sep. 16: Thirteen Socialist Democratic Populist Party (SHP) deputies resigned and joined the CHP. [9/16 FBIS]

Sep. 21: Algan Hacaloglu, SHP deputy from Istanbul, resigned from the party leaving SHP with 52 seats in the parliament. [9/22 FBIS]

Sep. 23: Turkiye Radyolari Network announced the establishment of the Integration Party under the leadership of Faiz Altun. Initial party members included 14 deputies who resigned from the SHP and 2 who had resigned from the Democratic Left Party. [9/24 FBIS]

Sep. 24: The Unity and Peace Party, the Banner Party, and the Reformist Democracy Party announced plans to merge into one party. The name of the new party was not announced. [9/25 FBIS]

Sep. 29: At least 82 people were reported killed when some 300 PKK guerrillas attacked a Turkish outpost in Semdinli along the Iraqi border. [9/30 WSJ, FBIS]

Sep. 30: Government sources reported that at least 211 people had been killed in recent fighting between the PKK and the army near Semdinli. [10/1 NYT]

Oct. 1: At midnight, at least one and possibly two sea sparrow missiles from the aircraft carrier USS *Saratoga* accidently hit the Turkish destroyer *Muavenet,* killing at least five sailors. The ships were participating in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercises in the Aegean Sea. It was not certain whether the missiles had been fired by accident or if they had strayed from the firing range. [10/2 WP, FBIS]

In an interview with reporters, President Suleyman Demirel stated that he did not believe a political solution to the conflict with the PKK was possible and that a military approach was mandated by PKK actions. [10/5 WP]

Oct. 2: Iraqi Kurds backed by Turkish fighter planes launched an attack on PKK fighters who had set up camps along the Iraqi side of the Iraqi-Turkish border. [10/7 NYT, FBIS, 10/8 FBIS]

Oct. 7: In Istanbul, police killed three Dev-Sol members and injured nineteen others. [10/14 FBIS]

Agence France-Presse reported that Iraqi Kurds had launched a second offensive against PKK guerrillas in northern Iraq. [10/8 FBIS]

Oct. 12: Security officials reported that 27 people had been killed in the preceding days in PKK-government clashes. [10/13 FT]

Turkey announced plans to raise diplomatic relations with South Africa to the ambassadorial level. [10/14 FBIS]

UAE

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1992

July 31: The *Washington Post* reported that a US District Court had ordered the ruling family of Abu Dhabi to forfeit $104 million in cash holdings in US banks as part of a plea bargain agreement for its role in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal. [7/31 WP]

Aug. 18: Abu Dhabi official investigator Ahmad al-Sayigh announced that his country had issued preliminary fraud charges against 14 former BCCI executives and said the country would hold a formal trial. [8/19 FT]

Sep. 22: The Abu Dhabi government announced that it had released a number of BCCI documents to US investigators in Washington, and had invited the US officials to travel to Abu Dhabi. [9/23 FT]

Oct. 15: Diplomatic relations were established with Slovenia and Ukraine. [10/16 FBIS]

Yemen

See also, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Iraq

1992

Sep. 15: Justice Minister Abd al-Wasi' Sallam resigned. [9/22 FBIS]

Sep. 16: Legal Affairs Minister Ismail Ahmad al-Wazir resigned. [9/22 FBIS]

Review Article

ALL THE SHAH'S MEN

Mohammad F. Saidi

The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969–1977, by Assadollah Alam, ed. by Alinaghi Alikhani, tr. by Alinaghi Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. viii + 557 pages. Index to p. 568. $24.95.
Khatirat-e Abolhasan Ebtehaj (Memoirs of Abolhasan Ebtehaj), ed. by Ali-Reza Aruzi. 2 vols. London: A. Ebtehaj, 1991. vol 1. to p. 431. vol. 2: pp. 432–900. $45.00.
Zohur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi (The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Monarchy), by Hosain Fardoust. 2 vols. Tehran: Ettelaat, 1991. vol. 1: 738 pages. vol. 2: 731 pages. Rls8000.00.

SINCE the 1979 revolution in Iran, a considerable number of books and articles have been written on that momentous event and its development path to the present. Students of Iran's politics, Iranian and non-Iranian alike, may continue to debate whether the definitive work on the subject has yet been produced, but the fact remains that the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy will continue to be the subject of interest to scholars for years to come. The books under review here, written by three men who had important roles during the final 25 years of Pahlavi rule, can help to advance readers' understanding of the intertwined combination of factors that led to the regime's collapse amid the revolutionary turmoil of 1978–79.

Zohur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi by Mohammad Reza Shah's childhood friend and life-long associate, Hosain Fardoust, is the most interesting and most controversial of the three books. Volume one contains Fardoust's chronologically ordered recollections of his more than five decades of association with the shah. The second volume reproduces scores of never before published official documents that are relevant to Fardoust's service to the crown. This work is valuable because Fardoust's friendship with the shah enabled him to become one of the most powerful men in Iran, especially in the 1960s and 1970s when his

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influence in the military and intelligence community was rivalled only by that of the shah himself. For these reasons, Fardoust's surprising defection to the revolutionary movement in 1978 has been the subject of considerable speculation. Readers hoping for a satisfactory explanation of his motives will be disappointed, however.

The posthumous publication of Fardoust's memoirs raises valid but unresolved questions about the nature of his relationship with the revolutionaries. Although government officials consistently have denied any connection between the regime and the general, his fate in Iran prior to his death in 1987 has never been clarified. For example, why did Fardoust remain at liberty for almost four years following the revolution? Why was he arrested in 1983, and why was he detained for over three years without formal charges or a trial? Answers to these questions may provide clues as to why the government expended so much effort—Fardoust's memoirs were compiled by the Institute for Political Studies and Research of the Islamic republic's ministry of intelligence—on getting this work published.

Although the unusual circumstances surrounding publication of *Zohur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi* require the reader to exercise caution, there is, nevertheless, a considerable amount of new material on the shah's life and his personality, the inner workings of the Pahlavi regime, the patterns of influence and power within the court, the shah's relationship with his prime ministers and cabinets, the process of consolidation of the regime after the 1953 coup, and the shah's foreign policy. Fardoust also provides valuable details on the military and its career patterns, the organization of various intelligence establishments and their interrelationships, as well as their ties and cooperation with foreign counterparts such as the US Central Intelligence Agency, the British MI-6, and the Israeli *Mossad.*

The last 120 pages of the first volume addresses the final months of the Pahlavi monarchy. Fardoust provides insight for one of the most intriguing questions regarding the fall of the shah—the apparent disintegration of the command structure of the armed forces in the face of revolutionary opposition in early February 1979. He recounts his role in discouraging any effort to buttress the government of Shapour Bakhtiar, the shah's last prime minister. During this critical period, Fardoust openly expressed his doubts regarding the survival chances of the regime; given his position in the system, this attitude encouraged the flight of key officials and influential people from the country and hastened the demise of the Pahlavi dynasty. Fardoust says that he was in daily contact with his long time friend, General Abbas Gharabaghi, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and attended the last meeting of the top brass of the armed forces at which was drafted the document that declared the military's neutrality in the conflict between Bakhtiar's government and the revolutionaries. Fardoust states that he was the first officer to sign that document, then the others followed him. The general's contacts with opposition leaders during those crucial last months may explain the uncompromising stance of the clergy toward the shah.

Fardoust's revelations fill an important gap in an understanding of the sequence of developments that led to the fall of Iran's monarchy. Nevertheless, his detailed account provides no insight into his own motivations. Scholars may never know whether Fardoust was a free agent, even an opportunistic one, or whether he was simply doing somebody else's bidding; or whether, as his captors seem to have suspected after 1983, he was a mole planted in the new regime to play a different role in the future.

Unlike Fardoust, Abolhasan Ebtehaj has had the opportunity to spend his latter years in comfortable retirement in exile. He states that the objective of *Khatirat-e Abolhasan Ebtehaj* is to share his experience and wisdom with the "future generations" of Iran. In actuality, however, his two volume work is more a record of his own achievements rather than an account of the economic, political, and social developments in which he

participated. Although his famed egotism is detected easily in his frequent indulgences of self-praise, he does provide considerable and fascinating anecdotal information about many prominent members of the Pahlavi-era political elite.[1]

Ebtehaj was representative of a rare breed of Iranian politicians who, although patriotic and nationalistic, openly advocated the necessity of close cooperation with the West. His distinguished government career spanned more than two decades, beginning in 1936. His remarkable self confidence and the backing of some powerful officials enabled him to attain senior financial positions, culminating in 1954 with his appointment as head of the Plan Organization. Ebtehaj was determined to create an autonomous organization to devise and supervise the execution of the new seven-year plan. His planning philosophy called for using Iran's oil revenues for the development of much-needed infrastructure and the industrialization of the country. He tried to convert the Plan Organization into a super ministry, completely ignoring other government agencies in the planning and execution of development efforts.

Ebtehaj's eventual downfall had its root in a fundamental disagreement with the shah over spending priorities for Iran's limited foreign exchange earnings. To Ebtehaj, the oil income was the engine of development for the country and should not be "wasted" on unnecessary military programs. His insistence that the requirements of economic development should take precedence over military expenditures finally brought him into confrontation with the shah, who initially had been Ebtehaj's main supporter. At a time when the shah was systematically consolidating his supreme position in the political system, Ebtehaj's independent spirit increasingly irritated the monarch. Significantly, Ebtehaj's ties to influential US politicians discomforted the shah. Thus, in 1959, after Ebtehaj submitted his resignation as a means of pressuring the shah to side with him in his fight with the minister of industry, Jafar Sharif-Emami, the monarch accepted it gladly.

Following his resignation, Ebtehaj returned to private banking and founded the Iranian Bank. As a prominent citizen, he continued to express his reservations about the wisdom of the shah's military expenditures. After returning in 1961 from the United States, where he had given a speech that criticized the US policy of bilateral assistance and support of the shah (vol. 2, pp. 799–808), Ebtehaj was arrested on charges of corruption and mismanagement of government funds while director of the Plan Organization. The incident was intended to silence him, and it proved effective. By the time charges against Ebtehaj were dropped and he was freed from jail, the shah's personal rule had become sufficiently consolidated that even a loyal critic like Ebtehaj found it imprudent to criticize his policies.

One man who was instrumental in transforming the shah's rule into a royal dictatorship was his long-time friend, one-time prime minister, and, finally, court minister, Assadollah Alam. The diary of Alam, *The Shah and I*, recounts the final decade of the shah's reign. During the last 25 years of the shah's rule, Alam was, by any account, one of the most powerful political figures in Iran. According to Fardoust's memoirs, Alam's influence, regardless of his official position in the government, always ranked second only to that of the shah himself. Alam's ties to the shah dated back to the 1930s, and he remained one of the monarch's staunchest supporters. Indeed, absolute loyalty, obedience, and devotion formed the hallmark of Alam's relationship with the shah.

The diaries begin in 1969 and continue until after Alam's resignation, on account of failing health, in 1977. The most important affairs of the state as well as the most mundane daily chores of the court are reported in the same bland fashion. The style is in the tradition

1. An authorized biography of Ebtehaj in English is Frances Bostock and Geoffrey Jones, *Planning and Power In Iran: Ebtehaj and Economic Development under the Shah* (London: Frank Cass, 1989).

of Itimad al-Saltaneh's diary, which was similarly written in secret by Nasir al-Din Shah's scribe and minister of publications in the late 19th century.[2] One is tempted to suggest that Itimad al-Saltaneh's diary, which was published in 1966, may have inspired Alam to write his own.

The greatest value of *The Shah and I* is the inside look that it provides into the shah's psyche behind the facade of imperial pomp and pageantry—his superstitious nature, his paranoia of foreign conspiracies, his ignorance of democratic processes in the West that he had come to despise so openly toward the end of his monarchy, his attitude about women—including the queen—and his family, his general contempt for the people who served under him, and finally his nationalism and dreams for the future of his country and his dynasty. Because foreign policy was one of the shah's main intellectual passions, Alam's diary provides considerable information on the monarch's mindset, concerns, and methods in this area. Alam's entries show how Iran's foreign policy was conceived and formulated to the minutest detail by the shah.

Contrary to the popular view held in Iran, the US government was not always willing to sell to the shah every weapon system that he thought he needed. Prior to the Nixon administration, the shah frequently pressured Washington to provide more and better arms (pp. 136, 141–2, 172–3, 175, and 180). Despite the shah's very close relations with the West, he felt paranoid and insecure toward the British and Americans, seriously believing that they took him for granted (pp. 80, 94). When in 1971 he was negotiating for better terms with the oil companies, the shah asked Alam whether the United States and Britain might consider toppling his regime because of his insistence on higher prices. The shah apparently decided any such effort would fail: "As for organizing a coup amongst the army," the shah said to Alam, "my generals distrust—and lack professional respect for—one another . . . they're too much at one another's throat to constitute a threat" (pp. 197–8).

The shah's fear of foreign conspiracy, of course, partly stemmed from the fact that he already knew much about the influence of external intervention in Iran's politics. Alam also describes the shah's obsession with Iraq's threat to Iran's security, particularly prior to the rapprochement of 1975. Concerns about Iraq were one of the shah's main motives for acquiring arms. He believed that if Iran failed to obtain adequate weapons, then the country "would be prey even to a miserable little dwarf like Iraq" (p. 82).

Alam deplores the prevalence of sycophancy in the higher echelons of the political system and states that people around the shah "tell him only what he wants to hear" (p. 45). Despite his criticism, Alam often engaged in the most abominable form of servile flattery toward the shah. This situation probably contributed to the shah's absolute intolerance of the slightest criticism of himself and his policies. By the early 1970s, the only source of less than flattering views was the foreign press. Alam's diary demonstrates that the shah elevated any unfavorable report or disagreeable suggestion in the foreign media to the status of a diplomatic issue.

The memoirs of Alam, Ebtehaj, and Fardoust clearly present a pattern of abuse of political power, greed, and corruption under Mohammad Reza Shah's rule. All three men were dedicated, loyal supporters of the Pahlavi regime and had little sympathy with popular political aspirations for a more representative government. In fairness to Ebtehaj, he did refuse to go along with the shah's seemingly insatiable thirst for personal power and, consequently, had to leave the government, while Alam and Fardoust both chose to support the consolidation of dictatorship and share in the financial and political rewards.

2. See Mohammad Hasan Khan Itimad al-Saltaneh, *Ruznameh-e Khatirat-e Itimad al-Saltaneh* (Daily Memories of Itimad al-Saltaneh) (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1345 [1966]).


These three men relate, in different ways, the tragic story of how the shah failed to see the political implications of the considerable economic and social developments that transformed Iran after 1960. Instead of embarking on the path of political reform, the shah chose to surround himself mostly by highly ambitious, unscrupulous, and self-seeking persons who fawned over him and anxiously pandered to his pettiest instincts. Of the three books, *The Shah and I* and *Zohur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi* should be read more discriminately because they were written in the full awareness of the cruelty and watchfulness of the regimes that the authors served. In reading these memoirs, one is reminded of Stephen Shapiro's observation: "Men who had always felt at peace with themselves and the world around them would have no need to write autobiographies."[3]

3. Stephen Shapiro, "The Dark Continent of Literature: Autobiography," in *Comparative Literature Studies*, vol. 5, (1968), p. 296.


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Book Reviews

Kurdish Studies: Orientalist, Positivist, and Critical Approaches

Review Essay by Amir Hassanpour

Kurdish Ethnonationalism, by Nader Entessar. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. viii + 169 pages. Notes to p. 191. Bibl. to p. 201. Index to p. 207. $32.50.

This book's "central thesis . . . is that ethnic conflict constitutes a major challenge to the contemporary nation-state system in the Middle East." Examining the "political and social dimensions of Kurdish integration into the mainstream of sociopolitical life in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey," Nader Entessar "challenges the long-held view that assimilation is an inevitable result of modernization and the emergence of the relatively strong and centralized nation-state system in the Middle East" (p. vii).

Chapter 1 (pp. 1–10), "Kurdish Ethnicity," addresses state and ethnicity, Kurdish identity, language, religion, and socioeconomic marginalization. The next three chapters examine relations between the Kurds and Iran (pp. 11–48), Iraq (pp. 49–80), and Turkey (pp. 81–111). Chapter 5 (pp. 113–57) explores the "International and Regional Context of Kurdish Nationalism" and focuses on Iran-Iraq relations and the 1991 Gulf war. The last chapter, "Whither Kurdistan?" challenges the feasibility or desirability of "secessionism." At a time when more than a dozen independent states have recently formed out of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the disintegrating Czechoslovakia, the author argues that international legal principles do not allow sovereignty for the Kurds. He recommends instead a constitutional restructuring of the existing state systems into federal structures, which will promote Kurdish integration through representation in "the decisionmaking institutions of the national government" (p. 169).

The book is riddled with factual and analytical errors too numerous to list in this review. A few examples from chapters 1 and 2 will suffice. Language is an important component of Kurdish ethnonationalism and some degree of sophistication in examining language is to be expected. Entessar's classification of Kurdish dialects ("languages," in his words) is entirely erroneous. He puts Gurani and Sulaymani into the same dialect group. Whether identified as

Amir Hassanpour, Department of Communications Studies, University of Windsor, Canada, is the author of Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918–1985 *(San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992).*

the dialect "spoken mostly by the Kurds of Kermanshah" (p. 4) or used as a label for the Hawrami dialect, Gurani cannot be placed in the same group with Sulaymani. "North and South Kurmanji" (better known as Sorani), which he puts in one group, also belong to two dialect groups. Entessar fails to mention that Sorani is the most developed standard variety of Kurdish. He locates Zaza (Dimili) speakers in "the Iranian province of Western Azerbaijan and central Turkey" (p. 5). In fact there are no Zaza speakers in Iran and the author has apparently confused the name with Zarza, a Kurmanji-speaking tribe in Western Azerbaijan. These errors are in part due to the author's reliance on non-expert sources.[1]

Quoting Izady, Entessar argues that "a single Kurdish language" does not exist because "variations among them [dialects] are 'far too great by any standard linguistic criteria to warrant the classification of these tongues as simply the dialects of the same language' " (p. 4). In fact there are no clear cut or "standard linguistic criteria" to distinguish between dialect and language. Although Western philologists argue that Hawrami and Dimili are not Kurdish, the speakers of these two dialects identify themselves as Kurds and they are considered to be Kurds by the speakers of other dialects. As long as this powerful ethnonationalistic solidarity persists, philological arguments—especially by non-natives—are irrelevant. Moreover, Kurdish scholars have persistently challenged these views even on philological grounds.

Entessar identifies Ahmad Moftizadeh as a "Shi'a cleric from Kermanshah" (p. 33) and "a leader of Shi'a Kurds of Kermanshah" (p. 3). Moftizadeh, a Sunni Kurd from Sanandaj, was educated at the theological college of Tehran University but was never a clergyman or theologian. Because of his pro-Khomeini politics, he fled Sanandaj and resettled in Kermanshah. The author also fails to mention that he was arrested by the Islamic government and spent several years in prison. In describing government-Kurdish relations under the Islamic regime (pp. 29–42), the author presents the Kurdish Democratic Party as the only Kurdish political organization active in Kurdistan, along with its allies the Mojahedin-e Khalq and Fadaiyan-e Khalq (pp. 33–5). The Mojahedin in fact were never present in Kurdistan militarily or politically whereas Komala, the dominant political organization in southern Kurdistan, is ignored by Entessar except in the section examining intrafactional politics among Kurdish organizations (pp. 42–8). According to the author, in the land reform of the 1960s, "the Shah left the large landholdings of the Jaf tribal leaders essentially untouched" (p. 27), yet the Jaf aristocratic family did not possess any land in Iran when the land reform began. They were the largest landowners in Iraqi Kurdistan and fled to Iran after the 1958 coup in Baghdad; much later, the shah gave them land outside Kurdistan. There is also no such thing as "the predominantly Shi'a Ardalan tribe" (p. 27). Ardalan is not a tribe; it is the name of a Sunni princely family and their principality.

These errors cast doubt on the scholarly merits of the book, but a more serious problem is the author's theoretical and ideological commitments. Entessar conceives Kurdish ethnonationalism and its demands from the point of view of the states that rule over the Kurds. In his approach, Kurdish demands for autonomy or statehood are not legitimate; however, the forcible occupation of Kurdistan and its division by the Ottoman and Safavid empires in 1639 and its redivision among five states in 1918 are legitimate. This book seeks the "source of ethnic conflict" in the Kurdish demands for autonomy or independence (p. 2 and elsewhere), rather than in the states' brutal suppression of these demands. Far from documenting the evolution of the Kurds as a nonstate nation (as some political scientists do), he presents them as "prime examples of nonassimilating minorities" (p. 159 and elsewhere) or "ethnic minorities." Ignoring centuries of detribalization, sedentarization, ruralization, and urbanization of Kurdish society, the author generally overemphasizes the now almost extinct tribal

1. Mehrdad Izady, "A Kurdish Lingua Franca?" in *Kurdish Times* 2, no. 2 (1988), pp. 13–24; and George Harris, "Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 433, (September 1977), pp. 112–24.

form of social organization. Like many Persian nationalists, he is usually reluctant to apply the concept "language" to the Kurdish speech and prefers to use "dialect" or "vernacular" (see, for example, pp. 9, 13, 49). Not surprisingly, when checking his quotation of a Persian-language document (Komala's "Declaration of the Basic Rights of the Toiling People of Kurdistan"), this reviewer found that Entessar had translated "mother-tongue" (*zabān-e mādarī*) as "local vernacular" (p. 48, line 5).

The Kurdish struggle for statehood or self-determination is conceived in this book as "secessionism" (see especially chapter 5). Although the author questions the "operational utility" of terms such as "politicide"—"the promotion and execution of state policies that result in the death of a substantial number of members of groups whose political opposition or hierarchical position places them in direct confrontation with the regime in power" (p. 167)—Entessar uses terms such as "Iranian nation" (p. 17) and "Iranian culture" (p. 161) whose very validity, operational or non-operational, is questionable. In a book on ethnonationalism, which demands precise definitions of terms such as nation, nationality, state, ethnicity, and country, the author regularly uses the term "nation" in the sense prevailing in US political discourse, that is, "country" or "state."

Entessar depicts the Iranian state as more benign than the Turkish and Iraqi counterparts. He incorrectly claims that Iran has recognized Kurdish ethnic identity (pp. 9, 81). He also claims that the Kurds of Iran are more pro-state than the Kurds of Iraq or Turkey. He makes a strange claim—that "Iranian Kurds are culturally closer to other Iranian nationalities than to Kurds in Iraq or Turkey." This "simply means that cultural factors favoring secessionism are not operative among the majority of Iranian Kurds . . . secessionist tendencies are more prevalent among both Turkish and Iraqi Kurds. This is partly because Turkish and Arab culture is more alien to the Kurds than the Iranian culture" (pp. 160–1).

This is certainly not true. The struggle for sovereignty (or "secessionism," according to Entessar) has been prevalent in all parts of Kurdistan. In the post-World War II period, however, the demand for autonomy has prevailed on the agenda of Kurdish political parties of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. This has been due to political considerations rather than cultural affinities. Cultural and even linguistic bonds are not enough to tie people together as one can readily see in the contemporary experience of Serbs and Croats or Czechs and Slovaks. In Iran, for example, the national oppression perpetrated on the Kurds has led to their abandonment of *Now Ruz* (in Kurdish, *Nawroz* [New Year]), an important cultural event that the Kurds share with Persians and others. After the extension of Tehran's control over the two principalities of Mukri and Ardalan in the mid-1800s, the Kurds in the major centers of Kurdish nationalism—Mahabad, Bokan, and Baneh—virtually abandoned the celebration of Now Ruz. Moreover, as this reviewer's research has demonstrated, while the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey rid their language of Arabic and Turkish words, the main target for the Kurds in Iran is Persian.

Entessar's book is largely a political history of the conflict between the state and the Kurds. It follows Persian nationalist historiography. Citing a Pahlavi propaganda work,[2] he assumes the existence of an Iranian state that had eternally ruled over all parts of Kurdistan until 1514 when for "the first time . . . a part of the Kurdish region was separated from Iran . . . . " (p. 11). Kurdish popular ballads and histories tell a different story, however. When they began their rule, the Safavid and Ottoman empires did not have any control over Kurdistan. Uninvited, they entered Kurdistan through aggression and occupation. Later, Entessar's monarchist historiography is smoothly transformed into US cold war propaganda when he recounts the history of the Kurdish Republic of 1946 (pp. 14–23). Instead of treating the republic as a genuine effort by the Kurdish people to achieve their national rights within

2. Rashid Yassemi, *Kurd va payvastigī-i nizhādī va tārīkhī-i ū* (The Kurds and Their Racial and Historic Bonds) (Tehran: Ibn-i Sīnā, 1319 [1940–41]).

the framework of the Iranian state, the author explains it by and large in terms of "Soviet expansionist" policy and its "long-sought access to the [Persian] Gulf" (p. 14).

Entessar ignores two important facts about Kurdish ethnonationalism. First, Kurds have a tradition of self-rule of at least five centuries. From the 15th until the mid-19th century, much of Kurdistan was ruled by Kurdish princes, most of whose principalities were independent with elaborate state structures.[3] Sovereign Kurdish states struck their own coins, raised their flags, and the *khutba* (Friday sermon) was read in the name of the Kurdish ruler. Second, Kurdish nationalist ideology was formulated 300 years ago by Ahmadi Khani in his work, *Mem û Zîn* (Mam and Zin). This nationalism, unique in the Muslim world of the 17th century, is surprisingly modern in its claims. It defines the Kurds as a nation distinct from ruling Arabs, Turks, and Persians, and calls on the princes to establish a unified state under a Kurdish king.

Far from being neutral, the production and dissemination of knowledge is shaped by the unequal distribution of power in society. Much of the knowledge produced in Middle Eastern studies has failed to contribute to the struggle of the region's peoples for democracy, freedom, and independence. Orientalism, justifiably criticized for its colonialist and partisan approach, has found a nearly identical twin in the positivist social science theories and methodologies that were introduced into Middle Eastern studies in recent decades. Although both trends see the Middle East through the eye of the Western powers and the pro-Western states of the region, this reviewer has regretfully found the works of orientalists such as Vladimir Minorsky, Alexandre Jaba, Basile Nikitine, and C.J. Edmonds—all colonial administrators or diplomats turned scholars—more informative and insightful than the research conducted by today's "objective" and "apolitical" positivist social scientists. It is to be hoped that critical social theory will find its way into Middle Eastern studies. *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* is not a step in this direction.

3. See, for example, the Kurdish history *Sharafnami*, written in 1597, and contemporary eyewitness accounts by Evliya Çelebi and European travellers such as J.B. Tavernier and C.J. Rich.

CENTRAL ASIA

Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889, by R.D. McChesney. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. xxi + 319 pages. Gloss. to p. 324. Bibl. to p. 342. Index to p. 356. $49.50.

Reviewed by John Emerson

The book under review examines a part of the world whose study in the West has been beset with numerous difficulties. For most of this century it has formed part of the Soviet empire and has generally gone under the name Soviet Central Asia. The Russian conquest of the area in the 19th century has meant that the development of its modern critical historiography has lain almost entirely in Russian or Russian-trained hands, and has been written primarily in Russian, a language often not accessible to Western scholars. Western scholarship on the area has been further impeded because the travel within it necessary to conduct effective research has been difficult for both political and logistical reasons. In Western institutions of higher learning, moreover, research on all aspects of the area, including its early history, have often perforce been conducted in departments of Russian or Soviet studies, where it has generally played an exceedingly minor role. The area's occasional alternative incarnation as part of "Inner Asia" has sometimes pulled it into a scholarship dominated by Far Eastern specialists who look at the area from a Chinese, or at best Mongolian perspective, which is of primary relevance only during the 13th and 14th centuries.

Events since the collapse of the Soviet empire, however, are slowly revealing the outlines of older and more enduring identi-

ties. Although the term the Arabs used for the area after their conquests in the 8th century, *ma wara al-nahr* (what is beyond the river [that is, the Oxus]), no longer has much resonance, the effect of the conquest was to incorporate the area into *Dar al-Islam*, a term the inhabitants themselves would have recognized at an earlier period and that has increasing resonance today. The opening of boundaries, and the flow of Iranians and Turks into the area in search of influence, is also bringing back to life its identity as an outlying part of the Middle East—another area hard to pin down satisfactorily, but, however defined, clearly a major world region. Within these frameworks, it can be seen more specifically as part of an "Eastern Islamic"—west of India, that is—or, to encompass the pre-Islamic period as well, a "Greater Iranian" world—particularly in a geopolitical sense—stretching from the Euphrates to the Indus and Jaxartes.

For over 1,000 years this area was either incorporated into, or deeply influenced by, successive Iranian empires. Its inhabitants, speaking Iranian languages, were converted to Islam from the 8th century onward, and the region became a vital part of the Islamic world with close cultural and political links to the Iranian plateau, becoming indeed the matrix within which the modern Persian language developed. After the Turkish and Mongol inroads of the 11th and succeeding centuries, Turkish moved alongside Persian as one of the two major languages of the area and eventually largely displaced it; hence its identification as Turkestan, another native name and identity which is re-emerging. Even after these conquests, however, the area remained in close touch with the Iranian plateau, as part of imperial structures erected by the Seljuqs, Mongols, and Timurids.

The Özbeg Turks who took over the area under discussion in the early 16th century had ties or origin and lineage to other Chingizid states and hence retained their Inner Asian connections. They had linguistic and religious ties to the Sunni Ottomans. They were willy-nilly involved with northern India, where the Timurids they had chased out of Central Asia created the Moghul Empire, but never forgot their homeland and were constantly scheming to get it back. All these factors have tended to obscure the fact that they should primarily be seen in the Greater Iranian context, above adumbrated, as one of the two ultimate inheritors—along with the Safavids, who conquered most of the Iranian plateau at the same time—of the legacy of Timur, and hence part of Middle Eastern history.

The difficulties in positioning the Özbegs have contributed to the problems in writing about them. Middle Eastern historiography in general, as practiced by both Western and indigenous scholars, has lagged behind that for many other regions of the world. Until recently, moreover, the classical period, to 1258, and the modern period, since 1800, have tended to claim more attention than the late medieval and early modern periods. Further, within the early modern period, the western Islamic world—dominated by the Ottomans—has attracted the lion's share of the research, because, with the exclusion of the Özbegs, the eastern Islamic world seemed to consist only of the Safavids, who were viewed as much less important than the Ottomans. The eastern Islamic context was often therefore implicitly ignored and the Safavids treated in an Ottoman context as a kind of an appanage to the greater polity.

This situation was not seriously remedied until the emergence of a historiographical school that—although not displacing the traditional historiography of the eastern Islamic world based on primary sources in Arabic and Persian, and a secondary scholarship written in, or translated into, English, French, and German—placed a new emphasis on sources in Turkish (Ottoman and Chaghatay) alongside Persian, and a secondary scholarship written primarily in Russian. Such a school may be said to have developed at Princeton University under the late Martin Dickson.[1]

1. Another school with a somewhat broader, Inner Asian focus—but one taking fully into account its western components—was developing at Harvard University under the leadership of Joseph F. Fletcher, Jr., until his premature death in 1984.

The author of the present work studied under Dickson and the work itself is the first serious extended book-length treatment in English of any aspect of Özbeg Central Asian history. It has two supreme merits. First, it provides readers with extensive information about the Özbegs in general, and the Balkh appanage in particular, during the four centuries it covers, and thereby starts filling this gap in the English-speaking world's knowledge of the eastern Islamic area during this period. Second, it brings fully into Western ken the great mass of Soviet research on the subject, the key to which can be found in an invaluable bibliography.

In such a pathbreaking work, it would be unreasonable to expect a tightly focused monographic study, and, in fact, the source material that exists on the Balkh *waqf*, at least until the 18th century, is found too infrequently for such a study. In addition, as the author points out in a superb introductory chapter that reviews the work which has been done to date on waqf, much more research needs to be undertaken before the institution is fully understood and a clear analytic framework constructed into which new studies can be fitted. Because documentation exists at widely scattered intervals, the author has covered a long period, but with the information at his disposal McChesney has done an excellent job in outlining the history and development of the shrine and its role in the area, extolling the "tenacity, adaptability and durability of the waqf and its administrators" and its ability to "[maintain] . . . itself over a long period of time and in the face of forces [including the impact of Nader Shah] that seem at times to have been quite hostile to the longevity of any independent economic institution" (p. 197).

In addition, as the author points out in his preface, "I discovered that it was necessary to create a narrative of the history of the region, for no satisfactory one now exists, and to try to sketch in the political, economic and social conditions that had the greatest influence on the way in which the institution and its endowments evolved" (p. xi). Thus the history of the region in which the shrine operated—effectively the whole area of present-day Afghanistan north of the Hindu Kush, with the exception of the provinces of Herat and Badakhshan[2]—is disentangled, and the work as a whole is roughly divided between this aspect and the treatment of the waqf. While focusing in detail on the region cited, the work is also successful in illuminating the history of the entire area, describing the complex relationships between the various appanages—for example, Samarqand and Bukhara—and the khans, sultans, and amirs (all terms with technical meanings different from those employed in other contemporary Islamic states) and showing the strength of the Chingizid legitimizing tradition until the mid-18th century.[3] There is much less on the economic background, but the information on this subject appears to be much more meager.[4]

Students of both the early modern Islamic world and the eastern part of the greater Iranian world are much in McChesney's debt for opening a large window onto a scene hitherto almost unknown in the West. It is hoped that others will follow with detailed studies of the remaining parts of this Central Asian world.

John Emerson, Harvard College Library

HORN OF AFRICA

Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991, by Jeffrey A. Lefebvre. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. xvi + 275 pages.

2. A German study of this latter area, covering much the same period of time, is Jan-Heeren Grevemeyer, *Herrschaft, Raub und Gegenseitigkeit: die politische Geschichte Badakhshans, 1500–1883* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1982).

3. A briefer and more balanced treatment of the political history of this area by the same author may now be found in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. V, pp. 176–93 (16th to 18th centuries), and by Yuri Bregel for the 18th-19th centuries, pp. 216–21.

4. A brief general account of the economic history of the whole Central Asian area, also by McChesney, is found in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, pp. 216–21.

Append. to p. 282. Notes to p. 342. Index to p. 351. $49.95.

Reviewed by Peter J. Schraeder

Jeffrey Lefebvre's book, an updated version of his doctoral dissertation,[1] is an impressive piece of scholarship that offers the best analysis to date of US foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. The primary purpose of the book is to clarify the ways influence is wielded in "great power supplier-small power recipient" relationships, by focusing on the evolution of US arms transfer policies to Ethiopia and Somalia from the 1950s to the beginning of the 1990s. Adopting what he terms a "supplier-recipient bargaining model," Lefebvre analyzes ten case studies of arms transfer policies—six for Ethiopia from 1953 to 1977, and four for Somalia from 1977 to 1990—and the ways the United States, Ethiopia, and Somalia adopted two general sets of bargaining strategies based on "the manipulation of weakness" and "the threat of defection" to achieve their national security interests.

Several aspects of this book make it unique within the broad body of scholarship devoted to understanding superpower intervention in the Horn of Africa. First, the book is comprehensive in the sense that it describes US foreign policy toward both Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as describing the evolution of those policies from their beginnings in the 1950s through 1991—a tremendously important year in which the Ethiopian dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974–1991) and the Somali dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre (1969–1991) were overthrown by guerrilla insurgencies.

The book is also unique in terms of the depth of documentation that is brought to bear. In addition to carrying out dozens of interviews with important figures who were critical to the evolution of US policies, such as Edward Korry, the US ambassador to Ethiopia from 1963 to 1967, and Richard Moose, assistant secretary of state for African affairs under the Carter administration, the author makes extensive use of government documents and publications, as well as the vast amount of available secondary literature.

A wide-ranging analysis of policy debates at three separate levels of the policymaking establishment—the White House, the bureaucracies of the executive branch, and Congress—also makes this book unique within the general literature. As the White House historically has remained uninvolved in the policymaking process with regard to Africa, and Congress only began to play a more important role in Africa policies in the 1970s, the author pays particular attention to the importance of bureaucratic politics and the often acrimonious infighting that has marked US foreign policy toward the Horn.

The final, and perhaps most unique, contribution of the book is its discussion of the various conflicts in the Horn of Africa in terms of Middle Eastern politics. Specifically, the author does an excellent job of describing the foreign policies of various Middle Eastern states, particularly Israel, toward the Horn of Africa, as well as the ways the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has affected those policies.

Although this book is definitely a must for scholars and policymakers alike, it is not without shortcomings. One simple but important problem, which no doubt is due to the publisher's desire to keep costs down, rather than any action on the part of the author, is the lack of a bibliography and a list of those interviewed (included in the original dissertation). Second, the analysis is at its weakest in the description of the most recent events in the Horn of Africa, particularly the overthrow of the Siad and Mengistu regimes in 1991, which is treated in an 11-page conclusion.

The most important critique emerges from what appears to be an underlying assumption of "rationality" within the policymaking process. For example, the author implies in the beginning of the book (p. 5) that suppliers and recipients are rational actors who seek to "maximize benefits and minimize costs." In-

1. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "Client Dependency and Donor Dependency: American Arms Transfers to the Horn of Africa, 1953–1986" (University of Connecticut, 1986).

deed, the issue of rationality is crucial, it seems, to the author's discussion of the bargaining model as applied to US relations with Ethiopia and Somalia. This characterization, however, is at odds with much of the evidence presented throughout the book, which seems to imply that US policies in the Horn of Africa were often anything but rational, resulting instead from such potentially irrational processes as parochial institutional operating procedures and infighting between the various bureaucracies of the executive branch. These critiques, however, are minor in comparison to the tremendous contributions of Lefebvre's book.

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IRAN

The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy, by Jahangir Amuzegar. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xii + 312 pages. Notes to p. 348. Index to p. 355. $71.50 cloth. $23.95 paper.

Reviewed by Mohammad H. Faghfoory

In this book, Jahangir Amuzegar intends to present a new perspective on the Iranian revolution. He succeeds in his work. The book is rich in fresh analysis and information, and is strengthened by its objectivity and scholarly presentation.

Amuzegar's text is divided into six parts. Part one discusses the salient features of the Iranian revolution and maintains that the revolution was both unforseen and unforeseeable. The discussion reveals, however, that a confrontation between the state and the nation—especially the clergy—was inevitable at some point in time. The only question was when and how this confrontation would take place.

Part two examines several theories on the Iranian revolution, arguing that, despite their validity, no single theory can explain this monumental event. Part three addresses historical and deep-rooted causes of the revolution. The fourth and fifth parts examine Iran's development strategies following World War II, and the shah's understanding of the revolutionary crisis. The final part is an analysis of the collapse of the Iranian monarchy and the lessons learned from the Pahlavi triumph and tragedy. Although the author gives the regime proper credit for its accomplishments, Amuzegar's negative assessment of the Pahlavi monarchy is revealed by a glance at such titles and subtitles of the book as "Hegemony of Style over Substance," "Nationalism without a National Purpose," "The Lyrical Illusion of Abundance," "Castles Built on Sand," and "A No-Exit Scenario."

According to Amuzegar, the emergence of the revolutionary situation in 1977 and the downfall of the regime in 1979 were neither spontaneous nor unprovoked. Rather, they were the outcome of diverse factors at work for several decades. These factors were rooted in institutional anomalies and contradictions; controversial policies and strategies; Iranian national character; the shah's own complex personal make-up, mind-set, and behavior; and the leadership role played by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

According to the author, the inherent contradictions in the constitution of 1906 planted the seeds of serious conflict between the religious establishment and a secular state (p. 119). Through their actions and policies, the Pahlavis reinforced contradictions between rule and reign. They could not understand that without grass roots political participation, it is impossible to build a modern secular state. By suppressing intellectuals, the clergy, and the radical left, the shah helped to unite them against himself, at a time when the country was experiencing profound economic changes. Imbalance between political and economic development made the regime particularly vulnerable to external attacks.

Amuzegar criticizes Iran's development strategies under the Pahlavis because of their preference for symbols over substance and disregard for native culture and psychology. Although the most advanced military hard-

ware was purchased, for example, the army lacked political awareness, professional independence, and a clear hierarchical chain of command. The shah's army, in fact, "consisted of human robots who were splendid in taking orders but unable to act (or think) independently." Consequently, its destiny and survival became dependent on the shah's fate (pp. 163–4).

Amuzegar's discussion of the shah's personality, behavior, and responsibility for creating the revolutionary situation is candid, yet objective. Constitutionally, the shah was exempt from responsibilities, yet every major policy and decision had to have his approval, regardless of the advice of parliament, the cabinet, or anyone else (p. 122). Although he legitimized his reign by invoking the constitution and Shi'ism, the shah did not observe the tenets of the constitution and never understood the symbiotic relations between the constitution and religion (pp. 122–3). Moreover, the shah was a unique case in psychological contrast. He considered Iran as his trust, and "was convinced that Iran was he, and he was Iran" (p. 218). He did not tolerate criticism, "wanted maximum information, but minimum advice" (p. 218), and "welcomed advice only when it helped his goal but never when it hampered it" (p. 304). Obviously, in the course of a 37-year reign, he went through profound psychological changes.

Challenging the view that revolutions do not occur in a vacuum, Amuzegar states that "it was precisely the political vacuum created by the regime that attracted the opposition like a powerful magnet" (p. 241). The mass exodus of many military commanders, politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats further widened this vacuum, and, in their absence, economic paralysis caused by the government employees' strikes worked as "a most, if not the most, crucial factor" in the collapse of the monarchical regime (p. 284). The book ends with lessons that politicians and students of history must learn from this revolution—that no one-man rule has long-term viability and no government can last long without the consent of the governed.

Some minor errors should be pointed out. It was the Mojahedin-e Khalq, as well as the Fada'iyan-e Khalq, who advocated the establishment of a socialist republic modeled after Mirza Kuchek Khan (p. 14); Ayatollah Abulqasim Kashani was never a *marja'-e taqlid* (p. 26); and Mohammad Vali Khan Asadi was the custodian of the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad during Fatollah Pakravan's tenure as governor-general of Khorasan (p. 108). Such errors are, unfortunately, typical.

As Amuzegar himself maintains, most of the information presented in the book is not new. The information is presented in a new context, however, and in an objective, analytical, well-balanced, and thoughtful manner. The book indeed provides a new perspective and a deeper understanding of the root causes of the Iranian revolution. The author must be commended for filling the void in the existing literature on the intricate fabric of the Iranian monarchy and the causes of its speedy collapse.

Mohammad H. Faghfoory is the author of Ulama-State Relations in Iran: 1921–1941, *and a forthcoming political biography of Ayatollah Kashani.*

Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946, by Louise L'Estrange Fawcett. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. xii + 181 pages. Notes to p. 212. Bibl. to p. 223. Index to p. 227. $54.95.

Reviewed by Mark Lytle

Louise Fawcett makes several important claims for this book. She says that her work elevates the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 to its proper place in Iranian history and, more important, cold-war history. She argues that the book's interpretation of events is post-revisionist. Finally, she eschews models in favor of an unabashedly historical approach. Fawcett fulfills all those claims. The reader should be warned, however, that the general history has been covered elsewhere, while

the details of the Azerbaijan uprising will be of interest only to a specialized audience.

In the first three chapters, Fawcett looks closely at circumstances within Azerbaijan, from the revolutionary period following World War I to the rejection of the Soviet oil claim in 1947. One regrets that US policymakers lacked Fawcett's clear perception of events. In that way they would not have taken such a dire view of Soviet ambitions in northern Iran. These, Fawcett concludes, proved to be limited and easily discouraged. Fawcett also takes a surprisingly bleak view of British policy. She finds the British so wedded to their narrow interests in Iran that they antagonized Iranian opinion to their own ultimate disadvantage. All the same she seems to exaggerate the degree to which the British turned a blind eye to Soviet maneuvering in the north. Even if they largely promoted their own influence in the south, British ambassador Reader Bullard and others regularly warned the Americans of Soviet ambitions. Fawcett also fails to mention that the British encouraged the use of US advisors, at least in part to create a buffer against Soviet expansion.

Fawcett should be applauded for taking a strictly historical approach. Too often, historians and—even more so—political scientists become so wedded to their models that the story gets lost. One hardly recognizes the events these models seek to explain. Fawcett does not completely escape, however, the problems posed by historical narrative. She arbitrarily decides to tell the Soviet, US, and British sides separately. The clarity gained comes at the expense of exploring the interplay among Allied policies, which is equally crucial to explaining events. Her treatment of Soviet and US policy does not go beyond existing works. In the Soviet case that is understandable, as the sources remain limited. In the US case she might, for want of fresh insights, have explored interpretive issues, at least in her footnotes. As it is, her treatment of US policy and great power oil politics is disconcertingly superficial.

This treatment may explain why her conclusions are not more compelling. Had she highlighted interpretive issues more the book would address a broader audience. To conclude as she does that the crisis was "a turning point in the relations between the great powers" (p. 177) is to put on the specialist's lenses. Fawcett might remember that Josef Stalin's February speech, George Kennan's Long Telegram, and Winston Churchill's Fulton, Missouri speech all came during the crisis, but were not inspired by it. The Azerbaijan crisis confirmed what the incipient cold warriors were prepared to believe about their former allies. Thus it was, as other historians have already concluded, a crucial step, but not a turning point.

Mark Lytle is the author of The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941–1953 *(New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1987).*

ISRAEL

The Last Option—After Nasser, Arafat, and Saddam Hussein: The Quest for Peace in the Middle East, by David Kimche. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; and New York and Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992. vii + 316 pages. Sources to p. 323. Index to p. 328. $25.00.

Reviewed by William B. Quandt

No one who reads David Kimche's *The Last Option* can claim not to have been forewarned. Opposite the title page is an "old Arab proverb" that reads " 'If I told you all I knew,' said the Prophet, 'you would flog me without pity'." Kimche does not pretend that he is a prophet, but he apparently does not intend to tell all he knows from his long service in *Mossad* and as director general of Israel's foreign ministry. Still, some of what he recounts must be true, or at least close to the truth. The problem for the reader is to figure out how much.

A blurb on the dust jacket refers to "the Yom Kippur war of 1967." Someone—author, editor—is not paying much attention to detail, a problem that continues on into the text of the book. In the midst of what seem to be sensational revelations, a blatant factual

error reminds the reader to be on guard. For example, while reading the description of Moshe Dayan's witnessing the first meeting between Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin (p. 69), this reviewer remembered that Dayan had not been present. Dayan's own account, *Breakthrough*, confirms that he was not there.[1]

Put aside the inattention to factual accuracy and the poor editing of this book for a moment. What does it relate about recent Middle East history and about the views of a prominent Israeli who played a part in some of those events? The book covers four major episodes—the relations between Israel and Egypt leading up to the peace treaty in 1979, Israeli-Lebanese relations, the Iran-Iraq war and the Iran-Contra affair, and Israel and the Palestinians.

Of these four sections, the most "revisionist" is the first. Kimche is persuaded that Leonid Brezhnev was the main player in events from 1967 to 1973. The Soviet leader set the stage for the 1967 war, he arranged for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Egypt in 1972 as an act of deception, and he encouraged Egypt and Syria to go to war in 1973. The goal throughout was "to diminish Israel and thus eliminate American influence" in the Middle East (p. 13). Only when Brezhnev realized that Sadat was losing the 1973 war did he abandon this strategy.

Readers who are skeptical of this line of argument should not expect to be overwhelmed with documentation or evidence. Apart from references to certain unnamed Soviet historians with whom the author has discussed these matters, the rest is to be taken on faith. In other words, the reader must accept that Mossad (and therefore Kimche) had access to the most secret Soviet and Egyptian records and that the author is accurately reflecting those sources in his analysis. Perhaps soon readers will be able to check for themselves. The notetaker for the Politburo during the 1973 war is writing a book based on his notes. Will they confirm Kimche's account?

In Kimche's version of the peace process, Israel made Anwar Sadat an attractive offer early in 1973 and again in 1977 (full withdrawal from Sinai). US officials (like the present reviewer—"one of Carter's principal and more cynical Middle East specialists" [p. 64]) were supposedly opposed to a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli deal. Henry Kissinger had supposedly managed to outmaneuver Richard Nixon and therefore set the stage for the eventual success at Camp David. Carter, in Kimche's view, almost succumbed to the bad advice of those around him, pushing Sadat into the dead end of a Geneva conference. But, fortunately, Sadat managed to get Carter by himself at Camp David in February 1978 to tell the US president bluntly that Egypt wanted a bilateral deal. Then Carter broke with his advisers and Camp David proved to be a step in that direction instead of toward an illusory comprehensive peace.

The only trouble with this nice story is that it is wrong. This reviewer has asked Carter specifically if Sadat ever spoke to him in this way at Camp David in early 1978 and he has denied it. It is also not true that some of Carter's advisers told Sadat at Camp David that he did not have to sign the agreement, as Kimche twice asserts (pp. 109, 182–3). As this reviewer is allegedly the source for this "fact," it can be completely denied right here. Kimche is relying on a source who has publicly acknowledged that he misquoted me, and Kimche was so informed by me on January 22, 1992, with full documentation, when the US edition of this book was still in "uncorrected advance proofs." In the three months that remained before publication, the author, who acknowledged receiving my letter, made no changes in this or any of the other factual errors that were brought to his attention. Perhaps his publisher was unwilling to make the changes, in which case its claim to publish academically respectable books may be questioned.

Another irritating example of playing loose with the record comes in a disparaging comment about an article published by Rich-

1. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 65.

ard Ullman in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1975. Greatly exaggerating the influence of both Ullman and the Council on Foreign Relations, Kimche quotes (p. 40) from the article an excerpt that implies the United States should abandon Israel. An innocent reader would conclude that Ullman was deeply anti-Zionist, if not worse. But in the original text, Ullman gives an example of how a cynical, Metternichian politician might assess the value of Israel to the United States, arguing that the United States could never afford to conduct such a policy. Instead, he concludes that the United States should offer Israel "an overt and explicit commitment to Israel's defense—including even the stationing of US military contingents in Israel" (p. 295).

The two parts of this book that have most merit are those where Kimche was a direct participant and is presumably more careful with the record. His sections on negotiations with the Lebanese are full of interesting tidbits, as are his revelations about dealing with Robert McFarlane on Iran in 1985. Even in these sections, however, the reader must be careful to check the record. For example, Kimche writes that the bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, in which the CIA's Robert Ames was killed, occurred after the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks (p. 178), whereas it took place the previous April.

Although this book frequently caused this reviewer's blood pressure to rise, it is recommended to readers who have enough background to provide necessary context. There are some genuine nuggets of information tucked away, although they usually require further documentation before being accepted as fact. In addition, the author's point of view is representative of a centrist, tough-minded Israeli who worries about his country's security but also believes that a peace settlement is essential. It is precisely with those Israelis that Arabs and Americans will have to deal if the peace process is to succeed.

William B. Quandt, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

KURDS AND KURDISTAN

The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, ed. by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. xii + 218 pages. Notes to p. 233. Bibl. to p. 241. Index to p. 250. $47.50.

La question kurde, ed. by Elizabeth Picard. Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1991. 151 pages. Chron. to p. 158. Bibl. to p. 161. FF53.00 paper.

Reviewed by Nader Entessar

The phenomenon of ethnonationalism has shaken the foundation of existing nation-states in many parts of the world in the late 20th century. In the Middle East, Kurdish demands for autonomy have challenged the region's nation-states and have resulted in increased interest in the plight of the Kurds. Until recently, however, there has been a dearth of scholarly and reliable information about the Kurds written in Western languages. The two books under review go a long way in addressing this deficiency. The contributors to these two volumes cover the Kurdish struggle in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, as well as in Lebanon, Syria, and the former Soviet Union. Emphasis is placed on the first three countries where the overwhelming majority of the world's 20–25 million Kurds live today.

Both anthologies contain chapters that study the history of the Kurds, especially in the 20th century. Following the end of World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were promised autonomy and eventually a state of their own in the Kurdish regions of the Ottoman Empire, including Mosul. Subsequent events led to the abandonment of Allied efforts to establish a Kurdish state. Another attempt to create a Kurdish state was made during and after the chaotic years of World War II, when the so-called Kurdish Republic of Mahabad came into being. The Mahabad Republic, which lasted only one year, was the result of Kurd-

ish nationalist efforts to set up an autonomous regime in Iranian Kurdistan at a time when Soviet military occupation of northern Iran prevented Tehran's interference in local affairs. Although neither of the books examine efforts to establish an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq following the end of the Gulf war of 1991, the May 1992 elections in Iraqi Kurdistan could lead to a semi-independent Kurdistan. As the authors correctly observe, however, the prospect of a fully independent Kurdistan encompassing all Kurdish regions is dim, as it would require the simultaneous collapse of the central authorities in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

In addition to existing regional and international barriers to the establishment of a sovereign Kurdish nation-state, the authors discuss a range of internal factors within Kurdish societies that have prevented the realization of the goal of Kurdish independence. Several of the authors accurately note that Kurds in Turkey, northern Iran, and northern Iraq speak a dialect of Kurdish that often is not intelligible to the speakers of the dialect common in the central Kurdish areas of Iran and Iraq.[1] Although attempts have been made to designate one written Kurdish language, the results have not been encouraging. Further, attempts at language unification have been limited to somewhat artificial language creations of dubious utility.

Religious diversity has also been an impediment to nation building in Kurdistan, albeit to a lesser extent. Although some 80 percent of the Kurds are followers of Sunni İslam, they differ widely in their religious practices, habits, and devotion. Among some Sunni Kurds, particularly those belonging to the Naqshbandi and Qadiri mystical orders, communal solidarity traditionally had been enhanced by the peasantry's veneration of the *shaykhs* of these orders. With the weakening of traditional Kurdish power structures and the concomitant weakening of the positions of *aghas* and shaykhs, this element of ethnic solidarity has become less important among today's Kurds.

1. See Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pp. 35–7.

Yet another factor inhibiting the realization of Kurdish independence has been the existence of non-Kurdish minorities in Kurdistan.[2] Many of these minorities, such as the Turkomans and Assyrians, have had acrimonious or uneasy relations with the Kurds. Throughout history, the Kurds have fought against these minorities either of their own volition or as agents of various central governments in the region. There are still claims on parts of the Kurdish homeland by these minorities, which would threaten the territorial integrity of any future autonomous or independent Kurdistan.

Both of these anthologies are welcome additions to the growing scholarship on Kurds. Many of the chapters in these books offer useful information for and insight into understanding the current Kurdish predicament. Both works would have been strengthened, however, by the inclusion of policy-oriented and prescriptive chapters offering alternative scenarios for conflict resolution in Kurdistan.

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MAGHRIB

Le Grand Maghreb et l'Europe: enjeux et perspectives, by Bichara Khader. Paris: Editions Publisud, 1992. 251 pages. Tables to p. 259. Contents to p. 264. FF169.00 paper.

Reviewed by Dirk Vandewalle

Of the multitude of internal and external problems the Maghrib now faces, its deteriorating relationship with the European Community must rank among the most important. To this reviewer's knowledge, there has until now been no book-length treatment of the rapidly changing interaction between the two shores of the Mediterranean. For those who

2. See Picard, pp. 57–66; and Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pp. 39–40.

have long hoped for a comprehensive history of the relations, primarily economic, between Europe and the Maghrib since the independence of the North African countries, Bichara Khader's book offers a rich trove of facts.

Part one contains a succinct and clear overview of the challenges of economic development in the Maghrib since the 1970s, a history of Euro-Maghribi economic relations, a chapter on the Arab Maghrib Union, and a chapter tracing the possible impact of a unified Europe on the Maghrib's economic fortunes. The second chapter in particular—"The Economic Development of the Maghrib, 1970–1990," drafted originally by Larbi Talha of Aix-en-Provence's Institut de Recherches et d'Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman (IREMAM)—is a masterpiece of conciseness. The author clearly sketches the growing dependence of the Maghrib on the European continent, and the crisis this engenders as Europe becomes more inward looking and moves toward greater unification. What emerges from this chapter, and the book in general, is a clear picture of how one sided the economic interaction between the Maghrib and the EC remains.

The second part of the book focuses on the issues of demography and migration. It is equally eloquent and informative, and provides an excellent overview of the problems associated with the continuing reliance of the Maghrib on Europe for access for its laborers.

Because the book in general provides ample references—although these references are derived exclusively from European sources—it would be a *documentaliste's* dream if not for the lack of an index and tables that often are not completely identified. Both defects are continuing European academic quirks that unfortunately show no signs of abating soon.

The book resembles a technical report, a cut-and-dry, richly documented overview of the changing relationship between Europe and the Maghrib. What it lacks is an additional chapter that would have analyzed the broader—and appreciably more pessimistic—context within which Maghribi-Community relations are developing. Khader notes perceptively that local states have lost their ability to continue providing patronage—one of the pillars of their power in the postindependence period—but he fails to analyze the loss of another pillar that is equally important—the loss of confidence in the state and its representatives, which once symbolized both modernity and opposition to the colonizers. It is the combination of both elements that, in a dialectical fashion, both fuels and is maintained by the ongoing unrest, of which the Islamists are the most visible expression. There is no mention at all in the book of the Islamic movements that are now a problem for both sides of the Mediterranean, already influencing the political debate across the entire spectrum of Europe's political parties. It is this changed perception in Europe of what security constitutes in a post-cold war world that is guiding many of the policies emanating from Brussels. It is the perception in Europe that ultimately only internal reform in the Maghrib can stabilize relations between the two sides—something the EC has little leverage over—that better explains the current halting and cautious dynamic of interaction between the two sides than the agreements and protocols Khader cites.

Despite this lack of a more structural analysis, the book will prove a most welcome addition and an invaluable reference to the economic relationship between the two sides of the Mediterranean since the early 1960s.

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PAKISTAN

Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq, by Shahid Javed Burki *et al.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press; and Lahore, Pakistan: Pak Book Corporation, 1991. xi + 153 pages. Chron. to p. 182. Biogs. to p. 192. Bibl. to p. 205. Index to p. 212. $29.50.

Reviewed by William L. Richter

When Muhammad Zia ul-Haq seized power in July 1977, neither he nor anyone else thought he would remain in office for very long. By the time of his death in August 1988, he had ruled Pakistan for fully a quarter of that country's period of independence. The Zia era was a watershed in many respects, the consequences of which continue to condition Pakistani politics and society.

The authors of this volume[1] have provided a valuable set of perspectives on the Zia period. The subtitle of the book is in fact much more descriptive of the contents than the title. The military's role under Zia, although not neglected, is by no means given the degree of attention that the title would imply. Instead, the book's six chapters cover a general overview of the period—including reflections on the reasons for Zia's "political longevity"—and economic issues (Burki), political developments and international relations (Baxter), constitutional change (Azfar), and bureaucratic reforms (LaPorte). In addition, useful chronological, biographical, and bibliographical materials are appended.

For the most part, the book is informative, interesting, and well written. There is more consistency and continuity than is often found in works written by several authors, in part a reflection of the co-authors' long associations with one another. Despite its generally high level of accuracy and perceptivity, the book does display a few minor errors. Azfar, for instance, confuses the terms "regime" and "republic" when he argues that Pakistan, since 1947, "has persisted through five different republics" (p. 49). In constitutional terms, Pakistan was a dominion, not a republic, until 1956. Also in the category of minor errors are some incorrectly attributed citations in the bibliography.

The style is part analytical, part interpretive, part personal memoir. At least two of the authors reflect on their meetings with Zia during his period in power. Of the analytical and interpretive parts, perhaps the most interesting are the two essays by Burki. In the first he explains Zia's long tenure in office in terms of his middle class social base, Pakistan's strong economic performance during the period, Zia's deft handling of the armed forces, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and luck. His chapter on the economy similarly provides clear and persuasive analysis of both the reasons for Pakistan's economic successes during the Zia era and some of the ominous weaknesses. "Pakistan, therefore, stands at an important crossroads;" he argues, "the model of economic management that has brought it to a comfortable stage of development may no longer be able to sustain the former pace of growth and development" (p. 112).

All readers interested in contemporary Pakistan should find this book instructive.

William L. Richter, Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, Kansas State University

1. Shahid Javed Burki, Craig Baxter, Robert LaPorte, and Kamal Azfar.

SUDAN

Sudan after Nimeiri, ed. by Peter Woodward. London and New York: Routledge, 1991. xiii + 217 pages. Index to p. 223. $69.95.

Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, by Abdelwahab el-Affendi. London: Grey Seal Books, 1991. xvi + 190 pages. Notes to p. 192. Bibl. to p. 203. Index to p. 209. £25.00.

Reviewed by Robert O. Collins

Both of these works are the result of the able tutelage of Peter Woodward of the University of Reading. *Sudan after Nimeiri*, edited by Woodward, is a continuation of a tradition that has become common in Sudanese studies—a collection of essays by a variety of well-known and respected scholars. The book is the product of a conference supported by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and the Gordon Memorial College Trust Fund at the Center of Near and Middle Eastern Studies at SOAS, and organized in association with the British Society

of Middle Eastern Studies, the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom, and the Royal African Society.

The importance of this book is that the contributors provide insights into the collapse of Sudan after the demise of Jaafar Nimeiri. Although the information that has been extracted or researched is useful, and despite the skillful editing of Woodward, there is bound to be—as in any edited volume—disparity in the quality of the particular essays describing what has occurred in Sudan following Nimeiri's fall in 1985.

The most interesting and informative essays are those by Charles G. Gurdon on "The Economy of Sudan and Recent Strains," and Kamal Osman Salih on "The Sudan, 1985–89: The Fading Democracy," which provides some extremely perceptive criticisms of the democratic tradition within Sudan. Jean François Rycx, in his essay on "The Islamization of Law as a Political State in Sudan," strikes at one of the most significant matters that has been so divisive in the country. Woodward, in his inimitable style, provides a final essay on "External Relations after Nimeiri," which attempts without great success to provide continuity to the variety of essays presented in this volume. There has been little written about Sudan since 1985. This volume fills part of that gap but not with coherence. Such a shortcoming appears to be an endemic disease in almost any published collection of intelligent and informed conference papers, which are driven by the specialties and limitations of their authors.

The second book under review, *Turabi's Revolution* by Abdelwahab el-Affendi, is a published doctoral dissertation written under the academic supervision of Woodward. El-Affendi argues the case for the Islamic revival, the rise of Muslim fundamentalism, the influence of Muslim militancy, and, of course, the leading role played by Hassan al-Turabi. This is an important book for two reasons. First, with the ascendancy of Muslim militancy throughout the Middle East and beyond, the author—who is intimately acquainted with the movement and presumably without any attempt at dissimulation—not only enunciates the goals of the movement but spells out exactly how they are to be achieved. These revelations come at a time when interest in Islamic fundamentalism has spread throughout the West on account of the movement's success in Sudan, Algeria, and elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Second, the author describes with astonishing candor not only the goals and growth of the Islamic militant movement, but its fundamental ideology. This book is not an idiosyncratic theological tract, but a metaphysical monograph on the importance and dynamism of Islam in the modern world, meticulously researched with an excellent bibliography. Its footnotes may be a bit thin but they are always penetrating and essential to the message that the author wishes to convey as to the importance of the Islamic revolution or, as the title indicates, Turabi's revolution. The title of the book clearly displays the author's admiration for Turabi, who without question has long been acknowledged as one of the most able, intelligent, and sophisticated individuals in the world of fundamental Islam.

Equally important are the techniques of revolution, which reminds this historian of the dedicated Bolsheviks. Clearly, the two movements have nothing in common ideologically, but the techniques that they employ to achieve power have striking similarities. To the Muslim militants there is the cultivation and nurturing of the youth who will come to form the vanguard in the struggle for political power, the acquisition of economic power through Islamic banks, and the patient and gradual infiltration of the key institutions of the country such as the military, the universities, the mercantile community, and the civil service. All of these tactics to achieve power have been traditionally hostile to the Sudanese whose revolutions have been rather benign compared to the determination of the *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (Muslim Brothers). Although there have been differences between the Revolutionary Command Council—the young army officers who took over the government in a bloodless coup on June 30, 1989—and the imams led by Turabi who have controlled policy from across the Nile in Omdurman, by and large there is agreement

between them when it comes to the maintenance of power, whether it involves hardship, atrocity, or the violation of what are generally regarded as basic human rights. Although a small minority, the National Islamic Front (NIF)—which is the political arm of the Ikhwan, and of the government—is determined not to make the mistakes of its predecessors. If it be necessary to use force to carry out the goal of creating an Islamic republic in a country in which one-third of the population are not Muslims, the NIF is committed to do so. In Islamic history this movement would be labelled a *jihad*, but in contemporary politics it is simply the acquisition and maintenance of power in order to finance, establish, and consolidate a religious ideology among the fainthearted and the infidels. No one can fully understand the power, inspiration, and ferocity of the rise of Muslim militancy without understanding the Turabi revolution.

Robert O. Collins, Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916–1920, by Bruce Westrate. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. xvi + 208 pages. Notes to p. 224. Bibl. to p. 231. Index to p. 240. $35.00.

Reviewed by Aviel Roshwald

This is an interesting study of the Cairo-based organization that coordinated Britain's support of the Arab Revolt during World War I. Claiming that the Arab Bureau has been misrepresented in much of the secondary literature as a collection of romantic and impractical Arabophiles, Bruce Westrate seeks to correct that image by a thorough examination of its history as an organization. It is in the development of the bureaucratic politics surrounding the Arab Bureau, rather than in the flaws of its larger-than-life members (such as T.E. Lawrence), that the sources of its failures are to be found.

Westrate contends that the bureau's policies were guided by a cynically imperialistic vision, rather than by naive conceptions of the Beduin as noble savages or by idealistic notions about the need to apply the principles of national self-determination to the peoples of the Middle East. From the bureau's point of view, the freedom of the Arab peoples was intended all along to serve as a foundation for the extension of British influence in the Middle East. Leading figures in the organization such as Gilbert Clayton and David Hogarth—and, indeed, Lawrence as well—harbored no illusions about the corrupt and unstable nature of Sharif Husayn's rule, nor did they take seriously the notion of a united Arab state emerging from the ruins of Ottoman rule in the region. An Arab confederation was considered a necessarily unstable political edifice that would depend on active British support for its survival. National self-determination would provide a legitimizing basis for informal empire.

If the bureau became an advocacy group for this particular vision, instead of a clearinghouse for alternative strategies (as had originally been intended), this was because Whitehall failed to give it sufficient political clout. Rather than enjoying the authority it needed to coordinate Middle Eastern policy effectively among the competing organizations in London, Cairo, and Delhi, the bureau was relegated to the role of merely another bureaucratic entity struggling to make its voice heard in Whitehall. As the Arab Bureau and Government of India became engaged in virtual proxy wars in the Arabian peninsula, the bureau's goal of maintaining a British-arbitrated balance of power among rival Arab chieftains receded ever further from view. In the end, Whitehall's insistence on fulfilling its wartime commitments to the French and Zionists dealt a fatal blow to the Arab Bureau's strategic vision.

The book is written in a lively and engaging manner, despite occasional infelicities of style. Although the nature of his subject clearly obliges Westrate to go over much

well-plowed historiographical ground, his focus on the organizational aspects of policy-making during this period provides an interesting perspective on these old, familiar issues.

The author's conclusion—that Britain's empire in the Middle East would have rested on significantly firmer foundations had the Arab Bureau's warnings regarding the French and Zionists been heeded—is questionable. As the late Elie Kedourie argued, the development of Arab nationalism had an inexorable logic of its own, which would not have been conducive to the long-term survival of British influence under any circumstances. For the Arab Bureau to base its plans for British dominance in the Middle East on its experience with the bumbling ineffectiveness of Sharif Husayn was an exercise in naivete or self-flattery. In a sense, the motley group of intellectuals, military men, and adventurers who composed the Arab Bureau was the victim of collective self-delusion after all.

Aviel Roshwald teaches diplomatic history at Georgetown University, and is the author of Estranged Bedfellows: Britain and France in the Middle East during the Second World War *(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).*

Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East, by Kevin Dwyer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. ix + 220 pages. Append. to p. 223. Notes to p. 238. Bibl. to p. 240. Index to p. 245. $39.95.

Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, by Ann Elizabeth Mayer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; and London: Pinter Publishers, 1991. xxii + 215 pages. Notes to p. 243. About the Author to p. 245. Index to p. 258. $39.95.

Reviewed by Marilyn Booth

Mobilization on human rights issues has become a prominent feature of the Middle East's political landscape. Ann Mayer and Kevin Dwyer assess the human rights situation in the region from different yet complementary perspectives. Both focus on the discourse of human rights—on the struggle by elites to control the terms of debate—rather than on the practical impact (or lack thereof) of human rights debates, policies, and organizations. Yet both authors are concerned about the implications for everyday lives of the discursive patterns they trace. Mayer stresses consequences for individuals of human rights schemes fostered by governments, while Dwyer's focus on opposition figures poses the question of grass-roots responses to human rights initiatives. Both authors are led by their sources to women's rights and religious freedom as key targets for human rights activism. Both emphasize the many uses of religious symbols and argue against, in Mayer's words, "the commonly held view that Islam by itself determines the attitudes one finds in the Muslim world on human rights issues" (p. xi).

Kevin Dwyer, an anthropologist and former Amnesty International researcher, recorded the voices of Arab intellectuals reflecting on human rights in the mid-1980s. Some are well known—Rachid Ghannouchi, Muhammad Sid Ahmed, and Nawal el-Saadawi—others are academics, journalists, lawyers, and religious leaders, whose cultural and political work takes place outside the spotlight. Refusing to place definitional boundaries on "human rights" and situating himself as the outside if not disinterested moderator, Dwyer seeks through lengthy quotations "to allow speakers to bring forward and discuss the crucial categories of their own thought, to elaborate their own visions of society" (p. 213).

Setting his discussion in the context of "crisis" as perceived by intellectuals throughout the region, he suggests that "human rights" constitute one term among many—for example, "democracy," "liberty," "identity," and "authenticity"—that have become organizing principles for self-examination and activism directed toward change. He focuses on Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, where open debate and organizing around human rights concerns are possible.

He links place and theme loosely, examining community identity and the role of religion in Egypt, the individual and democracy in Morocco, and problems of human rights organizing in Tunisia.

The very form of *Arab Voices*, with its presentation of clashing views and shifting definitions, and its muting of the authorial voice, is a laudable critique of reductive interpretation. Yet Dwyer's hands-off stance shades at times into an implicit acceptance at face value of discourse that cries out for critical deconstruction. As Ann Mayer demonstrates, the language of human rights can serve to deny or curtail the very rights it seems to celebrate.

At the center of Mayer's analysis is a set of documents on "Islamic human rights"—a commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by Sultanhussein Tabandeh, a pamphlet by Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) sponsored by the Islamic Council in London, the "Draft of the Islamic Constitution" issued by scholars affiliated with al-Azhar, and the 1979 Iranian constitution (the only one of these documents to be legally in force). Mayer also discusses rights-related policies of Islamization programs in Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan.

Mayer is at pains to note that the "Islamic" label on these schemes can in no way be equated with the views of Muslims on human rights, which range from full acceptance of codified international norms to absolute rejection of any notion of human rights. Mayer focuses on a "middle ground" (p. 29)—schemes that accept the validity of human rights but seek to define them according to Islamic criteria. Although these schemes claim to represent premodern Muslim thought and jurisprudence, they represent only one strain of a complex heritage, which can be drawn on equally to justify unqualified support of international norms. Mayer believes that an historically dominant, anti-rationalist, anti-individualist view—not inherently Islamic—developed in the context of premodern societies, underpins these schemes in the name of orthodoxy.

Comparing these schemes to international norms widely accepted as authoritative (including by many Middle Eastern governments, organizations, and individuals), Mayer finds "a pattern of borrowing substantive rights from international human rights documents while reducing the protections that they actually afford" (p. 76), by making rights subject to often unspecified *shari'a* rules. She shows how authors of these schemes (including states with Islamization programs), sensitive to potential international criticism, use various rhetorical strategies to disguise their areas of disagreement with international norms, especially in the areas of gender-based discrimination and religious freedom and choice. (Her examination of the substantial differences between the English and Arabic versions of the UIDHR, meant for different audiences, is fascinating.) Mayer concludes that "there is little evidence that the Islamic labels on the enfeebled rights protections in these Islamic rights schemes make them more attractive to the average Muslim than the stronger rights guarantees found in the International Bill of Human Rights" (p. 194).

Dwyer and Mayer are conscious of the charged context of these debates, in which human rights are associated with the colonial and neocolonial political agendas of the West, and "legal decolonization" (Mayer, p. 56) is a major concern. They both make a strong case that human rights cannot be written off as a Western imposition but represent a concept fully accepted and creatively appropriated by citizens, while provoking damage control by governments. Both books offer valuable material toward understanding what is perhaps the most exciting and hopeful process going on in the Middle East today.

Marilyn Booth is an independent scholar in modern Arabic literature and cultural history, and has written on censorship in the Middle East.

Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. by Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael. Miami:

Florida International University Press, 1991. xix + 537 pages. Contribs. to p. 543. Index to p. 570. $39.50 cloth. $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Lisa Anderson

Every spring this reviewer searches for a new text to use in her introductory course, "Politics in the Middle East and North Africa." One ideally hopes to find a comprehensive, clear treatment of the region's late 19th and 20th-century history, a sophisticated but accessible discussion of the region's economic trends in the period since World War II, a full and fair-minded analysis of the interplay of international, regional, and domestic politics, combined with a brief country-by-country survey of the special features of domestic politics through the area—all in lively and engaging prose, priced affordably. Suffice it to say that this reviewer has not found such a text, in the book under review or in any other, and the question therefore boils down to which of these features one is most ready to sacrifice.

Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa offers a general introductory section with some 25 pages of economic, social, and ethnic geography, 20 pages of history—beginning with the coming of Islam, which also gets about a dozen pages of its own—and 25 pages addressing the development of the region's nationalisms. The rest of the volume is devoted to country-specific chapters, except for North Africa—Libya gets a chapter of its own, but Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia share a single one. The Ismaels have written six of these country chapters and other authors the remaining nine—Ann Mosley Lesch on Sudan, Walter Weiker on Turkey and on Israel, Kamal Abu Jaber on Jordan, Bahgat Korany on the Maghrib, Richard Pfaff on Saudi Arabia, Marvin Zonis and Cyrus Amir Mokri on Iran, R. Hrair Dekmejian on Syria, Nassif Hitti on Lebanon, and Manfred Wenner with the Ismaels on Yemen.

By this format, the authors obviously intend to focus on the country studies. Even if this emphasis on political change fits well with one's interests, the introductory material is by necessity quite cursory. Unfortunately, however, the country chapters are varied in their themes and emphases, which discourages comparison. Indeed, simply finding data on land area and population size for each of the countries is difficult, as the chapters are not organized similarly. Presumably the freedom accorded each of the chapter authors was designed to permit them to identify the important and special determinants of the politics and government of each country—and some of them do that well, despite some unevenness—but what is lost is an overarching intellectual focus to unify and invigorate the volume.

Although the average undergraduate could benefit from this book as an assigned text, the work will not be of particular aid to the instructor. This reviewer's search for the perfect textbook goes on.

Lisa Anderson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

Politics in the Middle East, by Elie Kedourie. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. ix + 346 pages. Notes to p. 351. Further Reading to p. 355. Index to p. 366. $56.00.

Reviewed by As'ad AbuKhalil

This is an unusual book—a catalog of facts and events that lacks a central focus and methodological coherence. The book contains an historical, chronological review of constitutional and electoral developments in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey in the 19th and 20th centuries. There is little analysis in the book, and the author lists chronological events even in a section—"The Politics of Radical Islam" (pp. 325–46)—that promises analytical treatment. A condensed (and only slightly revised) version of this book was published earlier in 1992 as a separate book under the title *Democracy and Arab Political Culture.*[1] *Politics in the Middle*

1. Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*, (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).

East adds nothing new to the existing literature on any of the countries in question. Surprisingly, the author continues in his descriptive approach throughout the book's concluding chapter, providing only a chronological review. The last paragraph of the last page contains Kedourie's brief analysis.

Politics in the Middle East leaves the reader wondering about the purpose behind a book of this nature. Kedourie wishes to show the obvious—that political developments in the Middle East in the past two centuries entailed violent changes of governments, assassinations, riots, and what he considers the failure of democratic institutions. The author does not explain the causes behind the political developments; and he seems to relish the listing of violent episodes in the history of the region. Kedourie's fixation with violence as a facet of Middle East politics leads him to discuss Franz Fanon's theory of violence in a section on "Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism," without attempting to relate its relevance (p. 297). Moreover, the chronological review reflects in some instances the biases of the author—his account of the political developments in Turkey preceding the 1980 coup is clearly sympathetic to the generals (pp. 140–3), his account of the Iranian revolution is based on his belief that the shah's "liberal countenance" (p. 267) was behind the destabilization of the regime, and his account of the beginning of the Lebanese civil war coincides with the official version of the rightwing Phalange party (pp. 247–8).

The only analytical part of the book, aside from the final paragraph, is contained in the first 21 pages of the introduction. The author begins his book by invoking an often-used cliche about Middle East politics, that Muslims split the world into *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*. This cliche has become a cornerstone in the writings of those whom Maxime Rodinson has termed "theologocentrists," who attribute all observable phenomena in Muslim countries to Islamic theological texts. Kedourie is clearly still a prisoner of the classical dogmatic paradigm of theologocentrism. Not only does he typically ignore the third category of *Dar al-Sulh*, but he fails to show why this ancient Islamic jurisprudent view has any relevance to contemporary politics in Muslim countries. It is likely that Kedourie knows more about this subject than the average Muslim political activist. If one is to follow the logical conclusions of theologocentric analysis, one would assume that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait to bolster *Dar al-Islam*.

Kedourie also stresses the impact of centuries-old religious teachings, which require Muslims to be obedient to their rulers. An argument is sometimes made that the Middle East cannot enjoy democratic rule, given a long religious and political tradition that emphasizes obedience to the rulers. But if obedience is so central to the Islamic tradition, how can one explain the constant episodes of disobedience in the Arab Islamic tradition? As soon as Muhammad died, Muslims disagreed on the best political course to follow, and the era of the rightly guided caliphs did not experience an absence of what Muslims called sedition (*fitnah*, plural *fitan*). To be certain, an alliance between Islamic governments and clerical authorities throughout Islamic history tried to produce various dubious theological arguments to instill obedience among the masses, but the masses were not consistently obedient, and the survival of governments in the past as well as in the present-day Arab world was not and is not based on the popularity of Ghazali's argumentation, but on the sheer use of force in the service of various oppressive regimes.

On the subject of secularism, Kedourie seems to render a peculiarly harsh judgment in assessing its failure in Muslim countries. The criterion for the failure of secularism in the Middle East, according to Kedourie, lies in its inability to "eradicate the traditional attachment of the mass to Islam" (p. 147). Although one cannot deny that secularization of Muslim countries was impeded by the political influence of the clerical establishment and its alliance with the regimes, and by the association of secularism with atheism, secularism in the West did not eradicate the "attachment of the mass" to Christianity and to Judaism. Kedourie appears to be following the approach of conservative Muslim jurists who insist that a Muslim's faith will—or

perhaps should, in Kedourie's view—inevitably be diminished—or eliminated—by secularization.

On the question of Arab nationalism, Kedourie reiterates his belief that an Islamic identity is a "mirror image of the ideology of Arab nationalism" (p. 336). This view seems to ignore the long tradition of hostility between the Arab nationalist movement and the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the region,[2] and it treats the Arab nationalist movement as a solid monolith. Moreover, the view that Islam and Arab nationalism are two sides of the same coin is incompatible with Kedourie's references to Nazi and fascist influences (see, for example, p. 297) in the formation of "the" Arab nationalist ideology. Further, Kedourie believes that every Arab is sectarian at heart; thus, Constantine Zurayq's support of Arab nationalism is a disguise, in Kedourie's mind, for Zurayq's (Christian) sectarian consciousness and motivations. He treats Michel Aflaq similarly, and he underlines Aflaq's ostensible conversion to Islam. In fact, Aflaq never converted to Islam in his lifetime as far as is known, and the posthumous announcement of Aflaq's conversion to Islam was made by Saddam Hussein's regime as part of an emphasis on the Islamization of the Baathist regime.

It is doubtful that this book will be of use to students or to experts. The information in it can be found in any of the major works on the countries in question.

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The Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. by Rashid Khalidi *et al.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. xix + 288 pages. Gloss. to p. 290. Bibl. to p. 311. Index to p. 325. $49.00.

2. See Rashid Khalidi, "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature," in *American Historical Review*, 96, no. 5 (December 1991), pp. 1363–73.

Reviewed by Robin Bidwell

This book, resulting from papers given at a conference held at Columbia University in November 1986, is of particular interest because not only distinguished US scholars but others of Arab and Turkish origin came together to discuss the interaction between Arab and Turkish nationalism in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Its value is greatly increased because the majority of the essays are based on close research into primary sources. This approach is typified by Samir Seikaly and Ahmed Tarabein, writing on Shukri al-Asali and Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi respectively, who have obviously read the large journalistic output of their subjects.

There are also the new and stimulating interpretations given to sometimes already known facts that one has come to expect from C. Ernest Dawn and William Ochsenwald. Dawn shows that the Turkification policy did not originate with the Committee of Union and Progress, that most Arabs remained Ottomanists until 1918, and that Arab nationalism "was directed quite as much against Ottoman Arabs as against the Ottoman Turks themselves. The conflict was between elements of the Ottoman Arab elite. . . . " (p. 23). Ochsenwald argues that in the Hijaz the limited growth of secular institutions left intact tribal and religious links so that the Arab Revolt was directed against centralization rather than against "foreign rule."

Much previous research into the rise of Arab nationalism has concentrated on Syria, so two articles on Iraq break much new ground. Mahmoud Haddad's study of the affair of the Lynch Concession shows that nationalism there was anti-European rather than anti-Ottoman. This reviewer can only re-echo his plaint that there is no biography available of Sayyid Talib al-Naqib; it would surely make a fine film script that might be an inducement to someone to undertake the task. Reeva Simon's account of the training of Iraqis to serve as officers in the Ottoman army enlightens the background of the politicians who ran the new state after 1921 for, as she points out (p. 162), nine of the first

fourteen prime ministers had passed through it.

The rise of nationalism in Libya has also been neglected so Lisa Anderson's essay makes an original contribution. Libya was, of course, a special case with its Berber minority and its vulnerability to imperialist predators, and it saw Istanbul as its only possible protector.

To some extent, as James Jankowski and Beth Baron show, the same applied for Egypt, which was under actual occupation, so its predilections for the Ottoman Empire strengthened as those of its eastern neighbors weakened—indeed it was positively hostile to Arab nationalism. The one exception, as in so many other things, was Khedive Abbas, of whom a good biography would also be welcome; there is ample material available in Durham and in national archives in Britain, France, Germany, and Turkey.

Unusually for a book with many authors, no list of contributors is given and one would have been welcome as some of the names are unfamiliar. Otherwise the bibliography is good and the index as good as can be expected when publishers are unable to spend too much on them. The book will be a necessity for all involved in the study of one of the most interesting periods of modern Arab history.

Robin Bidwell, Cambridge University

The Superpowers and the Middle East, by Alan R. Taylor. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991. xiii + 198 pages. Bibl. to p. 204. Index to p. 212. $34.95 cloth. $14.95 paper.

Reviewed by John C. Campbell

The theme of Alan Taylor's book is that during the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union concentrated so heavily on their own bilateral competition in the Middle East, misjudging or neglecting regional factors, that their policies were often unsuccessful in winning support in the region or even in serving their own respective interests. The reader is in no danger of missing the point, as it is repeated many times. It is, indeed, a proposition with considerable general validity, but also one that bears examination in detail case by case, country by country, crisis by crisis, and, for the United States, administration by administration. This Taylor does with a broad brush, although covering a wide area over a period of decades of complex developments in a relatively short book compels him at times to oversimplify. His study is a sweeping summary treatment of both US and Soviet policy, drawing on the work of other Western scholars and on his own keen understanding of great power politics and of Middle East affairs.

Those who have been immersed in these matters will not find any revelations or surprises. Some may be inclined to question the interpretation here and there or to recall factors, evident to the political leaders or diplomats at the time, that if taken into account would modify the author's critique. Official Washington can certainly be faulted, for example, for misjudging the strength of Arab and Iranian nationalism, for overreliance on friendly monarchies, and for uncritical support of Israel. But how great was the damage, and what were the alternatives? One cannot be certain in evaluating the "ifs and if-nots" of history. If US officials had had a clearer and more sympathetic understanding of Nasir's motives and actions, could they have prevented his close association with the Soviet Union? If those officials had properly gauged the unpopularity and vulnerability of the shah's regime, could they have averted the revolution that fed on anti-Americanism?

Taylor is especially critical of Henry Kissinger's obsession with power politics and takes exception—as does this reviewer—to the view that Israel was a "strategic asset" in the Cold War. It is well to remember, however, that the global balance of power was the primary security interest of the United States. Even though that interest might have been as well or better served by policies that took greater account of regional political forces, the fact remains that the Soviets, while increasing their influence, did not take

over any countries in the region, and that the West continued to have a role and to maintain its access to Middle East oil.

The book's treatment of Soviet policy is understandably less comprehensive and less penetrating than its coverage of US policy. But it shows clearly how the men in the Kremlin were mesmerized by the superpower competition and the "American threat," a mirror image of the thinking of their counterparts in Washington, and were even more prone to miscalculation and error thanks to poor intelligence and ideological confusion. Was the Soviet threat to the Middle East as great as US policy took it to be? Probably not. The prospective opening of archives in Moscow holds the promise of putting to the test much of what Western officials and scholars have thought and written over the past half-century about Soviet policies in the region. It cannot happen too soon.

The author takes comfort in the events of the past two years—the ending of the Cold War, the shift from superpower competition to cooperation in the Middle East, and the beginnings of Arab-Israeli negotiation. He notes that both the United States and Russia have begun to take more account of political and other forces at work among the peoples of the region. So far so good. But will those peoples have a greater understanding of each others' interests and those of the outside world? Whether the problems will be any easier for Washington to cope with is an open question.

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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means, by F. Robert Hunter. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. xx + 237 pages. Chron. to p. 239. Notes to p. 267. Bibl. to p. 276. Index to p. 292. $24.95.

Reviewed by Duncan L. Clarke

In 1991 Don Peretz courageously commented on no fewer than 12 books on the *intifada* in a single review.[1] Although the flood of publications on the subject has continued unabated, F. Robert Hunter's treatment of the first two and a half years of the uprising is a solid addition to the literature.

The book is not without its limitations, however. The last year of the time period under examination is addressed in an epilogue and a postscript, neither of which match the quality of analysis in the rest of the study. Moreover, an epilogue and postscript cannot substitute for what is the book's most significant omission, a systematic conclusion. A second limitation is that specialists on the intifada will probably not find a treasure trove of new information here. Finally, although Hunter's assessment of the uprising's impact on the Palestinian people and the PLO is excellent, his treatment of its influence on the United States, Israel, and the rest of the international community is frustratingly sketchy.

These remarks should not be read as detracting notably from what is an outstanding scholarly achievement, one that is deeply sensitive to the plight of an oppressed people and is objective and balanced. Hunter is an historian with no special prior expertise in Palestinian or Arab-Israeli issues, who found himself in Israel in December 1987. The intifada "grabbed [him] by the throat and would not let go" (p. xiii). He then, rightly and of necessity, employed research methods more familiar to political scientists than to his own profession and succeeded in crawling into a momentous ongoing event. The author's extensive use of interviews with Palestinians and Israelis effectively illuminates the essence of a mass movement that became an institutionalized way of life for an entire society. Hunter is particularly skillful in revealing complex interactions among various Palestinian factions and organizations, and in demonstrating concretely the counterproductive nature of the Israeli response. He also is

1. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 20, no. 4 (1991), pp. 133–8.

insightful and instructive when comparing the intifada with instances of civil disobedience in the southern United States and in Mahatma Gandhi's India. Indeed, there is a need for a far more thorough, comparative analysis of the intifada as civil disobedience than is possible or appropriate in this book.

The Palestinian Uprising is an admirable study. Most participants in the uprising, and a good many of the occupiers, would likely agree that Hunter has rendered a fair, informed treatment of this recent phase of the Palestinians' struggle for statehood. This is high praise.

Duncan L. Clarke, Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey, ed. by Raymond Lifchez. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. xxiv + 322 pages. Gloss. to p. 331. Contribs. to p. 335. Index to p. 348. $50.00.

Reviewed by Emelie A. Olson

This long-overdue volume on Sufism in Ottoman Turkey is both engaging in tone and meticulous in its scholarship. Despite its title, it is not a narrow study of *tekke* (dervish lodge) architecture. Rather, tekke architecture becomes the focus for a more general contextual study of Turkish Sufism. Bracketed by the editor's introduction, which surveys Anatolian Sufism from the 11th century to the closing of the tekkes in 1925, and a chapter by Cemal Kafadar on the role of Sufism in contemporary Turkey, the more specialized chapters are grouped into three sections.

The four chapters of part one provide further historical background, showing how Turkish Sufism was influenced by Sufism in the wider Islamic world as well as by volatile relationships with Ottoman and pre-Ottoman governments. The two long chapters of part two describe how the tekkes and saints' shrines served and reflected dervish activities in Ottoman Istanbul and its environs. Part three is a ten-chapter sampler—in the best sense of that word—of recent scholarship on daily life and ritual among various brotherhoods, including music, liturgy, poetry, pictorial art and calligraphy, and food. This section begins with an excerpt (in a highly-readable translation by Carter Findley) from the memoirs of a tekke manager, which provides a rare and illuminating glimpse into dervish daily life. In the final chapter already noted, Kafadar questions some of the commonplace assumptions concerning the role of Sufis in Ottoman life and notes major areas of inquiry still to be undertaken. Further, decrying the "two-tiered model of religious and cultural history that still reigns in Islamic studies—namely, the sharp division . . . into 'high'. . . and 'popular' realms," he expresses the hope that the study of Sufism will begin to "replicate the cohesive function once fulfilled by Sufism itself within Ottoman social life" (p. 308) and thereby free Turkish intellectual life from the "schizophrenic quality of modern Turkish cultural life . . . [with its] sharp cleavage between an 'enlightened' elite of reformers and an 'ignorant' mass of traditionalists or reactionaries" (p. 315).

The Dervish Lodge helps alleviate the serious shortage of studies on Islam in Turkey. It both places Turkish Sufism within the context of general Sufism and identifies the elements that are peculiar to Turkish Sufism, even while it delineates both the differences between the separate orders and the ties between them. It presents original scholarship in many areas, including its focus on the architecture of the tekkes in contrast to the often studied monumental architecture of mosques and palaces (p. 126). Although it has much to offer the specialist, this book is also accessible to scholars unfamiliar with Turkish Sufism, thanks to a helpful glossary.

This reviewer both celebrates this book's publication and notes that much work remains undone. Most glaring is the absence of any discussion of the role of women in Turk-

ish Sufism beyond passing reference to the existence of areas for women within the tekkes, even though women attended or participated in rituals in some tekkes. Moreover, not only are the well-documented activities of women at saints' shrines connected with tekkes ignored, but the male pronoun is used exclusively when describing visitors to these shrines. Nonetheless, *The Dervish Lodge* is an admirable beginning in an area too long neglected in previous scholarly literature on Turkey and Islam.

Emelie A. Olson is professor of anthropology at Whittier College.

Disorienting Encounters: Travels of a Moroccan Scholar in France in 1845–1846—The Voyage of Muhammad as-Saffar, tr. and ed. by Susan Gilson Miller. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. xx + 221 pages. Bibl. to p. 233. Indices to p. 244. $38.00 cloth. $13.00 paper.

Reviewed by Alain Silvera

There is a great deal to be learned from this remarkable book containing the record kept by a Moroccan traveler of a journey to France under the July Monarchy. What could be more fascinating, as readers' attention is forcibly drawn in this quincentennial year to the recurring riddle of the New World's encounter with the Old, than to be offered such a fresh and original glimpse into what it truly means to embark on a voyage of discovery to a brave new world beyond the seas?

The encounter in this case forms part of the much more complex and diverse saga of the Muslim discovery of Europe and the West (on which the most authoritative study remains Bernard Lewis' *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*[1]), and its protagonist is not a Columbus or a Marco Polo but a modest and unassuming *alim*, Abu Abdullah Muhammad as-Saffar, an obscure and hitherto unknown scribe from Tetuan, who was chosen to accompany the governor of his native province on a diplomatic mission to Paris during the reign of Louis Phillipe. The mission was sent at the behest of the Guizot government in the wake of General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud's crushing defeat of the Algerian leader Abd al-Qadir at the battle of the river Isly in 1844 on the disputed border between Algeria and Morocco. It was in the same campaign that a French naval squadron under Louis Phillipe's sailor son, the duc de Joinville, had also bombarded Tangier and Mogador. These military disasters forced the *makhzan* to sue for peace, abandon Abd al-Qadir to his fate, and acknowledge the de facto conquest of Algeria after the French had voluntarily withdrawn from Moroccan territory. "Now we can be generous without being weak," wrote Bugeaud to the home government, "because we have hit them hard" (p. 7).

Morocco until then had always stood apart from the rest of the Islamic world, attracting only sporadic attention on the part of European travelers, traders, or diplomats. By the end of the 18th century, however, even such a remote and isolated outpost of Islam could no longer remain impervious to the West. Morocco was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of the American colonists—a gesture that earned Sultan Muhammad III a quaint letter of gratitude from George Washington. It had also been generous in tiding over the Old Regime during the disastrous harvest of 1789 by offering to sell Necker its grain, and had shown the first tentative signs of opening a window to a wider world by building a new port at Mogador (today's al-Sawira) on the Atlantic coast. By throwing in its lot with Abd al-Qadir's army, Morocco had reverted to traditional Islam as the best way to resist Western expansion. Bugeaud's incursion produced such a rude awakening that in 1845 the reigning sultan, under pressure from the local French agent—a certain Léon Roches who bears a striking resemblance to the French consul Drovetti in Egypt—was finally persuaded to give his consent to sending a Moroccan envoy to discover the ways of the infidel.

This book is an account of that embassy as compiled, only two years before the outbreak

1. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982.

of the 1848 French revolution, by an even more talented observer than the Egyptian shaykh Rifa Rafi al-Tahtawi, who had witnessed the July revolution of 1830. Tahtawi's work, after all—also couched in the form of a *rihla*, or Muslim travel account—was published by the Bulak press in Cairo after his return from Paris in 1831 and left its mark on successive generations of Egyptian translators and travelers. As-Saffar's manuscript, meant only for the eyes of his master, lay buried and uncataloged in the royal palace archives in Rabat until it was rediscovered a few years ago by an enterprising archivist, Si Muhammad al-Manuni. Susan Miller has had what the French call "the genial idea" of translating and editing the Arabic text with copious references and illustrations. Such minor lapses as designating the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Ali as khedive or relying on recent *Michelins* instead of using such contemporary sources as the *Guides Joanne* as a way to evoke the ambience of the times in no way detract from the excellence of her edition.

What emerges from Miller's labors is a rich and vibrant personality, a vigorous and authentic witness to the disorientation resulting from the clash of cultures. Driven by curiosity and sustained by an unswerving belief in the truth of the Quran as he journeyed to the far corners of the world, Muhammad as-Saffar should be hailed as the most entertaining Moroccan traveler since Ibn Battuta. Now, thanks to Miller, his voyage to France can be enjoyed and pondered by everyone.

Alain Silvera, Professor of History, Bryn Mawr College

Lives at Risk: Public Health in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, by LaVerne Kuhnke. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. x + 166 pages. Appends. to p. 177. Notes to p. 229. Index to p. 233. $40.00.

Reviewed by Lawrence I. Conrad

The history of Muhammad Ali's medical school, founded in 1827, is a fairly well-known subject. In contrast, the broader topic of public health in Egypt through the rest of the 19th century has until now been cloaked in obscurity. LaVerne Kuhnke shows how the initiative of the medical school gradually broadened, in response to devastating epidemics of cholera, plague, and smallpox, into a program of public health aimed at protecting not only the pasha's troops, but the Egyptian populace as well.

The array of issues and actors on what one at first expects will be a rather limited stage proves to be broad and complex. Indeed, the book's overarching merit is that it combines clear and consistent analysis, often in great detail, with a keen and sober sense of proportion. The advances gained by the introduction of Western medicine are identified and described, but set against an equally convincing discussion of how the imports included self-serving quarrels among European contagionists and miasmatists that obstructed many programs. The establishment of the world's first international quarantine board in Alexandria in 1831 is depicted as an important step; trade goods and maritime traffic were always prime culprits in the spread of such scourges as plague, but when the choice came to protection or profits the result was never in doubt. Foreign powers did their best to evade regulations that delayed or restricted their trade, horrific abuses were suffered by pilgrims and others confined in the Egyptian government's lazarettos, and the khedive's own shipping company was the worst offender when it came to overcrowding ships and abandoning poor travelers at quarantine stations far from their final destination.

Western accusations of Muslim "fatalism" are subjected to a cogent and long-overdue rebuttal, but Kuhnke also stresses how confusing the various public health measures were to the suspicious fellahin. Orders that all property of plague victims must be aired on the roof for two weeks were seen as an official ploy to learn what the deceased had possessed, and smallpox vaccination was perceived as a means of "marking" children for later conscription. Clot-Bey reappears throughout the text and emerges as a rather ambivalent figure. A keen observer of Egyp-

tian society and responsible for numerous brilliant programs (including one for women health officers, treated in one of the best chapters in the book), he was overseer of what increasingly proved to be an urban-based, cure-orientated system in an overwhelmingly rural and agrarian society, in which effective preventative measures were the primary need.

Kuhnke's work is an outstanding case study in the process of Westernization and its impact across the entire range of a traditional Islamic society, and is not without relevance to current issues in Third World development. The author makes a vigorous case against the proposition that the medical needs of developing nations are best served via the Western model of the urban, hospital-centered system, featuring highly trained physicians bringing the latest equipment, techniques, and remedies to bear in efforts that cure individuals, but offer no protection to society at large.

Lawrence I. Conrad, Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Economic Development in Saudi Arabia: Consequences of the Oil Price Decline, by Robert E. Looney. Greenwich, CT and London: JAI Press, 1990. xxii + 282 pages. Index to p. 289. $58.50.

Saudi Arabia's Economy: Oil and the Search for Economic Development, by Hossein Askari. Greenwich, CT and London: JAI Press, 1990. xxiv + 185 pages. Appends. to p. 241. Refs. to p. 245. Index to p. 248. $58.50.

Reviewed by Tagi Sagafi-nejad

The two books under review offer two economists' portrait of Saudi Arabia's economy, including the adjustment process that followed the hypergrowth period of the 1970s and early 1980s. Both authors do what economists normally do—crunch numbers and develop equations and formulas, to analyze the past and predict the future. Both should help readers understand, in part, the dynamics of Saudi Arabia's economy.

Robert Looney applies an arsenal of economic theories and concepts, including a "Keynesian expenditure multiplier" (p. 213) and "quantity theory" (p. 215) to understand how Saudi Arabia plans to cope with the oil price decline. His thesis is that the country's oil revenues will increase only slightly in the 1990s. He examines the industrial, agricultural, and financial sectors, as well as the role of the private sector, military expenditures, and fiscal and monetary policies. He then presents the results of an optimal control model that forecasts growth between 1986 and 1992.

Looney assesses the third five-year plan (1980–85), and the budgetary dilemmas of the fourth plan, including a discussion of military expenditures, the task of completing the unfinished projects carried over from the third plan, and agricultural self-sufficiency. According to Looney, the Saudis have faced several major obstacles in their efforts to absorb new technology. These include the lack of industrial infrastructure and an industrial tradition; the lack of skilled manpower, particularly on operational levels (for example, skilled workers and technicians); and the reluctance of many foreign companies to cooperate sincerely in the transfer of technology.

This last point bears special attention. Saudi planners should ponder and pause when foreign firms show reluctance to invest, transfer the desired technology, or respond to the country's call for cooperation with the enthusiasm the Saudis expect. They need to consider the political risk, low absorptive capacity, and vagaries of administrative systems where favoritism and corruption are said to be rampant and where the rule of law is subservient to princely fiat. Therein lie the root causes of the multinationals' "reluctance."

Hossein Askari's review of the Saudi economy includes an examination of oil policy, external investment policies, physical infrastructure, domestic subsidies, the private

sector, commercial and exchange rates, planning and the budget, and educational and social services. Askari also brings out some of the systems' shortcomings, albeit in a roundabout and nearly parenthetical way. Concerning the role of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) in regulating banks, he writes that ". . . normal regulatory controls . . . are rarely used" (p. 159), and "SAMA's charter is not fixed" (p. 161). Yet these are important factors that explain, perhaps better than the unreliable numbers, what ails the system. He also admits to the limits of quantitative projections when he notes that "uncertainty has not been discussed because it is technically difficulty to incorporate" (p. 17).

Massive agricultural subsidies are intended to make Saudi Arabia self-sufficient in food. Several years ago, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations praised Saudi Arabia for having reached its goal of wheat self-sufficiency. What was less publicized was the fact that each bushel cost ten times the international market price. Officials would argue that they recognize self-sufficiency has its price, and the country is willing—for national pride, fear of dependence, or political reasons—to pay that price. As a consequence of the decline in oil revenues, Looney concludes that the resources are no longer available to continue this subsidy. In a subsequent chapter, Looney outlines several natural and man-made obstacles to agricultural development and proceeds to give a detailed picture of this sector. His final conclusion is that government assistance will have to continue to subsidize the agricultural sector.

Careless editing of Looney's book has resulted in typographic errors, misquotes, and misspelling of such famous names as Heckscher-Ohlin (p. 68) and others. There are also problems with the data in Askari's book. In appendix five, "General Social and Economic Data," the author admits that "these data are not totally consistent with the data reported in the text" (p. 219). Why not? What are the inconsistencies? Which should readers believe? Elsewhere, when discussing optimal savings rates, Askari admits that "uncertainty has not been discussed because it is technically difficult to incorporate" (p. 17). It is not surprising, in light of this admission, to see scenarios that turn out to have been off-target, such as Table III.10, "OPEC Oil Output and Revenues" (p. 47). Buried in the footnote is an admission that, in 1987, when this scenario was drawn, it was "somewhat outdated."

One of the problems common to the two books is that neither author ever questions the integrity of the data. For instance, Looney plays with econometrics and economic theory, without being able to come down with equal precision when he discusses prediction or policy. Instead, he often finds himself hedging. This equivocation most likely comes from his lack of trust in the numbers with which he is working. Students of development have come to be distrustful of information coming from developing countries. Doubts are especially heightened with regard to quantitative information. Scholars who have completed field work in developing countries recognize the "number doctors," whose main responsibility is to adjust numbers so they come out as expected. One scholar, studying another developing country, went so far as to assign grades to the fidelity of various sets of data. Although subjective, this grading system is an explicit admission of the data's lack of reliability. The reason actual outcomes often diverge from predictions is not so much a result of the scholar's shortcomings as it is the raw material with which to work. In addition to reliability, there is always a time-lag problem. Much of Askari's data stop in 1985, which is unfortunate, in that the following years proved to be materially different from projections.

Looney and Askari provide a tremendous amount of data and analysis. Their books serve as good examples of how economic theory can be applied in the real world—and what shortcomings are encountered in the process. Both works make major contributions to further understanding Saudi Arabia's economy, and undoubtedly will be followed by further updates that, one hopes, will be based on more reliable information.

Tagi Sagafi-nejad, Sellinger School of Business and Management, Loyola College in Maryland

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society, by Nancy Tapper. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xxii + 290 pages. Notes to p. 292. Refs. to p. 299. Index to p. 309. $54.50.

Reviewed by Mary Hegland

Nancy Tapper teaches anthropology at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and has produced many fine articles based on her extensive field research in Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Concentrating throughout her career on women and the ways gender interacts with politics, economics, and religion, the author is preeminently qualified to describe and analyze the institution of marriage and how marriages provide an arena as well as a medium of expression for political competition.

In *Bartered Brides*, the author presents the results of her 1970–72 field research among the "Maduzai," a 272-household subgroup of the Ishaqzai tribe belonging to the Durrani Pashtuns of Afghanistan. Through case studies and a thorough discussion of the complex influences on marriage choices and the constraints on social relations, Tapper documents how marriage is used in the struggle for independence and power by each household and in the relations between the Maduzai and other ethnic groups. Part of the value of the work lies in its treatment of the changes in marriage customs and the meaning of marriage during the migration of the Maduzai from southern to northern Afghanistan about 1917 and the subsequent transition from pastoral nomadism, producing Persian lambskins for the market, to intensive cultivation. With increasing population pressure and competition for control over valuable agricultural land, women and marriage have become more strictly controlled as agnates struggle to protect reproductive and productive resources from incursions by others. Sadly, yet another radical change has increased the value of this book. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Maduzai fled and thus no opportunity exists for further study of the way of life documented in *Bartered Brides*.

The portrayal of the way of life emerging from these pages is one of fierce competition, where each household aims at least to survive or at best to maintain independence from interference by others. Groups and relationships are fluid and fluctuating as heads of households attempt to manipulate circumstances to their own best interests. Although often used by men as pawns in their own competition for political and economic advancement, women, too, are seen as deciding on strategies and behavior calculated to provide benefit for themselves. Women in wealthy, powerful households usually choose to be completely loyal to their husbands rather than risk losing their material advantages and, in fact, may become the closest partners of their menfolk, planning ruthless strategies to further the interests of the household. As the public status of a woman depends heavily on the consideration she is given by her husband at home, women most often put their efforts into pleasing their husbands. Whereas women from wealthy households usually remain loyal to their husbands, even when unhappy in the marriage, women from families where the menfolk are not living up to expectations of protection and support have less to fear and are more likely to engage in affairs or to "call out" for marriage to a man of their own choice. Thus, Tapper concludes, the honor of men rests more on their control over resources, which enable them to control their women and their sexual behavior, than it does on the behavior of their women.

In Maduzai society, Tapper recognizes, neither women nor men have much control over their own lives. Men also cannot chose their marriage partners. Fathers distance themselves from their maturing daughters for greater ease in using them as marriage pawns, sometimes as the last resource available to a

failing household. The weakest individuals in the Maduzai community, the author suggests, are not women but those men with insufficient kinsmen to prevent other men from taking their resources through the women's affairs or "calling out" for marriage to a more powerful man.

Bartered Brides gives readers a wealth of detail and analysis about women in Maduzai society and about the interconnection of gender with politics and economics through the institution of marriage, with significant implications for anthropological theory. Appetite whetted, one wants to know more—about Kishmir, the "headwoman," "who cared for individuals more than principles" (p. 235), about Shiri, the author's close friend who lost her life tragically, about the institution of *bazi* (play), wherein the groom stays at the home of the bride after signing the marriage contract and before the celebration of the wedding, and about how women felt and coped when given in marriage to enemies for restitution. One hopes the author will write a more personal book about the lives and views of these women and her relationships with them as a companion to this more formal, academic volume.

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Law as Metaphor: From Islamic Courts to the Palace of Justice, by June Starr. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. xli + 186 pages. Appends. to p. 197. Gloss. to p. 203. Bibl. to p. 230. Index to p. 243. $16.50 paper.

Reviewed by Richard T. Antoun

This book is divided into three parts, the first focusing on historical context, the second on the restructuring of social relations, and the third on the development of secular law, all in Turkey. The latter part is based on the author's fieldwork in the Bodrum area of southeastern Turkey from 1966–68, during the summers of 1985 and 1987, and in the spring of 1989. The central question the author poses in the introduction is

> Given the successes of the Islamic elites in creating Islam as one of the pervasive ideologies in Ottoman and later Turkish society . . . [and] the wholeness of Islamic penetration into the corners of daily consciousness . . . [and] the staying power of Islamic law in countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Libya, Iran . . . and Muslim India; how did secular elites in Turkey manage to supersede Islamic law? (p. xxxviii)

In part one June Starr argues that Ottoman reformers had already moved into the arenas previously dominated by Islamic law and custom, and that the shift to secular law was promoted (already) in the 19th century by the political and intellectual elite to protect the empire from dissolution. In part two she sketches the transformation of land law and administration in the 19th century from a tax farming system to one of land registration and private ownership favoring local notables over peasants. She notes that in Bodrum and its hinterlands marriage ties and trade rather than tribal relations integrated society, and that Bodrum was transformed twice in the 20th century, first with the establishment of the Turkish republic and later at the end of the century with its conversion into a tourist mecca. Starr ends part two by discussing the impact of the new Turkish Civil Code of 1926 as well as other social and political reforms introduced by Ataturk. Part three discusses various aspects of conflict resolution in the town of Bodrum and in an outlying village, including dyadic and triadic informal modes of conflict resolution as well as adjudication in the local and district courts. Starr's main interest here is in the process of disputation, particularly on how judges move a case from the fact-finding stage to the decision stage, how they determine whether a witness is telling the truth, and how they divide cases into those decided mainly on the basis of legal norms as opposed to those decided according to social norms (the latter to provide equity and prevent parties who meant no criminal harm from going to prison). In this part of the book Starr incisively lists (p. 142) the princi-

ples underlying the management of disputes and provides an interesting discussion of the differences between common law systems (in the United States) and civil law systems (in Turkey). More case material on disputes both in and out of court would have been welcome here.

The strength of this book—its ambitious aim of combining social anthropological and historical analysis, and conceiving law in terms of "enduring ideas, structures, and practices"—is also its weakness. The author argues that during the 19th century the Ottoman elite crafted a parallel set of legal and administrative institutions, one secular and the other religious, so that when Ataturk emerged victorious after the war of independence in the early 1920s, the stage was set for the rapid secularization of the country that was to accompany the policies of Turkification, laicism, and *étatism*, which in turn supplanted Osmanli culture, particularly its religious components. A much more lengthy description of "Osmanli culture" would have to be provided in order to know whether it had been supplanted and to what degree. The institution of witnessing, for instance, is not simply an aspect of Ottoman administrative and legal practice. It is a deeply rooted aspect of Islamic law and ethos that remains resilient in Muslim countries including Turkey at the end of the 20th century.[1]

On the ethnographic side, Starr finds that rural women use the courts to initiate divorce (p. 103) and insist on living separately from their husbands' families. This latter fact she construes as "representing a movement away from male supremacy values, from the values inherent in Islam, and from the ideology that supported extended patriarchal households" (p. 111). On the other hand she discovers that in Mandalinci village "no villager ever stated that the way they handled conflict was in accord with Islamic precedents, that they had sought out advice from respected Islamic elders . . . or that they prayed to Allah for help" (p. 126). Both townspeople and villagers are ignorant of Islamic law, not even referring to Quranic verses in any stage of conflict resolution or adjudication.

In contrast to her view that secular norms had permeated Ottoman administrative and legal structures and, indeed, that there was considerable continuity between Ottoman institutions and those of the Turkish republic in such structures—such as in the roles of notary, witness, and *vekil* (guardian)—Starr conceives the relationship between secularism and Islam, and, by more than inference, between secular law and Islamic law, as completely disjunctive, with the former supplanting the latter as the natural result of the Ataturk revolution (p. xi). She states that "I treat secularism and Islam in Turkey as two opposing ideologies used by competing elites for control of the nation" (p. xxxiii). This uncomplicated uniformitarian view of Islam is combined with a view that this unitary religion oppresses women: "Islam as a religion and as an ideology favors male control of females . . . " (p. xxxiv) and ". . . traditional Islamic law did not permit women to initiate divorce. . . . " (p. 92).

This reviewer's own research in an Islamic court in rural Jordan[2]—a patrilineal, tribal, Islamic polity and presumably part of the dichotomous contrast set with republican Turkey—indicates that Muslim judges favor the patrilineal extended family in some cases, as Starr's argument suggests, but in other cases favor the conjugal family (of husband and wife) against the father/father-in-law, and in still others favor the wife/daughter against her husband/father; that is, the individual rather than the family unit, conjugal or extended.

In part two Starr stipulates the six grounds of divorce given to women in the "secular" legislation of 1926 under the new Turkish republic. The interesting fact is that many of these rights were given to women by the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917, which was based largely on the Hanafi school of Islamic law, including the grounds of im-

1. See Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

2. *Law and Islam in the Middle East*, ed. by Daisy Hilse Dwyer (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1990).

potence, insanity, abandonment, and extreme cruelty. Many schools of Islamic law allow—and have allowed—the wife to stipulate into her marriage contract judicial separation (*fasakh*) for a number of causes, including the husband's taking another wife. Starr writes that the fact that "the Turkish High Court . . . upheld a wife's right to divorce when a husband refused to provide a dwelling separate from his father's or brother's after marriage" (p. 111) is evidence of "movement away from male supremacy values, from the values inherent in Islam." The right of the wife to a proper and legal Muslim house (*bayt shar'i*), including the right to privacy from male in-laws, is, and has been, part of Islamic law in many schools, and this reviewer has witnessed such cases brought by women in Islamic courts in Jordan.

Jordan, of course, is not Turkey. Such instances are cited simply to indicate the wide range of options within the Islamic corpus and to question the dichotomous conception of Islam and secularism. The author's uncomplicated and stereotypical view of Islamic law, and its rigid support of some family structures and not others, has marred an otherwise interesting attempt to combine ethnographic and historical analysis in understanding modern Turkey.

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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The Alchemy of Happiness, by Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali, tr. by Claud Field, revised and annotated by Elton L. Daniel. Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1991. xliii + 92 pages. Bibl. to p. 112. $35.00 cloth. $11.95 paper.

Reviewed by Alexander Knysh

This book is a revision of Claud Field's English translation of al-Ghazali's famous treatise, first published in Britain in 1910 and then reprinted in Lahore in 1987. Because it is not immediately clear why it was necessary to prepare yet another edition, the editor, Elton Daniel, repeatedly stresses al-Ghazali's significance as Islam's outstanding theoretician—an argument that is, indeed, difficult to repudiate. Paradoxically, the text edited by Daniel is not al-Ghazali's original writing. It is, in fact, an English rendition of "an Urdu abridgement of a Persian recension of a book first written in Arabic almost a thousand years ago" (p. xxxix).

The Persian text of the *Alchemy*, as the editor finely demonstrated in the introduction, was conceived by al-Ghazali as a popularization and recapitulation of his Arabic *magnum opus*—the *Revivification of the Religious Sciences*. The Persian variant, paraphrased into Urdu, formed the textual basis of Field's translation. Daniel's contribution consists of supplying an introduction and notes and making minor amendments to the translation by using a new recension of the Persian text established by Hosain Khadivjam.[1]

In the introduction, Daniel provides an overview of al-Ghazali's life and work as well as a brief survey of his epoch and cultural setting. This account is highly conventional and adds little to the standard portrait of the Muslim thinker as outlined by D.B. Macdonald and perpetuated by numerous Western writers ever since. Daniel refrains from mentioning any recent attempts to reassess al-Ghazali's thought and personality,[2] probably because he is unwilling to confuse the book's intended "lay" reader with such "unnecessary subtleties." Nevertheless, for those interested in gaining a deeper view of the Muslim theologian, the editor furnishes an extensive bibliography, which comprises both an annotated description of al-Ghazali's own works and a list of secondary literature examining his rich legacy.

1. Tehran, 1983.

2. See, for example, Hermann Landolt, "Ghazali and 'Religionswissenschaft': Some Notes on the *Mishkat al-Anwar*," in *Asiatische Studien* 45, no. 1 (1991), pp. 19–72.

To be certain, al-Ghazali's *Alchemy* in the "pleasantly archaic" (p. xxxviii) translation by Field is ideally suited for educational purposes. Yet, if taken as a typical example of Muslim mystical literature, it may leave the reader with an oversimplified notion of Sufism and Islamic theology—something Daniel does not sufficiently emphasize in the introduction. It is obvious that in this particular treatise al-Ghazali presents himself as a religious educator and a moralist *par excellence* and, therefore, should be judged as such. To portray him as "the greatest and certainly one of the most original of Muslim thinkers" simply on account of his authorship of the *Alchemy* (p. xi) may be misleading because the Western conception of "originality" hardly does justice to al-Ghazali's concerns, especially his uncompromising adherence to the Sunni cause and opposition to theoretical nonconformity of any kind.

The text of the translation is well edited and helpfully annotated. There are few mistakes, only two of which are worth mentioning. First, al-Ghazali's *Niche for the Lights* was edited by Abu al-'Ala 'Afifi and not " 'Abd al-'Ala 'Afif" (p. 99). Second, the editor wrongly renders the verbal nouns derived from the third form of the Arabic verb. Thus, *mu'amilat* should be *mu'amalat* (p. 43), and *muhasiba* is, of course, *muhasaba* (p. 67). These remarks, however, do not diminish the book's importance as an accessible introduction to the outlook of Islam's great theologian.

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LITERATURE

All That's Left to You: A Novella and Other Stories, by Ghassan Kanafani, tr. by May Jayyusi and Jeremy Reed. Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1990. Distrib. University of Texas Press, Austin. xxi + 128 pages. $8.95 paper.

Reviewed by Gaye D. Walton-Price

The legacy of Ghassan Kanafani and the literary world are rendered a great service by this English-language translation of his stories. The poignancy and adversities of the Palestinian people are deftly expressed by Kanafani, writing from within his own milieu. The informative introduction to the work by Roger Allen characterizes Kanafani's preferred literary context:

> His own experiences, coupled with his strongly held political beliefs, led him to concentrate his attentions on the poorer classes, and most particularly on those who live closest to that entity which the Palestinians hold dear, whatever their class: the land. . . . The qualities of these peasants are described with admiration; and on occasion this cast of characters is extended to include the Bedouin, that repository of all traditional lore and values of the Arab nation. (p. xviii)

This collection will enhance the reputation of Kanafani as an important Palestinian writer, which he established primarily with his novel, *Rijal fi al-Shams*.[1]

The collection contains a novella, "All That's Left to You," and ten short stories. Both the novella and all ten short stories are insightful and succinct glimpses into the lives of various Palestinian personalities. Every character reveals a sad and tragic nature, and a sense of the seeming inevitable power of fate to victimize.

The novella is actually a long short story whose duration is roughly 24 hours. Time itself plays a key role in "All That's Left to You." The author's "Clarification" preceding the story indicates that Time is personified as one of five characters, along with Hamid, Maryam, Zakaria, and the Desert. The technique of imbuing Time and the Land (that is, the Desert) with consciousness and thus having important roles to play, is quite effective in building up the momentum of the

1. 1956; translated into English by Hilary Kilpatrick as *Men in the Sun*, 1978.

story, as it mounts steadily to the stunning climax.

Another example of Kanafani's skillful story-telling techniques is revealed in "In My Funeral," written in the form of a letter by a terminally ill man to the woman he loves, releasing her from any obligation. It is expressed in the first person. The reader is brought immediately inside the dying man's thoughts and emotions. It is a deep-felt expression of human futility. As a short story, the reader must surmise how the beloved will react to the letter's contents.

The other stories focus on defeating circumstances, utter despair, and bizarre events, which stretch the bounds of human reality. These stories often have shock value. *All That's Left to You* is a praiseworthy collection, one that leaves a profound effect on its reader. Kanafani's story-telling is highly skilled and captivating. He masterfully weaves intensely emotional webs of intricacy that hold the reader within their intertwinings, and do not easily dismiss the reader.

Gaye D. Walton-Price has taught Arabic in the Department of Middle Eastern Languages of the Middle East Institute, and is the author of "The New Generation of Egyptian Short Story Writers of the 1970s" (doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University).

Shorter Notices

Conviction and Credence: US Policymaking in the Middle East, by Melvin A. Friedlander. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991. x + 125 pages. Notes to p. 149. Bibl. to p. 172. Index to p. 175. $32.00.

What is wrong with US Middle East policy? Melvin Friedlander finds the answer in the failure of US policymakers to integrate fully the profound importance of religion in the "lives and perceptions of ordinary Middle East citizens" (p. 6). Although the author's solution is not entirely clear, it seems to rest on the idea that a more ethical and religiously guided US policy (more conviction), would enhance America's reputation in the region (more credence). To make this point, he offers a highly descriptive overview of US diplomacy toward the region from Jimmy Carter's administration onward, which the author admits risks "recounting . . . events well known to scholars in the field. . . ." (p. 17).

The highly descriptive and summary quality of the book is one of several flaws that diminish its value. In the course of recounting events, the main threads of Friedlander's argument are lost in the narrative. The writing is less organized than one might wish. Inconsistencies abound, and quite dramatic claims are advanced without adequate support. For example, on page 12, one reads that "a large segment of the globe, particularly the nations of the Middle East, feels little attraction to the individualist. Arabs of the Middle East owe their loyalties to the group." Leaving aside the essentialist character of the statement, it is followed on page 14 by the following: "Even the most ardent Islamic radical gives substantial support to equal rights for individuals." Friedlander seems to feel no need to reconcile these different views of the position of individualism in the Arab Middle East. In the same section, on page 15, the reader also learns that "political elites have historically been held to be a positive and impartial force in society." So much for Karl Marx.

In his conclusion, Friedlander suggests that "US policymaking in the Middle East may be impeded unless the United States finds a way to be sympathetic to fundamentalists' goals" (p. 121). Would the United States actually improve its position by a policy that embraces the world view of Algeria's FIS, or Lebanon's Hizballah? This is a dubious ending to a book of dubious merit.

Steven Heydemann, Director, Program on International Peace and Security, Social Science Research Council

Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience, ed. by Metin Heper. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991. ix + 176 pages. Refs. to p. 189. Contribs. to p. 192. Index to p. 198. $54.95.

This useful study, with contributions from 12 Turkish scholars, examines the relations between the state and economic interest groups in Turkey during the 1980s. These Turkish professors—eight from Boğaziçi University, and the others from Ankara, Bilkent, and Middle East Technical universities—have incisive insights concerning labor, agriculture, commerce, banks, manufacturing, and big business. These specialists are mostly political scientists; others include an economist, a sociologist, and a law professor.

In the course of recent Turkish history, the military intervened in 1960, 1971, and 1980 during serious political crises. After introducing reforms, however, the military returned control to civilian

rule. Although the 1961 constitution had been a liberal one, the 1982 constitution placed interest groups under stricter control, in reaction to the sociopolitical conflicts of the late 1970s. The drafters of the 1982 constitution sought to prevent economic interest groups from becoming disruptive pressure groups through broader state regulation of their activities. Many groups, however, found it profitable to acquiesce to governmental control, especially as "policy formulation and implementation have become increasingly encapsulated within a narrow inner circle of technocrat-planners, insulated from institutionalized channels of intermediation and bargaining (bureaucratic and political) in the domestic arena" (p. 116).

This study concludes that the state (that is, government) in Turkey is exceptionally strong. During the 1980s, state-interest group relations in Turkey manifested an absence of both pluralism and neocorporatism, as the state came to have more autonomy *vis-à-vis* interest groups. Consequently, by the end of the decade, the state was isolated from civil society.

The conclusions of this study are accurate, objectively presented, and fully documented. Unlike many other collective presentations, this work has maintained its internal unity. Students of Turkish affairs will profit from reading this work. In addition to obtaining a better understanding of the broader aspects of the Turkish polity, this reviewer profited from details regarding various associations and organizations that are often difficult to obtain.

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Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era, by Masami Arai. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992. xii + 97 pages. Append. to p. 154. Bibl. to p. 158. Index to p. 168. NLG80.00.

Masami Arai's monograph, centering on the last years of the Ottoman Empire, addresses the essential problem of the transformation of Ottoman intellectual focus from "Ottomanism" or "Ottoman nationalism" to "Turkism" and "Turkish nationalism." Rather than concentrating on political movements, or even politicians, Arai examines the ideologies behind these movements and the ideas held by the movements' leaders. What he has found, and presents in this book, adds much to an understanding of issues that are newly significant today.

Basing his work largely on the substance of five journals published by Ottoman writers, *Türk Derneği, Genç Kalemler, Türk Yurdu, Türk Ocağı,* and *Islâm Mecmuasi,* Arai chronicles the changes advocated in these journals, from a push for "Ottomanism," with its attendant assimilation of various groups into one new one, to the adoption of Turkish nationalism. Arai finds strong evidence to support the proposition that both Ottoman nationalists and Turkish nationalists viewed change and modernization as possible within Islam.

Arai provides in the appendices tables of content of all the journal issues he could locate. The author analyzes the articles according to several identified themes, traces development of ideas over the lives of the journals, and separates groups of views and articles according to the place of origin of the authors, including many from the Russian empire.

Arai concludes that "contrary to the received wisdom, Turkish nationalists did not necessarily pursue secularization or Westernization; they were rather in favor of Islamization and modernization" (p. 97). Today, the early stages of a similar development may be taking place in the newly independent Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. Likewise, one may view parallels in the relations between these republics and Turkey.

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Recent Publications

DOCUMENTS

US Official Statements: Israeli Settlements, The Fourth Geneva Convention, ed. by Jody Boudreault *et al.* Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992. viii + 193 pages. Appends. $19.95 paper. Contains statements that address US characterization of settlements in the occupied territories, Israeli security, the place of settlements in future negotiations, Israel's obligations and responsibilities under international law, and policy toward deportations, transfers of prisoners, and house demolitions. (SG)

US Official Statements Regarding UN Resolution 242, ed. by Jody Boudreault *et al.* Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992. 184 pages. $19.95 paper. Policy statements are grouped into four parts—"242 as the Basis for Peace," "Principals of 242," "242 and Related Issues," and "US Objective: Implementing 242 without Changes." (SG)

Annotations have been prepared by the book review editor, with the assistance of **Laura Abrahams, Elisa F. Coghlan, Rebecca B. Mayer, and Holly Rietman.**

BIOGRAPHY

David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership in Israel, ed. by Ronald W. Zweig. London: Frank Cass Publishers; and Jerusalem, Israel: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1991. Distrib. International Specialized Book Services, Portland, OR. 314 pages. Contribs. $37.00. Contains 17 chapters, grouped in four sections: "The Praxis of Leadership," "The Early Years," "The Challenge of World War," and "Statehood." Contributors include Shimon Peres, Israel Kolatt, Michael Keren, Mattiyahu Mintz, Shabtai Teveth, Yosef Gorny, Dina Porat, Uri Bialer, Moshe Lissak, and Netanel Lorch. (SG)

Ferdowsi: A Critical Biography, by A. Shapur Shahbazi. Cambridge, MA: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1991. Distrib. Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, CA. xiv + 149 pages. Bibl. Index. $19.95. Offers an extensively documented study of the 10th/11th-century Iranian poet and historian. Evaluates critically the available evidence on Ferdowsi's life—including background, education, religious views, and economic and political circumstances—and provides in-depth commentary on his rendition of the *Shah-nameh.* The author stresses Ferdowsi's position as a leading symbol of Iranian nationalism, from his own age to the present. (RBM)

The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement, by Philip Mattar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. xvi + 191 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $14.50 paper. A revised edition of a book originally published in 1988 and reviewed in *MEJ* vol. 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 710–11. A new chapter, "Diplomacy and War, 1946–1948," has been added, and two other chapters, "Decline of Power" and "An Overview and Assessment," have been expanded. (SG)

IRAN

Elites et mirages: acteurs et séquences révolutionnaires en Iran, 1977–1979, by Chahrokh Vaziri. Lausanne, Switzerland: Centre d'Etude et de Documentation Iraniennes, 1990. 222 pages. Notes. Contents. n.p. paper. Details the diverse factions of the Iranian intellectual elite and analyzes their role in and the extent of their influence on the outcome of the Iranian revolution. Also reviews the sociopolitical context of events leading to the revolution. (EFC)

Iran after Khomeini, by Shireen T. Hunter. New York: Praeger; and Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992. Washington Papers, no. 156. xvi + 163 pages. Notes. Index. $32.95 cloth. $14.95 paper. Considers current conditions in Iran in terms of domestic politics, the military, economy, culture and society, and foreign relations. (SG)

IRAQ

The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, ed. by Robert A. Fernea and William Roger Louis. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991. Distrib. St. Martin's Press, New York. xxiv + 232 pages. Index. $49.50. A collection of 12 essays, based on a symposium held at the University of Texas at Austin in 1989. Chapters include "The British and the Origins of the Iraqi Revolution" by William Roger Louis, "US Support for the British Position in Pre-Revolutionary Iraq" by Frederick W. Axelgard, "The Soviet Union, the Great Powers, and Iraq" by Joe Stork, "The Impact of the Iraqi Revolution on the Arab World" by Rashid Khalidi, "State and Tribe in Southern Iraq: The Struggle for Hegemony before the 1958 Revolution" by Robert A. Fernea, "Class and Class Politics in Iraq before 1958: The 'Colonial and Post-Colonial State' " by Roger Owen, and "The Old Social Classes Revisited" by Hanna Batatu. (SG)

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Israeli Politics in the 1990s: Key Domestic and Foreign Policy Factors, ed. by Bernard Reich and Gershon R. Kieval. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991. xiii + 194 pages. Appends. Bibl. Index. Contribs. $42.95. Includes "Toward the 1990s in Israeli Politics" by Asher Arian, "Extremism, Intensity, and Apocalyptic Warnings: Prophetic Policy Advocacy in Modern Israel" by Ira Sharkansky, "The Religious Parties as a Support System for the Settler Movement" by Stewart Reiser, and "Demographic and Economic Forces Underlining Likud's Perspective of the West Bank" by Fred Gottheil. (SG)

LEBANON

La population déplacée au Liban, 1975–1987, by Robert Kasparian and André Beaudoin. Beirut: Université Saint Joseph; and Quebec City: Université Laval, 1991. 121 pages. Bibl. n.p. paper. An empirical study of the peoples in Lebanon displaced by the civil war there. Employs human migration theories and bountiful statistics to illustrate population distribution, social conditions, social organizations, and adjustment to new environments within Lebanon in the period under survey. Numerous graphs, tables, and maps accompany the text. (EFC)

MAGHRIB

L'avenir de l'espace méditerranéen, ed. by Christian Reynaud and Abdelkader Sid Ahmed. Paris:

Editions Publisud, 1991. 990 pages. Contents. FF328.00 paper. A collection of essays based on a conference held in Montpellier, France in 1990, sponsored by Crédit Mutuel Méditerranéen. The articles examine the relationship between the European Community and North Africa in such areas as demography, politics, and economics, in the broader context of North-South cooperation. (LA)

Renaissance or Radicalism? Political Islam: The Case of Tunisia's *al-Nahda*, by Michael Collins Dunn. Washington, DC: International Estimate, 1992. xii + 109 pages. $19.95 paper. Examines the history of political Islam's interaction with the Tunisian state; the character of *al-Nahda's* popular base and its two central figures, Rached Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou; the group's expansion and evolution from 1981 to 1991; overt and covert organizational structure; governmental counteractivities; and al-Nahda's cultivation of ties with elements in Algeria and Sudan. Concludes with a discussion of the compatibility of democracy with Islamic political movements. (EFC)

PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS

Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement, by Julie M. Peteet. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. x + 245 pages. Notes. Refs. Index. $13.50 paper. A paperback edition of a book originally published in 1991 and reviewed in *MEJ* vol. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), p. 692. It was praised there as "a well-documented, tightly argued book about the dynamics of politics and gender."

Les Palestiniens avant et après la guerre du Golfe, by Bichara Khader. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain, 1991. Cah. 87. 43 pages. Append. n.p. paper. Recounts the sequence of Palestinian reactions to the Gulf war's events through 1991, and reasons for and consequences of their views. (EFC)

SUDAN

The Nationalities Question and National Unity or Disintegration in Sudan, by B. Yongo-Bure. Bremen, Germany: Sudan Economy Research Group, University of Bremen, 1990. 19 pages. $20.00 paper. Argues that unequal distribution of economic and social resources, perpetuated by a ruling Arab elite, is the main cause of interethnic conflict in Sudan. The author calls for democratic political institutions at all levels, economic restructuring to counter discrimination against oppressed nationalities and ethnic groups, and further social reforms, in order to promote Sudanese national unity. (RBM)

Towards Alternative Economic Policies for Sudan, by Elhafiz Attaelmannan Taha *et al.* Bremen, Germany: Sudan Economy Research Group, University of Bremen, 1990. 85 pages. Refs. n.p. paper. Calls for massive economic reforms to bring agriculture and industry into equilibrium; criticizes the feasibility of an export-led growth strategy and argues instead for revenue-led development that is focused on agriculture. (LA)

SYRIA

Damascus Courts the West: Syrian Politics, 1989–1991, by Daniel Pipes. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991. Policy Papers, no. 26. xiii + 84 pages. Appends. $11.95 paper.

TURKEY AND CYPRUS

Turkey: Torture, Extrajudicial Executions, "Disappearances." New York: Amnesty International USA, 1992. 32 pages. n.p. paper. Records issues related to and incidents of torture, illegal detention and executions, and disappearances that were carried out by the Turkish government and the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) from mid-1991 to mid-1992. (EFC)

Turkey's Relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe, ed. by Erol Manisali. Girne, (Northern) Cyprus: Middle East Business and Banking, 1991. 116 pages. n.p. paper. Contains 14 articles as well as an opening address by Rauf Denktaş, president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, concerning the conflict on the island. Articles include "Dealing with a Changing World: Turkey and the Countries of East and Central Europe;" "The Impact of the Development of Soviet-Turkish Relations on the Establishment of Stability in the Region, with Special Reference to the Middle East and the Gulf;" "Beyond Glasnost and the Gulf War: Turkish Foreign Policy and Economic Relations at a Crossroads;" "Some Aspects of Azerbaijan-Turkish Economic and Cultural Problems: Prospects for Their Development;" and "An American Perspective on Turkey *vis à-vis* the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." The book is the product of the seventh annual International Girne Conference. (RBM)

Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, ed. by Clement H. Dodd. Huntingdon, UK: Eothen Press, 1992. Occasional Papers, no. 2. xi + 117 pages. £12.50 paper. Presents six essays that were collected mainly from the proceedings of the 1991 British Society for Middle East Studies annual conference in London—"Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk" by Selim Deringil, "The European Community and Turkey: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards" by Michael Cendrowicz, "The

Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies, and Prospects" by Süha Bölükbaşi, "Turkish Policy in the Middle East: Turning Danger to Profit" by Andrew Mango, "Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?" by Philip Robins, and "Turkey's Expanding Relations with the CIS and Eastern Europe" by Türkkaya Ataöv. (EFC)

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East, ed. by Alan Platt. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992. xiii + 136 pages. Notes. $21.95 paper. Includes "Prospects for Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East" by Richard E. Darilek and Geoffrey Kemp, "The Role of Aerial Inspections in Confidence Building and Peacemaking" by Michael Krepon and Peter D. Constable, "Arms Control and the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles" by W. Seth Carus and Janne E. Nolan, and "Chemical Weapons Arms Control" by Charles Flowerree and Brad Roberts. (SG)

Brave New World Order: Must We Pledge Allegiance? by Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992. xv + 176 pages. Notes. Index. $9.95 paper. Examines the "new world order" as it emerged from the end of the Cold War, and its perception in the First World and Third World; also considers the United States as a national security state, the Gulf war, and the environment. The last two chapters focus on the church and the ways that the teachings of Jesus can help to confront the emerging international order, which the author believes is based on violence and injustice. (HR)

The Control of the Middle East Arms Race, by Geoffrey Kemp. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991. Distrib. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. xi + 232 pages. Appends. Index. $11.95 paper. Contends that the likelihood of another regional war in the Middle East cannot be discounted until clear and forceful measures toward arms reduction are implemented; identifies dynamics of various Middle Eastern conflicts, as well as issues of arms production, regional security, and US policy regarding arms control. (LA)

Democracy and Arab Political Culture, by Elie Kedourie. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992. viii + 105 pages. $12.95 paper. Examines what the author labels "constitutional experiments" (p. 13) in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, and seeks to identify the causes of their failure. The author terms the record for democracy in the region "dismal" (p. 103) and attributes this condition to colonialism, the impact of foreign political ideologies, religious fundamentalism, and what he alleges is an incompatibility between constitutionalism and historical patterns of government in the Middle East. (LA)

The Intelligence Game: The Illusions and Delusions of International Espionage, by James Rusbridger. New York: New Amsterdam Books, 1992. viii + 294 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $24.95. Recounts various episodes of modern espionage, primarily by Britain's MI-5 and MI-6. (RBM)

The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, by Stephen C. Pelletiere. New York: Praeger, 1992. xvi + 167 pages. Append. Bibl. Index. $42.95. A history of the Iran-Iraq war, emphasizing military developments and related political consequences. (SG)

Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, ed. by James Piscatori. Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991. xvii + 267 pages. Chron. Bibl. Contribs. Index. n.p. paper. Chapters consider "Islamist" political forces in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and among the Palestinians. Contributors include James Piscatori, Amatzia Baram, Said Amir Arjomand, Jean-François Legrain, Gehad Auda, and Mumtaz Ahmad. (SG)

Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, by Mordechai Nisan. Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland and Company, 1991. xii + 300 pages. Notes. Index. $32.50. An overview of religious, linguistic, and ethnic minority groups in the Middle East, divided into four sections: "Muslim Minorities;" "Heterodox Muslim Minorities;" "Christian Minorities;" and "Jews, Israel, and Other Middle Eastern Minorities." Chapters include "Kurds: A Legacy of Struggle and Suffering;" "Berbers: Between Rebellion and Cooptation;" " 'Alawites: To Power and the Unknown;" "Copts: A Precarious Community;" "Armenians: Talent, Tragedy, and Territorial Loss;" "Maronites: Sophistication and Opportunity;" and "Jews: Zionist Achievement, Lingering Question." (HR)

Political Tides in the Arab World, by Muhammad Muslih and Augustus Richard Norton. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1992. Headline Series, no. 296. 72 pages. Bibl. $4.00 paper. An introductory discussion of events in the Middle East surrounding the Gulf crisis and war; briefly recounts 20th-century history in the region, introduces major issues in the Arab world, and explains the governmental system of seven Arab states. Discussion questions and an annotated reading list conclude the publication. (RBM)

La sécurité européenne devant les menaces extérieures à l'Europe: l'organisation de la paix et de la sécurité dans la région méditerranéenne et le Moyen-Orient. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain, 1992. Cah. 90. 25 pages. n.p. paper. Contains excerpts from the May 1991 report of the political commission of the EC's European Council. The report warns that North-South relations cannot replicate East-West relations during the Cold War and that Europe must play a leading role

in encouraging stability in the Middle East and North Africa. (LA)

The Soref Symposium: American Strategy after the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991. 83 pages. n.p. paper.

Soviet Policy toward Israel under Gorbachev, by Robert O. Freedman. New York: Praeger; and Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991. Washington Papers, no. 150. xvi + 141 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $34.95 cloth. $11.95 paper. Presents a detailed analysis of warming Soviet-Israeli relations from March 1985 to March 1990. The author identifies four main factors affecting changes in Soviet policy toward Israel—the need for leverage in regional peace processes, interest in improving relations with the United States, the desire for increased foreign trade, and the influence of Soviet public opinion. (RBM)

Who Needs an Islamic State? by Abdelwahab el-Affendi. London: Grey Seal Books, 1991. 115 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. £5.95 paper. A critique of Islamic and Western political philosophies, from Ibn Khaldun and Thomas Hobbes to Karl Marx and modern Islamists. The author argues for abandoning a utopian Islamic state in favor of a treaty-bound association of tolerant, democratic Muslim and non-Muslim communities. (RBM)

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Al-Atrak wa Qadiyat Filastin 'Abr al-Tarikh ila Yawmuna Hadha (The Turks and the Palestine Problem across History to the Present), 1880–1980, by Mim Kamal Awkah. Ankara: Kibris Turk Kultur Dernegi, 1986. 48 pages. Notes. n.p. paper. Contains five sections—"A Brief Summary of Ottoman Rule in Palestine," "Zionism and the Development of the Palestine Problem under the Ottoman Empire," "England and the Period of the Mandate in Palestine," "The Formation of Palestinian Policy in Turkey after World War II," and "The Common Fate of Palestine and Cyprus." (RBM)

Jerusalem, by Teddy Kollek. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1990. Policy Papers, no. 22. x + 70 pages. Maps. $9.95 paper.

Les voix du soulèvement palestinien, 1987–1988, by Jean-François Legrain and Pierre Chenard. Cairo: Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Economique, Juridique et Sociale (CEDEJ), 1991. 270 pages + 351 pages in Arabic. Gloss. Chron. $25.00 paper. Reprints 108 declarations printed in leaflet form during the first year of the *intifada*, in Arabic and in French-language translation, issued by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, and the Islamic Resistance Movement; also includes 18 publications bearing false authorship. The texts are accompanied by critical commentary on the authorship, publication, and distribution of the leaflets, as well as an analysis of their impact on the uprising. Supporting the work are tables, a glossary of proper names cited, and a chronology of intifada-related events during the period 1987–88. (EFC)

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

The Might That Was Assyria, by H.W.F. Saggs. London: Sidgwick and Jackson; and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. xii + 340 pages. Bibl. Indices. $35.00. Offers an introduction to the land of Assyria, discussing its political history—from earliest settlements to ascendance into empire and ultimate collapse—as well as geography, social structures, cultural practices, art, literature, religion, architecture and urban planning, agriculture, and army. Concludes with an overview of the development of Assyriology. Numerous maps and illustrations support the text. (EFC)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The Agro-Based Industries in Morocco: Key Characteristics and Rehabilitation Issues. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain, 1991. Cah. 89. vi + 62 pages. Appends. Refs. n.p. paper. Presents selected findings of a 1989 diagnostic study of Moroccan industry by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Surveys economic and political conditions in the country, the manufacturing sector, and the food-processing branch of the agro-industrial subsector in particular. The report offers recommendations concerning private sector and government policies to improve efficiency and competitiveness. Analyses are supported by extensive tables and figures. (RBM)

The Decade of the "Oil Deal," by Antonio M. Szabó. Boulder: International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, University of Colorado, 1991. Occasional Paper, no. 15. 16 pages. Notes. $10.00 paper.

Exchange Rate Policies in Developing and Post-Socialist Countries, ed. by Emil-Maria Claassen. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1991. xix + 443 pages. Refs. Contribs. Index. $14.95 paper. Addresses exchange rate fluctuations, dual exchange rates, and currency overvaluation in Eastern Europe and the Third World. Contains 14 chapters, including "Growth Collapses, Real Exchange Rate Misalignments, and Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries," "Capital and Current Account Liberalization and Real Exchange Rates in Developing Countries," and "Advice on the Choice of an Exchange Rate Policy." (LA)

Financial Innovation and Upstream Petroleum Development, by Gerald Pollio. Boulder: International

Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, University of Colorado, 1991. Occasional Paper, no. 14. 22 pages. Notes. $10.00 paper.

Turkey: Trade Reforms in the 1980s, by Anne O. Krueger and Okan H. Aktan. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1992. vi + 46 pages. Notes. Refs. $5.00 paper. Focuses on implications and effects of Turkish economic reforms introduced prior to the September 1980 coup; emphasizes the critical roles of government attitudes and exchange rate mechanisms in reducing inflation and external debt. (LA)

The US Natural Gas Market in the 1990s, by Gerald Pollio. Boulder: International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, University of Colorado, 1991. Occasional Paper, no. 12. 17 pages. $10.00 paper.

A War for Oil? Energy Issues and the Gulf War of 1991, by John Roberts. Boulder: International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, University of Colorado, 1991. Occasional Paper, no. 13. 18 pages. Notes. $10.00 paper.

World Development Report, 1992: Development and the Environment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. xii + 308 pages. $32.95 cloth. $16.95 paper. This World Bank report contains nine chapters, including "Development and the Environment: A False Dichotomy," "Environmental Priorities for Development," "Markets, Governments, and the Environment," "Making Better Decisions: Information, Institutions, and Participation," and "The Cost of a Better Environment." Extensive charts, tables, and graphs supplement the text. (LA)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Les migrations internationales en Europe, 1945–1991, by Jean-Claude Chesnais. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain, 1992. Cah. 92. 23 pages. n.p. paper. Examines major immigration issues confronting Europe since World War II. Reviews patterns of immigration to Europe and implications for the European Community; discusses recent escalation of migration from the Mediterranean region into southern Europe, and from the "East" and "South" into the European Community. Concludes with a brief analysis of possible future migratory trends. Tables support the text. (EFC)

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The Science of Mystic Lights: Qutb al-Din Shirazi and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy, by John Walbridge. Cambridge, MA: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1992. Distrib. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. xvii + 296 pages. Appends. Bibl. Indices. $14.95 paper. Discusses Qutb al-Din Shirazi's interpretation and further development of illuminationist thought, examining his ideas and major works in light of Shihab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi's *Philosophy of Illumination.* Supported by a look at Qutb al-Din's life and times, and several appendices that include biographical sources, listings of his students and his works, and the text of his *Epistle Ascertaining the Reality of the World of Image,* in Arabic and English-language translation. (EFC)

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, ARTS

The Arabic Language in America, ed. by Aleya Rouchdy. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1992. 349 pages. Refs. Index. $44.95 cloth. $19.95 paper. A collection of 14 essays, grouped in three parts—"Language Contact and Language Change," "The Use of Arabic: Aspects and Attitudes," and "Teaching and Learning." Chapters include "A Lebanese Dialect in Cleveland: Language Attrition in Progress;" "Borrowing in Arab-American Speech;" "Arab-Americans Learning Arabic: Motivation and Attitudes;" "Teaching Arabic in the United States: Past, Present, and Future;" "Diglossia Proficiency: The Need for an Alternative Approach to Teaching;" and "Computers for Arabic Teaching: The Promise and the Reality." (EFC)

Ottoman Art in the Service of the Empire, by Zdzislaw Zygulski, Jr. New York and London: New York University Press, 1992. xii + 192 pages. Bibl. Indices. $50.00. Provides a view of art in the Ottoman Empire, specifically its flags, horsetail standards (*tuğs*), and royal garb, arms, and tents. Explains and depicts the origin, materials employed, functional and symbolic importance, and varieties of these items; extensive illustrations accompany the text. (EFC)

WOMEN

Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender, ed. by Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1991. xii + 343 pages. Contribs. Index. $35.00. A collection of 17 articles in four parts—"The First Islamic Centuries," "The Mamluk Period," "Modern Turkey and Iran," and "The Modern Arab World." Includes "Islam and Patriarchy: A Comparative Perspective" by Deniz Kandiyoti, "Early Islam and the Position of Women: The Problem of Interpretation" by Leila Ahmed, "Manners and Customs of 14th-Century Cairene Women: Female Anarchy versus Male Shar'i Order in Muslim Prescriptive Treatises" by Huda Lutfi, "Ottoman Women,

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ARCHITECTURE

The Alhambra, by Oleg Grabar. Sebastopol, CA: Solipsist Press, 1992. xiv + 196 pages. Bibl. Notes. Index. $25.00. A second edition of a book originally published in 1978. Examines the architecture of the Alhambra within its historical and cultural context; in particular, the fortress' layout, the practical and symbolic functions of its physical features, and the basic elements and patterns of its architectural style. (EFC)

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Send copies of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

Abbreviations

A./a., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., America, American, etc.
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics Economie, économique, etc.
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Histoire, historique
IBLA, Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst., Institute, Institut, etc.
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
J., Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Med./Méd., Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc.
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc.
Probs., Problems
Quart., Quarterly
Rel., Relations
Rep., Report
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Société, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
US, United States
Z., Zeitschrift

The Bibliography of Periodical Literature has been prepared by the book review editor, with the assistance of **Laura Abrahams, Jane Ann Burdick, Elisa F. Coghlan, Betsy J. Folkins, Rebecca B. Mayer, Doug Nelson, Holly A. Newby, Holly Rietman, and Nancy Wood.**

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Editor's Note

IT is a pleasure to provide our readers with this special issue of the *Middle East Journal* focusing on civil society and democratization in the Middle East. The articles brought together here are the result of the ongoing research being undertaken by the Civil Society in the Middle East project, headed by Augustus Richard Norton—who is also the guest editor of this issue—and Farhad Kazemi at New York University. Norton, professor of political science at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York, is well known to members of the Middle East Institute through his participation at annual conferences and his past contributions to the journal, including his summer 1991 article, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over?"

In his guest editorial, Norton explains the purpose of the civil society project that he began developing in 1991—to encourage serious field research on and informed discussion about the nature of civil society in the Middle East. The project's objective is particularly important at this time because an unprecedented number of governments in the region are experimenting with laws that potentially can broaden opportunities for citizen participation in political processes. Whether political liberalization in such countries as Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, or Yemen evolves into genuine democratization may very well depend upon the strength or weakness of the diverse voluntary associations that constitute civil society in these states.

In our first article, Norton offers an overview of the crisis of legitimacy that has been confronting governments in the Middle East since 1988. Many regimes have been attempting to strengthen their political appeal by loosening restrictions on the activities of civil organizations. Although the revitalization of political parties, professional associations, social clubs, and trade unions is a positive

development, Norton cautions us to distinguish between the forms—voluntary associations—and the substance—a spirit of tolerance—of civil society. While the former are necessary components in any process of democratization, the absence of the latter—civility—undermines democracy.

In another overview, Alan Richards cites the centralization of state authority as a primary cause for the current economic and political malaise in the Middle East. Governments burdened with debt, heavy expenditures, and limited revenues are being compelled to restructure in order to stimulate the economic growth necessary to save themselves politically. Yet, arbitrary laws aimed at discouraging political dissent also discourage the private investment required to revitalize stagnant economies. Thus, says Richards, fundamental economic imperatives are forcing some Middle Eastern governments to democratize their political systems.

Norton and Richards's region-wide analyses set the stage for four case studies of civil society in Arab countries, beginning with Egypt, which, apart from Israel and Turkey, has the most vibrant civil society in the Middle East. Mustapha Al-Sayyid examines the extent of civility among Egypt's numerous secular and religious groups. Raymond Hinnebusch analyzes how civil society in Syria struggles to maintain a measure of autonomy despite a government that has long tried to control all civil organizations, and examines the prospects of this civil society in view of the regime's tentative steps to introduce limited economic and political liberalization. Muhammad Muslih analyzes the special circumstances of civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where voluntary associations must operate under the constraints imposed by the Israeli military occupation regime while simultaneously trying to define their relationship to an external actor, the Palestine Liberation Organization. Mary Ann Tétreault demonstrates how part of the traditional home in Kuwait has been brought into civil society, and, in the process, has provided Kuwaiti women an opportunity to participate in politics.

Our final piece is a special report on the status of democracy in Arab countries. The author, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, is the president of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies (ICDS) in Cairo. One of ICDS's objectives is to promote healthy civil society in Egypt and throughout the Arab world. In 1992, ICDS began publishing *Civil Society: Democratic Transformation in the Arab World*, a newsletter aimed at documenting the process of democratic transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. From his vantage point as a committed observer, Ibrahim surveys democratization in Arab countries in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a conflict that exposed the fragile base of legitimacy of some regimes, which many analysts thought would lead to democracy. Ibrahim concludes that the march toward democracy is halting and beset with more reverses than progress.

This special issue would not have been possible without the assistance of many dedicated persons. Jillian Schwedler, associate director of the civil society project at New York University, coordinated the gathering of the manuscripts and

Nancy Wood, our editorial volunteer, helped with copyediting and proofreading. Four interns assisted with the preparation of this issue's regular features, including the book reviews and bibliography of periodical literature: Eleni Eleftheriou, University of Michigan, 1990; Kristen L. Kelly, University of Virginia, class of 1995; Ranya C. Sihweil, Bryn Mawr College, class of 1993; and Roxanne Varzi, American University, class of 1993.

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Guest Editor's Note

THE Civil Society in the Middle East project, based at New York University (NYU), originated in 1991 as the major component in "Toward Enduring Peace in the Middle East," a program that I developed while senior research fellow at the International Peace Academy in New York. The president of the academy, Olara A. Otunnu, lent significant encouragement to the program, and the initial phase of the project was funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Since my days at the University of Chicago, less than two decades ago, the body of literature on politics in the Middle East has grown impressively, but studies of state and society are still relatively sparse. Even more limited, especially outside of Israel and Turkey, are studies that focus on the theme of civil society. If, as I assume, a vibrant and relatively autonomous civil society is integral to democracy, then no discussion of political change in the contemporary Middle East will be complete unless it takes into account the status of civil society there. In point of fact, it is all too common for experts—faint praise in today's marketplace of ideas—and even for serious policymakers, journalists, and scholars, to presume that there is very little *civil* society in the Middle East and, therefore, little justification for studying Middle Eastern civil society.

On the principle that hard facts are preferable to assumed knowledge, this project was created to examine the status of civil society in the Middle East and to produce a series of scholarly snapshots that might enlighten and inform public discussion, and, perhaps, actually allow us to speak about the Middle East in the same manner that we speak of other regions of the world. To many in the West, the Middle East remains an area inhabited by an inscrutable collection of crazies wearing funny clothes, speaking strange languages, and spitting blood every time words like *freedom* or *democracy* are uttered in public.

Not surprisingly, fully developed civil societies are not hidden away in Middle Eastern closets ready to spring forth on cue. Civil society is underdeveloped in most of the area and brutally suppressed in a few places, but, as the articles here demonstrate, through an examination of civil society in Middle Eastern settings our understanding of the region is enriched and broadened, and a novel collection of questions are uncovered in the process.

The inaugural meeting of the civil society project was held at Princeton University in February 1992 in cooperation with the Center of International Studies. Conference drafts of the first-year papers—dealing with Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza—were presented at the Mena House, in Giza, Egypt, at a May 1992 meeting convened in cooperation with the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies.

In the summer of 1992, the civil society project moved to NYU where it is now based in collaboration with the Department of Politics and the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies. The project enjoys the funding support of the Ford Foundation, and also has won support from the Rockefeller Foundation. With the move to NYU, Farhad Kazemi joined the program as *pro-bono* co-director.

Most of the articles that comprise this special issue of the *Middle East Journal* represent a sampling of the papers that have been commissioned by the Civil Society in the Middle East project. It is appropriate here to note, with thanks, the encouragement and essential support of Christopher Van Hollen, previous editor of the *Journal*. The papers presented here will be expanded in book form, as will the papers written subsequently in the civil society project. For the second year of the project, which began in January 1993, authors are preparing papers on the Arab gulf states, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia, as well as several thematic papers. The finished papers will be presented in late 1993 at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center in Italy. The third year of the project will be devoted to synthesizing and analyzing the fruits of the project, which will come to a formal close at the end of 1994.

Augustus Richard Norton

THE FUTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Augustus Richard Norton

ACROSS the Middle East, from bustling bazaars, squalid slums and privileged urban enclaves, to sun-baked oil fields, rugged mountains and in thousands of villages, there is growing evidence of widening dissatisfaction with the reigning regimes. Governments, strapped by limited resources, massive and unwieldy bureaucracies, and burgeoning demands of fast-growing populations, frequently are failing to meet the needs and the demands of their citizens.

Although there is wide disagreement about the outcome, among those who follow events in the Middle East there is little doubt that regimes in the region are under increasing pressure from their citizens. In some instances, rulers—prisoners of their own promises to lead their people to glory—are under siege from citizens no longer willing to believe empty promises or tolerate self-serving and incompetent officials. Repression at the hands of the state has become a topic of public discussion, and human rights activists, although still relatively few in number, have become increasingly vocal. In short, the region's governments, especially the Arab ones, face a persistent crisis of legitimacy.

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THE DOORS OPEN

The 1991 Persian Gulf War did not create or unleash the discontent and the disdain that widely characterizes observers' and citizens' perspectives on government, but the war certainly accelerated the crisis of legitimacy by highlighting the inefficacy and the weakness of many of the regimes. American pundits looked for eruptions in the street and were reassured to find so few of them, but the impact of the war was more subtle than sound-bite profundities about the "Arab street" imply. In an authoritative survey on this issue, Saad Eddin Ibrahim provides a fresh picture of the Arab world and notes that the pressures for change have been building steadily for almost three decades.[1]

In part, these developments reflect global trends, especially the powerful demonstration effect of the momentous events in Europe since 1989. Middle Eastern autocrats have been no more successful in insulating their realms from the global revolution in communications than have autocrats in Africa and Asia. The Middle East is bombarded with information. Moreover, as Alan Richards succinctly argues, the flow of information is part and parcel of a free market, and to try to stifle that flow would be a fool's errand, given the need to pursue economic liberalization.[2] Even without the penetration of the electronic media or the fax machine, hundreds of thousands of labor migrants, moving back and forth across the region, carry powerful images of change and dissent. The new language of politics in the Middle East speaks of participation, cultural authenticity, freedom, and even democracy. No doubt, the defining concept of the 1990s is democracy. Like *Coca-Cola, democracy* needs no translation to be understood virtually everywhere. *Democracy,* however, is easier to say than to create.

Only in a handful of Middle Eastern countries, notably Israel and less emphatically Turkey, is there a functioning, participant political system in which people vote regularly and meaningfully, where the freedom to speak freely is protected, and where the rights of the individual are offered significant respect. In many other instances, elections are shamelessly rigged, individual rights are pillaged, and free association is prohibited. Time-honored remedies are still plied—co-opting critics, bribing recalcitrants with privileged access to power and to deals, locking up dissenters, and worse—but the scope of failure is so broad that few rulers today have pockets deep enough or jails large enough to cope with the problem in traditional ways.

Although skeptics abound, and not least in the region, the last few years have witnessed a striking amount of speculation and discussion of the prospects for political liberalization in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab world.

1. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993).
2. Alan Richards, "Economic Imperatives and Political Systems," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993).

Middle Eastern rulers are talking, in cautious tones to be sure, about the need to renovate their political systems. Granted, their view of political change often amounts to little more than democracy by decree. Neither Thomas Paine nor Thomas Jefferson would be much impressed, but we need not belabor the arrogance of imposing an exogenous prototype. By now, it should be apparent that there is no single template for political reform in a region as diverse as the Middle East.

A cynic might conclude that the goal, especially in those states in dire economic straits, is simply to spread the blame for failed economic policies, for spectacular rates of unemployment and underemployment, and for inadequate public services. Certainly, the discovery of a democratic vocabulary by those in power does not stem from idealistic conversion, but from pragmatic conclusions about the need to relieve social and economic pressures, to allow the venting of political steam, as well as the shrewd recognition that democratization wins international favor. Moreover, as Richards notes, economic liberalization is inextricably linked to a commitment to the rule of law, the free flow of information, and wider participation. The result may look more like Singapore than New York, but that is not a choice to be made in this forum.

Some political leaders have been willing to liberalize, but none has been willing to democratize comprehensively. Liberalization here refers to reformist measures to open up outlets for the free expression of opinion, to place limits on the arbitrary exercise of power, and to permit political association. In contrast, democratization, namely, freely contested elections, popular participation in political life, and—bluntly—the unchaining of the masses, has not occurred.

Important experiments in opening up political space are underway in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey, and Yemen. Incipient political openings in Algeria and Tunisia have been harshly reversed; in the first instance with a *coup d'état*, while in the second the clamps are being applied somewhat more gingerly. A timid political opening, driven by the need to liberalize the stagnant economy, has started in Syria, although one would have to be an incorrigible optimist to foresee quick positive results on the political liberalization front. In neighboring Lebanon, the restoration of free political life remains a prospect under the leadership of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, although the intimidating influence of Damascus is not reassuring. In non-Arab Iran, the revolution has come to an end, associational life is reviving, and elections are technically fair, if still ideologically constricted. Meanwhile, in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf incipient democracy movements are trying to find their footing, and rulers have rejoined by bestowing consultative councils in Bahrain, Oman and, most notably, in Saudi Arabia, where the king announced the creation of a council in March 1992. At best, these appointive bodies are several steps away from even inchoate legislatures, but the direction of change is not in dispute.

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY?

Across the Arab world, the clarion call of pan-Arabism, in its several variants, now often falls on deaf ears. The prevailing ideology of opposition in the Arab countries, as in the broader Middle East, is signaled by the simple claim made more frequently across the region, "Islam is the solution." If those occupying the seat of power are sometimes indecisive and on the defensive, the Islamist groups are neither. Islam is viewed by an active minority as an emerging, durable, and appealing political ideology, as well as a defense against the encroachments of "Western decay," as Egyptian Islamists describe the imported books, magazines, videos and films that they believe undermine indigenous morality. Islamist movements are as noteworthy in the secular Republic of Turkey as in Sudan, where a militantly Islamic government challenges the cliché that Sunni Islam would be inhospitable to governments bearing a family resemblance to the self-styled Islamic Republic of Iran.

Yet, in contrast to the revolutionary example of Iran, many of the region's Islamist movements are attempting to work within the existing systems. Rather than toppling governments, the tactic is to push for reform from within. This is a wise approach. Whatever their political and economic failures, many Middle Eastern states are armed to the teeth and heavily policed. In Algeria, even after the stunning reversal—via the January 1992 coup d'état—of the electoral victory by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Islamists elsewhere continued to push for elections. In Lebanon, Hizballah, the Party of God, competed in the 1992 parliamentary elections with great success. In the West Bank and Gaza, HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement, has clearly signaled, although ambivalently, that it would compete in elections. In the October 1992 elections to fill the 50 seats of the Kuwaiti parliament, Islamists captured about two-thirds of the seats won by the opposition in its stunning victory.[3]

Consistently, the Islamists—skilled populists all—have dispensed promises more freely than programs, and there is certainly no evidence that they hold the solutions to the vexing social and economic problems that plague many states in the region. Some—but not, it is important to emphasize, all—of the Islamists are contemptuous, even hostile, toward democracy, which is seen as socially divisive and endemically corrupt. Although they certainly represent a region-wide phenomenon, the Islamists are not a monolithic force, notwithstanding an emerging trend among some political commentators in the West promoting the "fundamen-

3. There is considerable disagreement about the number of opposition seats actually won in Kuwait, because it is not altogether clear which members constitute the opposition and which are pro-government. Contemporary Kuwaiti and other Arab press estimates claim that the opposition won as few as 19 seats and as many as 37. The strong representation of Islamists is not at issue.

talist" trend as a product of Iranian manipulation and control: In the words of Charles Krauthammer, "Iran is the center of the world's new Comintern."[4]

In point of fact, the diversity of Islamist movements is more noteworthy than the role of external sponsors, and indigenous experts are more apt to underline Saudi support than the hand of Tehran-central. Yet, the legitimate concern of many thoughtful Middle Easterners is that the Islamic solution will turn out to be a variant of totalitarianism. One can hope that the realities of political life will tame Islamists' excesses, even make pragmatists of them, but such social experiments can be very painful, even if the predicted results eventually occur. Western specialists are certainly right to emphasize Islamic concepts like *shura* (consultation), *ijma'* (consensus), and *bay'a* (affirmations of communal loyalty), but these concepts do not comprise a compelling theory of government. Moreover, there would be more comfort if *hurriyya* (freedom), and *huquq insaniyya* (human rights) received equal play in the discourse of Islamic populists.[5]

CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Islamists are only one component in an array of organizations that populate civil societies in the Middle East. In rich and poor states alike, incipient movements of men and women are demanding—in one form or another—a voice in politics. Women's movements may well be the leading edge of a democratization trend, and these movements are noteworthy in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Turkey, Yemen, and among the Palestinians. Businessmen's groups in Jordan and Egypt have represented assertively their own economic interests, while providing an organizational model adaptable to other purposes. In May 1992, organized labor toppled the government of Umar Karami in Lebanon and, later, an array of organizations challenged the conduct of parliamentary elections under Syrian tutelage.

Instructive vignettes, drawn from case studies illustrate the relevance of analyzing civil society in the Middle East. The state is not disappearing from view, and loyalties to tribe, clan, and family are not about to be eclipsed by secular organizations. Nonetheless, no understanding of the contemporary Middle East will be complete unless it takes into account the status of civil society in the region.

In Lebanon, despite the accumulated destructive and financial power of the militias that reigned from 1975 to 1990, participants in civil society, such as the trade and professional unions, resisted the militia-populated war system and

4. Charles Krauthammer, "Iran To Become New 'Evil Empire'?" *Democrat and Chronicle* (Rochester, NY), January 4, 1993. In a similar vein, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin said, "We call on all nations, all peoples to devote their attention to the great danger inherent in Islamic fundamentalism." Quoted by Michael Parks, "Israel Sees Self Defending West Again," *Los Angeles Times*, January 2, 1993.

5. See John Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam" *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991).

worked to thwart the fragmentation of Lebanon into sectarian enclaves. Large-scale public demonstrations for peace challenged the militias' claims to represent authentically the Lebanese.[6]

In Kuwait, although the government rapidly crumbled before the onslaught of the Iraqi invasion, the resistance found a firm footing in civil society; cooperatives, for instance, continued to function in the face of the Iraqi occupation. After the Iraqis were expelled, the democratic movement resonated even in Kuwaiti tribes, where innovative primary elections produced anything but predictable results. In almost all cases, tribal chiefs lost the primary balloting to fellow tribesmen.

Arguably, the essential element in Kuwaiti civil society is the *diwaniyya,* the "meeting places which have historically been behind many political events. The *diwaniya* is traditionally a male gathering, but [in recent years] some women have started their own *diwaniyat.* It is well understood that no candidate could win election if he did not visit most, if not all, of the *diwaniyat* of his district. When the law of gatherings prevented the holding of any meeting without prior permission from the authorities, the *diwaniya* was excluded." As Ghanim al-Najjar notes, Kuwait's pro-democracy movement started in a diwaniyya.[7]

Jordanian civil society certainly found its voice during the 1990–91 gulf crisis. "Professional associations in Jordan were very active in organizing congresses and demonstrations against the allies' actual goals of dominating the Arabian Gulf and of destroying Iraq on the one hand, and in collecting donations to help Iraqis to face the blockade imposed over them on the other hand. In response to this, the Jordanian government had to respect the professional associations' stand over the gulf crisis, even when their stand was, in some cases, against the official position of the government."[8] The Jordanian case helps to illustrate that the development of civil society will not necessarily evoke applause for US or Western policies; often the result will be jeers rather than cheers.

The associations that comprise civil society often provide an outlet for the free expression of political ideas. Thus, in Tunisia, "the absence of free space for social and political expression [in state-dominated corporatist structures] meant that dissenting voices sought substitute political arenas in the union, the university, and the mosques, [and even] cultural associations, such as the Association of Ciné clubs, which later led to the formation of the most leftist weekly ever to appear in the country, *Le Phare.*"[9] The government clamp down on the usually

6. Antoine Messara, "Civil Society against the War System: The Lebanese Case" (in Arabic) (Paper presented at an International Peace Academy-sponsored conference in Giza, Egypt, May 28–30, 1992).

7. Ghanim al-Najjar, "Civil Society in Kuwait" (Paper presented at an International Peace Academy-sponsored conference in Giza, Egypt, May 28–30, 1992), p. 12.

8. Atef Odhibat, "Civil Society in Jordan: A Preliminary Assessment" (Paper presented at an International Peace Academy-sponsored conference in Giza, Egypt, May 28–30, 1992), p. 18.

9. Abdelbaki Hermassi, "Notes on Civil Society in Tunisia" (Paper presented at an International Peace Academy-sponsored conference in Giza, Egypt, May 28–30, 1992), pp. 7–8.

vibrant labor unions, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, coincided with a dramatic rise of an assertive Islamic movement, illustrating, yet once more, that repressive government has helped to create the space in which the populist Islamist movements have thrived.

Is Democracy at Home in the Middle East?

The symbol of democracy is the contested election by secret ballot. This is altogether understandable, since the right to cast a meaningful ballot free of coercion is a metaphor for a participant political system. Democracy, however, does not reside in elections. If democracy—as it is practiced in the West—has a home, it is in civil society, where a mélange of groups, associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties, and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen.[10] Although the concept of civil society is resistant to analytical precision, the functioning of civil society is literally and plainly at the heart of participant political systems.

In fact, the icon of the global trend of democratization is civil society. In the face of repression in Latin America and Eastern and Southern Europe, civil society is credited with thwarting authoritarian designs and challenging arbitrary rule. The vanguard of civil society often has been human rights activists, religiously inspired protest movements, artists, writers, and professional groups of lawyers, doctors, or engineers who insisted on governmental accountability and thereby exposed the excesses and the weaknesses of authoritarian rulers. There is no denying the awe-inspiring courage that must be summoned to speak out, to demonstrate, to stand one's ground in circumstances where the policing apparatus is both ubiquitous and untethered by legal restrictions, where the sovereignty of the individual is a gift rather than a right.

Nonetheless, civil society did not topple regimes, as much as the regimes crumbled from internal corruption and hollow claims of legitimacy; civil society was more the beneficiary than the wrecking ball. Moreover, civil society often is idealized as an unmitigated good thing. Like any social phenomenon, civil society can have, and, often, does have, a negative side. Self-interest, prejudice, and hatred cohabit with altruism, fairness, and compassion, sometimes making unrestrained free play of civil society a chilling thought, not a warm and fuzzy one.

The argument here is that the development of civil society is a crucial step toward realizing a freer Middle East. One is hard pressed to design a participant political system that could survive very long in the absence of a vibrant civil society. In short, the existence of civil society, where contending opinions are

10. This definition of civil society, although developed independently by this author, is similar to the one offered by Bryan S. Turner, "Orientalism and the Problem of Civil Society in Islam," in Asaf Hussain, Robert Olson, and Jamil Qureishi, eds., *Orientalism, Islam, and Islamists* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984), p. 27.

given a voice, though not necessarily an equal one, is central to democracy. The emergence of a civil society is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the development of democracy.

Civil society enthusiasts, however, often contain their excitement when it comes to the Muslim world, and especially the Middle East. There, civil society is said to be deficient, corrupt, aggressive, hostile, infiltrated, co-opted, insignificant, or absent, depending on which observer one prefers to cite. For instance, in a widely read essay, Ernest Gellner notes that "[Muslim societies] are suffused with faith, indeed they suffer from a plethora of it, but they manifest at most a feeble yearning for civil society."[11] One way, an important way, of evaluating the quality of political life in the Middle East is to inquire into the status of civil society there, to plumb their "yearning" for civil society.

If, as we assume here, that a vital and autonomous civil society is a necessary condition of democracy, is Middle East civil society up to the standard? More fundamentally, does civil society exist in the Middle East?[12] Many observers are doubtful that civil society, particularly in the Arab world, is sufficiently diverse or mature to support moves toward democracy. Moreover, a number of respected scholars have expressed skepticism that vibrant, autonomous civil societies will soon emerge in Arab countries, considering the statist economies that stifle free association and the intolerance of populist Islamist movements. In the Middle East, and particularly in the Arab states, democracy has been bestowed rather than won, and, as the Algerian example illustrates, the gift may be revoked. Gudrun Krämer's comment is to the point:

> The experiments in controlled liberalization that have occurred so far seem to be notable for the absence of what are commonly regarded as basic socioeconomic, political and cultural prerequisites of liberal democracy, such as involvement of broad sectors of "civil society," government dependence on internal mobilization of resources rather than oil or political rent, and a stable regional environment.[13]

Recent writings by leading scholars tend to endorse Kramer's skepticism. John Waterbury refers to the "non-nurturing environment" of the Middle East,[14] and Michael Hudson reveals that he is more pessimistic than he was only a few years ago about the chances for democracy in the Middle East.[15] In Algeria, although

11. Ernest Gellner, "Civil Society in Historical Context," *International Social Science Journal*, no. 129 (August 1991), p. 506.

12. The absence of a civil society to counterbalance despotic power was taken to be a marker of Oriental society by Karl Wittfogel, and it is this lacuna that lies at the heart of the orientalist analysis. See Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957).

13. Gudrun Krämer, "Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World," *Middle East Report*, January-February 1992, pp. 22–5, 35; quotation from p. 22.

14. John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats?" forthcoming in a yet to be titled volume edited by Ghassan Salamé and Giacomo Luciani.

15. Compare Hudson's "Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics," *MESA Bulletin* 22 (1988), to his August 1992 testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, August 1992 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, in press).

the regime's tenuous grip on power has tightened, almost everywhere else in the region, including Iraq, the ruling elites face growing challenges. Muddling through is a default option, although the strategic choices all imply one variant or another of expanding political space.

Raymond Hinnebusch argues that economic liberalization in Syria is intended to broaden that regime's political base and to lift disabling economic controls stemming from Syria's failed statist experiment.[16] Although the process is moving forward at a measured pace, Hinnebusch notes that one result may be a more active civil society. For instance, *suq*-based merchants who, until recently, were politically muffled and over-regulated, are benefiting from the changes. In short, Hinnebusch is pointing to an increasing scope for civil society in Syria. These developments may have significant consequences for the stability of Syria when the inevitable moment of succession arrives.

Is Middle East Society Civil?

There is no disguising the Western origins of the civil society concept, but the lineage of the concept should be largely irrelevant. The idea of civil society is potent analytically insofar as it exposes an important array of research questions. Applying the concept in the Middle East is not an exercise in imposing alien social values on the region any more than exploring aspects of religiosity can be construed as proselytizing. For policymakers, activists, politicians, and others committed to the buttressing or building of civil society, the study of civil society is unlikely to uncover a magic formula or reveal surefire prescriptions. Instead, the contribution of the participants in the Civil Society in the Middle East project, and other scholars working in the area is a more fundamental one, namely to provide an outline image of Middle East civil society without getting bogged down, unnecessarily, in Hegelian mysticism or Gramscian scribblings.

One deft appreciation of civil society has stressed the historical specificity of the concept, while expressing doubt that the idea of civil society can travel much beyond Western Europe and the United States, but this conclusion smacks of a familiar problem: a confusion of the ideal-typical with the real world.[17] Recent examples from Eastern and Central Europe, as well as from other quarters of the developing world, counsel that a categorical rejection of the idea of civil society in the Middle East is unwarranted, not least because the idea of civil society is fast becoming part of the indigenous intellectual and policy dialogues.

The existence of a civil society implies a shared sense of identity, by means of, at least, tacit agreement over the rough boundaries of the political unit. In a word, a sense of citizenship, with associated rights and responsibilities, is part and

16. Raymond Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993).

17. See especially, Adam B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

parcel of the concept; citizenship underpins civil society. To be a part of the whole is a precondition for the whole to be the sum of its parts, otherwise, society has no coherence and is merely a vessel filled with shards and fragments. Thus, the individual in civil society is granted rights by the state, but, in return, acquires duties to the state. All types of governments, but particularly autocracies, tend to trivialize citizenship, emphasizing displays of citizen support and patriotic ceremonies, while paying only lip service to the rights of citizenship.[18] Where the state, through its depredations and failures has lost the loyalty of its citizens, citizenship is an early casualty. As legitimacy crumbles, civil society threatens to fragment as well, unless an orderly transfer of power is orchestrated.

Civil society is more than an admixture of various forms of association, it also refers to a quality—civility—without which the milieu consists of feuding factions, cliques, and cabals. Civility implies tolerance, the willingness of individuals to accept disparate political views and social attitudes; sometimes to accept the profoundly important idea that there is no right answer.[19] Thus, a robust civil society is more than letterhead stationery, membership lists, public charters, and manifestoes. Civil society is also a cast of mind, a willingness to live and let live. The antithesis of civility was grimly revealed by a gunman arrested in the June 1992 killing of Farag Fuda, the Egyptian critic of radical Muslim movements: "We had to kill him, because he attacked our beliefs."[20]

It is as relevant to look for civility within associations as it is to observe it between them. Ironically, groups that espouse democracy and other commendable values often do not exemplify these values internally. Unfortunately, civility is a quality which is missing in large parts of the Middle East. Thus, as Mustapha Kamil Al-Sayyid observes, even in Egypt, widely noted for having an active associational life, civil society is undermined by a deficit in political toleration and constricted by arbitrary government regulation.[21] The absence of civility counsels skepticism about the short-term prospects for democracy in the region; however, if the art of association, as de Tocqueville called it, can be learned, then the promotion of civil society is no less than creating the underpinnings of democracy.

When groups and movements do emerge they often come in the form of human rights and women's movements. Both assert fundamental moral claims, namely the dignity of the person and the equality of the individual. Perhaps these movements are early indicators of a blossoming in civil society, demonstrations of vitality and assertiveness. Since the claim of such groups are truly basic ones, they are not easily assailed, at least explicitly, by the authorities of the state.

18. This observation is borrowed from Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 48.

19. See the timely essay by Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," *Government and Opposition* 26 (Winter 1991).

20. *Economist,* June 13, 1992, p. 40.

21. Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid, "A Civil Society in Egypt?" *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993).

Accordingly, they may enjoy more freedom of action than political opposition forces, or those groups that wish to affect the allocation of economic resources. These groups also may be less susceptible to co-optation, since their demands may not easily be assuaged by privilege, position, or cash. As Mary Ann Tétreault shows, however, those groups that one might presume to be the natural allies of the womens' groups, may turn out to be their adversaries.[22]

Although elements of civil society are likely to stand in opposition to the government, government must play the essential role of referee, rule-maker, and regulator of civil society. Civil society, it needs to be emphasized, is no substitute for government. All too often, there is a tendency to commend civil society as a panacea, but the evidence is compelling that the state has a key role to play. "Democratization is neither the outright enemy nor the unconditional friend of state power. It requires the state to govern civil society neither too much nor too little, [because] while a more democratic order cannot be built *through* state power, it cannot be built *without* state power."[23]

Influenced by the events in Europe, some scholars have stressed a widely asserted view that civil society is the natural enemy of autocracy, dictatorship, and other forms of arbitrary rule. For instance, examining Eastern European cases, Giuseppe Di Palma argues that civil society is an organic part of democratic systems, but that it is in opposition to absolutist regimes by definition.[24] Yet, it is naive to expect civil society to topple the state. The interface between government and civil society will often be defined by cooperation rather than conflict. As Michael Bratton emphasizes, we need to be alert to the "more subtle strategies" that may be adopted, especially in non-democratic settings:

> Just as we require a framework that enables us to account for citizen engagement as well as disengagement, we need to leave room for engagement between state and society that may be congruent as well as conflictual. And from a practical point of view, we cannot realistically expect fledgling civic associations to shoulder the onerous burden of opposition in a context where state elites are prone to equate opposition with disloyalty and treason. More subtle strategies than direct confrontation are required.[25]

Unless government plays a controlling or intermediary role, the result is likely to be chaos. Absent the regulation and policing of the state, would citizens behave with impeccable decorum? Civility may be learned in the school of civil society, but the lesson soon may be forgotten without an enforcing authority.

22. Mary Ann Tétreault, "Civil Society in Kuwait: Protected Spaces and Women's Rights," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993).

23. John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London: Verso, 1988), p. 23.

24. Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (October 1991).

25. Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics* 41, no. 3 (April 1989), quotation is from p. 418.

Given the integral connection between civil society and democracy, the long-term prospects for successful democratization in Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran may be better than is commonly assumed. Moreover, while the Palestinians lack a state, there are, as Muhammad Muslih notes, the stirrings of a vibrant civil society.[26] Whatever political entity finally emerges on the West Bank and in Gaza, there is a sound basis for expecting the Palestinians to develop a participant political system. Elsewhere the prospects are more problematic, if not bleaker. In Iraq, notably, civil society has been systematically decimated. Although in the Kurdish region associational life, if not civil society, has been rejuvenated, it is hard to imagine a durable system of democratic participation taking root in the entire country any time soon.

Ironically, the best opportunity to create a vibrant civil society may come in those states widely viewed as "traditional" or "backward." In cases where the state has not erected elaborate mechanisms for control and intimidation, nor fostered an enormous bureaucracy or a big state elite, political development may follow different paths. This hypothesis raises some intriguing questions about cases like Yemen, where the state is relatively weak and is now engaged in a dramatic experiment in democratization. Yemen, in many ways the most traditional of the Arab states, may turn out to be a pleasant surprise. On the one hand, elements in civil society—notably some women's groups—have shown real vitality and assertiveness. On the other hand, the tribal organization of Yemeni society is so marked that for Yemen's democratic experiment to succeed, there will have to be considerable tribal support for the effort.

No doubt, political change will follow a variety of paths in the Middle East. In some cases, people will be led in circles, only to find themselves where they began. In others, the rulers will adopt what the Arabs call "façade democracy," employing the vocabulary of democracy while continuing business as usual. The pressures to open up the political systems of the Middle East may not abate, however, and, if civil society continues to gain its footing, issues of accountability and performance will grow in importance. Although the region continues to be marked by regular encroachments upon the dignity of individuals, the trajectory of Middle Eastern politics is clearly toward an increased emphasis on the right of the individual to be free from the arbitrary abuse of the state. The evidence is still mixed, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the time has come to stop talking about Middle Eastern exceptionalism when we discuss global trends.

26. Muhammad Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993).

ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Alan Richards

CAN democracy find a home in the Middle East?[1] Many analysts find phrases like "Arab democracy" and "Islamic democracy" oxymoronic. Neo-orientalists assert that the absence of a tradition of civil society, the weakness of the middle classes, and Islamic conceptions of the state all doom any hope of the region's participating in the current world-wide upsurge of democratic politics.

Such arguments are hardly absurd. Only a very foolish analyst would predict a major thrust toward democracy in the political environment of the late-twentieth-century Middle East. Yet, the glimmerings of civil society undeniably glow rather more brightly in the region these days. Turkey is returning to parliamentary democracy, the Egyptian judiciary asserts its prerogatives more forcefully than at any other time since Nasir's revolution, Jordan and Kuwait have held reasonably fair elections, and the *intifada* has stimulated a flowering of Palestinian civil society. Could these be harbingers of still better things to come?

The answer could be yes, simply because economic imperatives dictate heightened political participation in the region. Since Middle Eastern states began attaining independence, industrial technologies and development strategies have fundamentally favored centralization and autocracy. Today the opposite is true. Although the legacy of past decades will not be overcome easily, in the modern international economy of information technologies, discriminating consumers, and intense competition, only economies that are less centralized than those of

1. See, for example, Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).

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Arab countries stand a chance of survival. Turkey recognized this more than a decade ago, and has made important (although still inadequate) strides toward creating a modern economy. Arab countries are further behind, as are the Iranians, who actually increased the role of the state in the economy until the end of their war with Iraq in 1988.[2] Increasingly, however, national leaders recognize the necessity for change. Structural adjustment and economic liberalization are on the agenda of nearly all regional states.

Successful economic liberalization will require increased political participation in some form. One can make an "instrumentalist" case for greater citizen political activity. Such an argument has the advantage of avoiding metaphysical questions such as the compatibility of "democracy" and "Islam." The argument here is far simpler: Coping with the challenges of food, jobs, and investment will require greater integration into the international economy. Such economic changes imply enlarging the role of the private sector, widening the scope of the rule of law, and, more generally, restructuring the state's relations with its citizens. In short, expanded political participation will be a necessary tool in the struggle to forge a successful "Arab," "Iranian," or "Turkish" capitalism in the information age.

Before outlining the core argument in more detail, a word of warning is in order: Just because economic imperatives require wider political participation does not mean that it will happen. Failure is possible, even likely for many countries. Socioeconomic suicide is a real alternative; challenges may not be met, and explosions are real dangers. Lebanon, Bosnia, and Somalia constitute all-too-vivid alternatives to economic progress. Economic determinism will serve poorly but, equally, ignoring economic forces will deceive as to the consequences of policy choices. The negative model of repression, violence, and chaos is feasible. The only positive alternative is broader participation and the rule of law.

ECONOMIC HISTORY ON A POSTAGE STAMP: CENTRALIZING AND DECENTRALIZING ERAS

The economic history of the Middle East and North Africa since independence may be usefully divided into three eras: the state-led, import-subsitution era (ISI)—roughly, 1930/1950–1973; the era of the oil boom—mid-1970s to mid-1980s; and the current era of structural adjustment—mid-1980s to date.[3] The first two eras fundamentally were centralizing epochs during which the role of the state expanded. By contrast, the current era is one of decentralization, for reasons of

2. See Jahangir Amuzegar, "The Iranian Economy before and after the Revolution," *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992).

3. Of course, the exactness of dates will vary from one country to another. In particular, Turkey pioneered both ISI and liberalization in the region. Space permits only the roughest sketch here. For more detail, see Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), chapters 7–9.

both market structure and technology. The political challenge is to build decentralized political economies atop the institutional sediment of earlier, centralizing foundations.

During the ISI period, regional states assumed primary responsibility for economic management, extending their control to the micro level through state-owned enterprises and detailed price controls. Reasons for such actions ranged from the absence of a "majority ethnic" bourgoisie—for example, Turkey, where many or most of this class were from minority groups like Greeks or Armenians—to the accepted wisdom of economic development specialists, to more specific ideological commitments, such as the Baath in Syria and Iraq. In some cases, such as Egypt, the vagaries of international conflict also played a role in the widespread nationalization of industry: British and French firms were nationalized because of the 1956 Suez War, as were Belgian companies during the Congo Crisis of 1960. Political and social factors pushed regional states to expand their control of the economy. State autonomy was reinforced by the "social contract" of the Nasirists, whereby in exchange for expanded opportunities in housing, employment, and education, the mass of the population acquiesced in authoritarian rule. The ISI era was the age of centralization of power par excellence.

Industrial technologies of the time facilitated this trend. Although centralization almost certainly went too far even by the standards of the day, industries with substantial economies of scale—such as heavy metals, cement, and canning—or with restricted domestic markets in relatively small, poor countries—for example, consumer goods like textiles—could be centrally managed, at least initially, without economic collapse. Technological change was also somewhat less rapid than today, especially in the "mature" industries of consumer and intermediate goods upon which ISI drives focused. Slower technological change further concealed the inefficiencies of central planning. The example of Soviet industrialization and post-World War II recovery and the wider intellectual climate that it engendered also facilitated the centralization of the industrial economies of the region. In the short run, the deleterious implications of ISI for international competitiveness could be avoided, whether through foreign aid, or, for states blessed by geology, by oil exports.

The second period, the oil-boom era, was, if anything, even more strongly centralizing. Everywhere outside of the United States, subsoil mineral rights belong to the state. The massive infusion of revenue that accompanied the quadrupling in 1974, and doubling in 1979, of oil prices, therefore, flowed directly into government coffers. Oil revenues were almost uniquely centralizing because they constituted almost a pure economic and political asset for the government, generating no corresponding political liability, such as miners to placate. Very few

workers are needed to produce and market oil; contrast, for example, copper and its role in the political economy of Chile.[4]

Oil revenues also obviated the need to tax the citizenry, thus avoiding the "Boston Tea Party problem" of coping with the demands for political participation by those taxed. Even states that were closely allied with the United States and ideologically committed to the private sector, like Saudi Arabia, found themselves creating state-owned enterprises; rather despite themselves, the Saudis emulated their Arab socialist cousins. Oil rents were a strong force for centralization in all oil-exporting countries.

The oil boom shaped all regional economies, including those of countries without significant oil deposits, through the mechanism of labor migration. In sharp contrast to oil exports, however, labor emigration and remittances were decentralizing because scarce foreign exchange accrued to individuals, not states. Governments, which hoped that such foreign exchange would enter the formal banking system, were forced to offer realistic exchange rates. In a sense, this marked the beginning of structural adjustment in the region. At the same time, labor migration from Yemen, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank, and Egypt widened the horizons—in Egypt for the first time in modern history—of young, poor rural and urban men. No country in the region any longer has a peasantry in the old, classical sense of rural people whose horizons extend no farther than the next village. This phenomenon, combined with spreading education, bodes ill for rigidly authoritarian, isolationist political systems.

The Middle East is now fully into the structural adjustment era. In the wake of the mid-1980s' collapse of oil prices, every state in the region, including Saudi Arabia, has had to practice budgetary stringency. Structural adjustment, however, must go well beyond mere austerity; fundamental institutional reform is needed to overcome the pernicious problems inherited from the previous two eras. Fundamentally, the contradictions of over-centralization have strangled growth even as the numbers and wants of consumers continue to multiply; population growth remains high in the region, and, as noted in the preceding paragraph, horizons have been expanded. As a result, expectations have risen dramatically. Adjusting economies to overcome the baleful legacy of the past while stimulating growth to satisfy the expanding wants of a growing population is—after the related problem of maintaining order—the challenge facing Middle Eastern economies and polities in the 1990s.

The catalogue of ISI ills is all too familiar to students of development policy: biases against traded goods, especially exports; excessive capital intensity and, therefore, inadequate job creation; discrimination against agriculture; and accumulating international debt. Such difficulties were exacerbated by the "Dutch

4. See, Theodore Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).

Disease" of the oil-boom era.[5] These problems are part of the transition to the structural adjustment era. Unfortunately, however, the centralizing legacy of the past, institutionalized throughout the political economy, is ill-suited for coping with the demands of the present.

The imperatives are evident. Countries must be able to compete in today's information-based, highly competitive international economy. Decoupling, always chimerical, is not a realistic option: Middle Eastern states must export and must accelerate job creation. Only aggressive export drives, with an expanded role for the private sector, have a chance of accomplishing this. Private sector organizations can respond far more quickly than those of the public sector, not only because of their superior incentives, but also because of their ability to focus on a single goal. Greater efficiency, however, is not the sole imperative to dictate decentralization. Modern technologies are inherently decentralizing; computers, faxes, and other information technologies cannot be controlled centrally. The increasingly integrated world simply has too much information. International competition is so keen that only specialists can keep up with developments, and only those with information can respond successfully.

Both the importance and logic of the acquisition of information and the greater and more rapid responsiveness of private economic actors suggest that there is a powerful economic imperative to the decentralization of political economies. There is no reason why the Middle East should be exempt from this trend. Indeed, there are three specific regional economic problems that strongly suggest that the economic imperative is as great in this region as anywhere in the world.

THE CORE CHALLENGES

Three core problems dominate the current structural adjustment era: jobs, food, and money. The solution to each problem implies greater citizen participation.

Jobs

There is a demographic time-bomb ticking in the Middle East: the growing supply of labor. Because population growth accelerated after the 1950s, the labor force in most countries is growing by well over 3 percent per year. Further, in few countries will the rate of economic growth markedly decelerate during the 1990s. When combined with the anti-employment bias of ISI and the collapse of growth

5. "Dutch Disease" afflicts countries with a fixed nominal exchange rate that experience a sudden influx of foreign exchange. Without very careful (and politically difficult) management, the real exchange rate quickly becomes overvalued, biasing price signals against traded goods production in industry and agriculture.

of the late 1980s,[6] it is little wonder that unemployment is rising while real wages are either stagnant or falling. In Egypt, for example, some 6 million jobs must be created during the 1990s simply to provide jobs for new workers—that is, with no reduction in employment, increase in real wages, or expanded female labor force participation. In an economy whose total labor force in 1990 was perhaps 14 million, this is a daunting challenge. During the past seven years, unskilled real wages have fallen by more than 40 percent.[7]

Everywhere the burden falls most heavily on the young. In Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, roughly one of five urban young men is unemployed; the official unemployment rate in Yemen is 25 percent. Some believe that 35 percent of young Algerians may never have a job.[8] The concept of "unemployment" breaks down at such high levels, as young men scrounge whatever living they can from the informal sector and from the grey or black economy of semi- or illegal activity. In some countries there is evidence that the educated have higher unemployment rates than the illiterate, who are so poor that they must take whatever job they can find.

The definitions may be in doubt, but not the frustrations. Many of these young men have had some basic education, but the quality of their training has ill-equipped them for modern economic activity.[9] These underemployed, semi-educated young men constitute a critical source of support for extremist Islamist groups throughout the region.[10] The greatest single social challenge facing regional leaders is providing jobs for the expanding, very young labor force.

The public sector cannot provide these jobs. Government payrolls cannot continue to expand; indeed, the imperatives of structural adjustment are already shrinking them. Nor can the other safety valve of the past, emigration abroad, be counted upon any longer. Neither the European Community nor the Persian Gulf states are likely to generate employment opportunities for young Egyptians, Maghribis, Turks, and Yemenis as they did in past decades. If only by default, the sole hope of coping with the rising demographic tide is a flexible, rapidly growing private sector pursuing comparative-advantage-generated niches in the international economy. Entrepreneurs, if left alone, will find such niches (although governments can and must assist them with information and other logistical

6. According to the World Bank, per capita income for the region as a whole was approximately 30 percent lower in 1990 than in 1980, when the annual rate of per capita income growth was -2.6 percent. Caio Koch-Weser, "Reform and Regional Cooperation: A Development Agenda for the Middle East and North Africa" (Paper presented at the Middle East Institute's Forty-sixth Annual Conference, Washington, DC, October 16-17, 1992.

7. See, for example, the essays in Heba Handoussa and Gillian Potter, eds., *Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, for the International Labor Organization, 1991).

8. Ibid.

9. See, for example, "Health and Education," in Richards and Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East,* chapter 5.

10. See, for example, Mark Tessler, "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis" (Paper presented at the Seminar on Political and Economic Islam, Washington, DC, May 19, 1992).

support). Investors, however, need, above all, to feel secure that their illiquid investments will not be confiscated. Only if governments can succeed in creating a suitable investment climate will Middle Eastern nations have a chance to solve the problem of job creation in the years ahead.

Food

Much nonsense is written about "food security" in the region. Food security is an insurance concept. Ensuring food security means guaranteeing that consumers are reasonably certain of being able to eat properly. All too often, however, students of the region confuse food security with food self-sufficiency. Politicians, in particular, seem unable to resist the siren song of alimentary autarchy. Food self-sufficiency for most countries in the region is, however, impossible. This is not a bad thing.

Consider the Arab states. It is true that during the 1980s, cereal self-sufficiency ratios—the percentage of consumption that is imported—remained roughly stable.[11] In comparison with the rapid deterioration of such ratios during the oil-boom era, the food sector's performance appears quite respectable. Nevertheless, there is little cause for complacency. Despite increases in land, water, fertilizer, labor, and machine inputs—and despite a more favorable policy environment—food production in the Arab countries managed simply to keep pace with population growth during the 1980s. When one realizes that the Arab world "added another Egypt"—some 53 million people—during the decade, this was no mean achievement. Not only population growth, however, but also increases in per capita income, fuel the growth rate of the demand for food. Income growth in the structural adjustment era of the 1980s was slow, reducing the rate of growth of the demand for food. Seen in this light, stable food self-sufficiency ratios during the past decade are the fruit of economic stagnation.

Fundamentally, the region cannot escape its geography: water is, and will be, very scarce in the region. So long as water is needed for photosynthesis, there will be serious barriers to the achievement of self-sufficiency in food or agriculture anywhere outside of Turkey or, potentially, Sudan. Even in those more geographically favored areas, attaining self-sufficiency extracts a heavy price in foregone incomes and wasted resources. The ecological dimension also should not be neglected: Saudi Arabia's vaunted self-sufficiency in wheat, achieved by heavy financial subsidies and unsustainable exploitation of ground water, has been aptly described as "paying money the Kingdom can no longer afford, to grow wheat

11. All statements in this section are taken from Alan Richards, "Arab Food Security in the 1980s: Stylized Facts and Lessons for the Future," in Ibrahim Oweiss, ed., *Arab Integration* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, forthcoming). Data are from the *Production Yearbooks*, 1982-1992, of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

surpluses it doesn't need, while consuming water it can't replace."[12] Food self-sufficiency is an expensive, wasteful, and ultimately doomed food security strategy.

This hardly means that attention to agricultural development is misplaced. Certainly, more sophisticated production and marketing technologies must be developed and diffused throughout the region. As the water constraint binds more tightly in the years ahead, continued agricultural growth will require increasingly sophisticated irrigation technologies and management systems, which in turn will necessitate more effective collective action at the local level and heightened political participation. Fundamentally, irrigation systems must change from being supply driven—that is, centrally planned—as they are currently, to being more demand driven—that is, responsive to the needs of small groups of farmers. Water pricing can help, but, for administrative reasons, prices will probably have to be charged to small groups of farmers rather than to individuals in most gravity-flow (for example, river-based) irrigation systems. The formation and heightened effectiveness of "water users associations" is a necessary condition for promoting food security in the years ahead. Put bluntly, the expansion of political participation is a necessary condition for more efficient allocation of the region's scarcest resource, water.

Even with the most sophisticated of irrigation systems, growing populations and (one hopes) rising per capita incomes will doom inefficient food self-sufficiency schemes. Fortunately, food security can be obtained in another way, through trade. Few would argue that Singapore or South Korea fail to enjoy food security. Middle Eastern political economies will have to emulate other economically successful, but agricultural-resource poor nations to achieve food security in the 1990s and beyond. Increasingly, Middle Eastern nations must export in order to eat.

Money

The shortage of capital is the final critical challenge facing the region. Given the vast financial resources of the gulf, it may seem odd to posit such a shortage. The 1991 Persian Gulf War, however, has made it clear that the capital-rich states will invest their money only where it earns the highest return. Appeals for "Arab unity," always hollow, are now especially ineffective. Calls by analysts to "share the oil wealth" are equally misplaced. Instead, the call should be to create a climate that will enable existing savings to be allocated properly.

Many countries of the region have a debt problem. The combined debt of Arab countries is now about $115 billion. Egypt skillfully used its participation in the Persian Gulf War coalition to reduce its debt by roughly 50 percent,

12. Douglas F. Graham, *Saudi Arabia Unveiled* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1991), p. 152.

staunching some $2 billion of yearly debt-service outflows. In Morocco and Jordan, however, debt service payments consume nearly one-third of exports. All countries of the region compete with Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union for capital investment. The need, furthermore, for investment in more sophisticated technologies for production and distribution, for cities and farms, for communications and educational facilities, is tremendous. To take only one example, Palestinian economists estimate that a future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza—with perhaps 3 million inhabitants—would require some $50 billion of investment over 5–10 years.[13] The needs in Egypt of 55 million inhabitants and the Maghrib of 58 million inhabitants are far larger.

International indebtedness, however, is not the root of regional capital scarcity. Neither can one blame deficient savings' propensities: There is no evidence that Middle Easterners do not save. Egypt offers a useful illustration. It has been estimated that the off-shore holdings of hard currency by Egyptians is some $40–50 billion, roughly equal to Egypt's pre-Persian Gulf War international debt. In 1988, gross investment in Egypt was about LE 8.4 billion, or some $3 billion at 1988 official exchange rates.[14] Middle Eastern savings seemingly are abundant.

The capital problem in the Middle East is fundamentally institutional. Savers and investors fear and distrust national governments (with good reason). Specifically, they fear that their savings will be expropriated either directly by state decree, or by stealth via rampant inflation and overvalued exchange rates. Unsurprisingly, they hold their savings off-shore or in highly liquid form. Only if genuine political reform creates secure private property rights and an independent judicial system to enforce those rights will the savings of Middle Easterners be placed inside their own countries. Still more difficult to induce will be the kind of illiquid, fixed capital investment—like factories—that the region needs to produce the goods to sell abroad to buy food and to create jobs.

From an instrumentalist, economic point of view, it makes little difference whether the legal system that protects property is based on Anglo-Saxon common law, the French Napoleonic Code, or the Islamic *sharia*. Far more important than any of the details of the relative efficiencies of these different systems is the need for some predictable legal system to replace the arbitrary, confiscatory state power that has dominated regional political economies since the 1950s.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

In summary, the region must export in order to eat and in order to create jobs. The capital needed for such a massive push must largely come from its own

13. See, for example, George T. Abed, *The Economic Viability of a Palestinian State* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990).

14. World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt: County Economic Memorandun: Economic Readjustment with Growth*, vol. 2, February 2, 1990, page 1.

citizens. They, and foreign investors, will only take the risks associated with tying up money in illiquid industrial investments if political systems cease to be arbitrary and capricious. At the same time, only the private sector can meet the challenge of increasingly sharp international competition in the age of information technologies. The conclusion is inescapable: Only a more decentralized political economy with greater reliance on contract and the rule of law has even a chance of coping with the problems of the end of the twentieth century and beyond.

The legacies of geography and history admittedly are baleful. The natural resource base, with its mix of abundant oil and scarce water, makes adjustment imperative, but also makes it difficult. The habits of the past will die hard. Entrenched interest groups, engendered over nearly a half-century of state centralization, will not be persuaded easily to abandon their privileges. With the exception of the Mashriq, the level of human capital in the region, although far higher than formerly, is very low in comparison with the competition in East and Southeast Asia and in Eastern Europe. The road ahead will be difficult; but there are few alternatives to starting down it.

The old Nasirist social contract, the exchange of welfare for political quiescence, is dead because the state can no longer fulfill its side of the bargain. There are really only two alternatives: repression or participation. Repression, with its violation of human rights, which most people find repugnant, is likely to be ineffective, especially in the long run. Middle Eastern rulers may conclude, with Lord Keynes, that in the long-run—which may mean six months hence—they are well and truly dead, and so clamp down. *"Après moi le déluge"* seems to be the rallying cry of Algeria's National Liberation Front, and other senescent (not to say senile) regimes may emulate them. The path of repression is very slippery, however, not least because of the maelstrom of violence into which it leads. Repression also impedes constructing the set of institutions that alone afford a chance of coping with the economic challenges of the immediate future.

The alternative is expanded participation. This need not mean democracy in the current Western sense. Even the West is unsure about the proper design of political systems, and Western countries have plenty of problems of their own. Doubtless Middle Eastern nations will have to find their own, culturally authentic paths to expanded participation. Whatever the precise forms, expanded participation will be essential for three reasons: First, the age of structural adjustment is the age of subsidy cuts. Economically, a subsidy cut is equivalent to a tax increase, and political participation is necessary to "share the pain"; if the cry in 1776 was "No taxation without representation!" that of the era of structural adjustment may be "No subsidy cuts without participation!" Second, a stable legal environment is a necessary condition for a functioning market economy. Since there is no alternative to markets for many allocative purposes, the only alternative to the rule of law is economic stagnation, poverty, and ultimately, chaos. Third, modern information technology supports market functioning, and properly functioning markets require widely available information as well as

secure property rights. The faxes that carry this morning's price data, however, also may convey the latest statement of the exiled political opposition. A regime may outlaw faxes outside of its control—as does Syria—but such a regime cannot effectively compete in international markets. Accordingly, it cannot solve the problems of food, jobs, and money.

Middle Eastern governments have much adjusting to do if they hope to cope with the economic imperatives of the last decade of the twentieth century. They will have to stop doing some things—such as, protecting state monopolies and flouting the rule of law—start doing other things—for example, assisting their private exporters in foreign markets—and do some things much better—such as, educating their young. Some countries may rise to the challenge. Some will likely fail. The costs of failure will be very high, and will affect not only their own peoples and their neighbors, but also the international community. The alternative road of repression, civil war, economic stagnation, food insecurity, poverty, and chaos is all too familiar to people of the region. The fact that there is an economic imperative does not mean that polities will rise to the occasion. The stark choice, however, needs to be placed before policymakers, both within and without the region. All should recall the dictum of Sir Winston Churchill: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others."

A CIVIL SOCIETY IN EGYPT?

Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid

OBSERVERS of intellectual debates during the last two years will not fail to notice that the controversy over "uses and abuses of civil society" has been echoed in the Arab world.[1] The controversy, which raged in pages of British, French, and US academic journals, was triggered by the wave of democracy that hit the shores of authoritarianism in Southern Europe, South Asia, and Eastern Europe.[2] Some Arab intellectuals believed that they also saw signs of the resurgence of civil society in the Arab world. Interest in this development was so strong that the prestigious Center for Arab Unity Studies, an intellectual foundation known for its pan-Arabist tendencies, organized a January 1992 symposium on that topic in Beirut to which almost 100 Arab scholars were invited to assess the extent to which civil society exists in Arab lands.[3] At the same time in Cairo, the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies began publishing *Civil Society: Democratic Transformation in the Arab World,* a newsletter.

What Arab intellectuals were debating was not merely a product of their imaginations, but a concrete development manifested in social processes taking place in some Arab countries, namely Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen, as well as Algeria prior to the military coup

1. Ellen Meiksins Wood, "The Uses and Abuses of Civil Society," in Ralph Miliband, ed., *Socialist Register* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1990), pp. 60–84.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991).

3. Center for Arab Unity Studies, *Al-Mujtama' al-madani fi al-watan al-Arabi* (Civil society in the Arab nation) (Beirut, 1992).

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in late December 1991.[4] These observers recognized some contradictory features in that process, particularly in the case of Egypt. On the one hand, divisive social groups were gaining more freedom to express dissenting views in professional associations and in political parties while, on the other hand, individuals claiming to act in the name of Islamist organizations were challenging the government effectively, not only in remote villages in Upper Egypt, but also in Cairo, where they have attacked Copts and foreign tourists and people voicing opposition to their mission. Some Islamists even declared to the Reuter news agency that a district in Cairo, inhabited by no less than 500,000 people, was "liberated territory"—their district—over which the government exercised no control.[5]

Ironically, whereas the state has permitted a degree of autonomy for societal actors, some of them have demonstrated intolerance for the exercise of the freedom of speech, worship, and even action for others. Herein lies the contradiction: If civil autonomy is definitely a measure of the resurgence of a civil society, acts of intolerance cast doubts on its "civil" character. These contradictory tendencies warrant an examination of the extent to which civil society exists in Egypt and the factors likely to affect its evolution.

OPERATIONAL CRITERIA FOR A CIVIL SOCIETY

It is no exaggeration to describe any attempt to provide a precise definition of civil society as problematic. The concept has been used by many scholars of Western political thought, including the natural law school, Hegelian thinkers, and various strands of Marxists. The English philosopher John Locke conceived of civil society as something close to what a twentieth-century political scientist considers a liberal democracy. Hegel insisted on the crucial position of the "universal class" of enlightened administrators, who, although bound by tradition, do not owe their authority to any type of electorate.[6] Middle Eastern scholars, in contrast, tend to dispute the validity of any definition of civil society inspired by Western experiences. Instead, they argue for a definition that reflects the specific experiences of Islamic and Arab societies.[7]

It would be too ambitious to claim to bridge the gap among so many different views or to disentangle the concept from the ideological underpinnings that have

4. For an account of democratization experiments in the Arab world, see Louis J. Cantori, ed., "Democratization in the Middle East," *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 36 (Spring 1991); Muhammad Muslih and Augustus Richard Norton, "The Need for Arab Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, no. 83 (Summer 1991); Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid "Slow Thaw in the Arab World," *World Policy Journal* 8, no. 4 (Fall 1991).

5. *Al-Mussawar*, January 1, 1993, pp. 18, 20–1; Chris Hedges "For Egypt, a New Front in Islamic Crackdown," *International Herald Tribune*, December 10, 1992, p. 2.

6. For a discussion of different concepts of civil society, see John Keane, *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988).

7. Brian S. Turner, "Orientalism and the Problem of Civil Society in Islam" in Asaf Hussain, Robert Olson, and Jamil Quereishi, eds., *Orientalism, Islam and Islamicists* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984), pp. 23–42.

been associated with it in the various intellectual schools. In this analysis of Egypt, a common ground among these schools is taken. It assumes that civil society encompasses the presence of a considerable number of formal associations catering to the varied interests of citizens in several areas of their social activities; state-society relations in which the former respects a reasonable measure of autonomy for the latter; and acceptance of intellectual and political dissension as a legitimate right for minorities so long as it is bound by peaceful methods of individual and collective action.

Under this definition, it would be difficult to ascribe a civil quality to any society unless three minimal conditions are met: the presence of formal organizations of various types among different social groups and classes; an ethic of tolerance and acceptance by the majority of minority legitimate rights, no matter how such minorities are defined; and limitations on arbitrary exercise of state authority. Undoubtedly, such criteria are not met entirely in any society, nor is it conceivable to find a society in which all three conditions are totally missing. It is safe to assume, however, that these conditions are largely met in liberal democracies.

Formal Social Organizations

Increasing social differentiation in Egypt since the early decades of the nineteenth century laid the objective foundation for the formation of a civil society. Modernization efforts initiated by Muhammed Ali, particularly the expansion of education, Egypt's integration into the international economy, and the emergence of a national bourgeoisie contributed to the development of a working class and a professional middle class.[8] With these new classes came the right of association for professional groups they formed. The first group to acquire such a right was the political elite, mostly lawyers and businessmen. Despite the liberal character of Egypt's 1923 constitution, which provided a legal but shaky framework for political life under the monarchy, the right to establish trade unions was not recognized until the 1940s—three decades after the first professional association of Egyptians, the Bar Association, came into being.

Other groups of citizens did not hesitate to follow the example of lawyers, doctors, journalists, and engineers in establishing professional organizations in order to improve their bargaining positions vis-à-vis the state. Authorities encouraged their endeavors because they found such organizations effective

8. See works by Abd al-Basit Abd al-Mu'ti (1988) and Ibrahim Hasan al-Issawi (1989) in the series *Dirasat al-takwin al-ijtima'i wa al-bina' al-tabaqi li Misr: Al-Dirasat al-mahalliyya* (Studies of the social formation and class structure of Egypt: Local studies) (Cairo: National Center for Sociological and Criminological Research.

instruments for controlling both the middle classes and workers.[9] Thus, the biggest increase both in the number and size of membership of voluntary associations took place in the 1950s and 1960s under the tight rule of a military regime that had many features associated with "state-corporatism."[10]

According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Egyptian society possesses a considerable number of associations; there were 12,832 in 1991, or one organization for every 1,824 adult citizens.[11] These data include only those associations that come under the supervision of the ministry. They are all organizations concerned with providing social services, 75 percent (or 9,516) of which operate only in one field. Included among them are associations concerned with matters such as child care, family care, social assistance, care for the elderly or specific categories of citizens, culture, science, literary activities, management and organization, care for prisoners, family planning and community development. Twenty-five percent of all societies (or 3,316) operate in two or more fields. Unsurprisingly, Cairo has the largest number of such organizations—3,266, accounting for 25 percent of the total number—followed by Alexandria with 907 societies, or 7 percent of the total. Cairo's share exceeds its demographic weight in the country, reflecting its political centrality in Egypt, although some other governorates, particularly Sharqiyya and Manufiyya have a high number of societies relative to their share of population.[12]

The voluntary associations that do not come under the purview of the Ministry of Social Affairs include 23 trade unions, 26 chambers of commerce, 21 professional associations, and 13 political parties. Although data on membership of these organizations is not available, trade unions, chambers of commerce, and professional associations seem to be the largest. The trade union federation claimed a membership of more than 3 million in the mid-1980s, while total membership of professional associations reached nearly 1.2 million.[13]

Different sources indicate that the number of associations expanded considerably in the mid-1970s, but have stagnated since the mid-1980s. The biggest increase in the number of such associations was registered during the period 1976 to 1981, rising from 7,593 to 10,731 (41 percent). The onset of both political and

9. Mustapha Kamil Al-Sayyid, *Al-Mujtama' wa al-siyasa fi Misr: Dawr jama'at al-masalih fi al-nizam al-siyasi al-Misri* (Society and politics in Egypt: Role of interest groups in the Egyptian political system) (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, 1983).

10. Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

11. Ministry of Social Affairs, *Al-Mu'ashirat al-ihsa'iyya fi majallat al-ri'ayah wa al-tanmiyah* (Statistical indicators in fields of social care and development) (Cairo, 1991), pp. 73–80.

12. Ibid.

13. Ahmad Faris Abd al-Mun'im, "Jama'at al-masalih wa al-sulta al-siyasiyya fi Misr: Dirasat ala al-niqabat al-mihaniyya, al-muhamin, wa al-suhufiyyin wa al-muhandisin fi al-fatrah, 1952–1961" (Interest groups and political authority in Egypt: A study of professional associations of lawyers, journalists, and engineers, 1952–1961) (Ph.D. diss., Faculty of Economics, Cairo University, 1984), p. 31; Huwayda A.R. Butros, *Al-Dawr al-siyasi li al-haraka al-ummaliyya fi Misr, 1952–1982* (Political role of the workers movement in Egypt, 1952–1982) (M.A. diss., Faculty of Economics, Cairo University, 1990), p. 141.

economic liberalization encouraged various social groups to set up their own organizations.[14] Since the 1980s, however, authorities have viewed such expansion as politically risky.

Egypt's voluntary associations may be classified as class-based associations, professional societies, social care and development organizations, traditional institutions, and political parties. The class-based associations are of two types: those that represent businessmen and those that limit membership to workers. The largest representative bodies of the first type are undoubtedly chambers of commerce and industry, which are divided into functional and provincial chapters grouped together under a General Federation of Chambers of Commerce in Egypt. This category includes also the Federation of Egyptian Industries, which groups managers of industrial firms in both the public and private sectors.

Despite their relatively large memberships, these two older bodies, largely controlled by the government, have lost ground to more energetic business associations that are restricted in membership but are more influential because of their fairly homogeneous character. The newer associations are limited either to the largest firms or to businessmen having special ties to particular foreign powers or to a specific industrial town; many members are former senior officials of the government. Examples include the Society of Egyptian Businessmen in Cairo, the American Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, the Egyptian-American Business Council, the Society of Businessmen of Alexandria, and the investors societies of the three industrial towns of Tenth of Ramadan, Sixth of October, and Sadat City. Other organizations for bankers, importers, and exporters exist, but are less active.

The workers are organized into 23 trade unions that belong to the General Federation of Trade Unions of Egypt. Despite its large size, there is no evidence that the federation enjoys much credibility among its rank and file members. Collective protest movements undertaken by workers, sometimes on a massive scale, have not been inspired by the federation's leadership nor by leaders of such unions, but have been led mostly by dissident trade unionists or workers who had never been officials of trade unions at any level.[15]

Educated members of the middle class usually join the syndicate of their profession, of which there are 21. The most active of such syndicates are the oldest ones, particularly the Bar Association, and the associations of journalists, medical doctors, and engineers, although they are not the largest in terms of membership. The largest two associations are those of teachers and graduates of faculties of commerce. Both are supportive of government policies and rarely undertake independent action, but this docile attitude seems to be disappearing

14. Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Taqrir al-istratiji al-Arabi, 1989* (Arab strategic report, 1989) (Cairo: Dar al-Ahram, 1990), pp. 458–62; Ministry of Social Affairs, *Al-Mu'ashirat al-ihsa'iyya*, p. 254.

15. For the details, see Butros, *Al-Dawr al-siyasi.*

from the teachers syndicate. The differences in how the professional associations relate to the government can be explained by the social background of members, established traditions in certain syndicates, and the success of radical opposition groups in capturing executive offices.[16]

A variety of other organizations cater to the different interests of citizens, ranging from benevolent and religious causes to literary and scientific concerns. The most active in this category are university professors clubs, which have become prominent in the country's politics since the early 1980s. Such clubs perform various functions, including those of trade unions and political parties, and serve as forums for debating literary and scientific issues.[17]

Any examination of civil society organizations in Egypt should include neo-traditional institutions, which have continued to be centers of social and political activities, often beyond the control of the government. These are the mosque and church-based associations. In fact, using places of worship as centers for social and political activities is not a new phenomenon in the history of Egypt, but dates back to the Pharaonic era. In the late eighteenth century, for example, Cairo's two revolts against Napoleon's armies were launched from al-Azhar. What is unique about the current situation, however, is the use of places of worship by social movements that have modern features, including their type of education and organization, in order to recruit and mobilize supporters against other institutions and practices of society. Those who carry out educational, medical, social, and political activities in mosques and churches are not traditional clergymen, shaykhs, or priests, but young professionals who received their education in the country's Western-type universities and who are alienated for a variety of reasons from the country's social and political system.

Such religion-based institutions have ambivalent relationships with other organizations because their integration in civil society depends very much upon their acceptance of other organizations. Such acceptance, however, does not seem to be a universal rule among these neo-traditional groups, as manifested in their equivocal attitude toward the June 1992 assassination of the secularist writer Farag Fuda by Muslim extremists.

Political parties in Egypt have existed since independence, with the exception of the 23-year period between 1953 and 1976 when legal political activity was confined to a single mass organization. Since the gradual demise of the single party, the number of legally authorized political parties has increased to 13. Apart from five parties—the ruling National Democratic Party, the liberal Neo-Wafd Party, the centrist and now Islamist Socialist Labor Party, the leftist Progressive Unionist Patriotic Rally, and the newly authorized Arab Democratic Nasirite Party—the other eight parties are not politically significant. The Muslim Brothers

16. Activities of professional associations are well covered in Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Taqrir al-istratiji al-Arabi,* various issues.

17. See comment by M.S. Habib in Center for Arab Unity Studies, *Al-Mujtama' al-madani,* pp. 544–6.

and the communists have not obtained the right to establish parties, but they express their views through existing authorized parties.[18] Thus, communists are present among leaders and activists of the Progressive Unionist Patriotic Rally, and Muslim Brothers have sought electoral alliances first with the Neo-Wafd and later with the Socialist Labor Party.

Given the lack of sufficient research on the social background of members of the major parties in Egypt, it is difficult to determine which of them is more representative of the country at large. Based on the social background of their leaders and the party platforms, however, it is possible to draw a rough profile. The National Democratic Party seems to be more of a multiclass party than the others. The Neo-Wafd Party seems to receive most of its support from members of the middle and upper middle classes in contrast to the Socialist Labor Party and the Progressive Unionist Patriotic Rally, both of which appeal mainly to the lower and salaried middle class, although they claim to speak for "the workers."

In terms of electoral strength, both the Neo-Wafd and the Socialist Labor Party have won hundreds of thousands of votes, almost reaching 1 million when one of them has engaged in an electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. The electoral strength of the Progressive Unionist Patriotic Rally tended to diminish in the 1980s, falling from some 400,000 to 200,000 votes between 1984 and 1987. The National Democratic Party claims 70 percent of registered voters, although the low turnout in the 1990 legislative elections and the 1992 local elections suggest that the party has great difficulty in mobilizing supporters in the country at large, particularly in major urban centers.[19]

Spirit of Tolerance

An essential feature of a civil society is a large measure of respect for freedom of conscience and thought, not only by state authorities but more importantly by citizens. An observer of public debate in Egypt could find some evidence of the espousal of various ideologies. Islamist, Nasirite, Marxist, and liberal viewpoints are all reflected in newspaper articles, books, movies, and plays. There are limits, however, on public expression. Any scholarly or literary work that a religious authority deems offensive to religion, particularly Islam, is prohibited. The case of Naguib Mahfouz's *Sons of Gabalawi* is well-known. There are other examples of books by Tariq al-Bishri, Louis Awad, and Sa'id Ashmawi being censored by al-Azhar or even by petty officials of the Islamic Research College. Such

18. Leaders of the Muslim Brothers have not even succeeded in getting the Supreme Administrative Court of the Council of State to repeal the 1954 decision by the Revolutionary Command Council dissolving the society. *Al-Ahram,* July 7, 1992, p. 7.

19. For an analysis of legislative elections in Egypt, see Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Intikhabat Majlis al-Sha'b: Dirasah wa tahlil (People's Assembly election: Study and analysis) (Cairo, 1986, 1988, 1992).*

censorship measures have been supported publicly by some writers who claimed to be advocates of an Islamic solution to all the country's problems.[20]

Lack of tolerance also has been demonstrated by groups of young Islamist militants who disrupt gatherings organized by their fellow students, attack their book fairs, and even attack weddings, believing that these activities are contrary to the true teachings of Islam. Extremist Islamists have carried this fight even further through assassinations and threats of assassination against outspoken secularists. Such acts of intolerance have been rather sporadic and limited in scope, but they probably will increase if the deplorable economic and social conditions of their perpetrators deteriorate further in the future.

Limits on State Powers

Although the Egyptian state, or any other state, does not possess absolute power vis-à-vis its citizens, the real limits to what it can do are based on the perceptions of officials and the political culture of the country rather than on constitutional or legal restrictions. The permanent constitution of 1971, like similar constitutions of authoritarian regimes, provides for the respect of a long list of civil and political rights, prohibits torture, and stipulates rules for the exercise of state power in different domains. At the same time, it leaves many details to be decided by laws and regulations. It can be interpreted by state authorities in ways that violate the fundamental rights of citizens.

Successive governments in Egypt, particularly that of Anwar al-Sadat, introduced a vast array of laws with myriad restrictions on citizens' exercise of their rights. Not content with such restrictive laws, the government of Husni Mubarak has called for and obtained from a docile People's Assembly renewal of emergency powers initially granted in 1981. Under these powers, the government can take any measures "required by the circumstances," including the suspension of the constitutional rights of citizens. State authorities have, however, accepted in general certain self-imposed limitations that have expanded the scope of autonomy of civil society organizations in the country, namely respect for the freedom of expression, so long as its exercise does not entail calls for armed struggle against the government, and enforcement of courts' rulings, even when such rulings are contrary to preferences of the executive authority. Civil society organizations have not failed to appreciate the opportunities that such self-imposed limitations on the part of the state have opened for them to expand further their margin of freedom.

State authorities did not accept self-imposed restrictions because they suddenly became new converts to the cause of democracy. Rather, they found during the 1981 "autumn of fury" that the cost of repressing all political and social forces in the country not only was too high, but also was counterproductive. Sadat

20. A list of censored books and movies was published in *al-Ahali,* February 1992.

was assassinated among "his soldiers" after having ordered the arrest of 1,500 citizens of all political persuasions. Mubarak, his successor, who was at the time the vice-president of the republic, was standing next to Sadat when the assassins' bullets put an end to his life. Mubarak cannot easily forget such a lesson.

A return to the single mass organization of the 1950s and the 1960s was not practical in 1981 because that formula had been discredited in the eyes of the public and ruling groups since the military defeat of June 1967. The ruling elite appreciated the diplomatic and economic benefits that the regime could achieve through the maintenance of a liberal facade, believing this would induce Western governments and investors to be more sympathetic toward the country. In addition, a liberal political formula offered the additional advantage of isolating the more radical opposition groups intent on continuing the armed struggle against the government because this formula was what most other opposition groups had aspired to during the last years of Sadat's rule. Thus, Mubarak must have thought that a little dose of political liberalization would not seriously threaten the stability of his government, but rather would ease tensions caused by his predecessor's harsh methods of dealing with the opposition.

THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Faithful to its more than five millennia tradition of centralized power, the Egyptian state is reluctant to permit uncontrolled associational life. Mubarak's government decided to maintain the controls, mostly codified in law, he inherited from his predecessors. In dealing with associational activities, the state justified its actions by referring to two important pieces of legislation, namely Law 32 of 1964 on citizens' societies and Law 40 of 1977 on political parties.[21]

The first law requires any society to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs. An important condition for such registration is a commitment by the proposed society not to engage in political activities. The ministry has interpreted the term "political activity" loosely, and has denied registration to certain associations, the most famous being the Arab Organization for Human Rights and its Egyptian chapter, even though the first was given observer status in the UN Economic and Social Council. The ministry also took advantage of the law to intimidate other societies by threatening to suspend their activities if they continued certain actions or if their elected leaders were not approved by the security agencies. The ministry even replaced the elected councils of some societies that it suspected of being arenas for activities of Islamist militants as was the case of the Society of Cooperation of the Followers of the Quran and the

21. For the law on citizens' societies, see Amir Salim al-Muhami, *Difa'an an haqq takwin al-jam'iyyat* (Defending the right of association) (Cairo, 1992). For the law on political parties and the press, see Constitution of the Republic of Egypt, ibid., pp. 105–22.

Muhammadan Tradition.[22] Successive electoral victories since the late 1980s by Islamists in professional associations has prompted some leaders of the National Democratic Party to contemplate drafting a law that would enable the government to appoint executive councils of professional associations if less than 50 percent of their members participated in elections.[23]

The law on political parties stipulates the many conditions for the establishment of a legally recognized political party. For example, the law bans any party with a religious or confessional platform or that appeals to a particular social class or propagates an atheist ideology. It prohibits also the formation of any party opposed to the principles of the so-called Corrective Revolution,[24] the term Sadat used to describe his arrest of Nasirite leaders of the former Arab Socialist Union. In addition, it requires approval of a proposed party by a special committee dominated by government representatives. Citizens have the right to appeal decisions of that committee before the Supreme Constitutional Court; nine parties already have won this juridical battle when their disputes were taken to the court. If, however, the government is intent on preventing the formation of certain parties, the juridical battle could continue indefinitely.

Other laws enable the government to curtail the autonomy of specific associations if it so wishes. Recent amendments of the penal code, justified by the government as being indispensible in the fight against terrorism, further strenthen its repressive capacity vis-à-vis associations.[25] In addition, the law on political parties has been amended to ban any activity by people applying for authorization of a new party before approval is granted and to require existing parties to inform the Committee of Political Parties, dominated by the National Democratic Party, of any contacts or joint activities with foreign political parties.[26] Armed with such laws, the government can also disqualify people from running as candidates for elected posts in parties or even in general elections. Names of candidates are approved by the so-called public socialist prosecutor, although this official has not shown much zeal in the exercise of this specific power.[27]

Government authorities may limit activities of professional associations, trade unions, and political parties, such as public meetings, for which prior authorization must be obtained. They may also suspend or ban publications of certain societies, a measure taken by Sadat against several opposition parties' newspapers and by Mubarak against *Sawt al-Arab,* the Nasirite weekly, for a

22. Center for Political and Strategic Studies, *Al-Taqrir al-istratiji al-Arabi, 1990* (Arab strategic report, 1990) (Cairo: Dar al-Ahram, 1991), pp. 451–3.

23. Ibrahim Nafi' "Mantiq khati' wa ittijah marfud" (A mistaken logic and an unacceptable attitude), *al-Ahram,* December 24, 1992, pp. 1, 3.

24. See al-Muhami, *Difa'an an haqq,* pp. 105–22.

25. *Al-Ahram,* July 16, 1992, p. 5.

26. *Al-Ahali,* December 23, 1992, p. 5.

27. Rahma Rif'at, "Al-Intihakat al-qanuniyya wa al-idariyya fi intikhabat 1991" (Legal and administrative violations in the 1991 elections) in *Nadwat al-haraka al-ummaliyya al-Misriyya fi al-intikhabat al-niqabiyya am 1991* (Seminar on the Egyptian workers movement in trade union elections of 1991), Arab Research Center, Cairo, December 1992.

critique of the Saudi Arabian government.[28] The weight of government intervention is felt most heavily by the trade unions. The law establishing the central organization of trade unions allows the Ministry of Manpower to intervene in their activities, although the International Labor Organization has exerted pressure on the government to draft a new trade union law that conforms to international labor standards. Nevertheless, a powerful president of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Egypt, described as "out of line" with respect to the government's open-door economic policy, was removed a few years ago at the instigation of the minister of manpower and training and replaced by the secretary of trade union affairs within the National Democratic Party.

In dealing with the state, civil society organizations strive to use the political resources at their disposal. Solidarity among such organizations is viewed as the best way for them to mobilize their common resources in order to expand their autonomy. Very few organizations, however, are willing to engage in confrontations with the state over the question of their autonomy or any other matter. Their leaders view maintaining good relations with the government as the best way to ensure receiving government favors in terms of appointments in legislative or advisory bodies, obtaining facilities and benefits for their members, or simply escaping the wrath of officials, particularly security forces. Thus, solidarity actions have been few and of a temporary nature, such as the formation by major opposition parties and some professional associations of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy to guarantee fairness in the 1984 legislative elections, or joint action by opposition parties in calling for the dissolution of the People's Assembly after the judiciary ruled it unconstitutional in 1990.

The usual practice of civil society organizations is to use their political resources to obtain concessions from the government or to effect societal change in ways consistent with their vision of an ideal social order. Two types of organizations seem to be particularly skillful in using these resources—business and Islamist groups. Business associations use their strategic contacts, knowledge, money, access to the media, and the support of foreign powers and international financial institutions on which the country is financially, technologically, economically, militarily, and politically dependent in order to pressure the government into accelerating a liberal program of economic restructuring and to consult with them during the decision-making process. Frequent meetings at the highest levels of government between senior government officials and top businessmen, individually as well as in their associational capacities, demonstrate the success of these organizations in attaining some of their goals. Prominent businessmen are often invited to participate in debates about economic policy with senior cabinet members and in the presence of the president. They also have been consulted about major pieces of legislation concerning economic reform.

28. Arab Organization for Human Rights, *Huquq al-insan fi al-watan al-Arabi* (Human rights in the Arab nation) (Cairo, 1989) pp. 146–7.

The Islamist movement has succeeded in using its resources to gain for itself a large space within civil society. Thus, the movement mobilizes the knowledge and organizational skills of its members, their financial resources, and access to mosques, newspapers, publishing houses, professional associations, and political parties, as well as the votes of members and sympathizers, in order to oppose governmental policies or the state. The movement hopes to transform the social order following its gradual takeover of society's institutions. Because of its skills, as well as a history of disappointing performances on the part of its rivals, the Islamist movement in Egypt is the most representative and the most powerful actor in a civil society with contradicting features. Islamist militants have succeeded in winning a majority of seats in the professional associations of engineers, medical doctors, pharmacists, scientists, and lawyers. They also run university professors' clubs in Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyut universities and control student governments in most universities whenever students are allowed the opportunity to participate in fair elections.

The strong presence of the Islamist movement, particularly its mainstream organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, in professional associations, publishing, and private business has led several political parties to seek alliance with the movement. The electoral alliance with the Wafd Party in 1984 was short-lived because the Wafd was too strong to be taken over by the Muslim Brothers. The relatively weaker position of the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Socialist Party, however, has contributed to the durability of the agreement they reached with the Muslim Brothers. The Labor-Islamic Alliance made a strong showing in the 1987 legislative elections as well as in local elections in November 1992.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that in Egypt, whereas one of the three criteria for a civil society is met—the presence of a large number of active formal associations catering to citizens' interests in many areas—the two other conditions are lacking. Notwithstanding a relatively large measure of freedom of expression, both the state and societal actors penalize those who dissent from what is considered correct political positions. There are also indications that state authorities are contemplating narrowing the area of autonomy granted political parties and professional associations in the 1980s.

The first criterion has been met because it does not pose a problem for Egypt. Such organizations reflect a process of social differentiation in society, as well as the myriad interests of citizens, ranging from material preoccupations to social concerns to intellectual pursuits. There is no reason to believe that the Egyptian state, no matter how authoritarian it may become, would consider denying citizens the right to organize in these fields. Some organizations, especially those active in social welfare, assist the state in attaining its goals. Others do not necessarily constitute a threat to stability because they operate in areas such as

sports and friendship that are marginal to any contest for political power. The two other criteria are more problematic.

Some Middle East specialists state that both the lack of tolerance toward dissenting minorities and the authoritarian state are permanent features of Islamic culture. The mass following that the Islamist movement seems to have in Egypt among middle class professionals and university students cast doubts, in their view, on whether such attitudes could fade in the future. The record of ruling groups who claim to be defending an Islamic ideal in such societies as Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan and some of the statements made by spokesmen of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria confirm their belief in the incompatibility between Islam and the image of a civil society along the criteria proposed in this study.[29] A closer look at the broader setting of the emergence of an embryonic civil society in Egypt suggests, however, another interpretation, which, while not ignoring the importance of culture, leaves open the question of the political behavior of people belonging to any specific culture.

According to this interpretation, different groups of people hold different perceptions of their culture and thus engage in a variety of modes of collective behavior. Consequently, the presence of one culture in Egypt influenced by Islam would give rise to different attitudes toward dissension as well as authoritarianism. It should be noted in this respect that although secularist positions in Egypt are articulated by a tiny minority of intellectuals, people who are willing to use force to suppress opposition to an Islamist political order come from specific social backgrounds. The assassins of Farag Fuda were frustrated young Egyptians who did not complete their university education and held jobs that did not require any particular skills.[30] Attacks on Copts and foreign tourists and armed clashes with the police were primarily in poor districts of Upper Egypt or in squatter settlements located within the "poverty belt" surrounding Cairo. Egyptian newspapers have widely reported the almost total lack of public services and the precarious existence led by people in those districts in Asyut and Fayyum governorates and in the Imbaba, Ayn Shams and Zawya al-Hamrah quarters of Cairo.[31] Other Islamists do not condone the use of force to settle differences with secularist groups. Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and several figures among the so-called Independent Islamists have condemned the use of violence, although not always unequivocally. Supporters of nonviolence in the Islamist movement are to be found mostly among professional groups of the middle class and wealthy entrepreneurs.[32]

29. See Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).

30. On the social backgrounds of the assassins of Fouda, see *al-Ahram*, January 5, 1993, p. 1.

31. For an account of living conditions in such areas, see *al-Ahram*, December 8, 1992, p. 3.

32. Several intellectuals expressing various ideologies presented their views on the question of political violence in *al-Ahram*, p. 8, throughout the summer of 1992.

As for the authoritarianism of state officials, it may stem from a centuries-old tradition of autocratic rule. It also could reflect the realization of state officials that they are incapable of dealing effectively in the short run with the economic and social causes of discontent among the young people of the middle and poor classes. In terms of economic growth, the 1980s could be described as a lost decade for Egypt. Not only did the rate of economic growth drop from 7.4 percent to 5 percent annually, but the decade also ended with the significant fall of Egypt from the World Bank's group of lower middle income countries to its group of lower income countries. The World Bank's statistics also indicated a rise in the rate of inflation during the same period, as well as a drop of 10 percent in the real income of industrial workers, their share of the value added declining from 54 percent in 1970 to 35 percent in 1989.[33]

The economic reform measures that accelerated in the wake of Egypt's agreement with the International Monetary Fund in April 1991 have caused recession, reducing the growth rate to 2.5 percent in 1992, according to official estimates.[34] Under these conditions, the government is concerned that a further democratization of the political system would strengthen political opposition, particularly among Islamist groups. The tightening of the penal code, the law on political parties, and possibly the law of professional associations indicate a shift by the government toward harsher methods of dealing with political opposition in general and Islamist groups in particular.

The other method used by the government in its competition with Islamist groups to win the hearts and minds of Egyptian citizens is to outbid them in the claim of conformity to religious, particularly Islamic, values. The Egyptian public has become accustomed to hearing the prime minister read a letter from the Shaykh al-Azhar or other religious dignitaries that states a particular piece of legislation is consistent with Islamic teachings. Prominent religious figures, whose discourse differs very little from that of the Islamist movement, are offered prime time on the government-controlled electronic media to present an official version of Islamic teachings to the public. The impact of mobilizing the *ulama* on the government's side does not seem to enhance the government's legitimacy, but contributes to the credibility of the Islamist discourse.

Several intellectuals advised the government to disperse with such opportunistic use of religion, allowing instead ideological diversity to be reflected in the electronic media. They advocated permitting secularists, more enlightened spokesmen of the Islamist movement, and Coptic figures to address public opinion through the media. The government, however, has turned a deaf ear to such advice. It did not also heed advice to show more concern for social equity considerations in the making of its economic policy.

33. For the economic performance of Egypt in the 1980s, see World Bank, *World Development Report, 1992: Development and the Environment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 218, 220, 230.

34. Ibid.

The National Democratic Party government realizes that economic reform is imposing sacrifices on the Egyptian people in the short run and that a further democratization of the political system under current conditions would only favor all segments of the opposition, particularly the Islamist movement. It prefers, therefore, to follow a more cautious approach toward the opposition, mobilizing official Islamic institutions to deprive Islamist groups of the claim that they alone are concerned about respect for Islamic values while enhancing its "political control" capacities through various legislative amendments. As for an alternative economic policy of "growth with redistribution," neither foreign aid donors with their financial institutions nor influential domestic actors are expected to lend any support to such a policy. All these foreign and domestic constraints have the government wishfully thinking that the implementation of economic reform measures will somehow enable it to get out of its economic predicament. Economic progress gradually will ease the social tensions that have allowed the Islamist movement to find large followings among the youth of middle and lower middle class origins.

President Mubarak has expressed the view that economic hardships faced by the Egyptian public will be eased by the end of 1995, with the full implementation of the economic reform package to which the government is committed vis-à-vis international financial institutions. Until such a prospect is realized, limitations imposed by the government on organizations of the civil society will continue, if not increase, be they professional associations, political parties, or scientific and literary societies. Under such conditions, the only prospect that one can envisage for Egypt's embryonic civil society is one of a protracted crisis.

STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SYRIA

Raymond A. Hinnebusch

"ASADSESCU"—the graffiti on Damascus walls reputedly read when the Rumanian regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu, ostensibly similar to Hafiz al-Asad's Syria, succumbed to revolution at the end of 1989. The widespread collapse of authoritarianism has given more credibility to claims that "modernization" broadens the base of pluralism. In eroding primordial isolation and generating a multitude of interests, it creates a mobilized complex society which, beyond a certain threshold, arguably cannot be governed without political liberalization.

A key variable in a stable pluralist transition is a viable civil society, a network of voluntary associations, sufficiently autonomous of state and primordial community, to bridge societal cleavages while buffering society from, yet linking it to, state power. In Syria's case, "traditional" associations, such as guilds, religious brotherhoods, and mosques—which grew directly out of premodern quarters, villages, and families—are legitimate elements of civil society. With modernization, many adapted and survived; they were, moreover, joined by a proliferation of "modern" parties, professional syndicates, unions, and business associations.

Eastern Europe apparently has passed the pluralist threshold, while in Latin America and East Asia authoritarian regimes have retreated before more complex societies. The Middle East is not immune; in Egypt and Jordan regimes have found that the effective governing of a more mobilized citizenry requires pluralist concessions such as a multiparty system and a freer press. The 1992 electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front and subsequent military *coup d'état* in Algeria suggest the alternative is massive repression and instability. In Syria, no copycat uprising followed Ceauşescu's demise, and authoritarian rule appears

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remarkably durable in spite of increasing socioeconomic modernization. Is Syria an actual case of "Middle East exceptionalism"?

The connection between social differentiation and political pluralization in Syria has been diluted by many intervening variables that raise the pluralist threshold; the regime deploys such still viable substitutes for pluralism as clientalism and corporatism. Syria is, however, undergoing a limited liberalization as the regime adapts its rule to a revival of civil society dictated by the exhaustion of statist development. The private sector is being encouraged, Asad is broadening his base beyond the party, government controls over society are being incrementally relaxed, and signs of a revival of civil society can be detected. This will not produce democratization any time soon, but it may permit a more autonomous and developed civil society, creating the base for future political pluralization.

THE HISTORIC IMBALANCE OF STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Historic imbalances obstructed a stable integration of state and civil society in Syria dating from at least the Ottoman period. The Ottoman state was initially a military-fiscal apparatus imposed by conquest on a primordially fragmented society with a thin layer of civil society between them. There were *waqfs,* sufi orders, and guilds in the urban quarters, while in the Qalamun mountains and the Damascus Ghuta, village associations managed waterworks; in time, local *ayan* waxed powerful as a parasitic tax-farming strata between the imperial treasury and the peasants. Civil society was discontinuous, however, and did not effectively bridge the state-society gap. Periodic local revolts and the clientalist connections of communal and tribal leaders to the state deflected arbitrary power, but, until the Young Turk revolution, society never attained power-sharing in the form of a parliament.

Imperial rule discouraged the emergence of an independent merchant bourgeoisie that might have united the cities to demand such representation. In obstructing the emergence of private property in land until the nineteenth century, the state discouraged the consolidation of a landed aristocracy, an advance beyond tribal fragmentation crucial to state-society linkage.[1] In the absence of powerful independent corporate groups—estates of aristocratic classes and free cities, a religious hierarchy separate from the state—state power was chiefly blunted by the practical limits of premodern technology.

Under French rule, the Ottoman superstructure was supplanted by a semi-liberal one lacking indigenous traditions. This state failed to consolidate strong linkages to civil society, which itself did not uniformly advance in the post-Ottoman environment. The French introduced representative institutions, and the nationalist struggle generated indigenous leaders and rudimentary parties with

1. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso, 1974), p. 372.

associational links to the urban quarters. Even as new forms of association were developing, however, older ones were being decimated; for example, capitalist penetration destroyed the guilds of Aleppo artisans headed by shaykhs who settled disputes and enforced standards.[2] A landowning upper class was finally consolidated under the French, giving a social base to the state. This class, however, developing largely through encroachment on peasant small holdings, never attained the legitimacy in the peasant community to give the state stable rural roots. The state was the creature of this notable class whose political parties were fragile parliamentary blocs unable to incorporate other classes. Illiteracy and ignorance crippled the masses' "capacity of . . . political combination."[3]

This narrow-based regime could not survive the accumulating consequences of social change cresting in the late 1950s. Capitalist penetration and social mobilization eroded the self-sufficiency and solidarity of segmental groups as communal land tenures gave way to individual ownership, endogamous marriage declined among educated youth, and modern communications broke down geographic isolation. The patriarchal authority and clientalism on which the traditional elites depended began eroding. Modernization also generated new classes and occupation groups. A small agro-industrial bourgeoisie emerged, and its investments generated a working class that formed trade unions. Expansion of education, the bureaucracy, and the army generated a salaried "new middle class"; the new associations and institutions into which its members were recruited fostered loyalties to profession, class, and nation that competed with those to family, sect, and quarter.[4]

Modernization also stimulated traditional civil society. The revival of agriculture was accompanied by new associations, such as the first Syrian cooperative founded in Dayr Atiyya and merchant-village partnerships to introduce irrigation pumps in Dayr al-Zur. The spread of education, far from uniformly displacing traditional values, spawned new traditional associations, such as the religious brotherhood that educated Salamiyya youth formed to defend the Isma'ili faith.[5]

This social differentiation resulted in political pluralization, as parties, press, and interest groups proliferated in the 1950s. Ideological parties, such as the Baath and the Communists, forged political association beyond personal and parochial loyalties and pushed political activism out from the divans of the notables and the army barracks, into the streets, campuses, and even villages. This broadening of the political arena, however, generated class conflict that aborted the consolidation of the liberal state. The failure of dependent capitalism to incorporate the salaried middle class turned it against the liberal model, while capitalist agricul-

2. Jocelyne Cornand, "L'Artisanat du textile à Alep survie au dynamisme?" *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales Institut Français de Damas* 36 (1984), pp. 104–5.

3. Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 91.

4. Philip Khoury, "Syrian Urban Politics in Transition: The Quarters of Damascus during the French Mandate," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, no. 4 (1984), p. 527.

5. Norman Lewis, "The Isma'ilis of Syria Today," *Journal of the Royal Central Asia Society* (London) 39 (January 1952).

ture unleashed landlord-peasant conflict. The *ancien régime* lacked the rural roots to counterbalance urban radicalism and strong institutions to absorb middle class activism. In the late 1950s, nationalist crises and economic stagnation lent credibility to claims that a powerful state able to mobilize the country for development and defense should take precedence over democracy.

THE BAATHIST STATE

The fall of the ancien régime opened the way for the formation of the Baathist authoritarian-populist state. Its leadership, dominated by rural minorities, was determined to break the power of the urban Sunni establishment. Opposition parties and professional associations—political vehicles of upper and middle class rivals—were repressed or controlled. The mobilization of new pro-regime participants by the Baath Party apparatus gave the regime some societal roots.

At the same time, nationalizations destroyed the economic bases of bourgeois power. Land reform eliminated the landlords' role as gatekeepers between state and village and transformed a large part of the landless proletariat into a small-holding peasantry dependent upon the state. Education and increasing state employment broadened the state-employed middle class.

The increased fluidity of the class structure and spawning of state-dependent social forces created the social terrain on which Asad constructed an autonomous "Bonapartist" state "above" classes. He used a combination of kin and sectarian solidarity, Leninist party loyalty, and bureaucratic command to concentrate power in a presidential monarchy, while a praetorian guard commanded by Alawi clansmen shielded him from challenges.

Control of the public sector and of oil rent acquired in the 1970s gave the regime features of a patronage state in which societal sectors competed for largesse through clientalism partly organized along sectarian lines. This enabled the regime to play off a society fragmented along class, regional, and ethnic-sectarian lines. The regime sought legitimacy through the struggle with Israel, in which it portrayed Syria as the vanguard of Arab nationalism, the most widely accepted political identity. The diversion of enormous resources into a huge military apparatus incorporating one-fifth of the labor force gave the state great weight in society.

This state sharply reduced societal autonomy, and destroyed some social forces while creating and coopting others. The state victimized some of the most developed parts of civil society—the *suq,* merchants, and industrialists. In deploying Alawi *asabiyya* in its primitive power accumulation, it stimulated primordial identities and delegitimized itself in the eyes of many Sunnis. Overlapping communal and class cleavages sharply bifurcated regime and opposition, allowing for little compromise or civility between them; opposition took violent forms while the regime was unrestrained by law in its repression.

The Baath state was better linked to society than its liberal predecessor, but the array of corporatist associations through which societal sectors had to articulate their interests under party tutelage lacked autonomy. Baathists created and led popular organizations (*munazzamat sha'biyya*), which incorporated peasants, youth, and women, and they dominated the leadership of the trade unions. The professional associations (*niqabat mihaniyya*) of doctors, lawyers, and engineers, in which the Baath was lightly represented, retained a certain independence until the Islamist-led rebellion from 1978 to 1982, during which their leaders were replaced by state appointees. The teachers' and agronomists' unions were Baath-dominated, and even associations that escaped Baath control were, by law, approved and regulated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

The state-society relation was not, however, a wholly zero-sum conflict in which the gains of the state meant across-the-board losses by civil society. Baath corporatism had a special populist character. While most corporatist regimes played off competing social forces or favored privileged groups such as businessmen's associations, the Baath, seeking to mobilize a popular base against the old classes it overthrew, organized previously excluded popular sectors and accorded them privileged access to power denied its bourgeois rivals. Baath corporatism was, at least initially, a strategy of inclusion rather than of exclusion or demobilization, which worked to the benefit of both the state and its constituency. Groups that hitherto lacked organization acquired new, if still limited, social weight. Thus, the women's union mobilized some real activism on behalf of equal employment opportunities and child care, although many women activists criticized its timidity in pushing for equality in matters of personal status.[6]

The peasants union exemplifies populist corporatism. Previous regimes had discouraged peasant organizing, but the Baath, facing intense urban opposition, recruited leaders from the small land-owning peasantry and backed their creation of union branches in the villages. By the 1990s, much of Syria's peasantry was organized. The union's autonomy remained limited, however, and there is no record of dissident challenges to its Baathist leadership. Constructed from the top down rather than through struggle from below, the union today lacks the popular muscle to challenge the state.

The union is not, however, a mere paper organization lacking presence in the corridors of power or the village. Its relations with the state are based on certain shared interests. The union articulates peasant interests within the limits defined by party strategy; thus, it refrains from pressing for further land reform, since the state wishes to encourage investment by the agrarian bourgeoisie, and it has deferred to the state's interest in the compulsory marketing of "strategic crops." In return, the union enjoys institutionalized channels of access; its leaders sit on party and state committees that make decisions affecting peasants. The union played a role in energizing the land

6. Bouthaina Shaaban, *Both Right and Left Handed: Arab Women Talk about Their Lives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 28–79.

reform process and promoting a system of cooperatives that, as channels of credit, services, and inputs, relieved peasants of dependency on landlords and merchants and protected them from renewed land concentration.

The union is also a player in bureaucratic politics, pushing with some success for higher prices for state-marketed crops in conflict with agencies representing urban (Ministry of Supply) or industrial (Ministry of Industry) consumers of agricultural goods. The union has organized small peasants to counter the power of larger proprietors, investors, and middlemen. Thus, union pressure helped implement favorable legislation, such as the agrarian relations law, which might otherwise have remained paper decrees. Today the union is seen as a major obstacle by investors seeking a more favorable law. The union's access to decision makers in the long absence of comparable access for landlords and merchants enhanced the weight of peasants against monied interests that would, in the normal course of things, have been more potent.[7]

Although the union facilitated state control of peasants, it also fostered peasant association that, if regime controls were relaxed, could acquire greater autonomy. Even now the peasant sector is not a state-controlled monolith; it actually retains considerable autonomy because alternatives to the state exist. Although participation in cooperatives giving access to credit and inputs imposes constraints such as state marketing of strategic crops, peasants can opt out and many crops remain on the free market. Peasants pursue investment and accumulation strategies through private kin associations, self-help groupings found widely throughout the Levant. Families diversify resources: one brother works on the land, a second in a petty business, and the third in a government or party job. In this manner, peasants utilize both state and private networks as it suits their interests.[8]

More generally, while the Baath at times aspired to totalitarian-like control, it never "atomized" civil society, where family, religious, and neighborhood solidarities retain their integrity. Syria is a close-knit society where networks of talk and rumor, informal groups, and personal connections penetrate the state, cut across political cleavages, and often soften the harshness of the regime. Although Syria's Baathist structures resemble Iraq's, the regime has never deployed the systematic terror to pulverize society in a way comparable to that used by Iraq.

CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER THE BAATH

Resistance and Evasion

Major parts of Syrian civil society, the "haves" and the "traditionals," were threatened by Baathist redistribution and modernization efforts. One reaction was

7. Raymond Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 197–219.

8. Françoise Metral, "State and Peasants in Syria: A Local View of a Government Irrigation Project," *Peasant Studies* 11, no. 2 (1984).

overt resistance led by Syria's Islamic movement. The center of this resistance was concentrated where religious institutions and the trading economy came together—the traditional urban quarters and the suq. Political Islam spoke for the more pious segments of society, notably the *ulama* who resented the secular and minority-dominated Baath regime. Since it was not organized in a state-controlled institution comparable to al-Azhar, the ulama retained considerable autonomy of and capacity to resist the regime.

Political Islam also expressed the lingering urban resentment of policies pursued under the radical Baathist leadership that ruled from 1965 to 1970. Land reform and the substitution of state agrarian credit and marketing networks for the old landlord-merchant ones deprived merchants and landlords of influence and wealth in the villages. Nationalization of industries, which in a few cases touched artisan workshops, was seen as an attack on business and property as a whole. The partial takeover of foreign and wholesale trade deprived big merchants of opportunities, while itinerant peddlers who serviced the villages were threatened by government retail networks. Government price fixing and market regulation alienated merchants of all sizes. The regime's attempt to win over small merchants and artisans failed because state trading bodies could not substitute effectively for the merchant bourgeoisie. Asad's 1971 partial liberalization of trade reopened opportunities for merchants, but they still had to deal with inefficient, corrupt, or unsympathetic government officials.

Political Islam's "counterideology" expressed the anti-statist worldview of the suq. Along with Alawi and military rule, it rejected state domination of the economy. Islamic manifestos demanded that the bloated bureaucracy be cut, that the state withdraw from commerce, and that an Islamic economy be instated that would legitimate free enterprise and the "natural incentives" of a fair profit. Islam, interpreted to exclude socialism, was a natural vehicle of protest against a rural-based regime's assault on urban interests.

This Islamic political association rose out of traditional civil society: Anti-regime sermons in the mosques stimulated rebellion, and the religious schools were Ikhwan recruitment pools; the suq was a consistent center of anti-socialist merchant strikes; professional associations frequently mobilized in alliance with the suq. The Islamic movement also developed the wider organization needed to confront the regime, establishing offices, chains of command, representative bodies, and military branches. The scale and durability of the Islamic rebellion of the early 1980s indicated a substantial advance in organizational capabilities.

In its mortal conflict with political Islam, the state ratcheted up its control over society. A purge of mosques, religious associations, and professional syndicates eliminated these as bases of opposition. The surviving modicum of press freedom and party pluralism was deadened. Political Islam lost the battle, but it remains deeply rooted in the suq and in the pervasive religious sensibility nurtured by the ulama. With a partially autonomous economic base and a counterideology, the traditional city remains the milieu most resistant to state

penetration, an alternative society with many aspects of civility. Insofar, however, as its dominant political expression rejects secularism and fosters communal resentment, the historical compromise that could lead to its incorporation into the political system is obstructed.

Another strategy pursued by threatened elements of civil society was survival and evasion. As early as 1971, Asad, to win the support of bourgeois civil society in the wake of his overthrow of the radical Salah Jadid regime, created the conditions for this strategy. Trade was partially liberalized, a role for the private sector legitimized, and the previous effort to totally control the economy abandoned. Many Syrians acquired independence from the state through family and work in the Persian Gulf, Africa, or elsewhere and from their ability to smuggle surplus capital out of Syria for investment abroad. In the large informal and black market sectors of the economy, state control was blunted by the corruption of officials.

Resulting variations in the regime's ability to control society produced, alongside the more state-penetrated associations such as the peasant union and the chambers of commerce, a more autonomous "alternative" civil society. The vitality of small enterprises illustrates how they can grow in the space left by gaps in state control. In certain rural areas, such as Yabrud, independent family-owned light industries developed from a preexisting artisanal tradition. A tradition of emigration fostered the import of technology and the accumulation of capital, closeness to Lebanon permitted smuggling to overcome raw material constraints, and product lines were selected from those outside of state price controls. Such autonomy was not without limits: the habit of hiding assets from potential nationalization, the fear of competition from state industries, and constantly changing import-export regulations deterred the natural expansion of these industries into larger, fully legitimate firms.[9]

Another case is that of small textile manufacturers and artisans in Aleppo. Those who joined the officially approved Syndicate of Artisans or the Chamber of Industries were entitled to buy inputs from state factories or import agencies, to participate in a social security fund, and to obtain export licenses from the Ministry of Economy. Alternatively, they could participate in the "parallel" free market controlled by large merchants; artisans were dependent upon these merchants for marketing and sometimes paid higher prices for their inputs, but they presumably preferred personal relations with a patron to dependence on state officials. In cases of conflict, they relied on traditional arbiters rather than the state's labor tribunals.[10] Despite the pervasiveness of government control, there was an alternative network wherein participants could forego certain benefits for greater freedom.

9. Anton Escher, "Private Business and Trade in the Region of Yabroud, Syria" (Paper presented at the Twenty-fourth Middle East Studies Association Conference, San Antonio, TX, November 10–13, 1990).

10. Cornand, "L'Artisanat du textile," pp. 111–41.

TABLE 1
Syrian Labor Force in Trade and Restaurants

	Labor Force in Trade	Total Labor Force	Percent of Labor Force in Trade
1970	139,002	1,524,552	9.1
1984	253,174	2,246,273	11.3
1989	338,061	2,882,619	11.7

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, *Statistical Abstract,* 1976, pp. 151–2; ibid., 1986, pp. 106–7; ibid., 1991, pp. 76–7.

The artisanal and merchant *petite bourgeoisie,* far from declining under the Baath, flourished in the vacuum left by the demise of the *haute bourgeoisie*: it doubled in size during the socialist decade of the 1960s—from 110,900 to 216,090 according to one calculation.[11] The numbers of merchants grew substantially in the more liberal decades from 1971 to 1991. As table 1 shows, the labor force in trade grew about 7 percent per year and, despite the austerity of the 1980s, had by 1989 increased its proportion of the labor force from 9 percent to almost 12 percent. In some respects, the petite bourgeoisie flourished in spite of the regime, but that it sometimes developed symbiotic relations with public sector suppliers and buyers suggests it manipulated the regime to its benefit.

The Widened Bases of Civil Society

Even as the state sought more control, its development drive, in fostering a proliferation of social forces enjoying more diversified resources, was broadening the formerly circumscribed bases of civil society. Increases in educational opportunity, urbanization, and modern occupations socially mobilized society on a major scale. Table 2 indicates the expansion in the differentiated modern sector. As professionals and workers proliferated, so did membership in syndicates, ostensible networks of civil society. These organizations were not autonomous of the government, and the largest growth was in state-dependent professional associations such as agronomists and engineers, while lawyers, often a force for checking state power, lagged. Presumably autonomous artistic, cultural, and charitable associations actually declined from 609 in 1975 to 504 in 1990.[12] On the other hand, the more autonomous housing and transport cooperatives, in which members pool resources, grew.

11. Elizabeth Longuenesse, "The Class Nature of the State in Syria," *MERIP Reports,* May 1979, pp. 4–5.

12. Syrian Arab Republic, *Statistical Abstract,* 1976, p. 784; ibid., 1992, p. 413.

TABLE 2
Associational Membership, 1974 and 1990

	1974	1990
Trade Unions	184,916	522,990
Housing Cooperatives	79,435	270,972
Lawyers Syndicate	1,661	5,291
Engineers Syndicate	6,573	36,198
Agronomists Syndicate	1,979	12,442

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, *Statistical Abstract*, 1976, pp. 782–96; ibid., 1991, pp. 412–20.

These figures also exclude associations outside of government control, such as those in which government-employed professionals, to enhance their fixed incomes, pool resources to import smuggled goods. Although there is no reliable data on their scale, these informal cooperatives proliferated as, after 1976, inflation radically reduced the purchasing power of professionals on fixed state salaries. Thus, the decline of the state's ability to control the economy and provide resources stimulated the formation of autonomous associations outside its control.

The sheer increase in the numbers of educated professionals has put pressure on the state: To contain the brain drain, to meet expectations for jobs the state can no longer provide in sufficient numbers, and to avoid the political threat of the educated unemployed, the regime is moving incrementally to accommodate their expectations for greater economic and personal freedom. Allowing professional syndicates the greater freedom they enjoy in states such as Egypt could satisfy some pent up participation demands.

Retreat of the State, Bourgeois Resurgence

An independent bourgeoisie is the force most able to carve out room for civil society and potentially to check state power. By the late 1970s, the state, instead of breaking down class barriers, began to reconstruct them. It either generated or became the pole around which a new bourgeoisie began to coalesce. A "new bourgeoisie" took form as the political elite used office to acquire illicit wealth, went into business on the side and formed business, political, and marriage alliances with elements of the private bourgeoisie. At its core was a "military-mercantile complex" of Alawi officers and Damascene merchants.[13] The "em-bourgeoisement" of the power elite differentiated it from its popular base, muted its conflicts with the old upper class, and gave it an interest in markets and the private sector that eroded its statist ideology. The children of the elite were

13. This concept is attributed by Patrick Seale to Sadiq Al-Azm. See Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 456.

educated in the West and went into business, merging with and adopting the values of the Westernized bourgeoisie.

The emergence of this new "class fraction," together with economic contraction, prepared the way for a resurgence of the private sector. The rent-driven expansion of the state during the 1970s exceeded Syria's economic base. When rent and growth declined in the 1980s, the state began to shed some of its economic responsibilities, and private business had to be given concessions to fill the economic gap. By the 1990s, the regime regarded the private sector, not just as an auxiliary to the public sector, but as a second engine of growth. The private sector's share of foreign trade has widened rapidly, and new private industries have proliferated.

Two segments of the bourgeoisie—domestic entrepreneurs and expatriates—have particular potential to widen civil society. In the vanguard of entrepreneurs who have risen from the local petite bourgeoisie are the Seif brothers, the largest private employers in Syria.[14] They started making mass-produced shirts, expanded into other garments, and have a reputation for being pious Muslims, and hence good employers who value their staff and provide them social benefits. Their apparent combination of private enterprise and a welfare network outside of government control could be an indication of the potential for the bourgeoisie to construct an autonomous civil society embracing wider strata of the population.

The expatriate internationalized wing of the bourgeoisie is cautiously exploring opportunities inside Syria. The regime's increasing desire to attract expatriate capital puts investors in a strong position to demand greater economic and political liberalization in return. Omran al-Adham, a Paris based expatriate, thinking the time was ripe, published an open letter to Asad urging him to "show confidence in the people" and give them "the opportunity to demonstrate their innovative power in every sphere."[15]

An independent bourgeoisie poised to launch capitalist development has not, however, been consolidated. The bourgeoisie is not strong enough to force greater liberalization than the state wants. It presents no common front in favor of the market because much of it is dependent on monopolies in an over-regulated economy and state contracts and protection. Nor can businessmen yet promote themselves as public figures. Some large merchants who tried to win popularity through press advertisements were broken by the enforcement of currency laws; the regime would tolerate no bourgeois pretensions to political independence.

Businessmen's confidence and investment will remain limited unless they win greater autonomy in which a bourgeois civil society can be constructed. The recent project to create a stock market and the consideration given to demands for

14. Volker Perthes, "The Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th," *Middle East Report*, May-June 1991, p. 33.

15. *The Middle East*, September 1991, p. 21.

private or joint venture banks are signs of greater tolerance for such a civil society. Curbs on arbitrary state power also will be needed.

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CHANGE

The regime currently is pursuing a strategy of calculated political decompression, which may widen space for civil society. With the collapse of socialism, the Baath party is ideologically exhausted and no longer a threat to private business. Asad is broadening his base beyond the party to the business class, and a revision of Baathist ideology stresses its long-neglected liberal component that accepted democracy, freedoms, and a private sector. The draconian controls of the 1980s are being relaxed as the Islamic threat recedes, and the security forces are being reined in. There is also greater press freedom, evidenced by the media's ability to criticize ministers. The religious schools and mosques are recovering their autonomy on condition that oppositional activity is eschewed.

At this time, however, full-scale liberalization still holds too many perceived political dangers for the regime. Asad argues that his 1970 rise to power initiated a Syrian *perestroika*—political relaxation and opening to the private sector—long before Mikhail Gorbachev, and that "the phase through which [Syria] is passing is not the most suitable for implementing [competitive elections]."[16] The Baath would have a hard time surviving them, and even a more limited opening could unleash uncontrollable forces.

Until the social cleavage between the state and the bourgeoisie is fully bridged, the Alawis will be threatened by any return of power to the Sunni-dominated business establishment. Fuller political liberalization carries the risk that political Islam would become a vehicle of anti-regime mobilization as long as the ideological gap separating it from the secular, minority regime is so wide. The regime is determined to avoid the recent Algerian and East European scenarios and the security forces have the firepower and personal stake in regime survival to defend it. Limited liberalization, at regime discretion, can be reversed if it unleashes dangerous opposition.

There is so far little overt societal pressure for democratization. The bourgeoisie is too weak; its control of the means of production remains limited and fragmented while Baath corporatism has obstructed most alliances with other classes. Although the political upheavals in Eastern Europe, Algeria, and Jordan have stimulated some yearning for democracy, the accompanying disorder and fears of Islamic extremism made its natural constituents—businessmen and intellectuals—wary of democracy. Much of the bourgeoisie is secular, liberal, and moderate in its Islam, and it is this wing the regime seeks to coopt.

16. Asad speech reproduced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*—Near East and South Asia, May 17, 1990, p. 27.

More valued by the bourgeoisie is stability combined with increased personal and economic freedoms giving scope for greater private association. The bourgeoisie also is now accorded growing access to decision makers; the populist-dominated corporatist system has been opened to them. The prime minister's Committee for the Rationalization of Imports, Exports, and Consumption, in which the heads of the chambers of commerce and of industry are included, gives crucial bourgeois access to economic decision-making.[17] Badr al-Din al-Shallah, head of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, who earned Asad's gratitude for keeping the Damascene bourgeoisie from joining the Islamic uprising, has been particularly influential in redressing business grievances.

Parliamentary elections, although controlled, provide some outlet for the politically ambitious. Some 10 millionaires in parliament are quite outspoken and a block of independent merchants and industrialists sometimes coordinate for common interests. Some religious and even Ikhwan-associated figures have been coopted. Although the state is playing off competing "popular" and "bourgeois" interests, as it becomes increasingly committed to capitalist development, business associations will acquire a growing capacity to argue that this requires new pro-business concessions.

In return for business freedom and security, the bourgeoisie seems prepared to defer demands for political power. This signifies a *modus vivendi* between a state that needs a wealth generating, conservative social force and a bourgeoisie that needs the economic opportunities and political protection provided by the state. Since the inegalitarian consequences of capitalism are likely to heighten popular discontent, neither bourgeoisie nor regime will want full democratization. The new corporatism, combined with a widened role for parliament and rule of law, may foster new habits of accommodation between them and constrain state power, but it deters a pluralist competition of groups and classes. It also puts the regime in a position to play off groups in a divided society.

CONCLUSION

Syria's experience shows that pluralism, no inevitable outcome of modernization, is retarded in the absence of a balance whereby an institutionalized state incorporates an autonomous civil society. The premodern Ottoman state tolerated an autonomous civil society, but it was fragmented and malintegrated into the political structure. The burst of new associations generated by modernization broadened civil society, but political mobilization amidst sharp class cleavages could not be contained by a fragile liberal polity unrooted in an indigenous state tradition. The authority vacuum was filled by the rise of an authoritarian state.

17. Steven Heydemann, "Liberalization from Above and the Limits of Private Sector Autonomy in Syria: The Role of Business Associations" (Paper presented at the Twenty-fourth Middle East Studies Association Conference, San Antonio, TX, November 10–13, 1990).

The Baath revolution created a more open social structure and a more class-inclusive form of authoritarian-corporatist polity that now embraces a more mobilized peasantry, a large educated middle class, and a reviving private bourgeoisie. This stronger state also deadened the fragile political life of the pluralist era and narrowed the autonomy of civil society. Thus, where an authoritarian-populist state emerging out of class conflict pulverizes classes, where a weak bourgeoisie evokes a large public sector that clientalizes society, and where international conflict fuels a huge national security apparatus, the overdeveloped state dominates and overshadows—but never wholly suffocates—civil society. Moreover, "modernized" semi-primordial association—sectarian asabiyya and clientalism—reinforces authoritarian rule and stimulates a reaction in civil society that retards the modus vivendi with the state needed for liberalization.

Nevertheless, once the Syrian state was exhausted, it acquired an interest in hiving off some responsibilities to civil society. As its functions and control started to contract, liberalizing concessions became unavoidable, and civil society began to revive. The social-economic requisites for pluralism—literacy, modern occupations, a growing private sector—had meanwhile advanced. As yet, the state cannot be forced into more than limited liberalization; patrimonial strategies such as clientalism remain viable since the large public sector and oil rent give the state the ability to stand above, play off, and coopt rival sectors of the fragmented society. Corporatist forms of state-society linkage may be enough to accommodate societal complexity for some time, and the regime holds a large repressive apparatus, knit by asabiyya, in reserve.

The greater autonomy that incremental liberalization accords civil society will, however, revive the bourgeoisie, the force with the resources to construct a business-centered civil society. Having opted to depend on private capitalist investment, the regime will have to be responsive to bourgeois demands for greater rule of law and a general rollback of the boundaries of state power. Increased societal autonomy is likely, in the longer run, to generate stronger social forces that cannot readily be controlled except through wider power-sharing.

The test of civil society in the shorter term may come with the inevitable succession struggle. Until Asad departs, there is little prospect of more than incremental liberalization, but rivals for the succession will need to bid for the support of newly revived societal sectors. The winner may, like Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat, have an interest in building a base beyond the core Alawi-army-party complex, and in stimulating the economic growth needed to consolidate it. This will require concessions of further autonomy to the bourgeoisie and perhaps to the syndicates and unions. The prospects for a peaceful succession without sectarian strife and Lebanonization have been advanced by the Sunni-Alawi alliances and the modus vivendi between the state and the bourgeoisie that incremental liberalization is advancing.

While capitalist development is bound to deepen civil society, and succession may provide the turning point for greater pluralization, democratization depends on political rights and representation for all social forces. Power-sharing for the bourgeoisie must not mean the exclusion of the popular sectors: If corporatism is not to become the instrument for disciplining popular forces on behalf of capitalist development, the associations representing them must attain the autonomy to defend their interests in a post-populist era. Conversely, the most autonomous part of civil society, the Islamic suq, must be integrated into the state without destabilizing it. Only through such a political incorporation of an autonomous and inclusive civil society can democratization advance.



PALESTINIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

Muhammad Muslih

SINCE the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, the idea of civil society has received attention among political scientists as a possible answer to the questions of how individuals can pursue the common good, and how society and state can interact and reinforce each other in a manner that creates and sustains a democratic system.[1] At the heart of this concept is the belief that the state is an indispensable agent responsible for refereeing and regulating the functioning of civil society.[2] In this context, civil society refers to an admixture of various forms of associations including unions, clubs, charities, religious associations and other types of formations that freely interact and communicate with each other in a spirit of civility and tolerance not only for their own sake, but for the sake of the entire population.[3]

Generally speaking, vibrant civil societies have been central to the functioning of democracies because they tend to provide a buffer between the citizen and the state.[4] Civil society, it should be noted, however, is not the exclusive domain of one country or continent, nor is it the exclusive domain of a particular type of

1. Adam Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 202–3.
2. Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society," *Dissent* 38, no. 2 (Spring 1991), p. 302.
3. For a general treatment of civil society, see John Keane, *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 35–72; Daniel Bell, "American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Role of Civil Society," *The Public Interest*, no. 95 (1989); Charles Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vols. 1 and 2, (New York: Langley Press, 1845).
4. Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society."

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political system. Almost all societies have within them civil formations, regardless of the system of government. The difference between one civil society and another lies mainly in the nature of their respective associational lives, civility, and tolerance of diversity and pluralism.[5]

Although associational life among Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza has long been rich, it has been questioned whether the above concept of civil society can be applied to their various associational forms. In this regard, two unique aspects of the Palestinian situation must be considered because they pose difficulties for studying civil society in relation to the state. First, the Palestinians have not had a national government in this century. Since 1967, the Israeli occupation apparatus has functioned as the de facto authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians consider the Israeli military regime illegitimate, and their goal is not simply to undermine its control or to temper its arbitrary effects, but to dismantle it altogether. Second, Palestinians in the occupied territories accept an external actor, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as their "state," and they clandestinely cooperate with local PLO representatives to sustain a network of institutions through which the PLO tries to exercise political power in competition with the Israeli military.

In addition to these extraordinary aspects, the characteristics of society in the occupied territories also influence associational life. The essence of social organization is a network of *hamulas* (extended families) and smaller families, as well as village, neighborhood, and religious solidarities. Palestinian society has a mainly rural character, and even urban centers are closer to the model of small towns than to that of large cities. In the West Bank, 65 percent of Palestinians live in more than 400 villages, while only 35 percent live in small towns.[6] Even in Gaza, where close to 85 percent of the inhabitants reside in Gaza City, the culture is predominantly rural.[7]

These points raise interesting questions germane to the study of civil society in a Palestinian context. For example, can a society with dominant rural characteristics, essentially organized on the basis of lineages, produce enduring civil society structures that transcend local solidarities? Another question concerns the context in which Palestinian civil society should be studied: Should it be the context of statelessness, or that of a national liberation struggle? This leads to an even more fundamental question: The study of civil society in the occupied

5. Bell, "American Exceptionalism Revisited"; Edward Shils, "The Virtues of Civil Society," *Government and Opposition* 26, no. 2. (Winter 1991).

6. Bernard Sabella, "Al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza: Al-sukkan wa al-ard" (The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Population and land), in Liza Taraki, ed., *Al-Mujtama' al-Filastini fi al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza* (Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Akka: Dar al-Aswar, 1990), p. 101.

7. See figures in Salim Tamari, "Al-Takhalluf wa afaq al-tanmiya fi al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza al-muhtallayn," (Underdevelopment and the horizons of development in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip), in Liza Taraki, ed., *Al-Mujtama' al-Filastini fi al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza* (Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Akka: Dar al-Aswar, 1990), p. 206.

territories is in relation to what government? All these questions can be addressed within the framework of the "state surrogate" paradigm. State surrogate in this article refers to the PLO, a parastatal formation having many aspects of a government, including a bureaucracy, an army, and financial resources. Analyzing how Palestinian civil society organizations relate to and communicate with each other and how they interact with the PLO apparatus in the occupied territories provides some insight into the prospects for democratization should the Palestinians attain autonomy or independence.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

To put the discussion of Palestinian civil society in its proper perspective, it is necessary to consider the historical context in which Palestinian social organizations evolved. For this purpose, modern Palestinian history can be divided into three periods. In the first period, which corresponds to British colonial rule (1917–1948), a wide array of civil associations existed, including religious groups, clubs, labor unions, women's societies, charitable organizations, town cafés, and village guest houses. These associations emerged outside the framework of British authority, and they articulated the interests of their respective societal sectors. Some of these associations were family based, such as the Dajani Sports Club in Jerusalem, and some were religion based, such as the national Muslim Societies (1921–23) and the Orthodox Club in Jerusalem. Others were broader based, such as the women's societies that multiplied after the Wailing Wall riots of 1929 and the European-style labor unions that emerged after 1925.

These associations performed social functions that produced benefits that transcended the boundaries of the family or the local neighborhood. Women's societies, for example, opened welfare centers, helped poor families, and taught mothers infant care methods. To finance their activities, they held annual flower days, bazaars, lotteries, and other activities. Similarly, social clubs launched programs to combat illiteracy, and sponsored lectures on health, education, and other social issues.[8]

By virtue of the national struggle, many of these associations were drawn into the orbit of the political apparatus of the Palestinian national movement. The Arab Executive—a body composed of dominant local politicians who attempted to coordinate the national struggle in the 1920s and early 1930s—was able to bring many associations under its control and use them as instruments with which to

8. Adnan Abu Ghazaleh, "Arab Cultural Nationalism in Palestine during the British Mandate," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 3 (Spring 1972); Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948* (New York: State University of New York, 1991), pp. 133–61; and Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 59–67.

mobilize the masses and expand the political base of the dominant political elite.[9] For example, al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the leader of the Palestinians during the last two decades of British rule, was able to draw a large number of associations into his political coalition, and he mobilized them not simply for the national struggle but also to expand the scope of his power and undermine his political opponents.[10]

In the second period of Palestinian history, from 1948 to 1967, a rich variety of social formations also existed, although Palestinian society was uprooted as a result of the creation of Israel. Palestinians were not able to play an independent role in shaping their own destiny or in organizing their associational life. Arab governments, each for its own political purposes, imposed constraints on Palestinian organizing.[11] Nevertheless, Palestinians formed social organizations of students, professionals, workers, and women's groups. Some of these associations were heirs to the pre-1948 societies, and in the case of all of them, their organizers benefited from the legacy of the earlier period. The creation of these organizations was as much rooted in the tradition of national politics as it was rooted in an attempt to forge an agenda related to the specific concerns of the members. Although the associations tried to serve their particular interests, they also worked for the national cause, and, in many instances, work for the national cause was paramount.

In the third period, 1967 to the present, the richness of associational life has endured despite the revolutionary changes brought about by the June 1967 War. In the West Bank and Gaza, a host of structural features influenced the social and political life of Palestinians living there. One such feature was the imposition of Israeli rule, which introduced a web of administrative and legal arrangements for the purpose of annexing the occupied territories to Israel and of attempting to shape Palestinian society in a fashion that suited Israeli interests.[12] Another feature was the existence of two major political forces competing to win the loyalty of the Palestinians.

The Jordanian government remained a political force in the West Bank, despite the Israeli occupation. Its instruments of political influence included an administrative infrastructure, the granting of Jordanian citizenship to West Bank

9. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine,* pp. 102–31; Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press and the Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988); Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974); and idem, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929–1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

10. For details on al-Hajj Amin and the politics of Palestine, see Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

11. Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 221–37.

12. See Amnesty International, "Israel and the Occupied Territories," in *Report 1992* (New York and London, 1992); Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law, Israel and the West Bank* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985), and idem, "Negotiating Self-Government Arrangements," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 21, no. 84 (Summer 1992).

inhabitants, the extension of financial assistance to municipalities, chambers of commerce, public schools, and the Islamic religious establishment. To these political connections should be added the familial, social, and economic ties between the people living on both sides of the Jordan River, as well as the geographic reality that Jordan was the only gateway for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to the rest of the Arab world.[13]

The second political force in the occupied territories was the PLO. Its recognition in 1974 by the Arab states and the UN General Assembly reinforced its assertion that it was the true representative of the Palestinian people. As a quasi-government with an executive, a parliament, and substantial financial resources, the PLO offered political rewards to enhance its status in the occupied territories. Above all, it also used its nationalist credentials for that purpose.

POLITICAL SHOPS

Since 1967, four types of organizations have characterized civil society in the occupied territories: political shops, voluntary cooperatives, voluntary mass organizations, and Islamist groups. The first type of organization, political shops, or *dakakin siyasiyya,* practices patronage politics and clientelism. Engagement in patronage politics, a common practice in many societies, traditionally has been used by dominant political forces either to muster support or to undermine the influence of political competitors. Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Jordanian government continued to employ its political and economic resources to support a loyal local elite. Numerous Palestinians occupying senior positions in the chambers of commerce and industry, as well as in other public institutions, such as the courts and the school system, remained in the political orbit of Jordan, thanks mainly to the financial incentives that they received.

Over the years, the gradual ascent of the PLO in the occupied territories effectively undermined the authority of the pro-Jordanian elite, but it did not eliminate the Jordanian-affiliated patronage system. In many ways, the PLO itself encouraged patronage politics by plowing money into a variety of institutions and political movements operating in the West Bank and Gaza. Fatah, which constitutes the backbone of the PLO, was the main architect of this policy.[14] Fatah's substantial funds, largess, and large constituency all were attractive drawing cards for the politically ambitious of various ideological persuasions. For many years, the occupied territories had no apparatus by which to mobilize popular forces and lacked funding for local organizations and activities. This void

13. Yehuda Litani, "Leadership in the West Bank and Gaza," *Jerusalem Quarterly,* no. 14 (Winter 1980); and Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 21–42.

14. For details on the history and organization of Fatah, see Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

thus enabled Fatah to channel its funds into support and propaganda work not only on behalf of its own policies, but also on behalf of Fatah-affiliated political bosses.[15]

There is no more important or suitable network of organizations in which to examine patronage politics than the trade union movement. The unions, in their capacity as representatives of different occupational sectors in various geographic locations, are supposed to promote the economic and employment rights of their members. To do that, they must occupy their own space outside the framework of a state apparatus or a dominant political force. Thus, the relations of a union with an external actor should be carried out in a way that promotes the interests of the members and not the political agenda of the other entity. In this sense, the autonomy of the unions is central to the existence of viable civil society organizations.

Since the early 1920s, the Arab unions in Palestine have been a leftist stronghold, partly as a result of the organizing efforts of the Palestine Communist Party (PCP), which crystallized out of Jewish social groups in 1923.[16] After 1948, the Jordanian government used communist influence on trade union activities in the West Bank as a pretext to subdue attempts to revive the labor movement.[17] In Gaza, Egyptian authorities imposed a ban on labor union organizing until 1956, after which six labor unions emerged with branches throughout the strip. In 1967, Israel suspended all organized societal activity after it occupied the territories. In the West Bank, communists revived unions during the early 1970s and remained in almost full control of the labor movement until the late 1970s. In Gaza, no labor organizing took place before 1979 because of the Israeli ban.

As a result of political developments in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region in the mid- and late 1970s, the PLO began to refocus its attention on the occupied territories. The PLO's growing influence thereafter resulted in sharp rivalries that culminated in major contests to control the labor movement. Two leftist PLO groups, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, were the first to take charge of labor organizational work, benefiting on the one hand from their alliance with the PCP, and on the other hand from the rivalry between the PCP and Fatah.

Determined to break the leftist hegemony over organized labor groups, Fatah mobilized all the resources at its disposal, particularly its massive cash reserves, to win what was called the "war of the institutions" in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The competition for control was so intense that local grass-roots activists,

15. For details on the behavior of Fatah and other political groups in the occupied territories, see Ali al-Jarbawi, *Al-Intifada wa al-qiyadat al-siyasiyya fi al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza: Bahth fi al-nukhba al-siyasiyya* (The uprising and political leadership in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A study of political elites) (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1989), pp. 70–130.

16. See Musa Budeiri, *The Palestine Communist Party, 1919–1948: Arab and Jew in the Struggle for Internationalism* (London: Ithaca Press, 1979).

17. Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982).

acting on behalf of PLO groups outside the occupied territories, split off to set up parallel labor organizations of their own. A major split occurred in August 1981 when two separate General Federation of Trade Unions—using identical names—emerged, one dominated by the Left and one controlled by Fatah. The Fatah-sponsored union was headquartered in Ramallah, while the leftist-controlled union was based in Nablus.[18] In the end, Fatah prevailed. Defeated and frustrated in their attempts to maintain their hegemony, Palestinian leftists watched indignantly as Fatah took control of a labor movement they had nurtured. By the early 1990s, Fatah-supported units, acting under the umbrella of the Workers Youth Movement, represented about 70 percent of the membership in the executive organs of the Palestinian Federation of Trade Unions.[19]

In many respects, the experience of the Palestinian labor movement is representative of the experience of other organizations, including student groups. Student associations continue to be important focal points of political infiltration by local PLO groups and their ideological counterparts in the diaspora. In this sense, they are used chiefly as political proxies or *imtidadat fasa'iliyya* (organizational extensions) and as a means to increase political mobilization on behalf of these PLO groups.[20] Despite the fact that many union and student representatives compete for favored access to the state surrogate and its resources, the non-political interests of workers and students have not been ignored completely. Through their representatives, students are accorded access to decision-making bodies in their respective schools, thus facilitating the redressing of their grievances. Similarly, the unions often try to resolve problems that may arise between employers and employees, particularly problems related to wages, working conditions, social benefits, and currency fluctuations.[21]

VOLUNTARY COOPERATIVES

Palestinian voluntary cooperatives fall into three categories: cooperative institutions, productive projects, and household cooperatives.[22] All these catego-

18. Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Ibrahim al-Fattash, *Tarikh al-haraka al-niqabiyya min sanat 1917 ila 1992* (The history of the labor movement from 1917 to 1992) (Jerusalem: n.p., 1992).

19. Al-Fattash, *Tarikh al-haraka al-niqabiyya,* pp. 67–73; Salim Tamari, "Left in Limbo: Leninist Heritage and Islamist Challenge," *Middle East Report,* November-December 1992, pp. 16–22.

20. Al-Jarbawi, *Al-Intifada wa al-qiyadat* p. 21, and idem, *Waqfa naqdiyya ma'a tajrubat al-tanmiya al-Filastiniyya* (A critical look at the Palestinian developmental experience) (Ramallah: Bir Zeit University, 1991), pp. 46–8.

21. See interviews with union representatives in al-Fattash, *Tarikh al-haraka al-niqabiyya,* pp. 51 ff.

22. Unless otherwise indicated, the data used in the analysis of cooperatives is adapted from Izzat Abd al-Hadi, *Al-Intifada wa ba'd qadaya al-tanmiyya al-sha'biyya* (The uprising and some issues of popular development) (Ramallah: Bisan Press, 1992). This work is based on field research and is the most comprehensive and up-to-date study on this topic.

ries emphasize job creation through production, but, structurally speaking, the production process in the case of the household cooperatives takes place inside private homes and gardens, whereas in the case of the other two categories it involves separate or independent centers run by committees organized on the grass-roots level.

The cooperatives are an example of the combination of a practical civil society project with a vision behind it. The practical aspect is manifest in the range of the cooperatives' activities—from food and dairy production to consumer projects—that, although limited in scope, contribute to the fulfillment of the daily needs of local Palestinian society, and thus alleviate the pain caused by Israeli military measures. Their vision is reflected in the collective spirit that these cooperatives help foster. Two interrelated ideas, which may be termed those of the neighborhood and those of the small town, motivate the cooperatives. The neighborhood idea is specifically that of a compact local community, a family or a network of families, harnessing its resources at its own risk and under its own authority, not simply to protect itself and meet its own needs, but also to protect and meet the needs whenever possible of other neighborhoods in the same area. The example of the household cooperative represents this idea in its purest form. This idea also forms a new strand in Palestinian self-consciousness, namely that of self-reliance and independence from the Israeli economy.

The small town idea, that of a larger cooperative operating in a broader economic framework, has a more overtly nationalist theme—development of the economic, social, and cultural resources of Palestinian society. Implicit in this concept is a certain economic pluralism because those involved in the productive projects and the cooperative institutions do not hail from the same socioeconomic background, and cooperation among them cuts across kinship ties. Both the neighborhood and town ideas assumed a distinct form as a result of the intifada. They did not emerge earlier because it was only after the intifada that the idea of economic independence began to crystallize and receive serious attention. It is such ideas that form the ethical basis on which the cooperative vision rests.

Thus far, these cooperatives have been able to maintain a considerable degree of autonomy from the state surrogate, but their experience shows that they cannot insulate themselves completely from the political forces that exist in the West Bank and Gaza. In terms of membership, for example, 62 percent of the members joined their respective cooperatives either on the basis of family affiliation, economic interests, or both; the remaining 38 percent joined as activists on behalf of local political forces, particularly Fatah. This shows that the cooperatives have not been drawn into the network of the state surrogate, but at the same time it also shows that membership in these units is not universal, but is somewhat influenced by the intrusions of the state surrogate.

VOLUNTARY MASS ORGANIZATIONS

The third type of association is the voluntary mass organization. The origins of this formation can be traced back to the mid-1970s, when students formed voluntary work committees in Nablus to clean up the old quarters of town. The voluntary work movement continued to develop, recruiting students and channeling their energies into voluntary work for farmers who either could not afford or could not find rural workers because most Palestinian laborers were recruited for unskilled day jobs in Israel.

Although PLO groups were active in this kind of work as early as 1975, the voluntary movement maintained a reasonable degree of autonomy. The movement did not, however, strike deep roots because of the utopian vision of its leaders, who preached a philosophy of agrarian democracy. Practically speaking, their strategy was ill-suited for an agricultural economy that required a permanent labor force, not a temporary supply of devoted students who left after completing short-term projects. Nevertheless, advocates of voluntary work created the rudiments of an infrastructure that could facilitate the completion of large-scale projects.

Israel's security policies, including the periodic cutting off of basic services and curfews that strangled economic activity, adversely affected the Palestinians, who found in voluntary group action an effective means to alleviate the impact of Israeli punitive measures. The intifada established cooperative action as a recognizable feature of associational life in the occupied territories. The mass organizations developed as relatively autonomous and organized social units with specific functional responsibilities, foremost of which was to serve the population and shield it from the negative effects of Israeli military actions.[23]

A review of the activities of these organizations provides an understanding of how they relate to civil society as a group of units that act to promote both individual and group interests, as well as to inculcate in their members a sense of good citizenship and belonging. The activities of social work groups and women's societies are most instructive because there are so many of these groups at the town, village, and neighborhood levels. Because their work falls within the realm of social action, these groups have helped to promote associational life outside the framework of the state surrogate networks. For example, the voluntary charitable organizations, including health and family planning organizations, societies for the orphaned, the handicapped, and the elderly and similar associations are all local private units independent of similar organizations operating under the direction of the Israeli military governor or of international voluntary agencies.

23. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada,* pp. 205–17; Adil Abu Amshah, *Al-Awda' al-iqtisadiyya wa al-ijtima'iyya fi al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza qabla wa athna' al-intifada* (The economic and social conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip before and during the uprising) (Nablus: al-Najah University, 1989), pp. 136–69.

The voluntary organizations are made up of doctors (including psychiatrists), lawyers, social workers, educators, and other professionals. They are generally local, but commonly they are affiliated with larger networks such as the General Union of Charitable Societies. These organizations offer financial assistance to the needy, legal and psychiatric care, and moral support to many of those directly affected by the Israeli occupation. Apart from these activities, these organizations perform what in the West Bank and Gaza is called underground social work. This involves helping those injured or wounded by Israeli soldiers. It also involves offering different kinds of support to the families of detainees, deportees, and to those whose homes have been demolished by the occupation authorities. In many instances, these organizations take the initiative in launching outreach activities, especially in cases involving wounded Palestinians who flee to hospitals or local clinics to avoid arrest by the Israeli military. Members of these organizations usually offer their professional services free of charge.[24]

The voluntary women's groups also provide important civic services. Again, these do not fall under the control of the state surrogate. Their basis is the town, village, quarter, or neighborhood, and their aims are essentially non-political. Like the social work groups, women's groups sometimes are integrated into larger associations such as the Union of Women's Committees for Social Work (established in 1982) and United Action Women's Committees Union (established in 1989). Their membership is drawn from various professions and different social classes.[25] Usually women's groups are built around a strong and devoted personality with a tradition of learning and community service. Their activities have included the setting up of hospitals, family planning clinics, libraries, schools, colleges, and sewing centers.[26]

The idea that guides Palestinian social work and the women's groups is that of voluntary social action in which individuals and groups work together, in many instances free of charge, within a local framework to promote the welfare of society. Implicit in this idea is a strong element of political pluralism, for the members of these groups are of different political persuasions, have different class origins, and come from diverse religious backgrounds. An expression of this idea is evident in the field of health, where women's groups have teamed up with charitable organizations and community volunteers to provide first aid in areas under prolonged Israeli military curfews; they even set up day care centers in

24. Amin al-Hajj Yahya, *Al-Amal al-ijtima'i fi dhill al-intifada* (Social work during the intifada) (Jerusalem: n.p., 1988); Mustafa Barghouti and Rita Giacaman, "The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance: The Case of Health," in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), pp. 207–26.

25. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, pp. 126–73; Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Zachary Lockman and Joel Benin, eds., *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), pp. 155–69.

26. See further Izzat Daraghma, *Al-Haraka al-nisa'iyya fi Filastin, 1903–1990* (The women's movement in Palestine, 1903–1990) (Jerusalem: Diya' Center, 1991), pp. 139–75.

these areas. Other examples include programs to integrate women as full members into the social and economic spheres and to diversify the resources available to them.[27]

These voluntary groups thus have been instrumental in planting the seeds of an active and engaged population in the West Bank and Gaza. Their work has been supported, and even complemented, by the work of a number of autonomous local bodies such as the Ramallah-based human rights organization, Law in the Service of Man, a West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists, and al-Hakawati, or speakers' forum, in East Jerusalem. Newspapers, magazines, and local committees consisting of volunteers who try to resolve local disputes that arise among Palestinians also tend to reinforce the work of the voluntary organizations. In East Jerusalem, for example, the office of Faisal al-Husseini is involved in helping the local Arab population find jobs, solve family problems, and even maintain public order in the face of Israel's lackadaisical performance in this area.

Despite their work and the philosophy behind these groups, they have to cope with four sets of problems. First, there are the various obstacles imposed by the Israeli occupation authorities, who are not friendly to the activities of autonomous civic groups. Second, the prevalence of a small town, rural culture that encourages religious conservatism and discourages universal participation, especially participation by girls and women. Third, the voluntary associations must struggle to maintain their independence of the state surrogate, whose constituent groups follow a strategy based on direct control. Finally, the political ambitions of what may be called the alternative state surrogate, the HAMAS movement, also tries to draw autonomous civil organizations into its orbit.

ISLAMIST GROUPS

The Islamist groups offer a social and political vision different from the other Palestinian groups, and they attempt to rival and create parallels to the PLO apparatus in the occupied territories. Some of HAMAS's graffiti reads: "The Quran is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." In Jerusalem in 1992, HAMAS founded the Association of Religious Sages in Palestine. Although HAMAS claims that the 77 members of this association are senior *waqf* or Supreme Muslim Council clergy, most of them are in fact junior clerics in the Muslim Brotherhood or HAMAS activists[28] whose real mission appears to be the promotion of the programs of HAMAS.

In general, the Islamist groups in the occupied territories reject not only Israel and the policies of the PLO, but also the system of secular ideas and

27. Ibid., pp. 74–106; Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, pp. 192–205.

28. *Ha'aretz*, July 6, 1992, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*—Near East & South Asia, July 9, 1992.

institutions prevalent among the Palestinians and Arabs in general. They maintain that true Islam as a system of politics and social life is the solution to the Palestine problem and for other problems in Arab societies.[29] With regard to the occupied territories, two examples provide a brief exposition of the central argument of the Islamists. The first example pertains to the rejection of what one Islamist calls *namadhij jadida* (new models). This rejection is put forth most clearly in *Waylun li al-umara'* (Woe Unto the Princes),[30] a monograph written in 1990 by Samir Abu Asab, a Palestinian from East Jerusalem.

In this work, Abu Asab discusses the attributes of the true Islamic leader, using the occupied territories as the explicit focus of his argument. He describes a strong leader as having not only integrity, equanimity, a perceptive mind, and the Quran as his inspiring guide, but also the *bay'at ahl al-hall wa al-aqd* (the oath of allegiance given by those who loose and bind). An honest leader is portrayed as having those qualities of fidelity and uprightness that are consistent with the *sharia* and the conduct of the worthy ancestors.[31]

In the author's view, this is the authentic model of leadership, and many Islamists would agree with him. Abu Asab argues that many of those who claim to be local leaders in the occupied territories are not *qada* (leaders), but *zu'ama* (bosses) who rose to positions of prominence with the aid of the "propaganda machine" of Israel and other external powers. Support for a *qaid* (leader), Abu Asab says, has a solid popular base, while support for a *za'im* (boss) does not and tends to evaporate with the za'im's departure from the political scene. There can be no *imara* (authority), and hence no legitimate leadership, without freedom, and there can be no freedom in the shadow of occupation. The author suggests that those entitled to lead are either languishing in Israeli jails or fighting in the ranks of the underground Islamic resistance.

It is within the framework of these ideas that Abu Asab sharply criticizes three prominent local Palestinians: Faisal al-Husseini, the Fatah-affiliated local leader; Sari Nuseibeh, an intellectual with a penchant for provocative political proposals; and Radwan Abu Ayyash, a Ramallah-based journalist well connected to the foreign press. Abu Asab provides no extended analysis of their ideas, but rather denounces their political positions and relations with certain Arab and Western governments. He depicts all three men as models of *al-zu'ama' al-duma* (puppet bosses), condemns them for contacts with Israeli groups, and censures them for advocating a compromise settlement and meeting with US officials.[32]

29. For details on the history and ideas of these movements see Ziad Abu Amr, *Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Ghazza* (The Islamic movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Akka: Dar al-Aswar, 1989); Iyyad Barghuthi, *Al-Aslama wa al-siyasa fi al-aradi al-filastiniyya al-muhtalla* (Islamization and politics in the occupied Palestinian territories) (Jerusalem: Al-Zahra' Center, 1990).

30. The book was published in Jerusalem. The name of the publisher is not cited.

31. Abu Asab, *Waylun li al-umara'*, pp. 32–7.

32. Ibid, pp. 46–112.

The second example concerns Islamist positions toward a number of social issues: objection to the dress of 'Westernized' Muslim women; emphasis on prayer and dignified behavior; attacks on coeducation; incessant calls for the propagation of "moral teachings" in the mass media; and a general emphasis on applying the Islamic tradition to the cultural and social spheres. Behind such positions there lies the ideal of the virtuous Muslim life, and the rejection of *taqlid* (blind imitation), which for Islamists is a great danger to the legal observance of Islam.

In the social sphere, the Islamist instruments of action include mosques, schools, charities, clinics, and teaching circles in private homes. Politically, the same instruments of action are used, in addition to guidance offices, religious committees, and underground cells. Thus, in terms of a program of political and social action, what emerges is a vision based on a non-PLO, and in some respects even an anti-PLO, ideology of religion intended to give support to the ideology of nationalism. Through such an ideology the Islamist groups, particularly HAMAS, seek to exercise and justify control over society. In terms of organizing, HAMAS has been able to use the aforementioned instruments of action, and to employ them for the purpose of acquiring more political space in the occupied territories. The duality of functions that characterizes the political shops of the PLO characterizes their equivalents in the HAMAS movement.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the extent of popular support for the Islamic movement because its activities are clandestine. As far as open manifestations are concerned—elections—Islamists seem to win between 30 to 35 percent of the vote in student and professional associations. Because Bir Zeit University is close to being a microcosm of the occupied territories, the results of its elections serve as a rough barometer of the political tendencies prevalent in the West Bank and Gaza. The campus elections in November 1992 resulted in the PLO list winning 67 percent of the vote; HAMAS won 32 percent; and Islamic Jihad, 1 percent.[33] The results of its elections demonstrate that the secularists still have the upper hand. The balance of forces is not static, however, and the contest between the secular and Islamist visions of nationalism likely will continue.

CONCLUSIONS

The issues discussed in this article suggest five questions. What kind of social formations has Palestinian society produced? Do these formations have identifiable boundaries? How much civility have they demonstrated in their interaction with each other? What is the role of Islam in these formations? What role could the formations play if a Palestinian entity or state were to emerge? Reviewing the nature of these formations, one can start by saying that a wide spectrum of social organizations exist in the occupied territories. These include unions, student

33. *New York Times*, November 14, 1992, p. A2.

groups, a variety of cooperatives, women's societies, charitable associations, social work groups, human rights organizations, and a host of other voluntary social formations.

With respect to the nature of these formations, one needs to inquire as to whether the people drawn into them are motivated by a kind of *'asabiyya* or solidarity oriented solely toward furthering the interest of the formation itself? On the whole, despite the differences in their political outlook, all these formations constitute an infrastructure of civil and political institutions that work toward securing the survival of Palestinian society in the face of the Israeli government's attempts to stunt its development and to atomize it. Equally important, the work of these different formations, whether in the area of workers' and students' rights or in the area of providing basic social services to the Palestinian community, really is a substitute for the occupying power that not simply neglects but also disrupts these crucial services. In this sense, each of these formations represents a psychological and practical counterweight to the Israeli military regime.

The solidarity of these formations is rooted in an alliance of common interests that transcend the local boundaries of the formation or group. For example, the pooling of resources by the charitable organizations, the women's societies, and the medical committees to serve the different refugee camps and town neighborhoods testifies to the way these formations look after the interests of all society. This cooperation also illustrates the ability of a small society to deploy its limited resources through a rich variety of social organizations, despite the power of the Israeli military.

Do these formations have identifiable boundaries? The formations are not monolithic. On the contrary, they are individual social units whose reality lies in the people who constitute them and in the activities that emerge from the interaction among those people. This is demonstrated in the interdependence of the activities of these units and the regulation created by interaction. The cooperatives, for example, engage in some trade and commercial exchange with at least a few other social units by virtue of marketing their products in Palestinian towns and villages. Similarly, the visible and underground social work of the charitable societies overlaps with the activities of other mass organizations in that they coordinate their activities in order to offer desperately needed services to other social units. These activities show that the boundaries of these units are irregular, that the units are special purpose associations, and that each one supplies to the larger Palestinian society its specialized services.

Some of these formations have been coopted by the state surrogate, that is, the PLO. Nevertheless, the state surrogate neither has consumed civil society nor curtailed its growth. This is true of the cooperatives and the mass organizations that maintain their own sphere outside the political apparatus of the PLO. It is also true of the political shops that the PLO uses partly as instruments in the national struggle, but more importantly as mechanisms for the acquisition of more political space in the occupied territories.

The PLO's methods of cooptation are a typical case of patronage politics, but they are also a vivid illustration of the way in which a diaspora-based political movement has been able to mobilize social and political units in the occupied territories and direct their struggle for political independence and institution building. This is important in itself, but also it must be seen in the larger context of state-civil society relations. To reiterate Michael Walzer's observation, civil society requires a political agency to provide the basic rules of associational activity, and the state is an indispensable agent.[34]

By tolerating political pluralism and making itself accessible to the social units that exist in the occupied territories, the state surrogate empowered members of these units. Civil society may exist in the absence of a democratic state, as was the case in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the case of the Palestinians, it is precisely because the state surrogate has sustained political pluralism that it may be inclined to sustain a pluralistic civil society if independence is achieved. That Palestinian civil society is pluralistic bodes well for its ability to sustain a state based on pluralism. Here, then, is the challenge for Palestinian civil society in the occupied territories. This also leads to the third question, that of civility.

As a social virtue, civility means responsible associational engagement based on the voluntary acceptance of associating and communicating not simply for the sake of a family, or a neighborhood, or a religion, but also for the sake of the common good; it also means allowing different political and social formations to inhabit their space uncoerced by fear or repression in order that their members may play their roles as citizens.

Viewed from this perspective, the activities and associational lives of formations are a clear illustration of civility. The signs of civility manifest themselves not only in tolerance of diversity, but also in the way in which the members of these formations have connected with each other and reached farther than themselves and their comrades to look after an embattled community. This has fostered and protected the associational networks. Equally significant, it has fostered and protected a sense of camaraderie that has enabled the formations to sustain their associational life in the face of the overwhelming obstacles created by the Israeli occupation.

There are also signs of a lack of civility. An example is the absence of trust between Fatah and HAMAS, and by extension between the formations coopted by these two actors. Other examples include patronage politics and its associated corruption, and the assassinations of Palestinians by other Palestinians. It may be that these practices are largely a product of their time in the sense that 25 years of occupation have created an atmosphere of despair that has made certain Palestinians prone to radicalism and violence. This situation is not unique to Palestinian society, and it would be unwise to exaggerate its significance because

34. Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society," pp. 301–3.

the radicalism has not disrupted civil society nor checked the growth of associational life. The real threat to this society has been and continues to be the coercive machinery of occupation.[35]

With respect to the fourth question, that of the role of Islam in the associational life of the Palestinians, the question can be recast in three ways. First, are the ideas of religious conservatism among the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza deeply rooted? In general, the answer is positive, and this has to do with the weakening of Palestinian cities and towns caused by political instability, economic decline, and the excessive practices of the Israeli military regime. It is inaccurate, however, to conclude that the situation will not change. If there were political and economic stability, and if a Palestinian "law of return" were allowed to apply to the occupied territories, then the atmosphere of confidence that this would foster might encourage the return of diaspora-based Palestinian intellectuals and professionals, many of whom have secular outlooks. These developments would shift the demographic balance in favor of the cities and towns, thus giving a boost to the secular and liberal components that currently are challenged by the forces of religious conservatism.

Another question can be raised in the context of the role of Islam in the creation of the Palestinian national bond. On the scale of the cultural and social spheres, Islamists have positioned Islam as the embodiment of the virtuous life. Their success in this regard is difficult to measure because of the lack of reliable public opinion surveys. At least two examples, however, seem to suggest that Islamists have seized the initiative in the area of individual and social morality. One is the refusal of Palestinian secular forces to challenge openly the social behavior code promoted by the Islamists lest they alienate the so-called Palestinian street. The other example is the Islamic political and religious rhetoric that is tolerated, particularly in Gaza and Hebron. On the political scale, however, Bir Zeit University elections seem to suggest a different picture. Discussion on this subject in 1992 in the West Bank and Gaza suggest that, at best, the Islamic groups enjoy the support of about one-third of the population. On the whole, although Islam has been a central ingredient of Palestinian social and cultural life, it does not seem to be the determining factor that provides the impulse to their nationalism.

This provides the context for yet another question, namely the relationship between the ideology of religion and the ideology of nationalism. Since the onset of the British occupation, the ideological thrust of Palestinian nationalism has been consistently secular. If the Palestinians ever were granted independence, it might be possible for them to sustain and promote their political pluralism along

35. The US Department of State's survey of human rights during 1992 noted a 62 percent increase in Israeli killings of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza despite a decrease in overall violence in these areas. It also noted that of 158 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in 1992, at least 45 were killed by undercover Israeli agents disguised as Arabs. About two-thirds of those killed, according to the report, were unarmed. See further, *New York Times*, January 20, 1993, p. A8.

the lines of a stable balance between the dictates of reason and the dictates of faith.

The final question concerns the role of the social formations in consolidating a Palestinian state. Judging from their associational life and their ability to endure, these diverse formations, when combined, would form what Salim Tamari has described as an infrastructure of political and civic institutions that would support a Palestinian state.[36] Indeed, this is a unique feature of Palestinian civil society in the sense that its various units do not try simply to help the individual and the rest of society survive in the highly repressive environment of alien military occupation, but also they constitute an enduring foundation upon which a state can be built.

To encourage such a development, Palestinian civil society in the West Bank and Gaza must be protected and allowed to develop. This would require a heavy dose of economic assistance and a heavy dose of sustained political support from the United States and the European Community. Some have suggested that the US government extend financial support to the West Bank and Gaza in order to develop further autonomous civil society formations.[37] This would be a step in the right direction, but care must be taken to situate such aid in a framework that would prepare the Palestinians for full autonomy from Israeli rule.

In one resourceful sentence of his Inaugural Address, President Bill Clinton said, "When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act, with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary."[38] If that idea is to have any meaning, the place to apply it is in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel's occupation of these territories and its repression and deportation of their inhabitants defy the will and conscience of the international community, as is evidenced by numerous UN resolutions, many of which have been endorsed by the United States. If Clinton were to use US leverage to forge a genuine Israeli-Palestinian solution anchored in meaningful self-determination and mutual security, he would not only be giving credibility to his own idea, but would also be supporting the emergence of a pluralist entity that could serve as a harbinger of further political liberalization in the Arab world.

36. Salim Tamari, "What the Uprising Means," *Middle East Report*, May-June 1988, p. 26.

37. See, for example, Jerrold D. Green and Augustus Richard Norton, "Time is Right for U.S. To Help Foster Democracy in West Bank and Gaza," *Sun* (Baltimore), November 22, 1992, p. 5H.

38. See the address in *New York Times*, January 21, 1993, p. A15.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN KUWAIT: PROTECTED SPACES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Mary Ann Tétreault

IRAQ'S 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait accelerated a shift in Kuwaiti attitudes toward the state, society, and the individual. Some Kuwaitis who stayed abroad during the occupation expected that the liberation of their country would mark the beginning of a more democratic state.[1] Many who endured the occupation were even more fervent in their desire to broaden the concept of liberation to include the extension of social and political rights to women and citizenship to stateless *biduns*,[2] and to free domestic society from authoritarian constraints.[3] Unlike their compatriots who had remained outside Kuwait during this period, their experiences with the resistance movement—which encompassed Kuwaiti women as well as men, Sunna and Shi'a, and the poor along with the rich—provided a radically different understanding of state, society, and the role of the individual. The resistance to the Iraqi occupation also provided a grim lesson about the unity of Kuwaitis:

> I spent seven months [here] during the Iraqi invasion and I saw a lot of things change, a lot of my friends, new faces and new blood—a new free Kuwait. And I have some ideas in my mind and I want them to be true, to be facts. I would like to change a lot of things. The bad thing before the invasion—there was no equality among the

1. Interviews with Kuwaitis abroad in London, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC, 1990 and 1991.

2. The biduns are a class of people born and raised in Kuwait but who are denied citizenship because they cannot provide documentary evidence that their families—mostly nomads—lived in the state prior to 1920.

3. Interviews with Kuwaitis in Kuwait, March, September, and October 1992. All interviews in subsequent references were held in various locations in Kuwait unless otherwise noted.

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> Kuwaiti people. . . . They are not equal in front of the law. It is a small society and there must be equality among all Kuwaitis here. All mankind. We didn't have this before the invasion. But during the invasion we experienced equality and the true spirit of the liberation. . . . When Saddam Hussein came he treated us equally. He did not kill Shi'a or Sunna: he killed Kuwaitis. He did not kill workers or merchants: he killed Kuwaitis. He did not kill men or women: he killed Kuwaitis.[4]

The occupation experience seemed to reinforce a widespread yearning for individual freedom and full participation in the richness of civil and political life.[5] Yet, in Kuwait, the boundary between the state and civil society traditionally has been blurred. Although voluntary associations are the primary venues of civil society in most countries, in Kuwait, voluntary associations are not fully autonomous: Clubs, guilds, and professional associations not only are regulated by the state, but also depend upon it for a substantial portion of their budgets[6]; labor unions operate under state charters that, among other constraints, forbid political activity[7]; political parties are banned.[8] Despite the extent of state penetration, associations in Kuwait have been effective in developing and articulating positions opposing state policy and the extension of state power.[9] They have been most effective when the National Assembly is functioning, and government restrictions on civil liberties are subject to public disclosure and criticism.[10]

Kuwaiti civil society also penetrates the state. For example, since the country's liberation in February 1991, some bureaucrats, who nominally are part of the state's apparatus, have articulated a kind of opposition, fulfilling what they believe are constitutional or functional responsibilities even if these contradict what are understood to be the government's desires.[11] Thus, in practice, just as

4. Interview with Saleh al-Hashem, lawyer and candidate in the October 1992 National Assembly elections, September 29, 1992.

5. For example, the October 1992 parliamentary elections were the direct result of pressure brought to bear on the amir and the rest of the government by Kuwaiti notables at meetings in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, during the Iraqi occupation. At the time, given the rapid collapse of the government in the face of the invasion, many Kuwaitis expressed displeasure with the ruling family and the government for their closed decision-making process and lack of foresight regarding Iraqi intentions. Kuwaitis' anger also flowed from the fact that the government's suspension of their civil liberties—including a press ban—had led to a dearth of public information regarding events leading up to the invasion. Kuwaitis with short-wave radio did manage to remain informed, but given that most Kuwaitis do not read the international press, most were taken by surprise by the turn of events.

6. The Graduates' Society, the Women's Cultural and Social Society, and similar organizations in Kuwait operate under state charters and are state-subsidized. Parliamentary candidates Saleh al-Hashem (Independent) and Meshairy al-Osaimi (Independent) described state penetration of the Lawyers' Association at a candidates' meeting sponsored by the Kuwaiti Graduates' Society on September 30, 1992. Interviews with Mohammad al-Jasim and Adelah al-Sayer, October 1992.

7. Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 80.

8. Ibid., pp. 86, 92.

9. See Shafeeq Ghabra, "Voluntary Associations in Kuwait: The Foundation of a New System?" *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991).

10. Ibid., p. 205.

11. For example, one official ended a discussion of the accomplishments of his agency since liberation by remarking that its success worked against the interests of "the government." Then he

the government strives to penetrate and control civil society, opponents of its authoritarianism use their formal positions in the state to resist government control in the name of civic values.

The extent and pattern of this interpenetration encourages taking an unconventional approach to the analysis of civil society in Kuwait and the development of civil discourse. This article examines the development of civil structures and modes of discourse in "protected spaces," that is, physical domains and the social organizations within them that institutionally, legally, and normatively are off-limits to state intervention. The notion of protected spaces is an expansion of the ancient Greek distinction between the "private space" of the home and the "public space" of politics and markets.[12] According to this concept, although a man's public actions are subject to external review and sanctions by peers and superiors, what he does in private is his own business. Legal definitions of privacy may extend beyond family life, but the residence of the family, physically as well as metaphorically, is protected by the public-private dichotomy. The English maxim "A man's home is his castle" describes the vernacular understanding of modern legal and constitutional provisions that explicitly protect the home from arbitrary intrusion by the state.

By definition, the private space includes only the home, but some parts of the public space also enjoy relative protection from state intrusion. In this article both the home and such privileged public spaces are considered "protected spaces." These protected spaces are not coextensive with civil associations, but they support such associations and even house some of them. The interplay between the state and social actors in these protected spaces defines the limits of legitimate state intervention in Kuwaiti society. Equally important, the existence of protected spaces helped to sustain the post-occupation campaign for the extension of political rights to all Kuwaitis, including women. This is not only because of the pivotal role of the home as a protected space, but also because of the expanding role of women in the public space.

Women in Kuwait had worked outside the home even before the invasion, but this did not attract much popular support for extending their public role to include participation in politics. During the occupation, women were prominent among activists in the resistance and in the diaspora. Consequently, following liberation, the effort to extend them full political rights, formerly the concern of a relatively small group of women and a larger—though still small—number of male supporters, was renewed by a much larger number of Kuwaitis.

paused, "I say that even though some people might say that I am part of the government." Interview with the official, September 1992.

12. Modern writers using these concepts include Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1959); Eli Zaretsky, *Capitalism, The Family, and Personal Life,* revised and expanded edition (New York: Harper Perennial, 1986); and Robert N. Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1986).

Civil liberties following liberation were still limited by the amir's July 1986 suspension of much of the Kuwaiti constitution. Although some restrictions were lifted during the campaign, the preliminaries, such as mobilizing support for particular issues and candidates, were conducted under circumstances like those surrounding Kuwait's 1989–1990 pro-democracy movement.[13] As a result, many political activities that took place prior to the official opening of the 1992 campaign were conducted in Kuwait's protected spaces. The nature of these protected spaces and their normal casts of characters heightened the importance of women's political rights as an issue in the 1992 election.

PROTECTED SPACES

There are two social spaces in Kuwait that are substantially protected, by tradition and law, from state intrusion. One is the domain of a civil association—the mosque[14]—and the other the domain of a private institution[15]—the home. The mosque is part of what is considered public space and is one of the few legal social structures in Middle Eastern countries available for mass political mobilization. The mosque enjoys an advantage over secular associations in that the public space it occupies is sacred, conferring legitimate authority on religious leaders and groups independent of the state. Although popular support for Islamist groups in Kuwait has grown in step with the general religious revival throughout the region, the strength of these groups also is linked to domestic politics, rising during periods of suspended civil liberties when secular associations are repressed.[16] This is not just because under these circumstances such groups are the only outlet available, but also because their authority to challenge the state is morally unassailable.

Secular democrats borrowed some of this religious authority to buttress their positions during the 1989–1990 pro-democracy campaign to restore the National Assembly, which had been dissolved in 1986. "Even the Islamists support our movement" had been a common refrain of secular opponents of the regime's authoritarianism.[17] During the occupation, the authority of the mosque was strong enough to challenge the authority of Iraqi troops, and secular as well as religious activists relied on its protection. Resistance efforts to sustain Kuwaitis physically,

13. Mary Ann Tétreault, "Kuwait's Democratic Reform Movement," *Middle East Executive Reports*, October 1990.

14. In this article, "the mosque" refers not simply to a physical place, but also to a metaphorical construct embracing individuals, institutions, and organizations, including those whose purposes go beyond conventional definitions of "religious" but which still identify themselves as "Islamic." The term is analogous to the use of "the church" in the context of Catholicism.

15. Shafeeq Ghabra suggests that the tribe and the urban commercial family should be considered separately as occupants of protected spaces.

16. Ghabra, "Voluntary Associations," p. 207.

17. Interviews, spring 1990.

emotionally, and spiritually were centered around the mosque, the only public space that the occupiers showed any hesitance in breaching.[18]

The home occupies the private space and does not fall within the usual conception of civil society. Like other Kuwaiti institutions, however, the home cannot be confined by analytical boundaries, in this case the boundary separating the private from the public space. Because of its private character, the home enjoys constitutional protection against state intrusion under Articles 38 and 44. The home is the only secular space with this status, enhancing its attraction to political organizers during periods when public meetings are restricted or banned. The Kuwaiti home supports a plausible substitute for civil society in the public space, the *diwaniyya,* which straddles the public-private divide.

The term *diwaniyya* is used for a room in the house where family and friends meet regularly to play cards, sing, eat, and talk about business and politics—among other activities. The gathering itself is also called a *diwaniyya.* Its permanent cast of characters includes a core of relatives who do not live in the house. This quality of the diwaniyya and its locus in the home are what make it private. Diwaniyyas can be held without the government permits required (or denied) for other meetings. In practice, the diwaniyya is also a quasi-public event that "outsiders" attend regularly.

After the ratification of the constitution in 1962, it seemed only natural for diwaniyyas to become places where candidates went to meet potential constituents and to campaign for office.[19] This practice reflected politicians' desires to go where the voters were. It also began a process whose natural evolution ended in a similar use of diwaniyyas by pro-democracy forces in 1989–1990 to restore the constitution and parliament.[20] The interdependence of practice and meaning is evident in the vernacular use of *diwaniyya* to describe the tents that candidates established as temporary headquarters during the 1992 parliamentary campaign as well as in the fact that formal campaign meetings often followed a "diwaniyya format." Until the 1992 campaign, most diwaniyyas had excluded women—reflecting their quasi-public nature—but this practice is changing.

The diwaniyya is the product of a merger between two traditional patterns of Kuwaiti social life. One is the old practice of seafaring businessmen gathering in the evenings to trade information about weather, markets, and where the fish were running.[21] The other is the primary role of the family in social, economic, and political interactions. Regular family social visits and the predominance of family businesses in the domestic economy of Kuwait naturally led to gatherings for

18. Interviews with Kuwaitis, March, September, and October 1992.

19. Interviews with Abdullah Nibari, prominent member of the opposition and currently a member of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, spring 1990.

20. Tétreault, "Kuwait's Democratic Reform Movement," pp. 16–17.

21. Interviews with political scientist Abdullah al-Shayeji and others, spring 1990.

typically Kuwaiti family-based strategic planning and action.[22] During the Iraqi occupation, for example, decisions by individuals to stay in Kuwait or to leave were frequently made on the basis of family needs because family resources sustained many Kuwaitis during those difficult seven months.[23] Following liberation, family networks became the foundations of candidates' political constituencies, not only in the outlying Bedouin districts conventionally viewed as "tribal," but also in urban electoral districts.[24]

Thus, in practice, the Kuwaiti home is not entirely outside of the public space. The diwaniyya is the means by which the public space enters the home. The modern Kuwaiti home also enters the public space when women go to school, to work, and to participate in other social and political arenas beyond the direct supervision of their male relatives. The evolution of the Kuwaiti family away from the traditional Arab seclusion of women enlarges the scope of interests and activities in which women participate as autonomous actors rather than as spectators whose public experience is controlled by or mediated through family members or religious leaders. This expands the social network of the family, and the number and kind of people that family members regularly see and talk to. As a result, the information and resource base of the family also expands, complicating the job of a state that wants to control the spread of information and popular mobilization.

The family is more vulnerable than the mosque to external manipulation. Although its space is protected, its legitimacy is derived from the external authorities of the state and the mosque, the two institutions that define the family and prescribe the behavior of its members. In the home, the interests of state and mosque both coincide and clash, with each attempting to subordinate the family to its own interests and needs. In Kuwait, the home in its public aspect competes with the mosque for political resources and authority. If the mosque were a unitary political actor, its best interests would lie in the complete privatization of the home. The home's removal from the public arena would erase the protected political space of secular reformers whose objective is to limit not only the power of the state but also that of the mosque.

The mosque, however, is neither unitary nor unified. Although Islam provides a key component of identity, Kuwaitis are both Sunna and Shi'a, and divided within each sect by the degree of religiosity that members and families express.[25] These sectarian divisions also divide Kuwaitis politically. Further-

22. Interview with Jill Crystal, Chicago, IL, September 1992; interview with consultant William Kent, Washington, DC, December 1989. Kent spent most of his adult life as a banker and businessman in Kuwait and Iraq.

23. Interviews with Kuwaitis, September and October 1992.

24. Ibid.

25. There are no official figures for the percentages of Sunna and Shi'a in Kuwait. Most estimates agree that among Kuwaiti citizens, about 70 percent are Sunni and 30 percent Shi'i. In addition to the Sunni-Shi'i division, there also are various Islamic political groups and numerous local religious associations, such as the men who meet in neighborhood *Husseiniyyas*.

more, factions within the mosque seek external allies to bolster their authority both inside and outside the religious establishment.

Because the legitimacy of the state is widely regarded as inferior to that of the mosque—not only in Kuwait but throughout the Middle East[26]—the government also seeks political allies. Its maneuvers include not only supporting Islamists over secularists on some issues, but also supporting specific religious individuals and factions. The overall result is to keep the mosque divided and to weaken it as a source of political opposition. The state's interests are served by reducing the legitimacy of the mosque as a source of authority superior to its own. Thus, state maneuvering also encompasses moves that seem to support the mosque or, on the surface, seem to have nothing to do with religion, but which actually mobilize other political forces against the mosque. The conflicting interests of state and mosque coupled with their authority over the family help to explain why the issue of women's rights is the primary political terrain upon which the conflict in Kuwait between state and mosque is taking place.

WOMEN, STATUS, AND POLITICS IN KUWAIT

The position of women in Kuwait is conditioned by tradition, religion, and law. None of these is unambiguous in its approach to women and the family, and it is as easy to ascribe the positions of women in Kuwait to any as to all of them. It is equally easy to attribute to the same set of forces the conditions that make the position of Kuwaiti women in society more favorable than that of women in other Arabian Peninsula states. This ambiguity lends itself well to political manipulation as state and mosque both assert that tradition, religion, and law support their positions regarding women, and each can find authorities and examples to support its arguments.

Whatever the "traditional" role of women in Kuwait may have been in the past, it had disappeared to a very large extent by 1990. Oil money raised living standards for all Kuwaitis. It enabled the state to educate women as well as men, to import foreign labor to work in the home as well as in government and the private sector, and to open domestic labor markets to women. The impact of these changes affected women differently depending upon their class and family backgrounds as well as on their individual characters and situations.

The liberalization of some women's lives actually began before oil income expanded public services. The daughters of the cosmopolitan upper class were among the first Kuwaiti women to be educated abroad, mainly in Egypt.[27] In 1963, these upper class women started the first Kuwaiti women's organization, the Women's Cultural and Social Society. Adelah al-Sayer, a member of the execu-

26. Ghassan Salamé, " 'Strong' and 'Weak' States: A Qualified Return to the *Muqaddimah*," in Giacomo Luciani, ed., *The Arab State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

27. Raymond Bonner, "A Woman's Place," *New Yorker*, November 16, 1992, p. 64.

tive board of the society, was reared in India. When she returned to Kuwait in 1958, she drove her own car, a sight sufficiently rare to move the men along her route from Fintas to Kuwait City to applaud.[28] Fatima Hussain, who was educated in Egypt, took part in Kuwait's first feminist demonstration in the mid-1950s, marching with other women to the main market square where they removed and set fire to their *abayas*, the long black cloaks sometimes referred to as veils.[29]

Women living in the city enjoyed the benefits of education and paid employment before Bedouin women from the rural areas were able to do so. Physically and socially more isolated than their urban counterparts, Bedouin women comprise the largest subgroup among the declining population of illiterate Kuwaitis. In fact, most of the women who attended the literacy classes of the Women's Cultural and Social Society were Bedouin.[30] In general, Bedouin women still tend to live traditional lifestyles, especially in rural areas where the social separation of women and men usually is practiced, and men are more likely to have multiple wives.[31] Before the recent Islamist resurgence that brought the veil back to many urban women, most veiled women in Kuwait were probably Bedouin.

This urban-rural divergence illustrates the importance of social practices in shaping the conditions of women's lives. Kuwaiti social practices are defined by laws, mediated by institutions, and shaped by traditional values that include, but are not limited to, Islam. For example, Kuwait's education and labor laws guarantee formal gender equality. In practice, however, women's education, as reflected in literacy rates and other measures—such as educational status[32]—lags behind that of men, and is a product of family decisions, university admissions policies, and state support for study abroad, all of which reflect values that lead to differences in the treatment of women and men.[33] Employment opportunities are also constrained by the effects of values on social practices. Even trained women with demonstrated interest and competence in certain positions find it hard to obtain jobs that would require them to go against traditional norms.

Although Kuwaiti women's rights to education and employment are re-

28. Interview with Adelah al-Sayer, October 27, 1992.

29. Veiling in Kuwait is far from uniform: some women wear only scarves covering the hair; others wear abayas; some augment abayas with masks, and a few with veils that cover the face completely; a small number even wear gloves so that no flesh is exposed.

30. Interview with Adelah al-Sayer, October 27, 1992. The disparity in male and female literacy rates persisted through 1985, the last year for which data are available. In that year 24 percent of women were illiterate as compared to 9 percent of men. See State of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, *Statistical Abstract in 25 Years*, special issue (Kuwait, 1990), table 17.

31. Interviews with Kuwaitis and foreign observers living in Kuwait, September and October 1992.

32. See State of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, *Annual Statistical Abstract*, 1989, table 35.

33. Interview with Moudhi al-Hamoud, consultant and associate professor of business management at Kuwait University, October 1992; speeches by Moudhi al-Hamoud and Badria al-Awadhi, of the Regional Organization for the Protection of Marine Life, before the diwaniyya at the campaign headquarters of Saleh al-Yaseen, September 28, 1992; interviews with female Kuwaiti students, 1990 and 1992.

stricted by tradition, their lack of political rights is a matter of law. The electoral law, originally written in 1959 and amended several times since, has yet to extend suffrage to women. The issue of women's formal political rights tends to pit secular reformers against Islamists and traditionalists. In the debate on this issue, Islamists have led the opposition to women's rights, basing their criticisms on their authority as religious spokesmen. According to one scholar:

> The Muslim fundamentalists opposed offering women equal suffrage with men. They argued that, if women were enfranchised, they would neglect their children and families. In addition, they pointed out that under the Sharia law, men are superior to women and that women are weak and incapable of assuming an independent political stand. . . . [I]f they were enfranchised, they would be liable to manipulation by their husbands.[34]

This particular argument, which reflects Kuwaiti and perhaps even foreign understanding of the rationale for opposing women's rights in Kuwait, masks the complexity of the opposition to women's rights—and the complexity of the Islamist position. It also oversimplifies what Kuwaitis understand as a much more complex issue than one embracing suffrage alone.

Kuwaitis perceive political rights for women as falling into three categories. The first is the right to vote, believed to be supported more widely in post-liberation Kuwait than it was in 1985, when a poll taken during elections that year showed that a majority of registered voters opposed granting the vote to women.[35] Kuwaitis who support voting rights for women cite as reasons women's performances during the Iraqi occupation and the fact that women in other countries, particularly Islamic Iran, can vote.[36] A growing underlying perception that granting women the right to vote will not necessarily lead to a change in social relations is also a primary reason for this change in attitude: Like the right to go to school or the right to work outside the home, voting rights for women can be constrained by customary social practices and informal regulations on female behavior. This perception explains the recent reversal in the type of man who says that women's votes would be manipulated by their husbands. In the past, Islamists used this explanation as an argument for opposing the extension of voting rights to women. Today, some Islamists, along with the amir, are supporting voting rights for women while some secularists object on the grounds that giving voting rights to women would result in the election of more conservative candidates because traditionalists have more wives and control them more closely than do liberals.[37]

34. Kamal Osman Salih, "Kuwait's Parliamentary Elections: 1963–1985, An Appraisal" (unpublished paper, Kuwait University, 1990).

35. Ibid.

36. Interviews with Kuwaitis, September and October 1992.

37. Ibid. This latter argument was also made by French and US diplomats interviewed in Kuwait in March, September, and October 1992.

The two other issues pertaining to political rights for women involve deeper questions of power in Kuwaiti society: the right of women to run for elective office and the right to be appointed to posts in the religious courts and government ministries that oversee religious institutions. All three aspects of women's political rights were debated during the 1992 election campaign. For example, Khaled Sultan, a parliamentary candidate, discussed his position as a Salafi—a member of the Islamic Popular Alliance, regarded as the more conservative of the two Sunni Islamist political groups that fielded candidates:

> Let's not confuse the rights of women with the right to vote. The rights of women under Islam supersede the rights of women anyplace else. . . . [But] the right to vote gives women the right to nominate themselves for parliament. From our religious point of view we cannot allow women to hold political positions. If that right of nomination is separated from the right of voting, and that right to vote would not create . . . moral consequences on the behavior and the running of the campaign, then we would not object to giving women the right to vote. . . . [But] if it comes to attending . . . rallies, then we cannot give women the right to vote.[38]

Compare Khaled Sultan's views to the position of Nasir Sarkhou, a Shi'i Islamist candidate and member of the Islamic National Alliance, the only Shi'i political group that was not banned from formal participation in the election:

> In Islam we [hold] that woman is not allowed to be a judge or a ruler so she cannot be a person to be followed as a spiritual leader. She can take part in the election, can participate as a candidate. The parliament is a way of organizing the system. The system is to organize the country. Other religious groups look at [engaging in] politics as equivalent to being a spiritual leader. We do not.[39]

The Sunni majority—based on the remarks of Khaled Sultan, one of its representatives—takes a hard line against women's rights. To Khalid Sultan, even the right to vote is too much if it would bring women into the public arena with men. The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), also a Sunni Islamist political group, is the Kuwaiti branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, or Ikhwan. ICM candidates also reject the presence of women in the public space. Campaign staff members asked this author to leave a meeting at the tent of Mohammad al-Busairy, an ICM candidate, saying that the meeting could not be conducted with a woman present. Nevertheless, one ICM candidate, Ismail Shatti, was reported as saying that he might be able to support the vote for women under conditions similar to those outlined by Khaled Sultan.[40]

In contrast to Sunni Islamists, the Shi'i minority has built bridges to Kuwaitis who want women's political rights expanded, women and men who tend to be secular rather than religious activists. This strategy reflects the same sort of

38. Interview with Khaled Sultan, September 30, 1992.
39. Interview with Nasir Sarkhou, October 2, 1992.
40. Interview with Shafeeq Ghabra, September 28, 1992.

political logic as the 1960s civil rights alliance between Blacks and Jews in the United States: minorities joining together and supporting one another to achieve common goals. By separating themselves from the Sunni Islamists in this manner, the Shi'i Islamists legitimize their distinct religious activism and status. Their strategy supports a liberal interpretation of Islamic teachings bearing on women's rights. According to Nasir Sarkhou, Islam does not forbid female political participation, but only the exercise of religious authority by women. From his perspective, not only voting, but also running for office, an activity that is public by definition, is acceptable for women. Another Islamic National Alliance candidate, Sayyed Hussain Ali al-Qallaf, actually set up a separate tent for women who might want to attend his meetings.

It should not be assumed that the presence of women in the public space is a problem just for Islamists. Even those secular candidates who openly advocated women's rights encountered difficulties with constituents who were not prepared to accept the practical implications of their candidates' platforms. The Kuwait Democratic Forum (KDF), the most programmatically developed of the secular groups competing in the 1992 election, sponsored seven candidates who ran on a single platform that included a provision calling for women's political rights.[41] All the KDF candidates welcomed women to their meetings but had to provide separate facilities for them. According to Ahmad al-Dayeen, a KDF candidate:

> I started out wanting a mixed diwaniyya but the men complained and I had to have a second tent. We did this because we go according to the social norms and they don't want this. Even though some liberated women come, housewives, we go by the social norms and keep them in a separate place. The women who come to the headquarters watch events through a closed-circuit TV hookup. They also share in meetings in private houses. On nights when a meeting is announced, about 60 or 70 women come.[42]

Ahmad al-Dayeen also asked a woman, Iman al-Bedah, to manage his campaign:

> [I chose her] for two reasons. One, I deeply believe in the role of women in politics in this country. Second, because I was nominated by the KDF in late circumstances and I didn't want to take staff from the other candidates and she was a good choice. In our program we call for full rights for women.[43]

Women played a minor role at candidates' meetings sponsored by neutral groups, such as attending the debates at the Graduates' Society and Kuwait University. The university organizers also placed a woman on each panel of commentators questioning candidates after their opening statements. In another

41. The KDF is the heir of two Arab nationalist groups: the National Alliance and the Democratic Alliance. The other two secular groups, the 1985 parliamentarians and the Constitutional Bloc, ran on platforms emphasizing the restoration of parliament and civil liberties. The vast majority of the candidates in the 1992 election ran as independents.

42. Interview with Ahmad al-Dayeen, October 1, 1992.

43. Ibid.

event, KDF candidate Saleh al-Yaseen forced the issue of opening the public space to women by sponsoring a diwaniyya where the two featured speakers were women, Moudhi al-Hamoud and Badria al-Awadhi. The original plan was that the guest speakers would be the only women present to occupy the open (public) space, sitting with the candidate at a table facing the audience and visible from all sides. The audience was partitioned to seclude the rest of the women from view, but before the meeting began, some women in the audience moved their chairs forward into an unpartitioned area in front of the table which, on the men's side, was part of the space that the men in the audience used freely. During the question and answer period following the speeches, men and women from the audience alternated in the asking of questions. The first to speak was a man who came into the open area to use the microphone provided there. A microphone was then brought into the partitioned area for the second questioner, a woman. As she stood at her seat to speak, a car sped by and a firecracker was thrown out. She was undaunted:

> My friends are telling me not to be afraid, to stand up for my rights. I am not afraid. The person who threw the firecracker wants to scare us away. Don't move. Stay here. Sit down.[44]

The next time it was a woman's turn, the questioner walked up to the open space in the front to speak.

GENDER INTERESTS AND WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

The prominence of women's rights on Kuwait's political agenda encourages discussion of a variety of opinions on the issue. Women's positions on this issue also vary and, like the positions of different Islamists, the variation can be explained in part by strategic goals arising from the different interests of Kuwaiti women and which among these interests particular individuals and groups seek to maximize.

Maxine Molyneux separates gender interests into two categories.[45] The first is "strategic gender interests." These are deductively derived from an analysis of the structure of women's subordination and the formulation of "an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist."[46] Women's political rights fit into this category. The second category is called "practical gender interests." These are inductively formulated from analyses of the specific situations of different women in the home, the workplace, and other social spaces. In the United States, the feminist movement was divided internally according to which set of interests different women thought should be emphasized. Political

44. Comments from the woman in the audience, September 28, 1992.

45. Maxine Molyneux, "Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua," *Feminist Studies* 11 (Summer 1985).

46. Ibid., p. 232.

feminists emphasized the vote during the first wave of American feminism and the Equal Rights Amendment during the second, saying that other rights depended upon equal access to the political process. Social feminists focused on specific situations and sought specific changes that would make an immediate impact on women's lives. In the United States, social feminists worked for specific things such as international peace, improvements in access to jobs and in workplace conditions, prohibition of the use of and protection from the effects of alcohol and other drugs, and divorce and child custody reform.

Kuwaiti women's rights advocates similarly are divided. Like American activists, some participate in more than one group and advance both sets of interests simultaneously. Also like Americans, there are Kuwaiti women who see their interests as best served by the status quo. Many Kuwaitis assume that this proportion is higher in Kuwait than in the United States, in part because the Kuwaiti government provides a much higher standard of social welfare than citizens enjoy in the United States. In Kuwait, the right to work is constitutionally guaranteed and in practice the government is the employer of last resort for any Kuwaiti, male or female, who wants a job.[47] Kuwaitis receive a variety of allowances and subsidies, and benefits such as free education—inside and outside the country—up to the level of individual competence and desire. Kuwaitis have free health care, including state-paid trips abroad to obtain medical services unavailable in Kuwait. The accessibility of cheap foreign labor for household work is another element in the high living standard that the average Kuwaiti woman enjoys whether she goes out to work or stays at home.

Kuwaiti women are difficult to categorize as traditional or non-traditional because so many who see themselves as being in the mainstream of Kuwaiti life participate extensively in activities outside their homes. Among activist Kuwaiti women, a differentiation between political and social feminists is relatively unimportant because so many individuals are involved in both kinds of organizations and activities. The attitudes of religious Kuwaiti women are also difficult to predict. Their acceptance or rejection of the idea of political rights for women might be influenced by the pronouncements of Kuwaiti religious men and the example of Saudi Arabia—or the contradictory pronouncements of other Kuwaiti religious men and the counter example of Iran. As a result, even though many are indifferent and some antagonistic toward the idea of women's rights, the legitimacy of the struggle is difficult to challenge on cultural or religious grounds.

If a woman's husband and family situation meet her minimum standards, if she has no interest in politics, and if she and her daughters have no career goals that conflict with normal social practice, then she has little to seek from the public arena. Even some women with this situation, however, enter the public space to

47. Interviews conducted in spring 1990 with Kuwait University political science professor Shamlan al-Eisa and Sulieman Mutawwa, former member of the board of the Kuwait Oil Company, planning minister in the Kuwaiti government-in-exile, and, at the time of this interview, a member of the commission on civil service reform.

work on community development projects and on projects designed to aid women, children, and families abroad. The Women's Cultural and Social Society is the oldest and best example of an organization that works for such social feminist goals. The society's emphasis on charitable work is attested by its authority to collect *zakat* to finance its activities.[48]

In Kuwait, Nadi al-Fatat is the group most strongly identified with political feminists. Led by Najat Sultan, with strong support over the years from Fatima Hussain, Nadi al-Fatat holds regular meetings in a sports club. To set the record straight, as one woman who has attended these meetings off and on for seven years somewhat ruefully remarked, Nadi al-Fatat does not concern itself with sports.[49] To their political opponents, the women of Nadi al-Fatat are idle dilettantes whose interests are far removed from those of the majority of Kuwaiti women.[50]

The perception that Nadi al-Fatat is isolated culturally from the vast majority of women in Kuwait probably is less true than that it is isolated socially to some extent because decision making is monopolized by a few women.[51] Nevertheless, Nadi al-Fatat's status among Kuwaiti women has changed as a result of the invasion and occupation. Since liberation, most Kuwaiti women, including those whose involvement with women's groups was tangential or even nonexistent, see Nadi al-Fatat as the group most closely identified with women's political rights. The occupation thus provided an enormous boost to the legitimacy of Nadi al-Fatat and its goal of achieving full political rights for Kuwaiti women. Women like Moudhi al-Hamoud, whose activities before the invasion concentrated on her family and her profession, have joined activists in Nadi al-Fatat to bring this goal about:

> I am a professional woman. I have nothing to do with politics. But after the invasion, when we came back to Kuwait, because of what we have done for our country outside and as women in the resistance inside, I think we deserve equal political rights. It was good to hear the amir and the crown prince also defending our rights. . . . We understand it is very difficult for the electoral law to be changed. Only the parliament can change the law, so we started with the [1992 election] campaign. I had written a few articles before the lecture [at the Yaseen diwaniyya]. . . . [A]s a group of about 40 women, we tried to convince and educate people—even some women don't want this right. . . . We have gatherings with the women, debates, and then we got one chance with the diwaniyya of Saleh al-Yaseen. Now we have a plan to move from the [date of the convening of parliament] until we get our rights. We have to convince these people, the public and the assembly—and with the Salaf and the Ikhwan our job

48. Interview with Adelah al-Sayer, October 27, 1992.

49. Interview with Fathia al-Haddad, an employee of the Kuwait Oil Company, at the October 4, 1992, meeting of Nadi al-Fatat.

50. Khaled Sultan, for example, dismissed Nadi al-Fatat as a few women "making some noises" about things "their sisters do not want." Interview, September 1992.

51. This comment was made repeatedly by younger women—ranging from teenagers to women in their thirties—who are not relatives of the women who form the core of Nadi al-Fatat.

> will be even harder. But we have a plan and will employ this plan until we get something.[52]

The ideological arguments of the opponents of women's rights mirrors the deductive orientation of Nadi al-Fatat and its counter arguments. Rather than approaching the issue by citing Western liberal doctrines, however, Kuwaiti political feminists refuse to be pushed out of their rightful domain.

> I feel angry that women will get their rights only in 1996 because of groups with fundamentalist and religious sentiments. Such religious groups only select those verses of the Quran that serve their interests and ignore the rest. In fact, according to the Holy Quran, women and men are equal in their rights as Muslims, and regardless of their sex, are equal before God.[53]

This resistance by Kuwaiti feminists to cultural marginalization keeps the debate between the country's political feminists and political anti-feminists within the bounds of civility.

WOMEN, THE STATE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The ruling family of Kuwait is the most prominent public institution calling for political rights for women. Numerous statements by the amir and the crown prince have put the family on the "right," or pro-democracy, side of the issue, implicitly putting the National Assembly on the "wrong" side, given the vote against women's rights by the 1981 parliament. The strength of the amir's support for women's suffrage fueled speculation that he would change the electoral law to enfranchise female citizens before the 1992 election. He had made other changes to the law in 1980 during a similar suspension of the constitution and parliament.[54] In 1992, the secular opposition challenged the amir's right to change the law unilaterally, despite the risk that this might alienate women and their supporters. Instead, their challenge managed to retain the support of activist women and to attract allies among constitutionalists in the religious opposition.

The ruling family's support for women's rights carries with it some less obvious effects, one of which is a counter to the rising power of Islamist groups. Many Kuwaitis outside the Islamist groups are convinced that the ruling family gave money and special favors to Islamist candidates during the campaign in order to weaken the electoral chances of candidates from the secular opposition. Islamists deny this. Regardless of whether the regime assisted Islamist candidacies, its repeated public support for women's rights make the institutionally stronger Sunni Islamists look like extremists. The government is engaged simultaneously in a subtle impugning of the entitlement to political rights that women

52. Interview with Moudhi al-Hamoud, October 17, 1992.
53. Quoted in the *Arab Times* (Kuwait), October 6, 1992, p. 1.
54. Crystal, *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 98; Kamal Osman Salih, "Kuwait's Parliamentary Elections."

(and men) in the resistance feel that they earned during the occupation. One example is evident in the "fillers" shown between programs on Kuwaiti television. Vignettes presumably showing life in Kuwait during the occupation invariably portray the Kuwaitis who stayed behind as passive and powerless before the Iraqis. This propaganda challenges the notion that women are entitled to political rights because of their bravery under occupation, and also undermines the larger assumption that all Kuwaitis earned their freedom by their efforts to liberate their country.

According to Farideh Farhi, when the struggle for women's rights in Muslim countries can be construed as a battle between an authentic national culture and imported Western, imperialistic ideas, real freedom for women becomes a hostage to the forces of nationalism.[55] The effort to preserve indigenous cultural norms against imperializing administrators and other missionaries frequently was framed as a religious conflict waged in terms of the family and women's roles. Consequently, in most Middle Eastern countries, an important legacy of imperialism is the condemnation of women to a symbolic role in "the politics of authenticity."[56] Women's claims to equality and full political participation are uniquely vulnerable to delegitimization as tools of "imperialist or neo-imperialist designs, [tainting] the local collaborators of such a project . . . with cultural inauthenticity if not outright betrayal."[57]

This situation is virtually absent from Kuwaiti politics, in part because Kuwaiti feminists refuse to accept the definition of themselves, their roles, and their claims to equality as contrary to Islam or in any way un-Kuwaiti. More important, since the invasion, Kuwaitis as a whole are unwilling to accept such designations. The role of the ruling family in normalizing the concept of women's political rights also has contributed to the "domestication" of the issue. This serves the interests of Kuwaiti women's rights activists regardless of the other political goals pursued by those willing to take public positions on their behalf.

It is ironic that the efforts of Kuwait's ruling family to divide Kuwaitis also have contributed to the formation of flexible and pragmatic coalitions that reinforce an established style of domestic politics that historically has been remarkably civil. Since liberation, the struggle for women's rights in Kuwait has been conducted primarily as a conflict among domestic interests rather than as a holy war. For the most part, the discourse has remained polite because so much of it is conducted indirectly, through the press and the grapevine, rather than in face-to-face encounters.

55. Farideh Farhi, "Sexuality and the Politics of Revolution in Iran," in Mary Ann Tétreault, ed., *Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, forthcoming).

56. Deniz Kandiyoti, "Introduction," in Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., *Women, Islam and the State* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 7–9.

57. Ibid., p. 7.

The entry of women into the public space of political activity, not confined to separate tents but sitting together with male peers, provides the real test of the civility of a Kuwaiti political discourse that includes women. This entry began during the 1992 parliamentary elections, with the almost unremarked inclusion of women at independently sponsored public debates and, even more significantly, at Saleh al-Yaseen's path-breaking diwaniyya. Weeks after that event, Moudhi al-Hamoud said of the firecracker that had enlivened that first official appearance of female speakers at a candidate's diwaniyya: "That was nothing. It could have been a lot worse."



Special Report

CRISES, ELITES, AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

Saad Eddin Ibrahim

DURING the last 25 years, Arab countries have experienced a number of major crises leading to the erosion of the legitimacy of their ruling elites. These events dramatically exposed leaders' incompetence at managing regional and inter-Arab conflicts as well as their ineptness at managing domestic societal affairs. Over the years as various crises unfolded, political observers considered each of them a watershed warranting subsequent structural changes in the modalities of governance. Beginning with the 1967 defeat at the hands of the Israelis and ending with the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war, many of the predictions about changing modalities have not materialized. In fact, the durability of the Arab world's authoritarian regimes remains striking.

Two years after the 1991 gulf war, nearly all the preexisting ruling elites remain entrenched in power, and inter-elite relations seem to have regressed to their old modalities. To be sure, some marked changes have occurred, but whether they are merely cosmetic or signs of embryonic trends is still to be seen.

LOSS OF LEGITIMACY

Most Arab regimes were discredited in the eyes of their citizens well before the gulf crisis. This process, although started in 1967, was reversed briefly in 1973 with a respectable performance by Arab armies in the October War. The decline in legitimacy, however, resumed with the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 and the inter-Arab cleavage opened by Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's

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visit to Israel in 1977 and his signing of the Camp David accords in 1978 and peace treaty in 1979. Another inter-Arab cleavage developed over the 1980–88 Iraq-Iran War and Arab regimes' ineffectiveness in the face of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut.

Dramatic as they have been, external defeats have not been the only sources for the discrediting of Arab regimes. Internally, regime performances have sagged or seriously deteriorated. In the non-oil Arab countries, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed population and urbanization growth without matching economic growth in real terms. The strategy of import substitution, introduced in the 1950s and 1960s, reached its upper ceiling by the early 1970s. In the two decades following, food imports rose steadily from $2 billion to $20 billion annually. Arab external debt rose with them from less than $5 billion in 1970 to about $200 billion in 1990. The ability of most Arab states to subsidize food, provide services, or generate enough jobs for new entrants into the labor force steadily diminished. Many of the gains achieved in the three decades following independence or the ascendence to power of so-called revolutionary regimes had bottomed out by the 1980s.

Even regimes of the oil-rich Arab countries were running into trouble by the mid-1980s. Much of the windfall oil revenues of the post-1973 war period was quickly depleted, either as the result of external regional adventures—as in the cases of Algeria, Iraq, and Libya—or because of corruption and wasteful public spending on grandiose white elephant schemes, particularly in the small gulf states. With the sharp decline in oil prices, starting in 1983, some of these countries—notably, Algeria and Iraq—joined the ranks of the other economically strained non-oil ones.

Thus, by the time of the gulf crisis, the wizened legitimacy of all Arab regimes was already obvious; the gulf crisis merely dramatized it. An implicit social contract, forged by the elites in the 1950s, had been predicated on a "trade-off" between genuine political participation and palpable improvement in the quality of life of the citizen as well as the heady excitement of Arab nationalism. In other words, political freedom was sacrificed on the high altar of Arab nationalism. The 1967 defeat was an early dramatic sign that the trade-off was a bad bargain. For a short while, in 1973–75, it looked as if the formula could be restored, but the subsequent march of events clearly revealed that such restoration was sociologically untenable and politically quite costly.

The slogans of the 1950s and 1960s—romantic pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, and socialism—did not appeal to the middle and working class socioeconomic formations that emerged after independence. These new formations included the new middle class, the modern working class, and the urban "lumpen proletariat." The first two grew dramatically in the 1950 to 1970 period while the third grew steadily and rapidly in the 1970 to 1990 period. To be sure, the growth of these socioeconomic formations was neither even nor uniform in all Arab countries. Generally, all three appeared on the social landscape of the northern tier of the Arab world—Egypt, North Africa, and the Fertile Cres-

cent—at least 20 to 30 years earlier than in the countries of the southern tier—Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and the Arabian Peninsula.[1] A native urban lumpen proletariat has yet to surface in the oil-rich gulf states; what little that exists has been made up of poor expatriates. As Islam has been repoliticized in the contemporary Middle East, the urban lumpen proletariat has proven particularly open to its appeal. In fact, the Islamists' populist appeal positively resonates among it.

No longer able to honor the terms of the old social contract, calm new socioeconomic formations with the tired language of political discourse, or forge a new participatory social contract (for fear of being toppled from power), the Arab ruling elites resorted either to coercive repression at home or to riskier adventurism abroad. Since 1980, Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq has done both, reaching an all-time high on August 2, 1990, with the invasion of Kuwait, triggering, of course, what came to be known as the "gulf crisis." During the crisis it was predicted that more participatory governance of the Arab world would be among its outcomes. This prediction was based on the proposition that the crisis was as much an internal Arab political crisis as it was a regional-international crisis.

DEMOCRATIZATION: THE RUMBLINGS

In the few years immediately preceding the gulf crisis, several Arab regimes were already sensing their mounting internal loss of legitimacy. It was expressed in increasingly frequent violent confrontations between regimes and one or more of the major socioeconomic formations. The upper rungs of the new middle class engaged regimes in nonviolent battles over basic freedoms, human rights, and democracy. On the pan-Arab level and within several Arab countries, this quest took the form of establishing human rights organizations and more autonomous professional associations, thus revitalizing stunted civil societies.

There were varying levels of popular demands vis-à-vis respective Arab regimes. On one level, the demands were for greater "liberalization," such as freedoms of the press, associations, and the right to travel abroad. Nearly all regimes made some concessions in response to these demands. On a higher level, the demand was for serious and explicit democratization, such as legalized political parties, equal access to the mass media, and free and honest elections. None of the regimes has fully responded to these demands.

The lower rungs of the new middle class adopted Islamic political activism to challenge ruling elites. The modern working class opted more often for strikes or other forms of work slowdowns and industrial sabotage. The urban lumpen

1. Many people are not accustomed to thinking of Mauritania and Somalia as Arab countries, instead considering them as belonging to black sub-Saharan Africa. Both countries joined the Arab League in 1973, but despite official efforts to strengthen their Arab identity have remained both geographically and politically marginalized.

proletariat resorted to "street politics," such as demonstrations, rioting, and looting. Whatever formation started a confrontation and however its discontent was expressed, the other equally alienated socioeconomic formations would join in to advance their own demands. During the 1980s and into the 1990s, this phenomena occurred across the region: Algeria, 1988; Egypt, 1981, 1986; Jordan, 1989; Kuwait, 1989, 1990; Mauritania, 1986, 1988; Morocco, 1984, 1988, 1990; Somalia, 1985–1990; South Yemen, 1986–1990; Sudan, 1985; and Tunisia, 1984, 1988. The ruling elites in these countries all responded to growing expressions of discontent with promises of economic and political reforms. In fact, some began to honor such promises before the outbreak of the gulf crisis. Others took advantage of the crisis to renege on or to delay honoring them.

Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen had embarked on serious democratization processes before the gulf crisis. All three had held national or municipal elections between 1987 and 1990 with few or no complaints regarding their integrity. The fact that anti-regime Islamist candidates performed well and captured more seats than expected added to the credibility of the process. The fact that democratically elected people in all three countries loudly supported Saddam Hussein during the gulf crisis perplexed Western observers espousing democratization in the Third World.

Their support for Hussein is an irony to be pondered on its own. These newly elected members in the opposition were expressing discontent not only in regard to their own rulers, but also in regard to the overall Arab order, and, for that matter, the much-talked-about "new world order." Although no less despotic than some of the other Arab rulers on both sides of the crisis, Saddam Hussein tapped and manipulated that discontent outside Iraq. He was able to do this in part because Iraq's oil wealth had not been as flaunted in poorer Arab countries by Iraqi citizens as had that of counterparts in the gulf. The argument by the United States and other Western countries about international legitimacy seemed insincere to many Arabs and, in view of the Palestinian question, smacked of a double standard.

In 1987, a few years before the gulf crisis, the Tunisian leadership changed peacefully—although via something of a constitutional coup—from Habib Bourguiba to Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. The new leadership promised political reforms to secular opposition parties, but continued to deny legitimacy to the Islamist al-Nahda Party. A series of bloody confrontations took place between the regime and followers of al-Nahda in late 1989 and early 1990. The gulf crisis, on which all Tunisian parties saw eye-to-eye, froze these confrontations for nearly a year, but they resumed subsequently. Other secular opposition parties remain disdainful of the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, but their fear of the Islamist trend makes them view the status quo as the lesser of two evils.

Limited democratization in Egypt and Morocco several years prior to the gulf crisis did not progress further in 1990–91. Although the Moroccan government sided with Kuwait and the US-led coalition during the crisis, the opposition

condemned foreign intervention and mobilized Moroccan public opinion. Indeed, the biggest demonstration in support of Iraq was staged in Morocco. The crisis gave the opposition a chance to show its ability to mobilize, a fact that did not go unnoticed by the regime. The immediate response was to scale back Moroccan military involvement. A year after the crisis, King Hassan announced political reforms.

In Egypt, there was less discordance between the ruling elite and the public over the crisis. In fact, the regime managed to call for a parliamentary election in October 1990, as if to show that life in Egypt was quite orderly despite the crisis. While two major opposition parties, the Wafd and the Labor-Islamic Alliance, boycotted the elections, their action was for reasons unrelated to the crisis, namely the government's refusal to guarantee fairness in the political competition. The Egyptian regime's self-assuredness was, however, shaken by two events: the October 1990 assassination of Rifaat al-Mahjub, the former speaker of the parliament, supposedly by Islamic militants, and the protests of thousands of Egyptian university students against what seemed to be the systematic destruction of Iraq. The students' clashes with the police left at least four dead, scores wounded, and hundreds arrested.

In Djibouti, Mauritania, and Somalia, mounting ethnic and tribal conflicts were kept under control during the gulf crisis. In the countries directly involved in or close to the heart of the crisis—Iraq, Syria, and the six states bordering the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman—ruling elites claimed a "legitimate" excuse to put off action, if any had been intended at all, toward democratization. It was a full year after the crisis before Arab elites showed serious inclinations toward genuine participatory politics, although promises had been extracted from them in some instances—such as in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. During 1991, it became obvious that something had to be done.

One positive among the many negative aspects of the gulf crisis has been the unprecedented political mobilization of the Arab masses. Popular expressions of support for one or the other Arab side in the crisis were not always in accord with the official positions of regimes. This had the effect of breaking the wall of fear of many Arabs vis-à-vis ruling elites. Iraq is a dramatic case in point in that the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north rose in arms against the regime of Saddam Hussein, emboldened, it could be argued, by Iraq's crushing defeat and the prospect of aid from the victorious allies. Even the gulf elites on the winning side faced mounting demands from their intelligentsia for more political participation.

DEMOCRATIZATION: THE ADVANCES

Since the gulf war, the democratization that has unfolded in a score of Arab countries has done so slowly and reluctantly; in others, it has been setback. What follows is a sketch of the Arab world as it stood at the end of 1992.

In Mauritania in 1992, a multiparty system was reinstated. In January 1992 presidential elections, incumbent Mu'awiyah Wild Tay'i won with more than 61 percent of the vote, defeating three other candidates. In parliamentary elections in March 1992, the president's party won a comfortable majority, taking 52 of 79 seats. Several major opposition parties boycotted the elections amid charges of rigging, but more serious than the charges of irregularities was the pattern of voting in both sets of elections. Tay'i and his ruling party mobilized and obtained the support of Arab and Arabized Mauritanians in the rural and northern areas of the country, while his opponents mobilized black Mauritanians in the capital and southern areas of the country. This quite obvious and disturbing ethnic cleavage, if not wisely contained, could threaten not only Mauritanian's nascent democracy but also the country as a whole.

In Yemen, shortly after the unification of the north and south in March 1990, the regime, made up of an alliance of the two parties that had ruled in the two Yemens, announced its intention to introduce a multiparty system in a full-fledged democracy. An interim period not exceeding 30 months was to culminate in parliamentary elections in the united, politically pluralistic Republic of Yemen. The gulf crisis threatened this commitment, but, nevertheless, the regime seemed intent on honoring it, and by the spring of 1992 a democratic environment was flourishing. The country had sprouted 46 political parties and organizations operating in the political arena, and the number of daily and weekly newspapers and magazines had multiplied several fold. At the end of 1992, there were about 93 publications; less than one-fourth were official (governmental) or semi-official (belonging to the two ruling parties). Observers visiting Yemen in 1992 were readily impressed by the open atmosphere in which opinions and criticism were expressed freely without fear of retribution.

There are, however, some justifiable apprehensions about the future of democratization in Yemen. Too many parties in the political arena could badly fragment the polity. Mounting incidents of violence, especially against leading figures of the Yemeni Socialist Party, one of the partners in the ruling alliance, threaten the entire experiment, as none of the offenders in these incidents has been arrested by the authorities, who are mostly members of the Popular Conference Party, the other partner in the ruling alliance. The precariousness of the situation may have been behind the regime's decision to postpone elections, originally scheduled for November 1992, until the spring of 1993.

In Jordan, King Hussein resumed his country's democratic march shortly after the gulf war. In March 1992, the Hashimite monarch terminated the emergency laws that had been in effect since the June 1967 War. This was followed in July by the reinstitution of the multiparty system after a 35-year suspension. In September 1992, the Jordanian parliament passed a new printing and publication law that lifted previous restrictions on the press. Together, these measures indicate that Jordan's democratization continues on the trajectory begun in November 1989 with the election of a new parliament. King Hussein has

launched an experiment in gradual democratization that may prove to be a bellwether for the Arab world. He also seems to have calculated that the long-term survival of his regime must be based on broad support. If so, the steps he has permitted to date are utterly necessary.

In Saudi Arabia, in the midst of the gulf crisis, a small group of Saudi women had staged a motorcade demonstration in defiance of discriminatory practices barring them from driving. Leaflets and cassette-taped messages circulated underground criticizing the royal family for its ineptness in defending the country and its reliance on non-Muslims for the task despite massive military spending during the two previous decades. More accountability was demanded, and the long-awaited political reforms were finally announced by King Fahd in March 1992—one year after the war. While modest by Western or even some Third World standards, these reforms represent a notable step in the political evolution of the kingdom. The reforms are akin to a constitution, providing a formalization of the basic system of rule in the country, a system of local governance in the provinces, and a national consultative council. This last item is by far the most important of these measures.

Comprised of 60 members to be chosen by the king, the council is to carry out all the activities usually performed by parliaments elsewhere except the enactment of laws. In other words, the council may initiate debates, discussions, and deliberations on public matters; it may question members of the executive; and it may recommend new laws and policies to the cabinet which, in turn, would forward the recommendations to the king. It is the latter who is invested with the powers of lawmaking within the bounds of *sharia*.

In September 1992, Fahd decreed the naming of the president and members of the council. Many Saudi intelligentsia thought these measures as too little too late. In response, they circulated petitions during the summer of 1992 calling for more and deeper reforms. The petitions were leaked and published in the Arab press outside the kingdom. Pro-regime elements then countered with a campaign of their own through paid advertisements in the same newspapers, reprimanding the petitioners and commending the king for his wise gradualist approach to political reform. Even this practice, "politics by petition," is new to the Saudis. That none of the regime's critics involved in the original petitioning is known to have been arrested, interrogated, or jailed also testifies to an increased margin of political tolerance in this conservative kingdom.

Lebanon and Kuwait are two countries with longer democratic parliamentary traditions. Beset by internal strife and external threats, Lebanon had not been able to conduct parliamentary elections since 1972. Thanks to the 1989 Ta'if agreement, regional and international efforts, and a modicum of relative stability, the Lebanese held their first parliamentary elections in 20 years during August and September 1992. The elections were based on the Ta'if formula of Muslim-Christian parity, although the 128 parliamentary seats are still allocated to all of the confessional groups.

Most Maronite Christians boycotted the elections because of Syria's failure to redeploy its forces in September 1992 as required by the Ta'if agreement. Nevertheless, the government, under Syrian tutelage, disregarded Maronite objections and proceeded on schedule with three rounds of elections. Although the Maronite-led boycott undermined the mandate of the new parliament, the underlying rationale of the boycott was well understood by many Muslims, and even had their sympathy. The showing of Islamist forces, Shi'i and Sunni alike, was striking and reflected, in significant measure, an impressive campaign to build political support at the grass-roots. Among the Shi'a, several of the long-reigning *zu'ama* (political bosses), including Kamil al-Asad, went down to stunning defeats. A new government headed by a newcomer to Lebanese political life, businessman billionaire Rafiq al-Hariri, was named by President Ilyas al-Hrawi in October 1992. Despite tremendous obstacles ahead and the challenges of rebuilding the country after nearly 17 years of civil war, Lebanon's democracy may be back on track.

In Kuwait, parliamentary life was resumed with a heated and spirited campaign during the summer and fall of 1992. In October, elections were held with few or no complaints about irregularities. Several new faces won seats in the National Assembly, where the opposition forces won a clear majority and Sunni and Shi'i Islamist forces won at least one-third of the 50 seats. The significance of the Kuwaiti elections is that they were the first to be held after the experience of the Iraqi invasion and occupation and the first since the 1986 suspension of the parliament that had been duly elected according to the 1962 constitution. The new parliament represented a victory for the democratic forces that had never accepted the 1986 suspension nor the regime's tampering with the constitution. The failure of the regime to avert the Iraqi invasion and the revelations about its ineptness before and during the crisis made it possible to extract concessions from the royal family.[2] Among the latter was the appointment to the cabinet of six elected parliamentary members.

Iraq, a three-decade-long authoritarian state, emerged from the gulf crisis as a tragic mixed case. Having been the immediate cause of the crisis, and badly defeated by the US-led multinational coalition, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was weakened substantially. It was challenged internally by the Kurds in the north, the Shi'a in the south, and by reported attempted *coup d'état*s in the center. Nevertheless, the regime has clung doggedly to power in Baghdad and the center of the country. Thanks to the Western-protected zone in the north, the Kurdish opposition parties were able to set up democratically elected bodies in May 1992 to run their "liberated areas" and to negotiate with Baghdad over a possible final settlement regarding self-rule. The reluctance of Saddam Hussein to

2. During the gulf crisis, an immediate demand to which the ruling elite bowed was to the removal of several cabinet members held responsible for the swift collapse of Kuwaiti defenses in the face of the Iraqi invasion. It was also under pressure that Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah pledged free parliamentary elections and restoration of the 1962 constitution.

meet some of the basic demands of the Kurds induced Kurdish leaders to rally other Iraqi opposition groups, in the summer and fall of 1992, in a quest to form a national united front to oust his regime. This effort is backed by the United States and other Western powers, who in summer 1992 declared a "no-fly" zone in the south to reduce the military pressure on the Shi'i rebels, who may very well attempt to emulate their Kurdish counterparts in the north in setting up some kind of interim home rule.

DEMOCRATIZATION: THE RETREATS

Despite advances in Arab democratization after the gulf crisis, there were also major reversals. The most dramatic among these took place in Algeria. Tunisia and Egypt also have had some difficult moments in their democratization processes.

In 1988, Algeria seemed to be a promising serious contender for the transition from autocratic to democratic rule. After nearly 30 years of one-party rule by the National Liberation Front (FLN), and in the aftermath of widespread rioting in the fall of 1988, the regime of President Chadli Bendjedid embarked on a series of political reforms. A multiparty system was introduced in 1989, under which municipal elections were held in the spring of 1990, shortly before the August eruption of the gulf crisis. Of the many parties competing in those elections, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) emerged as the most threatening to the FLN, scoring victories in about 50 percent of the country's municipalities. National parliamentary elections were scheduled for the summer of 1991. In the interim, there was a proliferation of as many as 50 political parties.

Internal division within the FLN, however, and FIS's insistence on modifications of electoral rules and its resort to militant confrontations with the government led to the arrest of its leaders and the postponement of elections for several months. When elections finally were held in December 1991, FIS emerged with a landslide victory in the first round. Out of the 599 contested seats, FIS won more than 300, compared to only 25 seats for the secular, Berber-based opposition Front of Socialist Forces, and 16 seats for the FLN. A round of run-off elections for some 250 undecided seats was scheduled for mid-January 1992.

With its decisive victory in the first round, FIS would have had a large enough majority to form the government without winning more seats in the second round. Many forces in the country—namely the army, the Berbers, organized women's groups, and the FLN—found this prospect quite ominous. Their apprehensions were reinforced by FIS portending the restructuring of Algerian socio-cultural life. A few days before the second round of elections, President Bendjedid resigned, the army took over, a provisional presidential council was established that appointed an interim head of state, Muhammad Boudiaf; this was clearly a coup d'état. With the democratic experiment in Algeria aborted, the country witnessed the widespread arrest of FIS leaders and violent confrontations

between FIS followers and the government. At the end of June 1992, Boudiaf, an elderly statesman and a former freedom fighter, paid with his life. At the close of 1992 the future of Algerian democracy looked quite dim.

In Tunisia, a multiparty system has been in effect since the coming to power of President Ben Ali in 1988. The ruling party, however, continues to monopolize power, although it engages in democratic rhetoric and dialogue with other secular opposition parties. Meanwhile, the regime has been forceful in isolating and oppressing the followers of al-Nahda and other Islamists. In this respect, gross human rights violations have been recorded by Amnesty International and Middle East Watch. The regime has not only ignored such criticism, but has also endeavored to curb the activities of the Tunisian League for Human Rights by making it illegal to hold simultaneous memberships in that organization and a political party. By July 1992, the league found it impossible to operate and, therefore, dissolved itself. Its dissolution was not only a serious setback for the democratization process, but also for the evolution of civil society in Tunisia.

In Egypt, the Mubarak government has continued to muddle through with little, if any, marked change in further democratization of the system. The press continues to enjoy a reasonable margin of freedom, and three new parties have been established by court order since the gulf crisis; of these, the most important is probably the Arab Democratic Nasirite Party established in April 1992. Not much else has happened to make the system truly more participatory. New bouts of violent confrontations with Islamist groups, meanwhile, broke out in 1991 and 1992. The assassination of Farag Fuda, a notable secular thinker, and sectarian strife in Asyut were among the more ominous developments.

The regime's reactions to the violence and strife have been more of the same: tighter security measures and additional anti-terrorism laws. Toward the end of 1992, the situation resembled that in Algeria—a low-level war of attrition between the regime and Islamists. With the greater margin of freedom in Egypt, however, other more moderate Muslim Brothers were continuing their peaceful march toward acquiring influence in major organizations of civil society, such as the professional unions. Through democratic elections they gained control of the boards of doctors, engineers, and lawyers associations. In the last case, the result was particularly stunning, because the lawyers association has been noted as Egypt's "fortress of liberalism."

In Iraq, Sudan, and Syria, the regimes have shown no discernable change in their autocratic methods. Syria, for example, conducted another presidential plebiscite early in 1992 with the usual "four nines"—99.99 percent of voters approving Hafiz al-Asad for six more years in office. Having mended his fences with Egypt, the West, and the oil-rich Arab states during the gulf crisis, Asad has been under no marked regional or international pressure to change his ways. With his Baathist rival in Iraq much weakened and isolated, his participation in the Middle East peace talks endearing him to Washington for the time being,

assistance from gulf states, and Syria's new oil discoveries filling his coffers, Asad has been able to present to the home front as strong a case as ever.

It is rumored that Asad may initiate some democratic measures in preparation for signing a peace agreement with Israel, but there is little evidence to authenticate such hearsay. The contention is based on an analogy with Egypt's late president Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat accompanied his opening to the West and the launching of negotiations with Israel with a policy of economic liberalization, *infitah,* and a modicum of new political freedoms.

In Libya since the fall of 1991, the Muammar al-Qadhafi regime has been embroiled with the West over the 1988 Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. UN sanctions and confrontations with the United States and Britain have given the regime a chance to mobilize Libyan public opinion behind Qadhafi. Several anti-West mass rallies, marches, and demonstrations have drummed up support. Qadhafi has portrayed Libya as just one more Arab country (after Iraq) targeted for destruction by the West in its on-going so-called vengeance against the Arab nation, for which the Pan-Am episode is merely a pretext. The opposition, which is fragmented, has opted for silence both at home and abroad.

In Sudan—where the 1989 overthrow of a democratically elected government set back democratization—Umar Hassan al-Bashir's military regime has been able to break out of its internal, regional and international isolation since the gulf crisis. Bridges were extended hurriedly to Libya and Iran, which for reasons of their own have responded with financial and military aid. The Sudanese regime, which is backed by the National Islamic Front, has been using this aid to pressure the rebels in the south. Losing their sanctuary in Ethiopia after the collapse of the Mengistu government in 1991 and suffering a serious internal division, the southern Sudanese rebels were dealt several military blows at the hands of government forces. Enhanced by these victories, the regime has tightened its grip on the home front and has felt emboldened enough to escalate an old border dispute with Egypt over the small town of Hala'ib. Much of the vocal northern Sudanese opposition is now operating from Cairo and London with little prospect of overthrowing the military-Islamic dictatorship in the foreseeable future.

SURVIVAL TACTICS

Two years after the 1990–91 gulf crisis, only two presidents have been forced out of office: Bendjedid in Algeria and Siad Barre in Somalia. Most Arab regimes' facades of resilience, however, are currently undermined by growing dissent, most of which is expressed militantly through Islamic activism. This is forcing regimes toward new strategies for survival.

Long practiced as a readily favored survival strategy, coercion has been stretched to the limits of diminishing returns. It has led already to the tragic disintegration of Iraq and Somalia and to quasi-guerrilla warfare in Algeria and parts of Egypt. One of the outcomes of the gulf crisis was not only the

political mobilization of the urban masses, but also their diminishing fear vis-à-vis the coercive measures of the state. The fact that hundreds of Arab volunteers—mainly Algerians, Egyptians, and Saudis—have returned home from Afghanistan, many of them Islamic activists, is reinforcing this development.

Another strategy for regime survival, by no means new, is to contrive or take advantage of a real crisis. The Libyan and Iraqi regimes are cases in point. Highly discredited by their dismal domestic and regional performances, the two regimes currently are portraying themselves as being unfairly victimized by the United States and its Western allies. The fact that the latter have made no effort to enforce UN resolutions against Israel or Serbia, but are pressing strongly for enforcement in the case of Iraq and Libya, gives credence to their charges. At best, this strategy gives the regimes a short breather but this too is steadily approaching the point of diminishing political returns.

A relatively novel survival strategy lies in symbolic or token power sharing with select opposition groups. The regimes determine who their most dangerous rival is and then attempt to isolate it through a combination of coercive and accommodationist measures. The responses to Islamic militancy in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia are prime examples of such coercive measures. The ruling elites in these cases dangle the prospect of power sharing to other secular opposition groups to neutralize them, if not induce their outright support. Although many such groups may have serious distrust of and misgivings vis-à-vis the regimes, their deeper fears of Islamic militants may drive them into acceptance of regime accommodation, which is, at best, a few seats in a parliament or cabinet portfolios.

This latter survival strategy offers the best hope for the transition from autocratic to democratic rule with a minimum of instability and bloodshed. Token or symbolic as it may be, it creates a three-way bargaining situation. The more a regime perceives the threat, the more it pursues power sharing with the secular opposition. If the parties are offered too little, they may either reject the offer of accommodation or gamble by coalescing with Islamic activists. In some countries, Islamists have shown a willingness to compete with the ruling elite in coalition arrangements with secular opposition parties. A case in point is Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. In 1984, it entered into a coalition with Egypt's foremost secular liberal party, the Wafd. Since 1987, the Brotherhood has been aligned with the Socialist Labor Party.

The Jordanian regime also has been involved in a similar three-way bargaining scenario. During the last three years, the government has included and then excluded representatives of the Islamic bloc from the cabinet. In fact, this modality also is being tried in Kuwait, where two Islamist deputies in the parliament have been given cabinet portfolios. The mere fact that both the Islamic and secular opposition agree to enter into these kinds of political deals seems to reduce ideological polarization. It demystifies the Islamists and makes them more cognizant of the complexities of the problems of their societies.

A fourth survival strategy centers on symbolic participatory politics. One year after the gulf war, the ruling elites of Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates announced the creation of appointed consultative councils to help in the better governance of their respective countries. Although the councils do not have legislative powers, their very creation is a gesture toward participatory politics. Oman went a step further by building into the gesture an electoral component at the provincial level by providing a representative pool from which the sultan selects the council members. The Omani model has drawn explicitly on the budding organizations of civil society. The representatives of each province are elected not by citizens at large, but by members of cultural, business, and professional associations.

CONCLUSIONS

Organizations of civil society are playing growing roles in the political arenas of a score of Arab countries. Professional associations and organized interest groups, nominally non-partisan, are becoming increasingly politicized. The elections of Kuwait's Chamber of Commerce in the spring of 1992—dubbed a dress rehearsal for the parliamentary elections to take place later that fall—attracted much public attention. As stated earlier, Egypt's medical, engineering, and lawyer associations have been equally politicized, with Muslim Brothers dominating their respective elections in 1992.

The same thing has been occurring in Jordan, where Islamists have used civil society organizations as proxy arenas for political discourse. Through them, they have been schooled in the arts of mobilization and articulation. They also have learned the imperatives of appealing to circles wider than their own if they are to win elections, perform well in office, and be reelected. Egypt's Muslim Brothers learned that lesson when they lost a reelection contest in the pharmacists association in 1992, gracefully conceding their first defeat in ten years. The case of the pharmacists has shown that the march of Islamists is reversible, not only in professional associations but also in political contests at large. In Irbid, Jordan, such a reversal took place two years after Islamists swept elections in 1990. Even the dazzling victory of Algeria's FIS concealed the fact that FIS lost 1 million votes between the municipal elections of 1990 and the parliamentary elections of December 1991.

The global wave of democratization is helping the process of opening up Arab polities, as is the eminent role being played by international and Arab human rights advocates such as Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, and the Arab Organization for Human Rights. These organizations are making it more and more difficult for the coercive impulses of ruling Arab elites to be played out. Thus, while the gulf crisis may not have led to a "democratic revolution" in the Arab world, it definitely has contributed to an erosion of Arab authoritarianism.

During recent years, there have been two indigenous processes unfolding in the Arab world: democratization and an escalating Islamic activism. Discordant as they may appear at first glance, the two processes intersect at the edges through the moderate variety of Islamic groups that are opting to engage in "politics-as-usual." The incorporation of these moderate Islamists into the mainstream of Arab politics would be much enhanced if civil society were permitted to develop naturally, but this process still is highly restricted in several Arab countries, as is the process of democratization itself. In extreme cases, such as Iraq, forming an association inside the country or joining one outside the country without written governmental approval can subject a citizen to no less than a death penalty. Even in countries with a longer history of civic organizations, such as Egypt and Tunisia, governmental approval not only is required, but the authorities reserve the right to monitor and dissolve such organizations almost at will.

Needless to say, in the Arab world, as elsewhere, there are other requisites for a sound and smooth democratization that have not been treated in this report. Among them are steady, even if modest, economic development, and a marked measure of social equity. Without these two requisites, the road to democracy will be quite rocky, and reversals likely. Unemployment, especially among youth, and income disparities usually drive many to fanaticism and violence. This condition encourages demogoguery on the one hand and entices an authoritarian military to step in and derail the democratization process on the other. Thus, the triad of civil society, economic development, and social equity must proceed hand in hand. They are mutually reinforcing of one another and of the prospects for democratization in the Arab world.

Equally reinforcing of the prospect of such democratization, would be positive regional developments, especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Delay or reversal in settling the conflict will only play into the hands of despots and religious extremists, Islamic and Jewish alike. Interestingly enough, the December 1992 decision by the Israeli government to expell some 400 Palestinians suspected of involvement in Islamist groups was resisted in Israeli courts and in the media at large by both Palestinian and Israeli groups. Human rights organizations on both sides have worked jointly for the return of the exiles. This is a modest but significant preview of things that could emerge in the region. The end of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be a great milestone on the road to democratization. In turn, the latter would be the best guarantee of a durable peace.

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Chronology

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ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and South Asia; Western Europe; Central Eurasia*
FT, *The Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon

1992

Oct. 17: At the end of a two-day conference in Tunis, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Committee endorsed the seventh round of bilateral peace negotiations scheduled to begin 21 October in Washington. During the conference, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) expressed disapproval of what they considered the compromising nature of the peace talks and urged that the Palestinian delegation not participate. The DFLP withdrew from the last session of meetings, rejecting the council's final recommendations. [10/18 NYT, 10/19 FBIS]

Near the Mattiyahu settlement in the West Bank, Yehudit Ostern, an Israeli, was killed and nine others injured when a bomb hit their van. [10/18 WP, 10/19 NYT]

In a village near Nablus, the Black Panthers shot to death three Palestinians suspected of collaboration.

Several thousand Palestinians, including representatives from rival Palestinian factions, attended a funeral procession in Jabal Mukabir for Hussein Obaydat, a prisoner who died 14 October after ending his participation in a hunger strike with other Arab prisoners, and his cousin, Mustafa Obaydat, who died that day after having been shot the preceding week by an Israeli policeman during a march supporting the hunger strike. At the end of September, as many as 5,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons had begun the hunger strike to demand better living conditions and less frequent use of solitary confinement. [10/18 NYT]

Oct. 18: The foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and representatives of Lebanon and the Palestinians met in Amman to evaluate the sixth round of peace talks. They confirmed their participation in the seventh round scheduled to begin on 21 October in Washington. [10/19 FBIS]

Knesset members Abd al-Wahab Darawshah and Talib Elsana of the Arab Democratic Party, Naomi Chazan of MERETZ, and Hashem Mahameed of HADASH met with PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and other PLO officials in Tunis to discuss the peace talks. Limor Livnat of the Likud Party said that at the first meeting of the Knesset's winter session, Likud members would demand the revocation of these Knesset members' parliamentary immunity and have them indicted according to an Israeli law prohibiting contacts with the PLO. [10/19 FBIS, 10/20 WP]

In Gaza, suspected collaborators Kafaryada Labda and Sabbar Shimali were killed. [10/20 FBIS]

The Israeli army sealed off several West Bank villages northwest of Jerusalem while soldiers searched for suspects involved in the 17 October bombing of a van of Israelis.

Israelis demanding better government protection demonstrated in Jerusalem, al-Birah, and in southern Galilee in response to the 17 October killing of Yehudit Ostern. [10/19 NYT]

Oct. 19: *Davar* reported that in previous weeks, Israel, the United States, and the United Nations had decided on a plan for UN participation in the multilateral Middle East peace talks.

Following his conference with PLO chairman Arafat in Tunis, Knesset member Abd al-Wahab Darawshah extended an invitation from Arafat to Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin for a meeting. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 21: The seventh round of bilateral peace talks began in Washington. The Israeli delegation presented the Syrian delegation with a new plan that for the first time mentioned Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for full peace and security. The Syrians, in turn, maintained that such an agreement necessarily would be only part of a more comprehensive peace accord. [10/21 WP, 10/23 NYT]

Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres announced that according to a statement from Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa, the PLO had consented to changing the representatives in the Palestinian delegation of the Refugee Affairs and Regional Economic Cooperation committees of the multilateral peace talks. The PLO additionally agreed not to discuss the right of return during the refugee committee meeting scheduled for November in Ottawa. Also, Israel suggested that the refugee talks concentrate on the amelioration of refugee living conditions in lieu of the issue of Palestinian reunification, claiming that discussion of family reunification would lead to talk on the issue of the right of return. [10/22 FBIS]

The Israeli army imposed curfews on Hebron and outlying villages after gunmen shot and wounded two Israeli soldiers riding in an army vehicle there. [10/23 FBIS]

Oct. 22: The Israeli government expressed satisfaction with Tunisia's offer to accommodate a round of multilateral talks on refugees scheduled for early 1993. [10/22 FBIS]

Oct. 24: Riots erupted when Palestinian workers at a Gaza checkpoint thought that Israeli soldiers were preventing them from proceeding to work in Israel. Israeli authorities imposed a curfew there. [10/26 WP]

Oct. 25: In a message to his cabinet, Israeli prime minister Rabin clarified that Israel's offer to withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria indicated its readiness for partial—not total—withdrawal. [10/26 NYT]

Al-Hamishmar reported that the Palestinian delegation to bilateral peace talks in Washington was divided on the issue of the application of UN resolution 242. Palestinian representatives Hanan Ashrawi, Nabil Shaath, and others did not insist on its application to the interim stages of negotiations and were willing to consider accepting direct control of only Gaza if Israel were to offer it as a concession for the interim period. Haidar Abd al-Shafi rejected both propositions. [10/26 FBIS]

Multilateral peace talks on the environment opened at The Hague.

At the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, gunmen shot and killed Shmuel Geresh, a 32-year-old Israeli soldier. The Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS, claimed responsibility. Israeli authorities imposed a curfew on the area. [10/26 NYT]

Hundreds of Jewish settlers from the occupied territories demonstrated in front of Israeli prime minister Rabin's residence to protest the Israeli government's allegedly inadequate measures to protect Israelis. [10/27 NYT]

Oct. 26: During an interview with Voice of Lebanon, Muwaffaq al-Allaf, head of the Syrian delegation to bilateral peace talks, rejected the Israeli proposal for partial withdrawal from the Golan Heights. [10/26 FBIS]

Oct. 27: Near the town of Sarrah, several dozen residents of the Qedumim settlement blocked the road between Nablus and Kefar Sava, one of the primary roads used by Palestinian workers from the occupied territories to reach their jobs in Israel. The protest was in response to the throwing of a firebomb at an Israeli bus the previous evening. [10/28 FBIS]

Oct. 28: A Knesset committee elected not to revoke the parliamentary immunity of the four Knesset members who had met with PLO chairman Arafat and his aides on 18 November in Tunis. [10/29 WP]

Oct. 29: A Jordanian spokesperson announced that during the seventh round of bilateral peace talks, Israel and Jordan had reached a tentative agreement on an agenda for subsequent negotiations, which would include talks on arms control, refugees, security, territorial disputes, and water. The document, which for the first time mentioned a peace treaty and normalization of relations, still required endorsement from both countries' leaders.

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations to bilateral talks established subgroups to craft a plan for Palestinian self-government and the nature of its authority. [10/30 NYT, WP]

In a press conference after the opening session of multilateral peace talks on economic cooperation and regional development in Paris, Fayiz al-Tarawinah, head of the Jordanian delegation, claimed that Arab countries would not take part in any proposed confidence-building development projects that included Israel until Israel withdrew from the occupied territories. [10/29, 10/30 FBIS]

Nov. 3: During a tour of the Golan Heights, Israeli prime minister Rabin refused to promise settlers in Ortal that removal of settlements would not be

included in a possible peace agreement with Syria. Several hundred settlers demonstrated there to show their opposition to the return of any territory.

The *Wall Street Journal* reported that since October, Israeli authorities had conducted their largest campaign against Palestinians in the occupied territories, arresting about 450 people suspected of belonging to various organizations. [11/4 WSJ]

Nov. 5: During an inspection along the Syrian-Israeli border, UN observers found a buildup of weapons on the Syrian side in violation of 1974 disengagement agreements. Israeli authorities refused to allow the UN team to inspect sites on its side of the border. [11/10 FBIS]

Nov. 6: In response to an entreaty by the Israeli human rights group Betzelem, Israeli justice minister David Libai organized an investigation into the arrest of Hassan Zbaydi, a Palestinian charged with participation in a "hostile organization," to determine if mistreatment during his detention caused the severe catatonia from which he suffers. [11/7 WP]

Nov. 7: Members of the Red Eagle squad shot dead 21-year-old Ahmad Ismail in the Shabura refugee camp in Rafah. [11/10 FBIS]

Nov. 9: At the resumption of bilateral peace talks in Washington, Israeli representatives issued a strong caution to Lebanon that if Hizballah rebels continued to bombard northern Israel with rockets, Israeli forces would "make life intolerable in Lebanon."

Thirty-five countries attended the opening of the second round of multilateral peace talks on refugees in Ottawa, including Israel, which had boycotted the first round because of its objection to the presence of Palestinian exiles in the Palestinian delegation at the talks. [11/10 WP]

The *Wall Street Journal* reported that in a change of policy, the PLO had rejected continued Israeli control over the occupied territories while the future of the land remained in question. [11/9 WSJ]

PLO chairman Arafat criticized HAMAS for violent acts, and threatened retaliation if it continued such acts. [11/10 NYT]

Nov. 11: The Israeli delegation withdrew from multilateral peace talks on refugees in Ottawa because Palestinian delegation head Muhammad Hallaj belonged to the Palestinian National Council (PNC). [11/12 NYT]

Student council elections at Bir Zeit University resulted in a victory for the PLO coalition, which received 67 percent of the vote. HAMAS received 32 percent, and Islamic Jihad 1 percent. They were the first student elections held in more than five years because of Israel's closure of the university. [11/12 WP, 11/13 JP]

Near Khan Yunis, unidentified gunmen seriously wounded an Israeli soldier. Israeli forces killed four Palestinians in an ensuing clash.

In the same area, Nihad Muammar, an 18-year-old member of the Red Eagles, was killed. Israeli soldiers fired on stone-throwing mourners attending his funeral, killing his cousin Issam Muammar, 20, and Mustafa Ashur, 59.

During a stone-throwing incident in Bayt Umar in the West Bank, Israeli forces shot dead Ibrahim Khali, 15.

The Israeli army closed off the areas of Khan Yunis and Rafah and prohibited the media from covering events there. [11/12 NYT, 11/13 FBIS]

Nov. 12: The Israeli delegation to multilateral talks on refugees agreed to participate after assurances that Palestinian delegation leader Hallaj's membership in the PNC had either "lapsed" or that he was "not currently a member." [11/13 WP, 11/16 FBIS]

Nov. 14: In an interview, Israeli prime minister Rabin accused Syria of frustrating peace talks by allowing Hizballah fighters to attack Israel from Lebanon and by supporting Palestinian groups opposing peace talks. [11/15 WP]

Nov. 15: During a consultation with Egyptian president Husni Mubarak in Egypt, Israeli foreign minister Peres announced that Israel would not consider independence for the occupied territories until resolution of the interim period issue. [11/16 FT]

Nov. 16: A hand grenade exploded in a market in the Muslim Quarter of Jerusalem's Old City, causing the death of Palestinian Abd al-Razik Idhkaydik and the wounding of at least 11 others. Police said the grenade was probably thrown from a Jewish enclave above the market. Police detained 12 Palestinians after the incident. [11/17 NYT]

In Maan near Khan Yunis, Israeli forces shelled and destroyed nine houses inhabited by suspected "fugitives." [11/19 FBIS]

Between 50,000 and 100,000 Jewish settlers and protestors demonstrated at Kings of Israel Square in Tel Aviv to show their opposition to possible Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. [11/17 FBIS]

Nov. 17: Egypt and Israel decided to hold regular meetings between their foreign ministers and deputies to discuss the peace process. [11/24 FBIS]

Nov. 18: In Washington, Israel and Syria concluded bilateral talks a day early because of a lack of progress. [11/19 WSJ]

The Israeli delegation to bilateral peace talks in Washington submitted a proposal to the Palestinian delegation in which Israel would cede its military authority in Palestinian towns to local Palestinian police forces and would create a new legal system. The Palestinians rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was based on division of Palestinian land and would negate the possibility of a unified Palestinian authority.

Israeli prime minister Rabin refused a written request made by Egyptian president Mubarak for a meeting between Rabin and PLO leader Arafat. [11/19 FBIS]

Israeli authorities rejected an Egyptian recommendation to dismantle the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai and replace it with a non-foreign military force. [11/18 FBIS]

Nov. 19: Bilateral peace talks in Washington ended with little progress reported. [11/20 WP]

The DFLP, PFLP, PLF, and PPSF announced that they would boycott a 21–24 November meeting in Tunis of the Palestinian leadership and the Palestinian delegation to Middle East peace talks to protest concessions made during the last round of talks in Washington, including those concerning the backgrounds of acceptable participants and the issue of Palestinian autonomy. [11/20 FBIS]

Nov. 20: During a press conference in Washington, Arab delegates to bilateral peace talks warned that if progress was not made in talks during the early stages of the Clinton administration, they might pull out of negotiations. [11/21 NYT]

Nov. 21: Israeli soldiers shot to death a suspected "armed terrorist" in Khan Yunis. [11/24 FBIS]

Nov. 22: Jordanian officials called for amending its agenda agreement with Israel on issues regarding control of the West Bank and Gaza proposed at the seventh round of bilateral peace talks. [11/23 FBIS]

Nov. 23: At the conclusion of a meeting of PLO, DFLP, PFLP and Palestinian delegation leaders in Tunis, the conferees elected to postpone a decision regarding Palestinian participation in the eighth round of bilateral peace talks until after consulting with Russia, the United States, and the participating Arab countries. [11/24 FBIS]

In the West Bank village of al-Ram, Israeli soldiers in civilian clothes shot to death Palestinian Amjud Jabir, who was part of a group of youths throwing stones at uniformed soldiers. A military official said that the shooting occurred after the soldiers had ordered the group to stop, but witnesses said that the boys had not been given a warning before the soldiers fired.

The *New York Times* reported that the preceding week, a similar conflict in reports occurred regarding the deaths of two Palestinians suspected of murder who were shot by soldiers in civilian clothes near Janin. [11/24 NYT]

Nov. 25: The Israeli Justice Ministry announced that the government planned to end the ban on contacts with the PLO but would continue to oppose direct PLO participation in Middle East peace talks. [11/26 FT]

Nov. 26: An Israeli appeals court overturned a $3,100 fine and a three-year suspended jail sentence that a lower court had given Arab-Israeli poet Shafik Habib on charges that he had published a poetry collection that was potentially insurrectionary. [11/27 NYT]

Nov. 27: In the Shaykh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City, Israeli soldiers opened fire on Palestinian protestors, killing Ahmad al-Husari and wounding five others. [11/30 FBIS]

Nov. 28: The Israeli army agreed to allow Palestinian Gazans 18 years of age and older to work in Israel in return for assurances that the Palestinian trade union in Gaza drop a supreme court case demanding that the army lift age restrictions on workers. In May, the army prohibited Gazans under 20 years old from working in Israel in response to the stabbing death of an Israeli schoolgirl by a Gazan in Bat Yam. [11/30 FT]

Nov. 29: Israeli soldiers shot dead Musa Ramadan, 17, after he had participated in stone throwing and tire burning.

The Israeli army imposed a curfew in the West Bank village of Dura and surrounding areas after a bomb exploded near an Israeli car outside the village. [11/30 FBIS]

Dec. 1: In Gaza, Israeli police shot to death a 12-year-old boy and wounded at least 26 other people when officers charged a funeral march for a Palestinian killed the previous week during a stone-throwing incident. [12/2 FT, FBIS]

Israeli forces shot dead Amr Yusuf Abu Sharah, 13, and Khalid al-Ustadh, 23, in Shaykh Radwan during a demonstration by Palestinians that followed the lifting of a curfew there and at al-Shati refugee camp. [12/1 FBIS]

Dec. 2: The Israeli cabinet asked the Knesset to repeal a 1986 law banning contact between Israelis and PLO members. The cabinet passed a preliminary vote, but its final passage in the Knesset was yet to be secured. [12/3 NYT]

Dec. 3: In London, the steering committee of multilateral Middle East peace talks convened for the first time to determine agendas for the five multilateral committees. The Syrian and Lebanese delegates boycotted the meeting. [12/8 FBIS]

In the Balata refugee camp near Nablus, Abd al-Rahman Mansur, 17, was killed when the bomb he was assembling exploded. [12/4 FBIS]

Shin Bet agent Haim Nahmani, 25, was stabbed and bludgeoned to death while on duty in West Jerusalem. Israeli authorities claimed that the assailant was a Palestinian informant associated with HAMAS.

In Rafah, Israeli soldiers shot dead Yasir al-Sufi, 18, and injured as many as 11 other people during a protest that followed the lifting of a four-day curfew in which Palestinians threw stones and overturned the soldiers' jeep.

In Gaza, unidentified gunmen shot and killed suspected collaborator Mueen al-Shakfa, 22. [12/4 NYT]

Yasir Abu Samahdanah shot dead suspected collaborator Jamal Faddal in the Shabura refugee camp in Gaza. [12/4 WP, JP]

Dec. 4: Japan called for an end to the Arab economic boycott against Israel in exchange for limits on Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Japan had observed the ban for years. [12/5 FT]

The PLO leadership authorized the Palestinian delegation to attend the eighth round of talks, scheduled to begin 7 December, after it failed to win support from other Arab delegations for the suspension of Palestinian participation in bilateral

peace talks until after the inauguration of US president-elect Bill Clinton to protest alleged Israeli intransigence. [12/7 FT]

Dec. 5: Qol Yisrael reported that in 1993, the Israeli army planned to significantly decrease forces protecting settlements along "confrontation lines in the north" because of defense budget cuts. Any settlement with more than 72 residents capable of carrying out guard duties would not receive army protection. [12/7 FBIS]

Voice of Palestine (Sanaa) broadcast Call No. 90 of the Unified National Command of the Uprising. [12/8 FBIS]

Dec. 6: The PLO announced that Palestinians would reduce their representation at the eighth round of bilateral peace talks from 14 to 4 to protest alleged Israeli intransigence. They had also asked the United States either to sit in on their talks with Israelis or to exert more pressure on them to compromise. [12/8 NYT]

Gunmen shot to death Faradus Abd al-Aziz, 27, in Illar, near Tulkarm. The Black Panthers claimed responsibility. [12/8 FBIS]

Dec. 7: The eighth round of bilateral Middle East peace talks opened in Washington. [12/8 FBIS]

Three Israeli soldiers—Hagai Amit, 24, Shalom Tsebari, 38, and Udi Zamir, 23—were shot to death near Bayt Lahiya in Gaza as they patrolled the area by jeep. HAMAS claimed that the shooting was in recognition of the uprising's fifth anniversary. The Israeli government reacted by barring Gazans' entry into Israel and imposing curfews on several areas. [12/8 NYT, WP]

Dec. 8: In Rafah, Israeli soldiers shot dead a youth trying to escape after he threatened to throw a molotov cocktail at them. [12/9 FBIS]

Israeli soldiers shot to death a 15-year-old Palestinian in Gaza and another teenager in the West Bank. [12/9 WP]

Dec. 9: The Arab delegations did not attend that day's peace talks in Washington to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the *intifada*. Palestinians in the occupied territories observed a general strike to mark the occasion. [12/9 FBIS]

After a large demonstration by PFLP supporters during which they set up barricades and burned tires in Bayt Immar near Hebron, the Israeli army imposed a curfew on the village and declared it a "closed military zone." [12/10 FBIS]

Dec. 10: Israel and Jordan agreed in principle to sign a bilateral agreement on water issues before signing an official peace treaty during bilateral peace talks. [12/10 FBIS]

Dec. 11: Israeli troops shot dead Ammar Fayiz Shidr, 17, during a clash between residents and soldiers in Hebron.

In the village of Anza in the West Bank, a shootout between police and Palestinians left policeman Sason Mordukh, 30, and Palestinian Issam Barami dead. [12/11 FBIS, 12/12 WP]

Dec. 12: After the Israeli army lifted a six-day-old curfew in the West Bank and Gaza, one man was killed and as many as 90 people suffered wounds when clashes broke out in Gaza between Israeli soldiers and stone-throwing Palestinians. The army imposed a curfew on Jabalya and Bayt Hanun. [12/13 NYT, 12/14 FBIS]

Gunmen affiliated with the Qassam wing of HAMAS opened fire on an Israeli military jeep near Hebron, killing the driver and injuring two others. [12/14 WP, FT]

Dec. 13: Members of HAMAS's Qassam wing kidnapped Israeli soldier Nissim Toledano, 29, and threatened to kill him unless Israel released Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, HAMAS's founder imprisoned since 1989. Since Israeli authorities refused to negotiate without assurances that Toledano was alive, and no word came on Toledano's status, a deadline imposed by the kidnappers' passed with their demand unfulfilled. Shaykh Yassin urged the kidnappers not to kill Toledano and to allow the authorities time to consider their demand. [12/14 NYT]

Israeli troops shot and killed two Palestinians in Gaza and one in the West Bank during clashes there. [12/14 WP]

Dec. 14: The Israeli delegation to bilateral peace talks in Washington presented for the first time in writing two proposals for the interim period. They suggested a tripartite land management system that would entail autonomous management of Palestinian lands, Israeli management of army and settler lands, and joint management elsewhere. They also proposed a judicial system in which Palestinian courts would control civil and criminal cases, military courts security issues, and Israeli courts the Jewish population in the territories. [12/15 FBIS]

In the wake of the HAMAS kidnapping of Nissim Toledano, Israeli officials sealed off the West Bank, continued the closure imposed on Gaza on 7 December, and confined Gazans to their homes. In Gaza, soldiers arrested about 1,200 Palestinians. Toledano's abductors renewed their demand for an exchange for Shaykh Yassin without giving word on the soldier's condition.

During their roundup, Israeli soldiers arrested Taher Shriteh, a Palestinian journalist. [12/15 NYT]

Dec. 15: The body of Nissim Toledano was found along a highway near the West Bank settlement of Kfar Adumim, where he had apparently been stabbed to death the preceding night. Israeli prime minister Rabin vowed to "strike unmercifully" against HAMAS, but pledged to continue in peace negotiations. [12/15 FBIS, 12/16 NYT, WP]

In relation to the Toledano kidnapping, Israel continued its crackdown on Palestinians in the occupied territories suspected of involvement in Islamist groups. As many as 1,000 people were arrested. [12/17 NYT]

Dec. 16: Israel's High Court of Justice temporarily halted an expulsion order for 418 Palestinians (allegedly associated with Islamist movements) in response to arguments presented by the Associa-

tion for Civil Rights in Israel. Their expulsion had been approved in an Israeli cabinet meeting the previous day.

Israeli authorities banned residents of the West Bank and Gaza from traveling to Jordan via the Damiya and Allenby bridges. [12/17 FBIS]

Dec. 17: After overcoming legal opposition for the Israeli cabinet's expulsion order for the Palestinians believed to be involved in Islamist groups in the occupied territories, Israeli authorities bussed 383 Palestinians, bound and blindfolded, into southern Lebanon just north of the Israeli self-declared "security zone" and left them with $50 each, some food, blankets, and jackets. Shortly afterward, Israeli authorities expelled another 34, who were taken by helicopter to the same location in southern Lebanon. None of the Palestinians had been tried or charged formally with an offense. Israeli prime minister Rabin claimed that the expulsions were necessary to thwart the activities of HAMAS. The government would not release a list of names, but the exiles reportedly were mostly professional and political figures.

Lebanese officials announced that they would prohibit the expelled Palestinians from entering Lebanon. Those who tried to return to Israeli-controlled land were met with warning shots fired over their heads.

A general strike was called in Ramallah and Nablus and a commercial strike was called throughout the West Bank in protest of the expulsions. Arab delegations to bilateral talks in Washington boycotted the final day of eighth-round negotiations. The PLO declared that peace talks with Israel would be postponed until the exiles were allowed to return home. [12/17 FBIS, 12/18 NYT, WP]

Dec. 18: The UN Security Council unanimously condemned Israel's expulsion of 417 Palestinians, and in resolution 799 called for their immediate return to Israel and for a UN envoy to visit Israel to discuss the situation with leaders there.

It was reported that the Palestinians stranded between the Israeli self-declared "security zone" and a Lebanese military checkpoint in the area of Marj al-Zuhur had been supplied with tents, food, and blankets by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and people living nearby. The Israeli government released a list of the exiles' names, revealing that the exact count was 415. [12/19 NYT, WP, 12/21 FBIS]

Israeli authorities released Palestinian journalist Taher Shriteh in Gaza after having taken him to the Lebanese border in an effort to expel him. They offered no explanation for the incident. [12/19 NYT]

Dec. 19: Following a 75-minute break in a curfew on Khan Yunis, Palestinians left their homes and protested the mass expulsion of Palestinians. The Israeli army opened fire on stone-throwing protestors, killing six people, including 9-year-old Amal Abu Tir, and wounding at least 30. The army reinstated the curfew there and in much of the rest of Gaza. Hundreds of Gaza City residents later took to the streets to protest the expulsions.

Israel rejected UN Security Council Resolution 799, citing its disregard of Israel's security concerns.

The exiled Palestinians vowed that they would not move until Israel allowed them to return to their homes. [12/20 NYT, 12/23 FBIS]

Dec. 20: HAMAS and Fatah issued a joint statement announcing that the two factions had agreed to cooperate in their struggle against the Israeli mass expulsion of 415 Palestinians and to call for an escalation of the intifada. [12/21 WP, FBIS]

Dec. 21: Lebanese soldiers ordered international relief agencies to cease bringing supplies to the Palestinian exiles in southern Lebanon and ordered the exiles to leave their camp there. When the Palestinians attempted for a second time to return to Israeli-controlled territory, they were met by warning shots fired by the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army (SLA). Two exiles were injured.

Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri disclosed that the Lebanese delegation to Middle East peace negotiations would participate in the ninth round of talks even if the 415 Palestinians exiled by Israel were not permitted to return to their homes. [12/22 FT]

The Unified National Command of the Uprising invited HAMAS to join it in order to unify and strengthen the Palestinian national movement. [12/29 FBIS]

In Khan Yunis, Israeli soldiers shot to death a 10-year-old boy who was among a group throwing stones and bottles. [12/22 NYT, 12/23 FBIS]

Dec. 22: The Israeli High Court of Justice rejected appeals for overturning the expulsion order for the 415 exiled Palestinians. [12/23 NYT]

The Israeli army and SLA reinforced and advanced their forces to repel better attempts by Palestinian exiles to return to Israel. [12/22 FBIS]

The Israeli army lifted curfew restrictions on some areas of the West Bank and Gaza. West Bank store owners kept their shops closed for a fifth day in protest of the expulsion. [12/23 WP]

Dec. 23: The 415 Palestinian exiles in southern Lebanon ran out of clean drinking water. ICRC officials were arranging emergency aid to be transported via Israel. [12/24 WP]

Israeli soldiers shot dead Ismail Abdin, 27, on his balcony during a protest in Khan Yunis. After Abdin's brother Naim, 32, began attacking the soldiers with stones, they shot and killed him also. [12/24 NYT]

Dec. 24: In a Cairo meeting, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and PLO representatives declared that Israel's expulsion of 415 Palestinians jeopardized, but did not warrant ending, the Middle East peace process. The group also urged the United Nations to impose a deadline on Israel for a reversal of the deportation order. [12/24 FBIS, 12/25 NYT]

All remaining curfews in Gaza were lifted and Palestinian workers were permitted to go to their jobs in Israel. [12/24 FBIS]

Dec. 25: In a close vote, the Israeli cabinet refused to allow ICRC relief workers to bring emergency supplies to the 415 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon, asserting that Lebanon was responsible for the exiles. Lebanese officials countered that Israel was accountable for the situation. [12/28 NYT]

Dec. 26: Palestinians attempted to cross into the Israeli self-declared "security zone" about 30 miles west of the exiles' camp. SLA soldiers opened fire on them, killing one. [12/27 NYT]

At a meeting in Tunis, the PLO rejected a recommendation made by HAMAS and other factions to withdraw completely from peace negotiations and to take up armed struggle. [12/29 FT]

Israeli soldiers shot to death 15-year-old Muhammad Ali Zatar in Gaza City after he had thrown stones at them from a nearby rooftop. [12/27 NYT, FBIS]

Dec. 27: UN under secretary-general James Jonah met with Israeli prime minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres in Jerusalem to discuss the 415 Palestinian exiles. Israel refused to rescind its expulsion order, saying that the best solution would be for the families of the exiles to bring appeals before military tribunals within 60 days.

Rabin banned all contact with the exiles to prevent Palestinians with Israeli citizenship from coming to their aid.

• Arab Knesset members declared that they would end their support of the government coalition as a result of the expulsions.

Ha'aretz reported that six of the exiled Palestinians were victims of mistaken identity and should not have been slated for deportation. [12/28 NYT, WP, FBIS]

Dec. 28: The Israeli army decided to allow 10 exiles to return home on the grounds that authorities had incorrectly expelled them; some would face trials upon their arrival. No date was announced for their return.

Although Israel and Lebanon had prohibited relief supplies from reaching the Palestinian exiles, local residents reportedly were smuggling food to them. [12/29 NYT, FT]

In Jerusalem, Palestinian leaders met with UN under secretary-general Jonah, insisting that Israel be compelled to comply with resolution 799. Lebanese prime minister al-Hariri refused to allow Jonah to pass through Lebanese territory to visit the exiled Palestinians. [12/29 NYT]

Dec. 29: UN under secretary-general Jonah met with Lebanese prime minister al-Hariri, who reiterated that no aid for the Palestinian exiles would cross the Lebanese border, because they were not the responsibility of Lebanon, but of Israel. Lebanese leaders rejected an Israeli proposal to send simultaneous aid convoys from both countries to the exiles. [12/30 NYT, WP]

Israeli authorities closed indefinitely the Islamic and al-Azhar universities in Gaza. [12/30 FBIS]

Dec. 30: Israeli prime minister Rabin offered to allow the 415 exiles to leave via Israel for countries other than Lebanon and to provide them with travel arrangements. The Palestinians rejected the offer. [12/31 WP]

The Israeli army placed a curfew on all of Gaza to remain in place until 3 January to prevent disturbances there on 1 January, Fatah Day. [12/31 FBIS]

Dec. 31: The Lebanese government announced that it would not allow the 415 Palestinian exiles to remain in the south of the country, and rejected a French plan to place them under the protection of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. [1/1 NYT]

Israeli human rights group Betzelem reported that it had collected evidence indicating that before their exile, nine of the Palestinian exiles were about to be released from detention. In some cases, their sentences had been reduced only a short time earlier. [12/31 FBIS, 1/1 WP]

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Jan. 1: Israeli prime minister Rabin offered to allow the 415 Palestinian exiles to return to Israel in exchange for a nine-month suspension of the intifada; Palestinian leaders rejected the proposition. [1/2 FT]

Jan. 2: The 10 Palestinians mistakenly exiled remained stranded with the other exiles while ICRC official Bernard Pfefferle attempted to reach an agreement with Lebanese officials permitting them to return home via Lebanon. The path across the Israeli border was impassable because the Israeli army had mined the area.

For a second day, the Israeli army fired shells near the exiled Palestinians' encampment. According to Israeli officials, the action was in response to individuals suspiciously approaching the Israeli self-declared "security zone." [1/4 NYT]

Jan. 3: The Israeli army lifted its curfew in Gaza.

Israeli soldiers opened fire on a group of stone-throwers in Rafah, killing one person and wounding 10 others. [1/5 FBIS]

Jan. 5: Talks between HAMAS and Fatah concluded in Khartoum with agreement to cooperate on inter-Palestinian issues and to form joint committees despite continuing disagreements regarding participation in the peace talks and HAMAS' possible representation in the PNC if it were to join the council. [1/5 FBIS]

Jan. 6: Israeli authorities announced the arrest of 22 Palestinians belonging to the Qassam wing of HAMAS. [1/7 FT]

Jan. 7: Israeli authorities agreed to allow two ICRC officials to visit and examine the health of the 415 exiled Palestinians in southern Lebanon but remained firm in their refusal to allow the delivery of relief supplies and to rescind the expulsion order. [1/8 NYT]

Jan. 8: Israeli foreign minister Peres informed UN special envoy Chinmaya Gharekhan that any further UN Security Council measures against Israel for its expulsion of 415 Palestinians to southern Lebanon could undermine Middle East peace talks by further undermining Israel's credibility among Arab countries. [1/8 FBIS, 1/9 NYT]

Jan. 9: After a visit to the camps of the 415 Palestinian exiles in southern Lebanon, two ICRC officials flew a man suffering from kidney problems and a teenager exiled by mistake to al-Naqurah, a Lebanese town in the Israeli self-declared "security zone." An Israeli defense official disclosed that Israel would permit ICRC representatives to return nine other Palestinians to their homes who were erroneously exiled. [1/10 NYT, 1/11 FBIS]

In East Jerusalem, UN envoy Gharekhan met with Palestinian representatives. [1/11 FBIS]

Jan. 10: In a meeting with UN envoy Gharekhan, Israeli prime minister Rabin reaffirmed Israel's rejection of UN demands to allow the return of the 413 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon.

Rabin's cabinet nullified a 60-day deadline for individual appeals of the expulsion. None of the exiles had made an appeal on the grounds that doing so would legitimize the order. [1/11 NYT]

Lebanese prime minister al-Hariri refused to permit further air lifts of exiled Palestinians, saying that they must return the way they came. ICRC officials had been scheduled to fly home another nine wrongly exiled Palestinians.

Jan. 12: At the close of a two-day meeting in Cairo, Arab League foreign ministers issued a statement calling on the United Nations to impose sanctions against Israel for its expulsion of the 415 Palestinians. The statement also urged the use of an international force to protect the Palestinians in the occupied territories. [1/13 NYT]

Jan. 13: Israeli officials disclosed that further checks into the legal status of the Palestinian exiles indicated that 15, not 10 as earlier reported, had been expelled erroneously. [1/14 NYT, FBIS]

Israeli border police shot dead alleged Black Panther member Ali Muhammad and injured another after they failed to surrender to police. [1/15 FBIS]

Jan 14: Israel decided to permit ICRC representatives to deliver medicine and other essentials to the 413 exiled Palestinians and to allow them to airlift 15 mistakenly exiled Palestinians back home via Lebanon, assuming that Lebanon would consent. [1/15 NYT]

Israeli soldiers shot to death Ahmad Abbadin, 14, and wounded 21 other Palestinians during intense protests in Khan Yunis in response to an army sweep of Palestinian neighborhoods. [1/15 FBIS]

Jan. 15: In Tel Aviv, a 25-year-old Palestinian from Gaza stabbed four people at a bus station before a passerby shot and killed him. [1/16 WP]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

See also, Regional Affairs, Iran, Turkey

1992

Oct. 16: Armenian foreign minister Raffi Hovannisian resigned at the request of president Levon Ter-Petrosyan. [10/16 FBIS]

Oct. 19: Acting Tajik president Akhbarshah Iskandarov appointed Major General Farouk Rakhmanov defense minister. [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 21: Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan appointed former prime minister Vazgen Manukyan to replace Vazgen Sarkisyan as defense minister.

In response to bombardment of the Kublatinsky rayon, the Azeri National Assembly ratified a presidential decree placing the rayon in a state of emergency. [10/21 FBIS]

Oct. 23: The Caspian Sea Pipeline Consortium chose the Bechtel Corporation and Willbros Group to develop an $850 million oil pipeline system spanning from Tengiz, Kazakhstan, and Baku, Azerbaijan, to Navorossyk, Russia, along the northern periphery of the Caspian Sea. Its estimated optimal capacity was placed at 1.5 million barrels a day. [10/26 WSJ]

Oct. 24: Armed militias from Kulyab Province in Tajikistan, led by Safarali Kendzhayev, former parliament speaker and head of the Tajik People's Front, entered the Tajik capital of Dushanbe and seized key government buildings in an attempt to restore former president Rakhman Nabiyev. Heavy fighting between insurgents and forces loyal to the government followed the invasion. [10/25 NYT, 10/26 FBIS]

Oct. 25: Pro-government and invading rebel forces in Dushanbe agreed to a cease-fire. Hundreds died in fighting begun the preceding day; among those killed was rebel military leader Rustam Abdourahim. The rebellion's leader, Kendzhayev, was wounded. For undetermined reasons, the insurgent forces reportedly began to withdraw from government buildings. The government imposed a curfew and placed the city under a state of emergency. [10/26 NYT, FBIS, 10/27 FT]

Gaidar Aliev, president of Nakhichevan, alleged that Azeri forces had attempted an unsuccessful coup to oust him. [10/26 FT]

Oct. 26: In Dushanbe, the Tajik government with the aid of Russian troops drove out the forces loyal to former president Nabiyev who attacked 24 October. Acting president Iskandarov promised the rebels a special parliamentary session to determine if Nabiyev would be returned to power. [10/27 FT]

President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan closed the country's border with Tajikistan to those fleeing the fighting in Dushanbe. [10/27 WP]

Oct. 27: Tajikistan's acting president Iskandarov announced that the parliament would not hold the previously promised emergency session; instead, a

national majlis would convene in Khudzhent the following week.

Mukhruddin Ashurov, the chief of the Russian army division stationed in Tajikistan, reported that pro-Nabiyev forces had gained control of 90 percent of the Kurgan-Tyube region. [10/28 FBIS]

Nov. 1: The Nakhichevan parliament appointed Tahir Allayarov to replace Askar Alakparov as interior minister. [11/2 FBIS]

Nov. 3: *Financial Times* reported that Turkmenistan and a US-Turkish consortium had signed an agreement laying foundations for the joint construction of a pipeline that would carry natural gas from Turkmenistan to Europe. [11/3 FT]

The Armenian Supreme Soviet elected Varazdat Avoyan as its secretary. [11/4 FBIS]

Nov. 5: Acting Tajik president Iskandarov dismissed Interior Minister Mamadayez Navzhuvanov and appointed Guldastsho Imronshoyev to replace him. [11/5 FBIS]

The heads of state of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan convened in Istanbul to sign an agreement establishing a Turkic common market that would seek cooperation in such areas as trade and communications. [11/6 FBIS]

Nov. 6: Tajikistan's acting president Iskandarov established a "republican state council" to help alleviate the nation's internal conflicts and appointed himself as the council's head. He also named acting prime minister Abdumalik Abdulladzhanov and Russian Tajik division commander Ashurov as deputy chairmen, both of whom would appoint the council's members. [11/6 FBIS]

Nov. 10: The members of the Tajik Supreme Soviet Presidium and government resigned to facilitate the election of new members during a Supreme Soviet session scheduled for 16 November. [11/12 FBIS]

Nov. 12: Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev relieved Finance Minister Tulenbek Abdikadirov and replaced him with Yerkeshbay Derbisov. [11/16 FBIS]

Nov. 16: In Khudzhent, Tajikistan, the Supreme Soviet convened to elect new members to the soviet and the Presidium. [11/16 FBIS]

Nov. 18: In Dushanbe, gunmen shot and killed Jurabek Aminov, a deputy KGB chief and leader in the Islamist-Democratic movement. Forces loyal to Safarali Kendzhayev seized the town of Yavan, 25 miles southeast of Dushanbe. [11/18 FBIS, 11/20 FT, 11/23 WP]

Nov. 19: The Tajik Supreme Soviet, meeting in Khudzhent, voted to remove acting president Iskandarov and replace him with Imamali Rakhmanov. The Islamist-Democratic coalition ruling in Dushanbe did not participate in the session. [11/20 WP]

Nov. 24: According to Tajik interior minister Guldastsho Imronshoyev, 50,000 people had died since 6 June as a result of fighting between Islamist and communist forces. [11/24 FBIS]

Nov. 25: In Khudzhent, Tajikistan, field commanders of communist and Islamist factions signed a cease-fire agreement. [11/27 FBIS]

Nov. 26: In Tajikistan, the 25 October cease-fire agreement between communist and Islamist factions led communist rebels to ease their blockade of Dushanbe. Near the border with Afghanistan, communist gunmen surrounded thousands of Tajik refugees. [11/27 WP]

Nov. 27: The Tajik Supreme Soviet elected to replace presidential rule with a parliamentary republic system. [11/27 FBIS]

Dec. 2: Acting Tajik prime minister Abdulladzhanov named the following cabinet positions:

Ato Hamdan, *Culture*
Alamkhon Ahmedov, *Health*
Narzullo Dustov, *Transport*
Rashid Olimov, *Foreign Affairs*
Vahid Safoyev, *Water Resources*
Saydullo Khayrulloyev, *Protection of the Environment*
Habibullo Tabarov, *Agriculture*
Abdussator Jabborov, *Social Security*
Hakim Soliyev, *Trade and Material Resources*
Shukur Suhurov, *Labor and Workers' Training Cadres*
Mahmudjon Shokirov, *Grain Products*
Ismoil Davlatov, *Economics*

The Tajik Supreme Soviet decided to merge Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube oblasts to form the Khatlon oblast. [12/3 FBIS]

Dec. 4: Pro-Nabiyev guerrillas shelled the suburbs of Dushanbe in an attempt to force the ruling Islamist-Democratic coalition out of the city. Officials reported that at least 20 died and 15 were wounded in the attack. [12/5 WP]

Dec. 5: The *New York Times* reported that at least 80,000 refugees who had fled fighting in Shartuz, Tajikistan, were stranded without adequate food, shelter, and medical supplies near the Afghan border. [12/6 NYT]

Dec. 6: Russian forces aided government forces in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe to defend the city from an attack by pro-Nabiyev troops based in Gissar. [12/7 WSJ]

Dec. 8: Carrying out earlier threats, Uzbek authorities arrested opposition leader Abdurrahim Pulatov when he attended a human rights conference in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital. [12/26 WP]

The Uzbek Supreme Soviet ratified a new constitution. [12/9 FBIS]

The UN High Commission for Refugees began assisting Tajik refugees along the Tajik-Afghan border to cross the Amu Darya River into Afghanistan, where they could receive relief aid. [12/14 FBIS]

Dec. 10: Forces loyal to former Tajik president Nabiyev took control of principal government buildings and industrial sites in Dushanbe and pushed Islamist forces to the eastern periphery of the city. The UN High Commission for Refugees reported that more than 35,000 Tajik refugees had

entered Afghanistan and about 5,000 were crossing the border daily as a result of fighting in the Kurgan-Tyube region. [12/11 NYT]

Armenian forces invaded Azerbaijan's Qubatli province. [12/10 FBIS]

Dec. 11: Imamali Rakhmanov entered Dushanbe as the proclaimed head of state of Tajikistan after pro-Nabiyev troops took control of the city and ousted the Islamist-Democratic coalition from power. Rakhmanov immediately initiated peace talks with the Islamist opposition. [12/12 FT, 12/13 NYT]

Dec. 13: In the southern suburbs of Dushanbe, clashes erupted between Islamist and pro-Nabiyev rebels. [12/14 FT]

Dec. 15: The Kyrgyz parliament appointed Ednan Oskonovich minister of foreign affairs. [12/16 FBIS]

Dec. 19: Muslim guerrillas in Tajikistan shot down a communist Uzbek helicopter, killing its two pilots. Communist forces backed by Uzbek military units assaulted Muslim rebel positions at Kofernikhon, east of Dushanbe. [12/20 NYT]

1993

Jan. 4: The leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent to discuss the establishment of a Central Asian common market that would address customs controls, exports, investments, pricing, and taxation, and would use the Russian ruble as its joint currency. They also decided to launch a Central Asian newspaper and a common television network to be transmitted from Tashkent. [1/5 WSJ]

Jan. 7: The Tajik government declared a state of emergency and a curfew in Dushanbe, prohibiting public gatherings and allowing soldiers to search individuals and vehicles. [1/8 FT, WSJ]

Jan. 9: Makhmadnazar Slikhov, prosecutor for Tajikistan, began criminal proceedings against the country's religious leader Akhbar Turadzhonzoda, Democratic Party leader Shodmon Yusuf, and former deputy prime minister and deputy leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party Dovlat Usmon. The three, charged with treason, had not been arrested and apparently had fled Dushanbe. [1/10 NYT]

Regional Affairs

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Central Asia, Iran, Turkey

1992

Oct. 22: The Iranian government completed its installment of eight missile launching pads on Abu Musa Island. [10/26 FBIS]

Nov. 2: Iran and Kazakh officials signed agreements establishing cooperation between the two states in the realms of culture, economy, oil, and transport. [11/3 FT]

Nov. 15: Turkish and Iranian officials meeting in Tehran agreed to link their electrical power grids within two months. [11/16 FT]

Nov. 16: The Iranian Foreign Ministry dismissed as invalid a statement drafted at a 15 November Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting of the defense ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates that rejected Iran's claims to Abu Musa and the greater and lesser Tunbs. [11/17 FBIS]

Nov. 23: Qatar's Foreign Ministry informed the GCC that it had decided to boycott a preliminary ministerial meeting scheduled to start in Abu Dhabi on 24 November and a summit at the same locale on 21 December to protest alleged Saudi aggression along their common border in September. [11/25 FBIS]

Nov. 27: Britain, France, and the United States condemned Libya's continued refusal to hand over two men suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, and threatened to impose further disciplinary measures. [11/28 WP]

Nov. 28: The foreign ministers of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Islamabad to sign the founding charter of the Economic Cooperation Organization, forming an economic bloc. Tajikistan previously had been accepted as a member but its representative could not attend because of strife in the nation. [11/29 WP, 11/30 FT]

Dec. 1: An Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting opened in Jeddah. Saudi Arabia's King Fahd beseeched the United Nations to allow Bosnian Muslims to arm themselves against the Serbs. [12/2 NYT]

Kazakhstan and Turkey signed an agreement that would allow Turkey to buy all of its oil from Kazakhstan after the year 2000 and would advance cooperation between the two countries in the prospecting and marketing of oil in the region east of the Caspian Sea. [12/8 FBIS]

Dec. 4: *Financial Times* reported that, two weeks earlier, the Turkish and Armenian governments had signed an agreement in which Turkey agreed to supply Armenia with power. [12/4 FT]

Dec. 10: The United Nations voted to continue the sanctions against Libya established in resolution 748 regarding the Lockerbie Pan Am bombing. [12/11 FBIS]

Dec. 20: Meeting in Cairo under the mediation of Egyptian president Husni Mubarak, Qatari amir Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani and Saudi king Fahd signed an agreement ending a dispute over their mutual border. The accord called for the implementation of a border agreement signed between the two states in December 1965, the establishment of a joint Qatari-Saudi committee to execute its

implementation, and its completion within one year. [12/21 FBIS]
Dec. 22: On the second day of a GCC summit in Abu Dhabi, delegates selected Shaykh Fahim Bin Sultan Bin Salim al-Qasimi to replace Abdallah Bishara as secretary general. [12/22 FBIS]
Dec. 23: At the conclusion of their summit in Abu Dhabi, GCC representatives issued the "Abu Dhabi Declaration," which demanded that Iran end its occupation of the Tunbs and Abu Musa and pledged $6.5 billion to Egypt and Syria for development. [12/24 FBIS, 12/27 NYT]
Dec. 25: Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani reasserted Iran's claims over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, proclaiming that its neighbors would have to "cross a sea of blood" to reach them. [12/27 NYT]
Dec. 30: Algeria and Armenia signed a protocol establishing diplomatic relations. [12/31 FBIS]

1993

Jan. 3: Egypt and Tunisia signed a convention calling for cooperation in religious affairs, especially in controlling Islamist movements in their countries. [1/6 FBIS]
Jan. 4: The Algerian, Egyptian, and Tunisian interior ministers met in Tunis to consider coordinating their efforts to quell Islamist activities in their countries. [1/5 NYT]
Jan. 9: A Libyan government official announced the closing of Libya's borders for three days to protest UN sanctions regarding Pan Am Flight 103 and Libya's neighbors' support of them. [1/10 WP]

Western Sahara

1992

Oct. 18: The Polisario charged Morocco with the illegal detention of 300 Sahrawis in Laayoune after Moroccan forces attempted to disperse a Sahrawi demonstration. Moroccan officials denied the allegation. [10/20 FBIS]
Dec. 1: Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, UN special envoy for Western Sahara, failed to convene a meeting between Western Saharan tribal chiefs, scheduled to begin two days earlier in Geneva, to discuss criteria for determining who may vote in elections on the future of the territory. The Polisario had refused to accept seven chiefs nominated by Morocco to attend. [12/2 FT]

Petroleum Affairs

See also, Central Asia, Regional Affairs

1992

Oct. 19: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that during the previous week, Iran's oil production reached 4 million barrels a day, its highest output since the 1979 revolution. [10/19 WSJ]
Nov. 3: The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) output reached 25.15 million barrels a day, a 12-year high. [11/4 NYT]
Nov. 4: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that OPEC was suffering from a lack of funds and that two years of budget shortfalls had depleted the organization's reserves. [11/4 WSJ]
Nov. 27: At the end of a conference in Vienna, OPEC members agreed to cut production by about 2 percent and to cap maximum output at 24.58 million barrels a day to push prices up. Ecuador announced that it was leaving the cartel. [11/28 WP, FT]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia, Regional Affairs, Iran

1992

Oct. 18: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mawlawi Yunis Khalis, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf met for the second time with interim president Burhanuddin Rabbani's representative, Mawlani Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi to discuss the removal of General Abdul Rashid Dostam's forces from Kabul and the formation of a "Resolution and Settlement Council." [10/21 FBIS]
Oct. 19: Fighting resumed in Kabul between government forces and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar supporters. [10/21 FBIS]
Oct. 24: The Leadership Council, headed by interim president Rabbani, ratified the generalities of the Resolution Bill, a measure that would establish a Resolution and Settlement Council to elect a president for a term of 18 months. Representatives of all rebel groups were present at the session. [10/26 FBIS]
Oct. 27: The Leadership Council elected to extend interim president Rabbani's term by two months. [10/28 FBIS]
Dec. 6: In Kabul, after a three-month lull, skirmishes between the Hezb-e-Wahdat and government forces that had resumed 4 December in the city's outskirts escalated, resulting in at least 20 deaths. [12/7 NYT]
Dec. 7: Muslims protesting the Hindu destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, India, burned three Hindu temples in Jalalabad, Khowst, and Gardeyz. [12/8 FBIS]
Dec. 9: General Dostam's militia attacked government forces in Kabul, driving them from the highway connecting the airport to vital installations around the city. The militia also bombarded by plane the compound housing the presidential palace and the Defense Ministry. [12/10 NYT]
Dec. 10: Calm was restored to Kabul after fighting ceased between government forces and those of General Dostam. [12/11 FBIS]
Dec. 12: The first meeting of the Resolution and Settlement Council failed to convene. Interim president Rabbani announced that he would hold his

post until a successor was chosen, in spite of the expiration of his term on 15 December. [12/14 FBIS]

Dec. 21: Three shells hit a Kabul bazaar, killing at least 10 people and wounding 16 during clashes between Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar and Jamiat-e-Islami. [12/22 FT]

Dec. 27: The United Nations warned Afghan leaders to resolve their differences or lose international aid. [12/28 WSJ]

Dec. 29: Members of the Resolution and Settlement Council met in Kabul to appoint an interim president. Most rebel groups boycotted the meeting, claiming that the government had bought off council members to vote for interim president Rabbani. Hezb-e-Wahdat threatened to continue fighting if Rabbani was reelected. Hezb-e-Islami leader Hekmatyar vowed to attack unless the council session was canceled. [12/30 NYT]

Dec. 30: The Resolution and Settlement Council voted to keep interim president Rabbani in power. Three hundred sixty council members from five of the nine factions in attendance refused to participate in the election. The council also voted to form a parliament from among its 1,335 members and to establish an army. [12/31 WP]

1993

Jan. 2: President Rabbani stepped down as head of the Jamiat-e-Islami Party and renounced membership in any party. [1/3 NYT]

Jan. 3: During the swearing-in ceremony for President Rabbani, at least six rockets fired by Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar hit Kabul. At least 15 people died in the assault.

The Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs announced that the Resolution and Settlement Council would be dissolved since its duties had been completed.

The Ministry of Information and Culture banned activities of all mojahedin groups. [1/4 FBIS]

Jan. 5: Pakistani authorities ordered all offices of Afghan factions and unregistered Afghan humanitarian groups in Pakistan to close down operations by 31 January. [1/6 FBIS]

Jan. 12: Vice President Mir Hamza, 40, died of a brain hemorrhage at a hospital in Peshawar, Pakistan. [1/13 FBIS]

Jan. 13: Hezb-e-Islami leader Hekmatyar announced that his forces would not initiate conflict with government forces and would offer his support if Rabbani resigned, returned power to the Leadership Council, and all prisoners were released. He added that with the Leadership Council's approval, Rabbani would be able to return to power.

Hekmatyar's forces fired rockets into Kabul and closed off the city, setting up roadblocks and threatening to shoot down aircraft using Kabul International Airport. [1/13 FBIS]

General Dostam threatened to withdraw his political and military support unless President Rabbani broadened power sharing to include official recognition and representation of his movement in the new government. [1/14 FBIS]

Algeria

See also, Regional Affairs

1992

Oct. 17: In three gun battles between police and Islamists in an area on the edge of the Sahara, two civilians were shot to death and four others wounded. Police arrested 56 gunrunners. [10/18 NYT]

Oct. 22: The Ministry of Culture and Communications suspended publication of the weekly French-language *L'Observateur* after it printed an interview with an unidentified person who advocated violence and terrorism. [10/23 FBIS]

Oct. 24: Near Muhammadia, police killed Almi Abd al-Nasir, a prominent aide of Islamic leader Abd al-Kader Chebouti. He was alleged to have been carrying forged personal documents. [10/27 FBIS]

Oct. 26: Radio Algiers Network reported that in preceding days, police had shot dead five people and arrested at least twenty-seven others on the grounds that they were involved in terrorist activities. [10/27 FBIS]

Oct. 29: Police shot and killed three people and arrested twenty-seven others in Tlemcen, Oum al-Bouaghi, Chlef, Djelfa, Medea, Tiaret, and Sidi Bel Abbes provinces on the grounds of possession of weapons and illegal leaflets. [10/30 FBIS]

Nov. 6: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that government officials had suspended the import of luxury goods to ease the strain on foreign exchange reserves, ending a year-old trade liberalization policy. [11/6 WSJ]

Nov. 14: Abd al-Hamid Mahi Behi was dismissed as minister of justice because of measures taken against high-ranking government officials that were considered outside Algerian law. [11/18 FBIS]

Nov. 16: The Foreign Ministry announced that it had decided to reduce its diplomatic mission in Iran and had asked the Iranian government to decrease its diplomatic representation in Algeria. [11/18 FBIS]

Nov. 16: Muhammad Takiya was appointed justice minister. [11/20 FBIS]

Nov. 20: Iranian authorities suspended relations with Algeria, expelling seven of its diplomats and closing its cultural affairs office in Tehran. Algerian officials denied the reports. [11/20, 11/23 FBIS]

Dec. 5: Police killed a suspected armed member of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) between Khemis al-Khechna and the Eucalyptus.

During a search of a house in Setif, police killed a suspected affiliate of the "armed Islamic move-

ment" and arrested two others alleged to have ties to the same group. [12/8 FBIS]

Dec. 5: A 40-day amnesty period ended during which "Islamic militants" involved in "subversive" activities could turn themselves in to authorities. A sweep began involving 30,000 army and police troops and indefinite nightly curfews banning vehicles and pedestrians from streets in Algiers and the provinces of Tipaza, Boumerdes, Blida, Media, and Bouera. Authorities also ordered the dismantling of every public and private entity connected to the FIS. During the amnesty period, more than 100 people had turned themselves in. [12/6 NYT, 12/7 FBIS]

Dec. 8: Algérie Presse Service reported that since the beginning of December, the government had "dissolved" about 180 popular communal assemblies and six regional assemblies affiliated with the FIS. [12/9 FBIS]

Dec. 9: Police killed six of seven people who attempted to storm a police headquarters between Tebessa and Khenchela. [12/10 FBIS]

Dec. 10: Rezzag Bara, chairman of a government inquiry commission, announced that the June assassination of Muhammad Boudiaf, former chairman of the Higher State Council, had been carried out primarily by Islamist movements. [12/11 FT]

Dec. 13: The Interior Ministry suspended the activities of six Islamic organizations: the Call and Conveyance of the Message, the Nahda Association for Social and Cultural Reforms, the Algerian Islamic Association for Civilization Construction, the Women's League for Islamic Literature, the Algerian League for Islamic Literature, and the Islamic League for Fine Arts. [12/14 FBIS]

Dec. 14: In the Kouba area of Algiers, gunmen ambushed and shot six policemen during a routine patrol, killing five and wounding one. The incident occurred just after the government announced that three special courts were ready to try more than 1,200 Islamists awaiting trial. [12/15 FT, FBIS]

Dec. 15: Six Islamists were killed in a house near the Kouba mosque in Algiers. [12/16 FT]

Dec. 19: The Ministry of Culture and Communications banned the publication of *al-Djazair al-Yom* on the grounds that its content aimed to undermine the state. [12/21 FBIS]

Dec. 20: In Blida, soldiers clashed for nine hours with gunmen.

Financial Times reported that in the previous week, Algerian troops had killed 13 Islamists as they swept through areas outside of Algiers. [12/22 FT]

Dec. 24: The Ministry of Religious Affairs ordered the destruction of all unofficial mosques and required prior approval by religious authorities for the establishment of new mosques. [12/30 FBIS]

1993

Jan. 1: Islamists attacked a police base in Ksar al-Hirane, killing five police officers. [1/3 NYT]

Jan. 2: The Ministry of Culture and Communications suspended publication of the daily *al-Watan* because the paper published a banned news item that allegedly threatened state security. The ministry also suspended publication of *al-Massa* for 48 hours. [1/4 FBIS]

Jan. 7: At the conclusion of a 12-day trial of 79 men charged with the establishment of an armed group and treason, a military court sentenced 19 of them to death. Fifteen were tried *in absentia*. [1/9 NYT, 1/11 FBIS]

Jan. 13: Soldiers killed "suspected terrorists" Shebani Amor, Alwan Yocef, Bechara Said, and another person near Kadiria in Bouirs Province. [1/13 FBIS]

Bahrain

See also, Regional Affairs

1992

Nov. 10: *Financial Times* reported that Bahrain, in its first move toward broadening political participation since the 1973 election of a parliament that was dissolved two years later, had announced plans for the formation of a 30-member consultative council. Its role would be solely advisory. [11/10 FT]

Nov. 12: The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Bahraini National Liberation movement, and the Popular Front in Bahrain published a joint statement rejecting the proposed 30-member consultative council on the grounds that it did not respond to popular sentiment. [11/18 FBIS]

Cyprus

See also, Kuwait

1992

Oct. 26: A round of talks scheduled to open in New York between Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas and Greek Cypriot leader Yeoryios Vassiliou were postponed because of Denktas's objection to language used in a UN document pertaining to the talks. [10/28 FBIS]

Oct. 27: UN-sponsored talks resumed in New York after UN and Turkish Cypriot officials resolved difficulties impeding the talks. [10/28 FBIS]

Nov. 11: The UN-sponsored negotiations ended. They were scheduled to reconvene in March 1993. [11/12 NYT]

Nov. 26: The UN Security Council approved resolution 798, proposing a series of confidence-building measures between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. While Greek Cypriot president Vassiliou proclaimed it a victory for Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish leaders unanimously condemned the document on the grounds that it unjustly inculpated the Turkish side and declared that

it would impede seriously subsequent negotiations. [11/27 FBIS]

Dec. 4: The Greek Cypriot election board announced that presidential elections were scheduled for 7 February 1993. [12/4 FBIS]

Dec. 8: Turkish prime minister Suleyman Demirel stated that he was willing to discuss the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus if assured that the security of Turkish Cypriots would be guaranteed. [12/10 FBIS]

Dec. 11: The Cyprus News Agency reported that the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus would be cut by about 28 percent because of budgetary constraints. [12/11 FBIS]

Canada announced that it would begin withdrawal of its peacekeeping force in June 1993 because of the lack of progress in the UN-sponsored negotiations in addition to their having other obligations. [12/12 FT]

Dec. 13: UN peacekeeping forces blocked about 300 Greek Cypriots from marching to a chapel in the Turkish-controlled area. [12/14 NYT]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Sudan

1992

Oct. 17: In the Bulaq Abu al-Ula area of Cairo, 5,000 Egyptians rendered homeless by the 12 October earthquake protested the lack of government housing aid. Egyptian police used tear gas to disperse the protestors. [10/18 WP, 10/19 NYT]

Members of the Islamic Group killed three Copts in Tima, in Upper Egypt, in retaliation for the 14 October death of a Muslim there. [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 18: President Husni Mubarak promised housing within six weeks for those who had lost their homes in the 12 October earthquake. Three new camps were to be constructed to supplement two already existing ones, and for the short term, the army would provide tents and other facilities. [10/19 WP]

Oct. 19: According to final official estimates by Local Administration Minister Mahmud Sharif, 552 people died and 9,929 were injured in the 12 October earthquake. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 21: Two persons believed to be Islamists fired guns at a tour bus outside Dayrut, killing a Briton, Sharon Hill, and wounding two others. [10/22 NYT, FBIS]

In Munira al-Sharqiyya, a house collapsed, reportedly as a consequence of weaknesses resulting from the 12 October earthquake, killing five people and injuring others. [10/22 FBIS]

Oct. 22: Asyut governor Hasan al-Alfi announced that all roadways in the governate would receive constant patrolling by police to prevent further assaults against foreign tourists. [10/23 FBIS]

The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the 21 October attack on a tour bus outside Dayrut. [10/23 WP]

Oct. 25: An unidentified assailant stabbed and wounded three Russians in an attack on five tourists in Port Said. [10/26 NYT, WP]

Oct. 26: Because of attacks on foreign tourists, Australia, Great Britain, and the United States released travel warnings to their citizens planning to go to Egypt. [10/27 WSJ]

Nov. 1: In al-Minya, gunmen, reportedly members of the Islamic Group, opened fire on a tour bus carrying Egyptian Copts, wounding 10. [11/2 FT]

Nov. 7: Eight hundred professors and students at Asyut University protested harsh security measures taken by Egyptian police, which included encirclement of the campus by armored vehicles and systematic searches. [11/12 FBIS]

Nov. 9: A bomb explosion at a police post in Dayrut and an attack by Muslims on a Christian-owned business in the town of Asyut sparked a clash between police and members of the Islamic Group there. Authorities imposed a curfew on parts of the Asyut governate. [11/10 FBIS]

The government discontinued Nile River cruises between the towns of al-Minya and Asyut allegedly because water levels were too low. [11/12 FBIS]

Nov. 11: In Asyut, police arrested 154 people allegedly belonging to the Islamic Group and suspected of planning attacks on various institutions in the city. [11/12 FBIS]

The government placed all mosques under the direct control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in an effort to stymie Islamists. [11/12 FT]

About 400 Islamists gathered in the Imbaba section of Cairo to call for a revolution to remove all "infidels" from power. [11/12 NYT]

Nov. 12: Near Qina, four gunmen affiliated with the Islamic Group opened fire on a tourist bus, wounding as many as seven German tourists and four Egyptians. [11/12 FBIS, 11/13 NYT]

Nov. 13: Police arrested 170 persons during house-to-house searches for assailants in the Qina shootings. [11/14 NYT]

Nov. 16: Interior Minister Abd al-Halim Musa announced that security was to be tightened in the area extending from Cairo to Luxor, which is heavily traveled by tourists. [11/17 NYT]

Nov. 18: The Sudanese government offered to allow an Egyptian inspection team to verify that no camps existed in Sudan for training "foreign, non-Sudanese elements," in response to Egyptian accusations that such camps existed, and that their trainees were sent to Egypt to commit violent acts there. [11/25 FBIS]

Nov. 27: Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, Islamic leader and head of the Islamic Group, said in an interview that the Islamic Group would end its attacks when the government opened a dialogue with the group and released its adherents from detention. [11/30 FBIS]

Nov. 28: A report by *al-Wafd* disclosed that the Interior Ministry, in cooperation with Libyan authorities, had begun to increase the police presence in al-Sallum along the Libyan border to curtail infiltration by suspected would-be terrorists. [12/2 FBIS]

Dec. 3: A military court issued death sentences for eight Islamists charged with assassinations and sedition. Seven of them were tried *in absentia*. [12/3 FBIS, 12/4 WP]

The *Wall Street Journal* reported that, according to the Egyptian Interior Ministry, more than 2,000 Iranian revolutionary guards were training elements in Sudan to carry out attacks in Egypt. [12/3 WSJ]

Dec. 6: The government recalled Ahmad Namiq, the head of the Egyptian interests section in Tehran. The decision was made in response to Iran's alleged efforts to incite an Islamic revolution in Egypt. [12/7 FBIS]

Dec. 8: Some 16,000 police searched for Islamists in the Imbaba district of Cairo. They made at least 250 arrests. [12/9 NYT]

Dec. 9: Police in Cairo's Imbaba district continued their search for Islamists, bringing the total number of arrests to more than 400. [12/10 NYT, FT]

Al-Nur reported that US authorities had refused Egypt's request to extradite Umar Abd al-Rahman because of his US citizenship. He had married a US citizen. [12/10 FBIS]

Dec. 16: Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that since the start of the crackdown against Islamists in the Imbaba district, police had arrested as many as 700 people. [12/17 FBIS]

President Mubarak confirmed reports that the government had sent additional troops to the Sudanese border to prevent infiltrations. He also assured tourists that authorities had effectively crushed the Egyptian Islamic movement. [12/17 WP]

Dec. 23: President Mubarak visited Luxor to reassure tourists that the government had been successful in making the area safe from Islamist attacks. [12/24 NYT]

Dec. 30: In the Ayn Shams neighborhood of Cairo, police arrested more than 50 people in the first of a two-day search for Islamists. [12/31 FBIS]

1993

Jan. 2: AFP reported that the Islamic Group had issued a warning to all tourists to leave the country or risk being killed in the group's conflict with the government. [1/4 FBIS]

Jan. 3: Arsonists burned a Coptic church in Dayrut. [1/5 NYT]

Jan. 4: In two incidents in Dayrut, gunmen shot and killed Ishak Ibrahim Hanna, a 65-year-old Coptic farmer, and wounded a Coptic pharmacist. [1/5 NYT]

Jan. 5: Suspected Islamists opened fire on a bus carrying Japanese tourists in Asyut. A leading Islamist figure declared that such attacks would continue until authorities released Islamists detained by police in previous months. [1/6 NYT]

Jan. 6: Since the start of a large-scale search for Islamist strongholds in Masarah, Dayrut, Sanaba, Manshiyat Nasir, and Dayrut al-Sharif two days earlier, some 8,000 soldiers were reported to have participated in the arrest of 180 members of the Jihad and al-Tabiyyunun. [1/7 FBIS]

Jan. 10: Between 2,000 and 3,000 students marched from the campus of Cairo University to the Israeli embassy where they protested the December Israeli expulsion of more than 400 Palestinians. [1/11 FBIS]

Iran

See also, Regional Affairs, Petroleum Affairs, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Sudan

1992

Oct. 24: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting began shortwave transmission of Uzbek- and Tajik-language programs to Central Asia. It also planned to start a broadcast of Azeri-language programs on 6 November and to add a Kyrgyz-language program. [10/26 FBIS]

Oct. 29: Iran released 200 Iraqi soldiers allegedly captured during its 1980–88 war with Iraq. [10/30 FBIS]

Oct. 31: The Interior Ministry director general for the Affairs of Foreign Nationals met with officials from the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and the UN High Commission for Refugees to sign a draft of a trilateral agreement for the return of Afghan refugees to their homeland. [11/2 FBIS]

Nov. 2: The 15 of Khordad Foundation increased the reward for the murder of Salman Rushdie, author of the *Satanic Verses,* to more than $2 million, in response to a visit by Rushdie to Germany and German press reports concerning a cancelation of the *fatwa* calling for his assassination. [11/2 FBIS, 11/3 NYT]

The government filed a lawsuit against the United States at the International Court of Justice at The Hague seeking reparations for US attacks on three oil platforms in 1987 and 1988. [11/7 NYT]

Nov. 4: The government announced the arrest of Milton Meier, a US businessman, on charges of corruption and links to agents of foreign intelligence services. [11/5 NYT]

Nov. 9: Authorities in Tehran demolished more than 140 houses and shops that they said had been constructed illegally. [11/10 FBIS]

Nov. 12: Iran released 400 Iraqis who were reportedly prisoners of the 1980–88 war. [11/13 FBIS]

Nov. 19: The value of the rial against the US dollar dropped to its lowest level ever, causing a shortage of foreign currency and postponement of debt payments. [12/9 FBIS]

Nov. 23: Officials commissioned the first of two submarines purchased from Russia. [11/24 WP]
Nov. 24: Authorities decreed that men and women should ride separately on Tehran buses. [11/24 FBIS]
Nov. 26: The governments of Britain, Canada, France, and Germany refused to allow Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati to fly to Sarajevo on their military planes carrying humanitarian aid to the city. Velayati was to meet with Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic to invite him to an Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Jeddah the following week, but instead did so by phone. [11/27 WP]
Nov. 29: Alan Schlemen, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stated that Iran had not released any Iraqi prisoners of war since May 1992. He said the Iraqis released since then were not prisoners of war, but soldiers who had fled to Iran in 1990–91 and had been detained for acts of subversion and vandalism. [12/2 FBIS]
Nov. 30: Naval Commander Rear Admiral Abbas Mohtaj announced the purchase of two more submarines from Russia. [12/1 WP]
Dec. 16: The Council of Expediency passed a bill that would permit divorced women to demand reimbursement from their former husbands, in the form of wages for work performed at home, in cases where the husbands initiated divorce proceedings. [12/17 NYT]
Dec. 20: The Council of Guardians approved a proposal to hold elections for the presidency on 11 June 1993. [12/21 FBIS]

Iraq

See also, Regional Affairs, Iran, Jordan

1992

Oct. 16: A 50-member team of UN weapons inspectors led by Nikita Smidovich of Russia arrived in Baghdad to search for long-range ballistic missiles. [10/17 WP, 10/18 NYT]

The Turkish armed forces began an air campaign in the Zakhu, Sinath, and Batufah regions along the Iraqi-Turkish border to halt infiltration of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members into Turkey. In the same region, Turkish ground operations continued. [10/19 FBIS]

The British Foreign Office reported that an Iraqi court denied appeals in the cases of Michael Wainwright, serving a 10-year prison sentence for illegally crossing the Iraqi border from Turkey, and Paul Ride, serving a 7-year term for illegally entering the country from Kuwait. [10/17 NYT]
Oct. 17: Iran's Interior Ministry assured Turkey that it did not support the PKK and would not allow any PKK rebels to enter Iran through its borders with Iraq. [10/19 FBIS]
Oct. 19: According to a *Sabah* (Istanbul) report, Turkish prime minister Suleyman Demirel requested Iran's permission to conduct military operations into Iraq against Kurdish rebels from Iranian territory bordering Iraq. Iranian authorities granted the request. Turkish soldiers reportedly had moved through Iran and into northern Iraq the preceding night.

An explosion at an ammunition dump near Baghdad killed three people and injured twenty-seven others. [10/23 FBIS]
Oct. 20: Iraq ceased importing luxury goods and traders were ordered to clear all imported luxury items from their shelves by 20 November. [10/21 FT]
Oct. 21: The Turkish assault on alleged PKK bases in northern Iraq continued. Turkish interior minister Ismet Sezgin reported that Turkish forces had destroyed all PKK camps there and had encircled its forces. He claimed that the Iraqi Kurds were persisting in a counterattack on the PKK that had begun on 2 October.

Two hundred twenty Iraqis and other Arabs expelled from Kuwait arrived in Safwan. [10/22 FBIS]
Oct. 22: Jan Eliasson, UN under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, and Nizar Hamdun, Iraqi UN ambassador, signed an agreement calling for the resumption of international relief programs for Kurds in northern Iraq, and for them to continue until March 1993. The agreement entailed $200 million in food, medical aid, fuel, shelter, and protective surveillance. [10/23 NYT]

A Sudanese cargo plane carrying 35 tons of meat arrived at al-Habbaniyya airport in violation of the UN blockade imposed on Iraq. [10/23 FBIS]

In spite of serious losses during the previous two weeks, PKK forces withstood a heavy attack by Iraqi Kurds on their base near the Harkuk Valley. [10/22 FBIS, 10/25 NYT]
Oct. 23: The Turkish military launched a major ground and air attack, involving some 5,000 troops, against about 8,000 PKK rebels in northern Iraq. [10/24 FT]
Oct. 24: The *New York Times* reported that at various times during the preceding week, Iraqi Kurdish officials had seen both Iranian helicopters and mule caravans carrying supplies from Iran to a major PKK encampment in Iraq. [10/25 NYT]
Oct. 26: Iraqi Kurdish sources stated that the peshmerga in northern Iraq had created a passage of safety through which PKK members could flee to Iran. [10/26 FBIS]
Oct. 27: Exiled opponents of President Saddam Hussein's regime met in Salah al-Din to discuss a possible opposition government and to elect a 174-member general assembly, a 24-member executive committee, and a governing body of as many as seven people that would include Sunni, Shi'i, and Kurdish representation. They also urged Iraq's neighbors to open their borders to allow supplies for the opposition to pass through. The Arab Baath Socialist Party/Iraqi Command, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Independent Group, the Iraqi So-

cialist Party, the National Reconciliation Group, and the Unionist Nasirite Grouping boycotted the conference. [10/28 WP, FBIS]

PKK leader Osman Ocalan met with Iraqi Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Masud Barzani in Irbil to sign a peace agreement. [10/30 FBIS]

Oct. 28: Officials stated that at least 20,000 Turkish troops supported by tanks were operating close to Zakhu in northern Iraq. Other Turkish forces were in action near the Iranian border, outside of Harkuk. [10/29 FT]

Oct. 29: *Financial Times* reported that during the preceding week, Iran had deployed a brigade-size force along its border with Iraq to prevent the flight of PKK rebels into the country. [10/29 FT]

Oct. 30: Iraqi Kurdish officials offered to allow Turkish Kurdish rebels inhabiting the border region to move further into the Iraqi interior on the condition that they cease military activities. PKK leader Ocalan agreed to the arrangement. [10/30 FBIS, 11/2 NYT]

Turkish prime minister Demirel demanded that PKK fighters surrender to Turkish authority and ordered troops to continue their advance into northern Iraq, apparently dismissing Iraqi Kurdish requests to allow PKK rebels to abide by their surrender to peshmerga forces in Iraq. He asserted that the country had no territorial aims regarding northern Iraq. [11/2 FBIS]

Oct. 31: Iraqi opposition leaders meeting in northern Iraq chose Kurdish Democratic Party chief Masud Barzani, Shi'i clergyman Muhammad Bahr Ulum, and retired Iraqi major general Hasan Naqib to lead the opposition movement. They also elected a 25-member Executive Committee and selected a federal model for their proposed government. [11/1 WP]

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani asked the Turkish government to cease its campaign against PKK rebels in Iraq and to allow the rebels to abandon their weapons and move to regions away from the border in accordance with the PKK "surrender" to Iraqi Kurdish authority. [11/2 FBIS]

• **Nov. 1:** Turkish forces killed 14 Iraqi Kurdish fighters and wounded 40 more at Demkah and Suriya in an air attack on Iraqi Kurds. [11/2 FBIS]

Turkish military officials reported that Turkish forces had captured a central PKK base at Haftanin, 10 kilometers inside Iraq. [11/2 FT]

Stefan Wihlborg, Leif Westberg, and Christer Stromgren, three Swedes who had been sentenced in September to seven years imprisonment for entering Iraq illegally from Kuwait, submitted a petition for clemency to President Hussein. An earlier appeal to the Iraqi supreme court had failed. [11/2 WP]

Nov. 2: The *Washington Post* reported that Iraqi Kurdish leaders Talabani and Barzani had accused Iran, Iraq, and Syria of aiding Turkish Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. [11/2 WP]

The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Muhammad Hammud, a former Lebanese shareholder in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and First American Bank and a key front man for BCCI, had borrowed about $7 million from Banca Nazionale del Lavoro to supply high-grade steel to Iraq. [11/2 WSJ]

Nov. 3: Iraqi opposition members announced that an explosion at al-Qaqa military installation near Baghdad had resulted in 700 deaths. [11/9 FBIS]

Nov. 6: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that President Hussein had relocated Scud missiles and buried rocket boosters to evade UN weapons inspections. [11/6 WSJ]

The Turkish army's planning chief disclosed that some of the Turkish forces that had entered Iraq since 12 October might remain there after the termination of the campaign against Turkish Kurds to ensure the security of the borders. [11/9 FBIS]

Nov. 7: Apparently distancing himself from President Hussein, King Hussein of Jordan declared that "there is every need for the Iraqi people to put an end" to the regime in Iraq and to strive for a democratic, pluralistic society. [11/8 NYT]

Nov. 13: Turkish troops began withdrawing from positions in northern Iraq. [11/16 FBIS]

Nov. 14: The foreign ministers of Iran, Syria, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the Iraqi Kurd issue. The three denounced the de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq and cautioned Iraqi Kurdish leaders that they would prevent any attempt to partition Iraq into separate states. Iraqi and Kurdish leaders were not invited to participate in the talks. [11/15 NYT]

Nov. 16: PKK leader Ocalan claimed that PKK rebels in northern Iraq had not surrendered to Iraqi peshmerga. He said the PKK had concluded a "peace agreement" with Iraqi Kurds in order to be able to move away from the Turkish-Iraqi border and thereby remove Turkey's pretext for its attacks on PKK rebels in Iraq. [11/19 FBIS]

Nov. 17: Turkish deputy prime minister Erdal Inonu announced that Turkish cross-border operations into northern Iraq had been completed with success and that Turkish forces had set up a "security zone" along Turkey's border with Iraq to prevent PKK attacks. [11/18 FBIS]

Nov. 18: At the end of a 10-day UN weapons inspection mission to Iraq, team leader Dimitri Perricos claimed that Iraqi nuclear experts had withheld a list of foreign companies involved in the construction of Iraq's nuclear weapons program in violation of UN cease-fire requirements. [11/19 FT]

PKK rebels lifted a month-long blockade into Iraqi Kurdistan that had prevented Turkish cargo trucks from entering northern Iraq. [11/19 FBIS]

Nov. 20: PUK leader Talabani announced that Iraqi Kurds and Turkey had agreed to cooperate in securing Iraqi border and frontier areas. [11/23 FBIS]

Nov. 23: Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahaf and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz made

an appeal before the UN Security Council, requesting that UN sanctions against Iraq be lifted because of Iraq's fulfillment of its "substantive obligations." [11/23 FT]

Nov. 24: The UN Security Council refused to lift sanctions against Iraq, asserting that several UN conditions remained unfulfilled.

The *New York Times* reported that during Turkey's attempts to crush Turkish Kurds active in northern Iraq, about 5,000 members of the PKK in Iraq had been forced out of their encampments and more than half had been killed, wounded, or captured. [11/24 NYT]

Nov. 26: *Hurriyet* reported that Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish officials had completed arrangements for a security zone along the Turkish-Iraqi border. With Turkish supervision, arms, and supplies, Iraqi Kurdish forces would patrol the area from four main headquarters in Haftanin, Shive, Metina, and Harkuk and 60 guard posts. [12/9 FBIS]

Nov. 28: After further meetings with UN officials in New York, Deputy Prime Minister Aziz said the Security Council should initiate discussion within the United Nations of the possibility of lifting sanctions against Iraq. He admitted that Iraq did not expect to return to the level of power it had possessed before the 1991 gulf war. [11/29 WP]

A Middle East Watch report disclosed that the military had laid a profusion of land mines in northern Iraq during the Iran-Iraq and gulf wars. Because authorities had not retrieved them, many civilians had been killed and injured, and farming and village reconstruction had been impeded. [11/29 NYT]

Nov. 29: In Irbil, bombs exploded in six trucks carrying UN food supplies from Turkey to the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. There were no casualties. [12/2 FBIS]

Dec. 5: Two new UN weapons inspection teams arrived in Baghdad. [12/6 WP]

Dec. 7: The government informed Maurizio Zeffirero of Italy, head of a UN nuclear inspections team in Iraq, that it was ready to begin discussion about its nuclear suppliers. [12/9 FBIS]

President Hussein announced the completion of the "Saddam River," a project that created a third "river" or canal in Iraq, 565 kilometers long and up to 100 meters wide. Voice of Rebellious Iraq (clandestine) accused Hussein's regime of using the project to divert waters away from southern marshlands so that Shi'i residents taking refuge there would be more vulnerable to attack. [12/7 FBIS, 12/8 NYT]

The government imposed a ban on 146 imported consumer goods to ease strains on foreign currency reserves, steady the dinar, and reduce profiteering by merchants. [12/11 FT]

Dec. 13: UN weapons inspection team leader Johan Santesson of Sweden reported at the conclusion of his team's visit that they had not uncovered any weapons-related material, but that there were still areas to be clarified with the Iraqis. [12/14 WP]

Dec. 16: Bombs exploded in 10 of 19 trucks in a UN relief convoy traveling from Turkey into northern Iraq just after the trucks had stopped at an Iraqi checkpoint at Faidah, in Dahuk Governate. The drivers believed that the bombs had been attached to their vehicles at the checkpoint. [12/18 FBIS]

Dec. 17: The military moved forces north to an area within striking distance of the Kurdish region, maintaining that the troops were there for an exercise. [12/18 NYT]

Dec. 19: The United Nations suspended its relief operations in the Kurdish region in the north until officials ensured that no more bombs would be planted on relief trucks passing through Iraqi-controlled areas. The United Nations also ordered more UN guards to Iraqi checkpoints to protect better the convoys. [12/20 NYT]

Dec. 23: Iraqi authorities refused to allow UN guards to inspect and escort trucks carrying relief aid while in parts of the country under government control. [12/24 WP]

Dec. 27: A US plane shot down one of two Iraqi planes that had entered the southern "no-fly" zone without heeding a US warning to turn back. Another pair of Iraqi planes had crossed earlier, but had quickly exited the zone. The government claimed the right to retaliate for the incident, asserting that the plane was shot down over sovereign Iraqi territory. [12/28 NYT, WP]

Dec. 28: A UN official reported that the government had agreed to allow UN guards to inspect and escort UN relief convoys taking aid to the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. [12/29 FT]

Dec. 29: For the third consecutive day, Iraqi aircraft crossed into the southern "no-fly" zone, turning back before US planes could intercept them. [12/30 WP]

The Kurdish Democratic Union and the Faili Kurdish Muslim Movement decided to merge and form the Kurdistan Nationalist Union. [12/31 FBIS]

Dec. 30: According to a UN official, relief convoys supplying Kurds in the north resumed deliveries. [12/31 FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported that an apparently official memorandum, circulated by a Kurdish group, provided the first written evidence that Iraq had possessed biological weapons since 1986. The memo was among thousands of files taken by Kurdish rebels during their uprising in spring 1991. The government contended that the documents were forgeries. [12/30 NYT]

A group of 357 Iraqis, Jordanians, and Palestinians expelled from Kuwait arrived in Safwan. [1/5 FBIS]

1993

Jan. 3: US officials reported that the Iraqi military had moved surface-to-air missiles below the thirty-second parallel into the southern "no-fly" zone and had augmented forces just north of the zone,

threatening the flights of US and allied planes patrolling those areas. [1/5 NYT]

Jan. 6: Britain, France, and the United States presented a deadline to UN ambassador Hamdun stating that Iraq had 48 hours to return surface-to-air missiles deployed in the southern "no-fly" zone to their original sites. The allies threatened a military response for noncompliance. [1/7 NYT]

Jan. 7: In response to the allies' 6 January ultimatum, UN ambassador Hamdun asserted Iraq's sovereignty over all of its territory and proclaimed its right to deploy defenses on any part of it, but he gave no definitive word regarding compliance with the ultimatum. Hamdun also extended an invitation for a US congressional delegation to investigate. The Iraqi Council of Ministers rejected the ultimatum and voted to retaliate if attacked. [1/8 NYT, FBIS]

One CARE Australia staff member died and another was injured in a shooting by suspected Iraqi gunmen in the northern province of al-Sulaymaniyya. CARE Australia officials asserted that the incident was an accident. [1/8 NYT]

Jan. 8: The allied deadline for Iraq to move surface-to-air missiles deployed in the southern "no-fly" zone passed without full Iraqi compliance and without an allied response. Hindered by bad weather, allied reconnaissance efforts to determine Iraqi compliance revealed that some of the missiles had been dismantled, but could not determine whether Iraq had moved them to their proper locations.

Deputy Prime Minister Aziz proclaimed that Iraq would not remove the missiles and would only permit UN arms inspectors to be flown into Iraq in chartered Iraqi planes, rather than in UN planes. The UN Security Council condemned the announcement. [1/9 NYT]

Jan. 9: US officials announced that although Iraq had not fully met the demands of the United States and its allies, it had dismantled and dispersed the missiles deployed in the "no-fly" zone well enough to ensure the safety of allied air patrols. The officials cautioned that Iraq would not receive a warning if it made further violations. [1/10 NYT]

Jan. 10: Following through on a pledge to ban flights of non-Iraqi planes into the country, Iraqi officials refused entry to a UN plane carrying about 70 weapons inspectors, and suggested that they use Iraqi Airways or drive from Jordan. The officials also claimed that, in contradiction to US reports, the government had not acceded to allied demands to move its anti-aircraft weapons from their positions in the southern "no-fly" zone.

According to a UN report, about 200 Iraqis crossed into an area along the border with Kuwait that once belonged to Iraq, but which the United Nations had designated Kuwaiti territory according to a newly drawn border that would go into effect on 15 January. In spite of efforts by UN personnel to block them, the Iraqis seized missiles and other weapons from a bunker at Umm Qasr and then returned to Iraq. [1/11 NYT]

Jan. 11: A senior Iraqi official declared that Baghdad would cease cooperating with UN weapons inspectors and that authorities would kill Iraqi citizens providing names of those involved in Iraqi weapons development. They also refused to allow a UN surveillance helicopter to enter the country's airspace. [1/12 WP]

The government deployed a battery of SA-2 missiles near the Saddam hydroelectric dam about 25 miles north of Mosul, in the northern "no-fly" zone. Closer to Mosul, a SA-3 battery was deployed. Also, US reconnaissance revealed a newly deployed SA-3 battery near Tallil air base in the southern "no-fly" zone.

For a second time, about 250 Iraqis crossed into the Iraq-Kuwait border area to retrieve Iraqi weapons, including four Silkworm missiles. Although the United Nations had given Iraq until 15 January to retrieve its equipment, it condemned the incursions because Iraq had not obtained the necessary permission beforehand. The UN Security Council demanded the return of the weapons and warned that Iraq would face "serious consequences" if it continued its incursions into the border area and if it maintained the ban on UN flights. [1/12 NYT, WP]

Jan. 12: Senior US officials said that President George Bush had decided to launch a military strike against Iraq in the near future—barring a radical turnaround in Iraqi behavior—but gave no further details. Britain and France said they would take part if necessary.

Iraqi UN ambassador Hamdun presented a letter to Yosio Hatano, president of the UN Security Council, saying that Iraq wanted to open a formal dialogue with the council to resolve outstanding differences.

US administration officials disclosed that during a 27 December confrontation between US and Iraqi planes, one of the Iraqi aircraft fired a heat-seeking missile that ultimately fell short of its target and went undetected by the US pilots. Later analysis of Airborne Warning and Control System plane computer tapes had revealed the missile fire. [1/13 NYT, WP]

Jan. 13: At approximately 6:45 Iraqi time, about 110 British, French, and US planes attacked radar and mobile missile sites near al-Amara, Basra, Najaf, Samawa, and the Tallil airbase. US military officials claimed that during the 30-minute attack, all targets were hit and no allied casualties occurred. Iraqi forces fired at least four surface-to-air missiles.

British, French, and US officials indicated that unless Iraq changed its behavior, it would be the target of further strikes. The United States announced plans to send more than 1,000 troops to Kuwait.

In response to the allied air attack, President Hussein called on the Iraqi people to wage "anoth-

er battle of jihad." UN ambassador Hamdun pledged that Iraq would cease sending missions to Umm Qasr and that it would no longer require UN inspectors to use Iraqi airplanes. Other officials reported that four Iraqis had died and seven had been injured in the allied attack. [1/14 NYT, WP]

Jan. 14: In assessing the damage done during the preceding day's attack on Iraq, the US Pentagon reported that allied forces had destroyed only one of three surface-to-air missile batteries targeted and had dropped a stray 2,000-pound bomb that seriously damaged an apartment building near Basra.

In contradiction to reports the previous day, the allied attack occurred over a period of 15 minutes and additionally involved the participation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Iraqi News Agency reported that 19 people had died, 12 had been injured, and that bombs had hit heavily populated civilian areas in or near Basra, Misan, Najaf, and Thayy Qar.

Many Arab countries decried the strike as hypocritical, pointing to allied inaction regarding Israeli noncompliance with UN resolutions on the more than 400 expelled Palestinians stranded between Israel and Lebanon since December. [1/14 FBIS, 1/15 NYT, WP]

Jan. 15: Iraq refused to give air clearance to a UN flight scheduled to enter the country. In response to a US deadline requiring Iraq to ensure the security of UN planes carrying UN weapons inspectors, Iraq sent a message saying that it could not do so because Iraqi forces protecting Iraq's sovereign airspace might mistake UN aircraft for allied war planes. Iraq had also failed to remove by the deadline six police posts in the area consigned to Kuwait in the UN border redrawing. US officials, reiterating their threat to use force in response to Iraqi noncompliance, placed its forces on high alert and renewed discussions with its allies regarding a possible reprisal.

After a restricted government tour of Basra, journalists reported the destruction of a civilian farming hamlet in the outskirts of the city, in contradiction to Pentagon reports that civilian damage had been limited to a Basra apartment building. [1/15 FBIS, 1/16 NYT, WP]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon

1992

Oct. 20: Interior Minister Arye Der'i informed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that the Sephardi Torah Guardians (SHAS) wanted Shulamit Aloni removed from her position as minister of education. After a cabinet meeting to discuss the situation, Aloni asserted that she would not resign. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 22: The Labor Party elected Nisim Zvili as its secretary general. [10/23 FBIS]

Nov. 2: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that in response to a US threat to suspend military aid, the Israeli government acceded to US demands that it grant US Department of Justice investigators limited access to Israeli officials for questioning about a plan to divert US monetary assistance for covert Israeli operations. [11/2 WSJ]

Prime Minister Rabin's government defeated four no-confidence motions in the Knesset regarding Education Minister Aloni. Instead of resigning from the government coalition in protest of Aloni's views and policies, SHAS had settled for an apology from Aloni, promises for greater influence in regular public schools, and restrictions on the importation of non-kosher meat into Israel. [11/3 NYT]

Nov. 3: New government reports stated that the birthrate among the country's Jews had dropped to its lowest level, 2.6 per woman, while the rate among Israeli Palestinian women had risen to 4.7 per woman. The low Jewish birthrate was offset by the immigration of 170,000 Jews in 1991. [11/4 FT]

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announced that for the first time, Arab citizens of Israel would be eligible to join Israel's diplomatic corps. [11/4 NYT]

Nov. 5: Five Israeli soldiers were killed and six others wounded when a missile misfired and hit them during a training exercise in Ze'elim. [11/6 WP]

Nov. 15: Likud's Central Committee approved a primary election system based on popular primaries in which the winning candidate, who would need 40 percent of the vote to avoid a runoff election, would automatically become both party chief and candidate for prime minister. [11/17 NYT]

Nov. 17: In Jerusalem, vandals drew a swastika and painted black the grave of former prime minister Menachem Begin; they were thought to have been zealous Jews protesting an archaeological dig in East Jerusalem that they said desecrated Jewish graves. [11/18 WP]

Nov. 19: The *New York Times* reported that during the previous week, German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel and German military chief of staff General Klaus Nauman visited Israel to reassure Israeli leaders that their country was concerned with rising German anti-Semitism and was taking measures to combat it. [11/19 NYT]

Israeli and Vatican officials met in Jerusalem at a senior level for the first time, commenting that they were moving toward full diplomatic relations. [11/20 WP]

Nov. 25: French president François Mitterrand arrived for a two-day visit to discuss economic issues concerning the two countries and the Middle East region. [11/26 FT]

The military censor denounced four foreign correspondents for violating censorship regulations in

their accounts of the 5 November missile misfire and asserted that they could face punishment. [11/26 NYT]

Nov. 29: The cabinet issued a statement that presented a stinging censure of the neo-Nazi resurgence in Germany and exhorted the German government to take strong measures to quell it. [11/30 NYT]

Dec. 1: The government indefinitely suspended the press credentials of Carol Rosenberg of the *Miami Herald* and Ian Black of the *Guard* and reprimanded four other reporters before the military censor for their breach of Israeli censorship in their coverage of the 5 November missile misfire. [12/2 NYT]

Dec. 9: During a visit to England, Prime Minister Rabin urged British prime minister John Major to encourage the European Community (EC) to push for stronger action throughout Europe against racist and anti-semitic attacks. [12/10 FT]

Dec. 16: The government voted to bail out the failing Israeli Military Industries. [12/17 FT]

Dec. 21: The Knesset voted down a no-confidence motion by Likud. [12/22 FBIS]

Dec. 29: Prime Minister Rabin decided against a proposed cut in army deployment in the territories, claiming that increases in violence there warranted the army's presence, in spite of budgetary constraints. [12/30 FBIS]

The Finance Ministry announced that beginning in March 1993, it would use $106 million in US loan guarantees granted in 1992 to facilitate the absorption of Soviet Jewish immigrants. [12/30 FT]

1993

Jan. 3: In Jerusalem, police fired rubber bullets at thousands of Jewish demonstrators protesting the unearthing of ancient graves in the process of building construction. [1/4 FT]

Jan. 6: At a Tel Aviv high-tech industry conference, Prime Minister Rabin accused the EC of trade discrimination. He pointed to the imbalance in Israeli-EC trade in which Israeli exports to EC countries were half the value of EC exports to Israel. [1/7 FT]

Jan. 11: Finance Minister Avraham Shohat announced the approval in principal of a "free" industrial area, to be constructed in the Negev or Galilee, where manufacturers would not be subjected to normal taxes and bureaucratic regulations. The proposal would require alterations to extant laws in addition to Knesset approval. [1/12 NYT]

Jan. 15: Benjamin Netanyahu, a former deputy prime minister and leading contender to replace former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir as head of Likud, admitted on Israeli television to having an extramarital affair. He claimed that a senior member of his party had threatened to expose the affair unless he withdrew his candidacy for party chief.

The Labor Party elected Ezer Weizman as its candidate for president. Elections were scheduled for 24 March. [1/15 NYT]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq

1992

Oct. 18: The teams of defense lawyers representing Layth Shubaylat and Yaqub Qirrish, two Islamist parliamentary deputies charged with attempting to overthrow the government, withdrew officially from the case in protest of a secret court session during which evidence incriminating Shubaylat was presented and from which all but three of the lawyers were excluded. Shubaylat and Qirrish began a hunger strike. Judge Yusuf Fauri ruled that the defendants had until 20 October to find new counsel. [10/19 FBIS]

Nov. 5: King Hussein disclosed that although doctors in the United States had removed cancerous tissue from his body, he still required further treatment in the United States. [11/6 NYT]

Nov. 10: A military court sentenced Layth Shubaylat and Yaqub Qirrish to 20 years of hard labor for membership in an underground Islamic group and possession of arms and explosives. Two shopkeepers who were also being tried in the case, Ahmad Ramzi Ayyubi and Abd al-Hamid Sadik Idhkaydik, were also convicted of the same charges and received ten years of hard labor. [11/11 NYT]

Nov. 12: King Hussein proclaimed amnesty for 140 political and criminal prisoners, including Layth Shubaylat and Yaqub Qirrish, as well as members of the Islamic Resistance Movement and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. [11/13 NYT]

Nov. 23: In a speech to the nation, King Hussein made clear that with regard to Islamism, the government would not tolerate "those elements that seek to impair our country's image and take us back to the past." He declared his support for pluralism and democracy. [11/24 NYT]

Nov. 30: Qol Yisrael reported that in the previous week Jordanian police had closed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command offices in Amman and arrested several people on the suspicion that the office supported anti-government activities. [12/1 FBIS]

Dec. 3: The Interior Ministry rejected a request to license the Arab Socialist Baath Party and the Jordanian Communist Party. It approved the licensing of the Jordanian National Alliance. [12/4 FBIS]

Dec. 7: The Interior Ministry recognized two new political parties, the Popular Union Party and the Pledge Party. [12/8 FBIS]

Muayad Hassan Naji al-Janabi, a 52-year-old Iraqi nuclear scientist affiliated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Iraqi Minis-

try of Military Industries, was shot to death in Amman, where he and his family were making arrangements to defect to Libya. Police arrested two Iraqis whom they suspected were hired by the Iraqi government to kill al-Janabi in order to set an example to others considering defection. [12/8 NYT]

Dec. 8: The Interior Ministry licensed the Future Party and the Islamic Action Front. [12/11 FBIS]

Dec. 12: Doctors at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, declared that King Hussein was free of cancer. [12/13 WP]

1993

Jan. 4: The Jordan Shipping Agents' Association reported that the economy had lost at least $570 million due to the diminished volume of transit cargo through the port of Aqaba and ship inspection fees. [1/5 FT]

Kuwait

See also, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1992

Oct. 18: A new government was formed:

Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, *First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister*

Dhari Abdallah al-Uthman, *Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs*

Ahmad Hamad al-Jabir, *Interior*

Ahmad Abdallah al-Rabi, *Education and Higher Education*

Ahmad Muhammad Salih al-Adasani, *Electricity and Water; Public Works*

Jasim Muhammad al-Awn, *Social Affairs and Labor*

Jaman Salih al-Atmi, *Religious Trusts and Islamic Affairs*

Habib Jawhar Hayat, *Communications*

Saud Nasir Saud al-Sabah, *Information*

Abdallah Rashid al-Hajiri, *Commerce and Industry*

Abd al-Wahab Sulayman al-Fawzan, *Health*

Ali Ahmad al-Baghli, *Petroleum*

Ali Sabah al-Salim, *Defense*

Mishari Jasim al-Anjari, *Justice and Administrative Affairs*

Nasir Abdallah al-Ridan, *Finance; Planning* [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 20: The new parliament elected Ahmad Saadun as its speaker. [10/21 FT]

Oct. 26: A Ministry of Communications source disclosed that the ministry had decided to privatize telecommunications services, and a new entity, Kuwait Telecommunications Company, would be established within six months to manage operations. [10/27 FT]

Nov. 16: Information Minister Saud al-Sabah announced the suspension of publication of *Sawt al-Kuwayt* and *al-Fajr al-Jadid* on the grounds that the restoration of Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion had ended the need for the papers. [11/18 FBIS]

Dec. 4: Grupo Torras, a Spanish holding of the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), announced that it was filing for insolvency protection, halting payments on more than $2.9 billion in debts. It had already lost more than $4 billion. [12/5 NYT, FT]

Jan. 4: The government decided to reduce its diplomatic staff in Cyprus, as well as employees of Kuwait Airways there, after it received several threats from a Palestinian organization suggesting that it would murder Kuwaitis in Cyprus. [1/5 FBIS]

Jan. 7: The KIO filed a criminal suit in Madrid against seven of its members—including Kuwaitis Fuad Jaffar, former manager of the KIO, and a cousin of the amir, Khalid al-Sabah—for their alleged diversion of more than $800 million of Kuwaiti investments in Spain during their directorship of Grupo Torras. [1/8 FT, 1/11 WSJ]

Lebanon

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq

1992

Oct. 16: The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) stated that its post on the Qa'qa'iyyat al-Litani Bridge and another in Frun were hit as a result of Israeli bombardment of Qa'qa'iyyat al-Jisr.

After an attack on the South Lebanon Army (SLA) between al-Tuhrah and al-Dubshah from Hizballah-controlled territory, the SLA retaliated by bombarding Hubbush, al-Nabatiyya al-Fawqa, Kafr Tibnit, the Litani River basin, parts of Kafr Rumman, and the periphery of Alman and al-Shumariyya. [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 17: Muhammad Huwaydi, a Fatah official, was assassinated by unknown persons at the Jall al-Bahr camp in Tyre. [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 18: In Sidon, gunmen shot and killed Fatah–Revolutionary Council members Riyad Asad Kawash and Inab Rifai. [10/19 FBIS]

Oct. 19: Husayn Udaymi of Fatah was murdered in Tripoli. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 20: The Chamber of Deputies elected Nabih Berri speaker. [10/21 NYT]

Berri submitted a draft bill calling for parliamentary elections in four years to establish a nonsectarian government. [10/21 FBIS]

In Sidon, gunmen killed Fatah members Muhammad Husni Hubaysh and Muhammad Ibrahim Mustafa and wounded three others. [10/20 FBIS]

Oct. 21: Israeli planes rocketed a house allegedly belonging to Hizballah near Mashgharah, and Israeli tanks fired on Hizballah positions and villages

inside the Israeli self-declared "security zone." [10/21 FBIS, 10/22 WP]

Palestinians in Ayn al-Hilwa observed a general strike to protest violent confrontations between Fatah and Fatah–Revolutionary Council. [10/23 FBIS]

Oct. 22: President Ilyas Hrawi appointed Rafiq al-Hariri prime minister. [10/23 WP]

The government assured Turkey that it would not allow PKK rebels to take refuge in the Biqa Valley. [10/23 FBIS]

Oct. 25: On a road near Ahmadiyya in the south, an explosion killed Israeli soldiers Eran Shohan, 21, Asaf Golan, 19, Niv Amoyal, 19, Sirhan Wassam, 20, and Avraham Asulin, 20, and wounded five others. Hizballah claimed responsibility. In retaliation, Israeli forces bombarded Hizballah encampments in the Biqa. [10/26 NYT]

Oct. 26: Israeli forces launched attacks on alleged Hizballah bases as far north as Nahr al-Barid and bombarded the suspected source of Hizballah Katyusha rocket attacks that left several dead in Qiryat Shimona. [10/27 NYT]

Oct. 27: A Hizballah-launched rocket struck an apartment complex in Qiryat Shimona, killing a teenage boy. [10/27 WP]

Oct. 28: Hizballah forces ended their rocket attack on Israeli-controlled territory, prompting Israel to claim that its forces would take no further action unless attacked. [10/29 FT]

Oct. 31: After consulting with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, Prime Minister-designate al-Hariri, and Chamber of Deputies Speaker Berri, President Hrawi announced cabinet appointments:

Rafiq al-Hariri, *Prime Minister; Finance*
Bahij Tabbarah, *Justice; Administrative Reform Affairs*
Asad Rizq, *Industry and Oil*
Marwan Hamadah, *Health and Social Affairs*
Muhsin Dallul, *National Defense*
Abdallah al-Amir, *Labor*
Faris Buwayz, *Foreign and Expatriate Affairs*
Michel Samahah, *Information*
Mikhail al-Dahir, *National Education and Fine Arts*
Nicholas Fattush, *Tourism*
Bisharah Mirhij, *Interior*
Mahmud Abu Hamdan, *Housing and Cooperatives*
Muhammad Ghaziri, *Post and Telecommunications*
Adil Qirtas, *Agriculture*
Hagop Yarwan Demerdjian, *Economy and Trade*
Muhammad Bassam Murtada, *Public Works and Transport*

In addition, President Hrawi appointed Shahe Barsoumian, Anwar al-Khalil, Fuad Sinyurah, and Ali Usayran as ministers of state. [11/2 FBIS]

The Lebanese Army arrested 27 members of the Lebanese Forces on charges that they had attempted to foment unrest and rekindle the civil war. [11/1 NYT, 11/3 FBIS]

Israeli forces renewed their shelling of suspected Hizballah-controlled villages in the south. [11/1 WP]

Nov. 4: Israeli bombardment continued in Kafr Rumman, Hayy al-Maslakh, and al-Nabatiyya. [11/5 FBIS]

Nov. 8: Hizballah forces launched Katyusha rockets into the Galilee apparently in response to an Israeli attack on a Hizballah base in Ayn al-Tina the preceding day that left at least four people dead. [11/9 FT]

Nov. 9: Hizballah forces continued attacking the Galilee with rockets. Israeli forces persisted in their counterattack. [11/10 FBIS]

Nov. 10: Israel began massing troops and armored vehicles along the northern border of its self-declared "security zone." [11/11 NYT]

Nov. 11: The Israeli army launched an aerial attack on a Hizballah base in Sidiqin. [11/12 NYT]

Nov. 12: During continued fighting between Hizballah and Israeli fighters in the south, Hizballah rebels fired a Katyusha rocket into a Nepalese UNIFIL battalion near Sidiqin, killing one soldier and wounding three. [11/13 NYT]

Nov. 13: Israel began to reduce its forces in the self-declared "security zone" in the south following a lull in fighting. [11/16 NYT]

Nov. 18: An Islamic Resistance attack on an Israeli encampment near al-Nabatiyya precipitated an Israeli strike on Hizballah sites, whose forces were not involved in the incident. Two Hizballah fighters were killed. [11/19 NYT]

Nov. 24: Authorities uncovered a failed Islamist scheme to assassinate the country's key leaders at an Independence Day parade on 22 November. [11/25 NYT]

Nov. 30: In a full-page ad in *al-Hayat,* the US Department of State offered as much as $2 million to anyone who helped track down kidnappers responsible for the deaths of CIA bureau chief William Buckley, Lt. Col. William Higgins, and Peter Killburn, a librarian at the American University of Beirut. [12/1 WP, FBIS]

Dec. 1: Walid Abu Tarbush and Hassan Dib of Fatah–Revolutionary Council were killed when a bomb they were planting near a Palestine Liberation Organization office in Ayn al-Hilwa exploded. [12/2 FT]

Hizballah forces rocketed sites in the Israeli self-declared "security zone." [12/2 WSJ]

Maronite and Hizballah leaders met in Beirut to discuss plans for saving the sectarian power sharing system. [12/3 NYT]

Dec. 22: About 4,000 Palestinians demonstrated in front of UN offices in Beirut, demanding that Israel allow the 415 exiled Palestinians stranded between Israel and Lebanon to return to their homes. [12/23 FBIS]

Dec. 24: Islamic Jihad–Bayt al-Maqdis claimed responsibility for the firing of several Katyusha rockets at the Misgav Am settlement in northern Israel. [12/29 FBIS]

Dec. 27: Three Katyusha rockets reportedly launched by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) hit Israeli-controlled positions in Bayt Lif. The DFLP, however, did not claim responsibility for the incident. [12/29 FBIS]
Dec. 29: Two thousand Lebanese Army troops moved into the south in the army's first attempt in eight years to exert control there. [12/30 NYT]

1993

Jan. 12: After two bombs exploded near an Israeli army patrol in al-Mansuriyya in the Israeli self-declared "security zone," Israeli forces sealed off the area and shelled suspected Hizballah bases north of the zone in Iqlim al-Tuffah. No group claimed responsibility for the bombs. [1/12 FBIS]
Jan. 15: Responding to a Phalange Party Politburo dismissal of two-thirds of its district leaders the previous day, those dismissed asked the party leadership to reconsider. Phalange president George Saadah ignored the request and issued a list of new district heads. [1/16 NYT]

Libya

See also, Regional Affairs,* Egypt, Turkey

1992

Oct. 26: The government demanded compensation from Italy for its 32-year occupation of the country, as well as information on the whereabouts of more than 5,000 Libyans that the Italian government allegedly deported to its own territory as forced labor. All communication and transportation services were suspended in observance of a newly established national day of mourning commemorating the exile. [10/26 FBIS, 10/28 NYT]
Oct. 28: The government established relations at the ambassadorial level with Bosnia-Herzegovina. [11/3 FBIS]
Nov. 17: An extraordinary session of the General People's Congress elected the following secretaries:

Jumua al-Maholi al-Fazzani, *Unity*
Umar Mustafa al-Muntasir, *Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation*
Miftah Muhammad Kuaybah, *Marine Resources*
Jadallah Azzuz al-Talhi, *Industry*
Abdallah Salim al-Badri, *Energy*
Ibrahim Muhammad Bakkar, *Justice and Public Security*
Muhammad Bayt al-Mal, *Planning, Trade, and Finance*
Mubarak Abdallah al-Shamikh, *Utilities, Tourism, and Communications*
Isa Abd al-Kafi, *Agrarian Reform, Land Reclamation, and Animal Resources*
Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Muhmudi, *Health and Social Security*
Matuq Muhammad Matuq, *Education, Youth, Scientific Research, and Vocational Training*
Ali Murzi al-Shairi, *Information, Culture, and Jamhiri Mobilization* [11/18 FBIS]

Nov. 18: In further elections, the General People's Congress elected Abu-Zyad Umar Durdah as secretary general of the General People's Committee and Muhammad Zaruq Rajab as secretary of the Supervision and Followup General People's Committee. They also selected members of the General Secretariat:

Al-Zanati Muhammad al-Zanati, *Secretary General*
Al-Tayib al-Safi, *Conference Affairs*
Abd-al-Latif Abd-al-Rahman al-Dali, *People's Committees Affairs*
Umar Shalbak, *Trade Unions, Federations, and Vocational Associations Affairs*
Bashir Salih Bashir, *Foreign Affairs* [11/19 FBIS]

In a speech before the General People's Congress, leader Muammar Qadhafi announced an economic plan in which half of the country's oil revenue would be used to cover costs for public projects, while the other half would be distributed equally and directly to the nation's citizens. [11/20 FBIS]
Dec. 22: A Libyan Boeing 727 airliner flying from Benghazi to Tripoli crashed near Suq al-Sabt, killing all 157 aboard. Authorities had not yet discovered the cause of the crash. [12/23 NYT]
Dec. 31: US officials announced that they had frozen $260 million in Libyan cash assets to further punish the country for its alleged support of international terrorism, bringing the total of assets frozen by the United States to $950 million. [1/1 WP]

1993

Jan. 6: Justice Minister Ibrahim Muhammad Bakkar died in an automobile accident on his way from Tunisia to Libya. [1/7 FBIS]

Morocco

See also, Regional Affairs

1992

Nov. 3: After a two-day visit with Moroccan officials, French prime minister Pierre Bérégovoy announced that henceforth France would give full support to Moroccan efforts to establish a partnership with the European Community. [11/4 FT]
Nov. 16: Othman Demnati stepped down from his position as minister of agriculture and agrarian reform. [11/20 FBIS]

*See "Regional Affairs" for events related to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Nov. 17: King Hassan II appointed Abd al-Aziz Meziane to the post of minister of agriculture and agricultural reform. [11/20 FBIS]

Pakistan

See also, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan

1992

Oct. 19: Six Chinese engineers and a policeman were kidnapped en route to Quetta. [10/21 FBIS]
Oct. 23: Police arrested Sandar Muhammad Ibrahim, head of the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Alliance. [10/26 FBIS]
Oct. 24: Troops opened fire on thousands of people attempting to cross the border into Indian-controlled Kashmir in support of Kashmiri independence. At least 28 people were killed, and the leader of the march was arrested. [10/26 FT, FBIS]
Oct. 27: The Kashmir Freedom Movement and other groups organized protest rallies in Islamabad and Rawalpindi to commemorate the 45th anniversary of India's control over parts of Kashmir. [10/28 FBIS]
Nov. 15: Police arrested hundreds of People's Democratic Alliance (PDA) workers in an effort to quell the movement's planned long march from Rawalpindi to Islamabad on 18 November to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the government. [11/16 FBIS]
Nov. 17: In spite of a government ban on the 18 November long march, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who was also the organizer of the march, refused to cancel it. Authorities called the army to patrol Islamabad, threatened to arrest Bhutto and her followers, and took various other measures to stop the march. [11/18 NYT]
Nov. 18: Before the long march began, police in Rawalpindi barricaded the planned route and fired tear gas at gathering marchers. Authorities arrested PPP leader Bhutto and top officials of her party. Bhutto was later prohibited from entering Islamabad for 30 days and was sent to Karachi. March supporters clashed with police in Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore; thousands were arrested. [11/19 NYT]
Nov. 19: PPP leader Bhutto offered to call off new plans for an anti-government protest if the government held elections. Her attempts to travel to Peshawar to continue the protest were blocked by police. [11/20 NYT]
Nov. 21: Authorities announced that they would prohibit a cross-country train expedition from Karachi to Rawalpindi planned by PPP leader Bhutto to raise support for her anti-government movement. [11/22 WP]
Nov. 23: PPP leader Bhutto endeavored to lead an anti-government protest march in Peshawar in spite of the threat of government interference. [11/23 FT]
Nov. 25: PPP leader Bhutto began a train journey from Lahore to Islamabad to campaign for a new government. Stops at small towns outside of Lahore drew crowds of supporters as large as 20,000. [11/27 NYT]

Authorities banned live transmission of Cable News Network (CNN) because of its extensive coverage of protests led by Bhutto. [11/25 FBIS]
Nov. 26: Rawalpindi and Islamabad officials lifted their ban on PPP leader Bhutto and other PDA leaders. [11/27 FBIS]
Nov. 27: North-West Frontier Province lifted its ban on PPP leader Bhutto and other PDA leaders. [11/27 FBIS]
Dec. 7: During an emergency cabinet session held in reaction to the Hindu destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, India, the preceding day, leaders called for nationwide business strikes and peaceful rallies the following day in a show of protest. [12/7 FBIS]
Dec. 8: Businesses and offices closed and thousands of citizens rallied to protest the Babri mosque's destruction. In Loralai, Baluchistan, a mob stormed a Hindu temple and stoned six Hindu children who were inside. In all, anti-Hindu violence resulted in 12 Hindus dead and 50 temples damaged. [12/8 FBIS]
Dec. 11: Representatives at a meeting of key opposition parties decided that the long march would resume on 18 December. [12/14 FBIS]
Dec. 12: PPP leader Bhutto launched a month-long protest movement to be staged in Punjab in response to the Babri mosque's destruction. [12/14 FBIS]
Dec. 26: In Chasma, the Atomic Energy Commission started construction of its second nuclear power plant. China was providing the materials for the plant. [12/27 NYT]
Dec. 29: The Foreign Office asked India to reduce its diplomatic staff from 64 to 20 at its consulate general in Karachi by 31 January. [12/30 FBIS]

1993

Jan. 8: General Asif Nawaz, the army chief of staff, died of a heart attack in Rawalpindi. [1/9 WP]
Jan. 11: A bomb explosion at a Bihari settlement in the town of Kotri, about 90 miles north of Karachi, left at least 13 people dead and 25 injured. Police suspected that members of the Jiya Sindh Nationalist Party, who oppose further Bihari settlement in Sindh Province, planted the bomb. [1/11 FBIS]
Jan. 12: The lower house Foreign Affairs Committee elected PPP leader Bhutto to be its chairperson. Bhutto stood by her position that the legislature and government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif were products of a fraudulent election. [1/13 WSJ, FBIS]
Jan. 13: The *News* reported that Sardat Abdur Rab Nishtar had been appointed the next chief of army staff. [1/14 FBIS]

Qatar

See also, Regional Affairs

Saudi Arabia

See also, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1992

Dec. 4: King Fahd dismissed the seven members of the Supreme Authority of Senior Scholars, the country's highest-level religious body, after they refused to denounce religious figures who had criticized the government. They were replaced by 10 younger scholars who were reportedly more "progressive" Muslims than their predecessors. [12/15 NYT]

Dec. 16: The *New York Times* reported the completion of a comprehensive census that showed 16.9 million people were living in the country. Of those, 12.3 million were Saudis and 4.6 million were foreigners. The census was the first in more than 20 years to be made public. [12/16 NYT]

Dec. 19: The *Washington Post* reported that Kamal Adham, a key figure in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal and the former head of Saudi intelligence, had agreed to pay ahead of schedule $10 million of the $105 million that he owed to the US Federal Reserve Board in order to help revive First American Bankshares, the bank once illegally owned by BCCI. [12/19 WP, 12/21 WSJ]

Dec. 21: King Fahd demanded that Saudi Islamists cease their distribution of anti-government materials and their use of mosques in spreading anti-government sentiment. He also accused foreign influences of backing the anti-government campaign. [12/22 NYT]

1993

Jan. 10: The US court-appointed liquidators of BCCI filed suit against the nation's largest commercial bank, the National Commerce Bank of Saudi Arabia, and its Saudi owner, Khalid Bin Mahfouz, seeking $10.5 billion for fraud and racketeering. [1/11 WP]

Sudan

See also, Egypt, Iraq

1992

Oct. 19: *Rose al-Yusuf* (Cairo) reported that between 1 and 15 September, Iran had launched an airlift between Tehran and Port Sudan to supply weapons to the Sudanese government. [10/27 FBIS]

Nov. 2: Fighting between the rebel factions of John Garang and William Nyuan had left at least 2,000 dead in the Kongor and Waat areas. [11/6 FBIS]

Nov. 3: Lieutenant General Umar Hasan al-Bashir, chairman of the Revolution Command Council, asked Muhammad Nasr al-Din Ahmad to step down from his position as secretary general of the Transitional Assembly. [11/6 FBIS]

Nov. 4: The Foreign Ministry ordered the closure of the Yugoslav embassy in Khartoum to protest mistreatment of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [11/6 FBIS]

Nov. 15: The opposition parties' coalition collapsed when leaders of the Ummah and the Democratic Unionist parties rejected the "leftist" character of their coalition partner, the Sudanese Communist Party. [11/25 FBIS]

Dec. 6: Under UN supervision, representatives of the government and the Garang, Nasir, and Torit rebel factions reached an agreement guaranteeing the delivery of relief supplies to those affected by war in the south. [12/8 FBIS]

Dec. 20: Agence France-Presse reported that since October, about 55,000 refugees from Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, and Uganda had entered Sudan. Refugees in the country totaled more than 1 million, according to an official report. [12/22 FBIS]

Dec. 29: Lieutenant General al-Bashir authorized the resumption of International Committee of the Red Cross relief efforts in southern Sudan, after having suspended them earlier in the year. [12/31 FBIS]

Dec. 30: The government decided to merge all primary and preparatory schools of Egyptian educational missions throughout the nation into the Sudanese educational system. [1/4 FBIS]

Dec. 31: The Egyptian Education Ministry strongly criticized Sudan's incorporation of Egyptian mission schools into its own educational system. [1/4 FBIS]

1993

Jan. 4: The BBC World Service reported that during the previous week, the nation had sent a message to the UN Security Council protesting the incursion of newly deployed Egyptian troops into the disputed Hala'ib area. [1/5 FBIS]

The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Sudan had decided to privatize its cotton sector, its largest and oldest agricultural industry. [1/4 WSJ]

Jan. 6: Contradicting a Sudanese memo to the UN Security Council, Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa asserted that Egyptian civilian and military movements in the Hala'ib region north of the twenty-second parallel were movements on Egyptian territory. [1/7 FBIS]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Iraq, Lebanon

1992

Dec. 14: US officials alleged that Syria had refused for eight weeks to grant exit visas to Jews wishing to leave the country. [12/15 NYT]

Dec. 22: The Foreign Ministry asserted that the government had not stopped issuing exit visas for Syrian Jews, crediting recent halts in visa issuance to bureaucratic processing problems, not a policy change. [12/31 NYT]

Tunisia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1992

Dec. 27: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali announced that presidential and parliamentary elections would be held in March 1994 and invited opposition parties that had boycotted the April 1989 elections to participate. [12/28 NYT]

Turkey

See also, Central Asia, Regional Affairs, Cyprus, Iraq, Lebanon

1992

Oct. 19: The Freedom and Democratic Party was established, headed by Mevlut Ilik. [10/21 FBIS]
Nov. 25: Turkiye Radyolari Network reported that the Constitutional Court had outlawed the Socialist Party and confiscated its assets on the grounds that the party's activities were counter to the aims of the constitution and the Political Parties Law. [10/27 FBIS]
Nov. 3: German defense minister Volker Ruehe warned the government that if Turkish forces used German weapons granted through NATO against Kurdish rebels inside and outside Turkey, relations between the two nations would be jeopardized. [11/3 FBIS]
Nov. 9: In Diyarbakir, twelve people were killed when a group armed with rifles and rockets attacked official buildings. [11/10 FBIS]
Nov. 10: A court ruled that a Libyan ferry carrying 600 passengers would be detained at the port of Izmir until the Libyan government paid more than $6.1 million owed to a Turkish contractor. [11/13 FBIS]
Nov. 11: An Amnesty International report cited in the *Washington Post* charged that the government had failed to improve human rights and that political killings and torture continue. The organization additionally faulted the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) for human rights abuses. [11/11 WP]
Nov. 15: In the country's potentially largest privatization action, the government decided to sell 20 percent of the state telecommunications monopoly. [11/16 FT]
Nov. 23: In London, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel met with British prime minister John Major and European Commission president Jacques Delors to press for Turkey's admittance into the European Community. [11/23 FT]

The Rebirth Party was established. [12/2 FBIS]
Nov. 24: The Constitutional Court banned the Great Anatolia Party on the grounds that its aims and the conditions of its establishment were no longer valid. [12/3 FBIS]
Dec. 1: Sixteen parliamentary deputies of the Motherland Party, led by Konya deputy Mehmet Kececiler, left the party to protest party chief Mesut Yilmaz's leadership. [12/3 FBIS]
Dec. 2: Fifty-four former parliamentary deputies, including five founding members, resigned from the Motherland Party in opposition to party leader Yilmaz. [12/3 FBIS]
Dec. 15: In spite of an earlier commitment to supply Armenia with electricity, the government suspended the agreement temporarily in reaction to Armenia's seizure of ten Azeri villages. [12/15 FBIS]
Dec. 17: Izmir deputy Isilay Saygin resigned from the Motherland Party. [12/18 FBIS]
Dec. 22: Four independent deputies joined the True Path Party, bringing the party's representation in the Grand National Assembly to 182. [12/23 FBIS]
Dec. 24: The Grand National Assembly approved a motion to extend by six months the stay of the "Poised Hammer" multinational force deployed in Turkey since the 1990–91 Gulf crisis. [12/28 FBIS]
Dec. 27: The Turkish Worker•Peasant Party dissolved itself and its members joined the Workers Party.

The Nationalist Action Party dissolved itself and its members joined the Nationalist Labor Party.

An explosion on a tourist ship in Istanbul left one dead and another wounded. Two outlawed leftist organizations claimed responsibility. [12/8 FBIS]

1993

Jan. 11: The Motherland Party's Istanbul deputy resigned from the party. [1/12 FBIS]

UAE

See also, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1992

Dec. 30: Agence France-Presse reported that since an 8 December Pakistani-led riot in al-Ayen against the Hindu burning of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, India, the government had deported about 1,920 Pakistanis on charges of violating local laws. [12/31 FBIS]

Yemen

1992

Nov. 5: The Presidential Council scheduled parliamentary elections for April 27, 1993, thereby extending the governmental transition period, which was to end 22 November. [11/10 FBIS]

Nov. 16: After six days at sea, a ship carrying 2,500 Somali refugees docked briefly at the port of Mukalla to receive emergency food, water, and fuel. A few hours later, it sailed on to Aden, where UN workers prepared a makeshift camp for them along the beach. [11/17 NYT]
Nov. 22: Most of the nation's public sector workers went on strike to protest the government's postponement of elections. [11/23 FBIS]
Nov. 25: The soldiers and noncommissioned officers of Marib Governate's paratroop brigade mutinied, protesting the government's delay in paying two months of their salaries. [12/2 FBIS]
Dec. 9: In Ta'iz, a demonstration by taxi and bus drivers calling for a fare increase turned violent when protestors attacked public buildings, looted stores and a hospital, and destroyed vehicles. One person was killed in the fray. [12/10 FBIS]
Dec. 10: Thousands marched to the parliament building in Sanaa to protest falling living standards. Police fired on the crowd. Four casualties were reported. [12/10 FBIS]
Dec. 11: During two days of rioting in Sanaa, Ta'iz, al-Hudaydah, and elsewhere over falling living standards, 11 people were killed and 48 injured. Police arrested about 250 demonstrators on charges of fomenting riots. [12/11 FBIS]
Dec. 12: Anti-government protests continued in Sanaa. [12/14 FBIS]
Dec. 14: An opposition politician announced that Prime Minister Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas had submitted his resignation in response to the series of cost-of-living riots. President Ali Abdallah Salih rejected the resignation and urged al-Attas to remain in his position. [12/15 FT]
Dec. 15: Education Minister Muhammad Abdallah al-Jaifi resigned to protest the government's policies, especially in the economic realm. [12/15 FBIS]
Dec. 29: Bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where US marines en route to Somalia were staying. The blasts killed one person and injured at least five. [12/30 WP]
Dec. 30: The United States withdrew its troops from Aden, which had served as a refueling port for US forces, in response to bomb explosions at hotels housing US soldiers. [1/3 WP]

1993

Jan. 10: Five towns, including Sanaa, were besieged with protestors demanding more pay and a price freeze on essential goods. The riots left as many as 13 people dead and 48 wounded. [1/11 WP]

Book Reviews

IRAN

Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909, by Mangol Bayat. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 267 pages. Notes to p. 296. Bibl. to p. 303. Index to p. 316. $45.00.

Reviewed by Shahrough Akhavi

In this splendid book Mangol Bayat has opened a new window onto the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and to developments leading up to that event. She contends that the clergy was a differentiated stratum and that the distinguished *mujtahids* of the period, contrary to established scholarship, did not play the leading role in any of its major events, including the Tobacco Protest of 1891–92 and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–09.

Bayat instead maintains that the high clergy only provided an aura of religious legitimacy to the efforts of lower ranking clergymen, who were identified in public opinion with Babi and Azali sectarian politics. These junior clerics, termed "radicals," wanted major structural changes in Iranian society. They could not openly avow this, however, given the prevalent political culture, steeped as it was in the symbols and discourse of Imami Shi'ism. Consequently, they used the language of Shi'ism even while adopting inherently antireligious positions. Moreover, they were importantly influenced by Baku and Tabriz-based social democrats who were even further removed from religion than they were themselves.

The top clergy, for their part, needed the loyalty and involvement of the "radicals," because it was they and their supporters who provided the leading mujtahids with the resources, retinue, activists, and armed gangs that were the mark of the successful high-ranking cleric. Because of great rivalry among these distinguished *ulama*, the radicals and their supporters offered critical assistance to mujtahids and *maraji' al-taqlid* regularly competing with one another for advantage.

The senior clerics allowed their subordinates to write broadsides, post placards, and even forge *fatvas* in their masters' names in the interests of limiting the autocracy of the government. Bayat maintains that the top clergymen were not opposed to the shah and the government as a matter of doctrinal principle, but in fact insisted on strengthening the government so that it could better protect the

sharia and the lives of Muslims. When they did criticize, it was not in defense of the sovereign rights of the people, but to curtail the excesses of the shah and the interference of foreign powers. Crucial to Bayat's argument is that no central authority exists in Imami Shi'ism, and hence the actions of the top clergymen should be seen as a function of their personal motives and ambitions, rather than in terms of their defense of a putative doctrinal or religious interest.

Bayat's arguments are a welcome antidote to the ahistorical notion that the clerics acted monolithically in a high-minded way to defend the rights of the people. Yet, an important question remains. Is it possible to falsify Bayat's propositions? To put it another way, conceding the absence of centralization of authority in Shi'ism at this time, how would one be able to tell when or if the clergy were acting on behalf of institutional religious interests rather than each following his separate ends? Bayat presumably would not maintain that decentralization of authority always means that incumbent professional elites cannot act collectively on behalf of institutional interests or, conversely, must act separately to maximize their individual utilities. If, indeed, she would not maintain this, then under what conditions may leaders of a decentralized system be said to be acting collectively on behalf of that system's interests?

Lacking the specification of such conditions, a troublesome possibility of reductionism emerges of ascribing all actions by top clergymen to their calculations of private advantage. This is particularly important because Bayat excludes two leading activist mujtahids, Muhammad Taba'taba'i and Ali Thiqat al-Islam, from her proposition that the mujtahids generally sought to promote their own individual interests. It takes on added significance in the light of her acknowledgment, for example, that the leading Najaf-based clergymen—Muhammad Kazim Khurasani, Abdallah Mazandarani, and Khalil Tehrani—did take public stands against the monarch's autocracy, for the constitution, and for the Majlis.

Bayat avows that these men were not advancing democratic principles. This may be, but a disinterested observer may perceive these stands to be prompted by more than merely personal interests. Accordingly, it is insufficient to explain that "some of the fatvas and long cables attributed to Khurasani, Mazandarani, and Tehrani . . . may have been written by younger members of the religious institutions who served the ayatollahs" (p. 255). In short, some ground rules concerning collective action would help resolve certain ambiguities, even though the clerics' continuing use of the Shi'i practice of *taqiyyah* (dissembling one's true beliefs for fear of persecution) could render moot the possibility of any finally decisive conclusions.

Bayat has written a wonderfully rich and textured work. In the process, she has shown respect for the work of those whose arguments she is amending. Consequently, she has accomplished perhaps the most valuable service a scholar can perform—to cause readers to re-examine their understanding of considered truths and to advance fresh explanations for anomalies in received knowledge.

Shahrough Akhavi, Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina

La révolution sous le voile: femmes islamiques d'Iran, by Fariba Adelkhah. Paris: Editions Karthala, 1991. 252 pages. Appends. to p. 262. Gloss. to p. 269. Bibl. to p. 278. Index to p. 280. FF150.00 paper.

Reviewed by Nesta Ramazani

Few media images have proved more baffling to Western viewers in recent years than those of gun-toting, *chador*-clad women fighting during the Iranian Revolution to bring to power an Islamic regime. Little has happened since then to clarify such puzzlement or lessen the conviction that the Islamic government of Iran is intrinsically hostile to women's rights. The compulsory veiling of women is offered as evidence to support the unquestioned conviction that Islam necessarily demeans women.

In this timely study, Fariba Adelkhah questions the simplistic equation of the veil—and by extension Islam—with the subjugation of women. The author lived and studied for several years in Paris and is a social anthropologist. Before that, however, she participated actively in the Iranian Revolution. In this work, Adelkhah seeks to dispel some of the misconceptions surrounding the whole question of "Islamist" women. The author is not an apologist for Iran's Islamic government. Rather, she seeks to analyze dispassionately the intriguing new evidence she gathered through personal interviews conducted from 1985 to 1987 with Islamist Iranian women. She found that large numbers of them supported the revolution and the Islamic regime not simply to overthrow the shah, but to establish a new social order and a new female identity. Their support for the Islamic government is rooted in indigenous cultural norms and a conviction that Islam is inherently an egalitarian religion that needs to be reinterpreted. These women have not hesitated to criticize the Islamic government.

As a result of their active participation in the revolution and military involvement in the Iran-Iraq war, Adelkhah suggests, women have found a new voice and a new public presence in Iran. The whole "woman question" has been opened up for discussion as never before. Public debates on women's rights have raged in newspapers, women's magazines, and Friday sermons delivered by major clerical leaders holding widely disparate views on the subject. Women have been enlarging their circle of activities, while arming themselves with knowledge of their religion and placing secular education at the service of their cause. Among their ranks are holders of Ph.Ds, university professors, teachers, writers, legislators, doctors, and housewives.

Even the Islamic trousers and *manteaux* of Iran's women testify to innovation and change, as the current *hejab* is not traditional, but a modern alternative to the unwieldy chador. Paradoxically, the wearing of Islamic garb has given women greater access to the public arena, a new voice, and a presence with which to be reckoned.

Although already slightly outdated, the validity of Adelkhah's findings have been borne out by recent developments in Iran. For example, a bill has been passed allowing women to claim "wages in cash" from husbands who file for divorce. This is only the latest in a series of victories for Iran's women under the Islamic government.

La révolution sous le voile deserves to be made widely available to English-speaking readers through a competent translation, as a badly needed corrective to the prevalent view of women as mere victims of Iran's revolution.

Nesta Ramazani is a freelance writer who has published extensively on Middle Eastern women.

ISRAEL

Pulling Strings: Biculturalism in Israeli Bureaucracy, by Brenda Danet. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. xviii + 255 pages. Appends. to p. 310. Notes to p. 331. Refs. to p. 358. Index to p. 374. $54.50 cloth. $18.95 paper.

Wildfire: Grassroots Revolts in Israel in the Post-Socialist Era, by Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. x + 176 pages. Bibl. to p. 185. Index to p. 198. $12.95 paper.

Reviewed by Donna Robinson Divine

Israel has always seemed to share more fully in the political culture of the West than in that of the Third World with whose nations it achieved independence after the end of World War II. Fiercely contested democratic elections coincide with peaceful transitions of power.

The view that Israel, as a new nation, is exceptional has been challenged by many fine scholars, Brenda Danet and Sam Lehman-Wilzig among them. In these two books under review, both scholars open up new perspectives on Israeli society by focusing on how its Jewish citizens interact with various components of its political system. Danet

analyzes the extent to which ordinary Israelis rely on personal connections or "pull strings" to circumvent bureaucratic obstacles. Like citizens of other modern states, Israelis must interact with their government frequently, and Danet has concentrated almost all of her major scholarly studies on that encounter. In theory, Israel's organizational culture is committed to a merit-based hiring system and the discharge of duties in accordance with laws and regulations. Indeed, Danet has discovered that most Israelis proclaim their commitment to these universal norms and values. But many of these same people who insist on the rule of law and the creation of regular channels to guide citizen-government interaction fail to use them; instead, they turn to personal friends or contacts for governmental services due them or to redress infringements of their rights. Israelis more readily pull strings than turn to institutions such as the ombudsman charged with administrative oversight.

Danet develops her argument by mining the results of two similar questionnaires administered in 1968 and then again in 1980. Applying the most rigorous and sophisticated statistical methodology to the data, she is able to describe an Israeli organizational culture based on the attitudes and behavior of its polyglot Jewish population: immigrants from Western Europe and the Americas, from the countries of the Middle East, and the ever-increasing percentage of native-born citizens. The author's conclusions defy the notion that Israel is a Western society and becoming more so. With respect to its large network of organizations, Israel is bicultural. In Danet's words, "instead of prizing the right to receive a universalistically grounded decision—even if they are wrong—clients forego this right . . . sacrificing principle for interest." Moreover, she demonstrates that "it is not the unsocialized, marginal groups who engage in deviant behavior . . . it is the respectable citizens who routinely break the rules" (p. 235). Although the complexity of Danet's statistical presentation may intimidate many, *Pulling Strings* is so masterful a synthesis that it must be considered essential reading for all serious students of Israeli society.

Sam Lehman-Wilzig's *Wildfire* also probes Israel's informal sectors and the types of behavior deemed illegal or inconsistent with the established rules and regulations, which the author claims has had the cumulative effect of weakening Israel's economic and political systems. The best part of Lehman-Wilzig's book is contained in chapters on Israel's mass media, the black and grey markets, and the school and health systems. Israelis manage to secure the services they feel they need regardless of official policies. According to the author, such behavior arose in the wake of the repeated failures of Israel's paternalistic state. Increasing numbers of Israelis are taking matters into their own hands. To explain this phenomenon, Lehman-Wilzig draws his language and categories from the realm of social psychology. Israelis mark one stage of development while their political and economic institutions have been imprinted with characteristics from another and much earlier phase. Israelis are maturing and do not need the strong governmental guidance their socialist parties introduced as a means of state building and justified as an instrument necessary to securing political sovereignty. "The grassroots revolts in Israel have spread to virtually every sphere of daily life—private and public . . . from a civic standpoint they teach the wrong lessons . . . [but they suggest] a type of behavior which might be very socially productive . . . " (pp. 151–2).

The contrast between the two books is dramatic. Danet draws only those conclusions sustainable by the empirical data she has collected. Her theories are modest but useful. On the basis of material culled from newspaper articles, Lehman-Wilzig asserts a grand theory of Israeli social and political development. Even those who may share his particular views about the need for smaller government may find Lehman-Wilzig's evidence problematic. One can draw a number of conflicting conclusions from the story that Lehman-Wilzig outlines.

There is certainly a need to reconsider some of Israel's most long-lived and cherished institutions. Both books provide a starting point for such a reconsideration, but Danet's shows a great appreciation for the

complexities of Israeli reality while Lehman-Wilzig's is so heavily reductionist as to leave readers with an account that is frustratingly incomplete.

Donna Robinson Divine, Department of Government, Smith College

JERUSALEM

Jerusalem Blessed, Jerusalem Cursed: Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Holy City from David's Time to Our Own, by Thomas A. Idinopulos. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991. xiv + 337 pages. Notes to p. 343. Sources to p. 357. Index to p. 368. $30.00.

Reviewed by Ronald Brownrigg

This book is an attractive, compellingly readable historical analysis of events, from which the author draws contemporary conclusions and solutions. Thomas Idinopulos is steeped in both Jerusalem history and local tradition, with a wide ecumenical perspective of faith and fact. Consequently, he gives a generous and sensitive portrait of the evolution of current thinking among Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Jerusalem today. With a clear sense of direction, the author uses a scholarly wealth of quotations, with occasional mid-19th century photographs and some city plans. His notes are exhaustive, his index clear and full, and he reveals a rich span of sources, covering the whole period. Although other choices could have been included, this is a brilliantly balanced and comprehensive introduction to the Holy City—in history, tradition, and politics.

Idinopulos includes a wealth of Jewish comment on Christian and Muslim life, with rather less Christian and Muslim interpretation of Jewish scriptures. He weaves a generous path through the maze of caliphs and sultans. He describes the long, continuing conflict within the Christian church between Greek and Latin, and between Greek national and Arab clergy, and analyzes the many *millets*, or religious communities, within the city.

In a somewhat uncritical approach to the biblical account, the author barely mentions the Canaanite/Jebusite influence on the sanctuary worship and civic constitution of "David's city" and the establishment of David's kingship, although his notes mention K.J. Asali's *Jerusalem in History*.[1] He transposes, however, the Jewish translation of "Urushalem," place of the pagan sun-god "Shalem," into the city of peace, "Shalom." He rightly proclaims the priority of the primeval sacrificial rock, as the link between David's shrine, Solomon's altar of incense, Jesus in Herod's temple, Muhammad's ascension on his Night Journey, and the rock and cave today.

There is a faint Zionist perspective in his "sanctification" of David, "sacrilization" of the city, and new covenant based on David's line, building on the older Mosaic covenant, with David as a second Moses and Jerusalem the successor to Sinai. Can one think of "the immortalization of David's legacy in the myth of messianic redemption?" (p. 45). With a blend of history and topography, he continues to the tragic losses of the state, but the constant survival of national identity and unity, in the prayerful hope of a coming day of redemption, which has survived through a further millennium to the present day.

The author's estimates of Byzantine and Crusader occupations are quite fair, but surely it is manifestly untrue that there is no "archeological evidence to support the contention that the Church of the Holy Sepulchre contains the Golgatha stone" (p. 177). He seems unaware of the recent Armenian excavations and the column of shale, "which the builders rejected."

Of the Passion of Jesus, his full presentation of Mark's story is yet incomplete. He does not mention Isaiah 52 and 53, so often quoted by Jesus. How can there have been no purposeful intention? "The Son of Man goes as it is written . . . to give his life a ransom for many." Was not the charge before Caiaphas the blasphemy of accepting messiahship? No wonder Peter could not risk being forced to

1. *Jerusalem in History*, ed. by K.J. Asali (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1990).

witness to his own confession of Jesus as Christ, at Caesarea Philippi!

On Christian pilgrimage, his selections from Jerome and Origen are severe. Why are there no references to Justin Martyr, Augustine's "Believe and thou comest . . . " or Jesus' "Come and See," or the proclamation at the empty tomb, "Come, see the place . . . ?" What is wrong with Zander's postulation of residual grace in a place chosen by God?

In his analysis of recent politics, he rightly blames the perfidy of Albion in 1916–17, as setting spark to the timber of conflicting nationalisms. Today only a common enemy unites the diversity of cultures and groupings in Israel. All that Teddy Kollek has or has not done—or indeed all the successive Israeli leaders—will not achieve sufficient security to satisfy so divergent an electorate into making enough compromise and sacrifice. Meanwhile, settlements will take root and politicians will share neither municipality nor sovereignty. Both Palestinian and Israeli will suffer, the civic rights of the one sacrificed for the survival of the other, and Jerusalem will remain both "blessed and cursed."

Ronald Brownrigg, author of eight books on Jerusalem and the Middle East, and one-time dean of St. George's Cathedral, Jerusalem.

KUWAIT

Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State, by Jill Crystal. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Westview Profiles/Nations of the Contemporary Middle East. xiii + 178 pages. Chron. to p. 180. Bibl. Essay to p. 185. About the Author to p. 186. Index to p. 194. $37.50.

Reviewed by Mary Ann Tétreault

Among the many casualties of the second Gulf war is the ability of nonspecialists to assess their knowledge of the region with any degree of accuracy. Nearly a year of sound bites selected for pithiness or shock value has convinced millions of formerly ignorant Americans that they know all about Kuwait and its neighbors when in fact they have been systematically misinformed. This debasement of general knowledge will soon reach surrealistic levels now that the US defense department has begun to use "the Kuwait" as a measure of military force.

For persons so afflicted, Jill Crystal's book is highly recommended. One of those rare works that has much to say to the specialist as well as to the general reader, *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State* provides a complex and richly nuanced picture of this not-so-rich-as-it-used-to-be oil state. The Kuwaiti core is a community with an almost 300-year history. The last century of that history encompasses two divergent forces for change. Colonial and neocolonial intrusion into Kuwaiti domestic life removed structural constraints on its rulers, supporting a level of authoritarianism impossible without external patronage. Halfway through this period, however, a more ambiguous external influence, oil revenues, paradoxically strengthened the state and civil society at the same time. Politics in Kuwait today reflects the tension between a state that has formally absorbed a large proportion of civil society and a civil society that persists in seeing itself as separate from and sometimes even antagonistic to the state—and behaving that way.

Among the many strengths of Crystal's book is its detailed portrayal of Kuwaiti civil society in the context of rapid changes in state structure. Kuwaiti nationalism, whose origins she places before the "Arab Awakening," as well as colonially mediated state formation in the post-Ottoman Middle East, is a focal point of the author's analysis of domestic politics and Kuwait's relations with its neighbors. Crystal uses a similar double lens to explore the Islamist resurgence in the region as a whole and its impact on domestic politics and society in Kuwait. Her methodology combines information and analysis from a diverse literature with the results of extensive field work in Kuwait. This enables the author to identify and trace the ramifications of multiple identities through intersecting systems of political, social, and economic forces. It also locates microsystems—for ex-

ample, the family—within larger ones such as labor markets, domestic politics, and Islam as a world religion.

Like Alice, this reviewer prefers books with pictures and conversations. She wishes this book had conversations so that readers could hear the voices of Kuwaitis helping to tell this story. The book does have pictures, however, and their selection goes a long way toward neutralizing stereotypes nurtured by talk shows and photo opportunities—only one shows a camel and that on a road sign. The rapidity of the changes in Kuwaiti society is mirrored in photos from the 1940s that show women in the old *suq* carrying baskets on their heads, or a gnarled pearl merchant sitting with a customer, and more recent shots of the Suq al-Manakh and a gym class in an elementary school. The pictures of war damage show the destruction of places that could just as plausibly have been captioned "Buffalo" or "Galveston" as "Kuwait."

The words and pictures in this book combine to combat the reader's preconceived orientalist images of Kuwait. Kuwait remains a foreign country with a different culture, but one that becomes comprehensible to the reader. One sees its government and people embedded in a distinctive history and proceeding toward a future that is as uncertain as anyone else's. It is a tribute to the author that she leaves her readers with a sense of the uncertainty of that future, reinforcing a perception of Kuwait as a living system rather than a stereotype of perpetual, immutable exoticism.

Mary Ann Tétreault is a professor of political science and geography at Old Dominion University.

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Comparing Muslim Societies: Knowledge and the State in a World Civilization, ed. by Juan R.I. Cole. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. xiv + 293 pages. Contribs. to p. 296. Gloss. to p. 299. Bibl. to p. 321. Index to p. 328. $45.00 cloth. $18.95 paper.

Reviewed by Jay Spaulding

This volume offers a stimulating and thoughtful set of eight essays, six adapted from previous contributions to the journal *Comparative Studies in Society and History* and two prepared in a similar spirit for publication here. The editor's lucid introduction locates the effort within a growing literature of revulsion against Orientalist reductionism, to which nuanced comparative analysis, both within the Islamic world and with relevant external segments of the human experience, is offered as a corrective. The two most significant comparative paradigms employed are those of Max Weber (particularly in regard to the world of ideas) and of Barrington Moore, Jr. and Theda Skocpol (concerning society and economy). Although some readers may prefer alternative paradigms, all will appreciate the analytical coherence among the contributions that is granted by this self-imposed limitation. The term "Muslim" is used as an adjective to mark "ethnicity and broad culture, not necessarily . . . religion" (p. 1).

Allen Christelow contrasts the institution of Muslim judge as it developed historically in the colonial municipalities of Algeria and Senegal. Granted a modicum of responsibility under French authority, the two judiciaries came to serve different ends and provoked antithetical responses among the faithful.

Through insightful analysis of the lives and writings of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (Egypt) and Ali Shari'ati (Iran), Charles D. Smith effectively challenges the modernization theorists' maxim that "Western-oriented intellectuals are necessarily willing agents of change" (p. 163). Dale F. Eickelman's study of the social reproduction of Islamic higher education in 20th-century Morocco explores changing patterns in the recruitment, training, and career destinies of students, and traces the complex dialectic between traditional education and its shifting sociopolitical matrix.

Ellis Goldberg offers an impressive comparative Weberian analysis of Calvinism and fundamentalist Islam, in which both movements are interpreted primarily in terms of their "distrust of a state in which policies directly reflect the personal preference of rulers" (p. 224). Deniz Kandiyoti argues that "the place and conduct of women has been and remains a metaphor for deeper concerns about cultural authenticity and integrity" (p. 256). She critiques prevailing analyses of gender relations and ideology, and suggests that the state, not reified Islam, provides the most pertinent frame of reference for consideration of gender issues.

Shahrough Akhavi explores the possibilities and limitations of political activism and Shi'i ideological idiom in the context of an insufficiently integrated 20th-century Iranian rentier state. Despite efforts to the contrary by the current government, dependence on oil exports "continues to bedevil the economy of this state" (p. 289). Charles Lindholm proposes an extended comparison between the attitudes of Americans observed by Alexis de Tocqueville and those of the Swat Pukhtun. That this improbable juxtaposition of mentalities yields a logically consistent discourse should raise questions about the intrinsic merits of psychic analogy within the Weberian paradigm.

In a more constructive vein, Nikki R. Keddie proposes a delexification of Middle Eastern studies through the opening of a material level of analysis. Her discussion amply demonstrates the need, but her choice of comparative references unfortunately neglects scholarly traditions (pre-Columbian America, parts of Africa, and, in the Middle East, Sudan) in which a more sophisticated appreciation of material culture already prevails.

Jay Spaulding, Department of History, Kean College

Palestine and Egyptian National Identity, by Ghada Hashem Talhami. New York: Praeger, 1992. viii + 165 pages. Bibl. to p. 168. Index to p. 177. $45.00.

Reviewed by Joel Gordon

Ghada Talhami seeks to understand how Palestine has influenced Egyptian identity. Her book is an essay in intellectual history from 1907 through the reexamination of Egypt's Arab role following Anwar Sadat's trips to Jerusalem and Camp David. Palestine, she argues, was where Egypt embarked on an uneasy relationship with Arabism, abandoning Saad Zaghlul's dictum that Egypt and the Arabs had nothing to offer each other. That uneasy relationship persists. Had Talhami delved—as she hints early in the book that she will—beyond the debates of prominent intellectuals, she might have helped illuminate the meaning Palestine has held for Egyptians. Unfortunately, she limits her focus to a discourse that is all too familiar.

Talhami faithfully recounts the debates concerning Egypt's proper regional role, focusing on Palestine since the late 1920s. The recap is useful but lacks fresh analytical insight. For thinkers prior to the 1960s she relies on secondary sources. Most problematic, she offers a paradigm for understanding Egyptian identity—the classic *umma-watani* debate at the turn of the century—that is highly reductionist and overly simplistic. The book lacks an introduction, save two prefatory paragraphs. Here the author introduces her thesis that Egyptians have been polarized since the 19th century by "antithetical" visions of Egypt (p. vii). One is a "Westernized, enlightened," liberal society, the other a "strong and rededicated Islamic society." The first presupposes a "firm sense of local identity," the second "deeply entrenched" regional affiliation (pp. 159–60). Palestine, she argues, first galvanized the regional-Islamic trend. The 1948 war discredited liberalism, Israeli policy made Gamal Abd al-Nasir a pan-Arabist, and 1967 induced Sadat's turnabout.

It is all a bit too neat. To understand how Palestine has influenced the ongoing Egyptian "search for identity" one must look to Egypt's own internal struggle for nationhood. Talhami never explains how the Palestinian cause may have mirrored Egyptians' own historical experience, why it has rallied their

support and, at times, alienated them. There is an *a priori* assumption that Arabism and support for Palestinian nationalism go hand in hand, and a manifest overemphasis on external factors shaping Egyptian self-view, promoting instability and preventing solidarity (p. 164).

Herein lies the book's primary weakness. There have surely been moments of debate and reappraisal, and the pendulum has swung between isolationism and regional involvement, as it has between communal and national pride. What Talhami does not seem to accept is that a nation can be pulled in conflicting directions at the same time, that one can identify with nation, religion, ethnicity, or culture, depending on historical experience and circumstances of the moment. Rather than viewing identity as a multilayered, shifting, contextual construct, she seeks an ultimate stability that is unrealistic.

The book ends abruptly in 1978; one senses it was written shortly thereafter. Can one conclude today that Camp David "will continue to exercise great power over the direction of Egypt's Arab policies" (p. 164)? Certainly much has changed since then. Currently, confessional and secular-religious discord dominates a discourse punctuated by violence in which Palestine plays little, if any part. As the author writes, "the debate goes on" (p. viii). However its terms shift, Egypt will remain central to Egyptians.

Joel Gordon, Department of History, Franklin and Marshall College

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970, by David A. Korn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. xiii + 278 pages. Appends. to p. 287. Notes to p. 311. Bibl. to p. 315. About the Author to p. 316. Index to p. 326. $36.00.

Reviewed by Michael Collins Dunn

Over the years there have been a handful of studies of the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war—the various efforts at finding a ground for negotiation, and the so-called "War of Attrition," which began in 1969. This book probably deserves to supplant those that have gone before as a standard history of the period, at least from a US viewpoint. It is written by a former US diplomat, David Korn, who served as political officer and then as chief of the political section in the US embassy in Israel from 1967 to 1971. It therefore combines the experience of a participant with considerable research into the decisions made on both sides, and benefits from the added perspective of the passage of nearly a quarter century since the events described.

The latter consideration is important, as most of the leading participants, Egyptian and Israeli, have long since written memoirs of the period, and as these events recede in time—and the two countries remain at peace—both sides will sometimes talk more freely in interviews than would have been the case even a decade ago.

The author seems to have mined the Hebrew-language memoirs particularly well. The Egyptian sources have been used less thoroughly; Anwar Sadat's English-language *In Search of Identity* is included, as are Muhammad Fawzi's memoirs in Arabic, but otherwise most of the Arabic-language material is from contemporary newspapers. Several political and military leaders have contributed memoirs in recent years, many of them in newspaper or magazine form in Arabic. (The important memoirs of General Abd al-Ghani al-Gamassy have now appeared in Arabic, but only after this book's publication.) This is not really a criticism; the fact that Korn uses both Arabic-language and Hebrew-language sources is not that common in modern diplomatic histories. Further, Korn has interviewed most of the surviving key players, Egyptian, American, and Israeli.

Korn tells the story well. Some of the earlier attempts to study the War of Attrition have been heavily laden with political theory or conflict resolution models; this is diplomatic

history, and well told. Korn has a good sense of the political climate in Washington at the time—the Nixon-Rogers-Kissinger equation—and of that in Tel Aviv. One may never know precisely what Gamal Abd al-Nasir was thinking in those years: as is to be expected, various claimants to the legacy—Sadat, Muhammad Heikal, Tahsin Bashir, and others are quoted—have offered a particular set of perspectives.

Although there are few earthshaking revelations here, Korn has told the story thoroughly, readably, and well, and has written a good overview of the diplomacy (and a competent narrative of the military action, such as it was) of the War of Attrition period. This reviewer found it particularly interesting to see the reminders of how Israel convinced itself that its dramatic raids on Egypt during the period—raiding Upper Egypt and the Red Sea coast, capturing an Egyptian radar installation—demonstrated complete military dominance over the Egyptians. Korn quotes an Israeli minister's remark that such actions had "proven that Israel could exhaust Egypt's strength" (p. 174), and Haim Herzog's remark, after the radar station was stolen, that Egypt was becoming a "supply channel" for Soviet equipment to Israel (p. 176). Such cocky overconfidence eventually helped make the crossing of the Suez Canal on October 6, 1973, a possibility.

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PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

The Arab Christian: A History in the Middle East, by Kenneth Cragg. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991. xii + 303 pages. Bibl. to p. 316. Indices to p. 336. $29.95.

Reviewed by Matti Moosa

Kenneth Cragg needs no introduction. He is a fine and eminent scholar who has written extensively on the history and culture of the Middle East. The work under review demonstrates his comprehensive knowledge of the area, and reflects his focus on a topic to which he has devoted much study—the question of religion in the Arab world. In this instance, it is not Islam but Christianity that he emphasizes, and readers get some clue as to his point of view from the title.

Cragg's book is an example of serious scholarship. It contains a wealth of information about the interaction of philosophy, history, theology, sociology, economics, politics, and literature. He addresses such Christian and Islamic concepts and terms as Nicene, Monophysitism, Monothelitism, Nestorianism, "God in Christ," Chalcedonians, Malkite, *dhimmis*, *jihad*, *aql*, *sira*, *khawarij*, and *tahrif*, to give some examples.

Cragg emphasizes the intellectual and cultural contribution of the Arab Christian to the Hellenistic world before Islam, as well as to Islamic civilization from the 7th century to the present time. His discussions include the Arab Christian poet al-Akhtal at the Umayyad court (p. 27) and the 19th-century Lebanese Christians, Nasif al-Yazifi and Butrus al-Bustani (p. 265). Although belonging to different times and separated from their Muslim contemporaries by religion, they made their impact on Islamic thought, in an Islamic setting. The author devotes an entire chapter to poetry, art, and church liturgy to illustrate the influence of Arab Christians on Islamic thought and culture.

One of Cragg's main contentions is that the concept of "Arabness" preceded the advent of Islam. During the 5th and 6th centuries Christianity had already spread rather extensively among the tribes of Arabia. The Arab population included Christians as well as Jews and animists. With the overwhelming impact of Islam in the 7th century, this kind of awareness and identification changed. To this day most non-Arabs believe that being an Arab essentially means being a Muslim, although, of course, this is not the case. Cragg shows that not only have there been Arab Christians in the Middle East for almost two millennia, but that they have made significant contributions to the political and cultural history of the region. Nevertheless, for over

one thousand years, they have been relegated to a minority and, therefore, inferior status.

Although no longer regarded as *dhimmis* (minority subjects under the protection of Muslim law), Arab Christians are still generally considered second-class citizens who, although tolerated, remain alien to the Muslim *umma* (community). Under the Ottoman Turks the Arab Christian communities were part of the *millet* system, which maintained, even exacerbated, their subordinate status. With the awakening of Arab nationalism in the late 19th century, Arab Christian writers engaged in a concerted effort to change the concept of "Arabness" to one that would accommodate all faiths, not solely Islam. This attempt to change both legal status and public image was unsuccessful in light of *sharia* (Islamic law). Sharia mandates differentiation between Muslims and non-believers—whether Arabs or not. Further, the law requires that the status of non-Muslims be always and everywhere inferior to Muslims.

What made the situation of the Arab Christians even more difficult is the historical order of revelation according to Islam. The latter considers its monotheism superior to that of Christianity because Muhammad received the last and final revelation of God. Accordingly, Islam rejects all Christian doctrines that do not accord with the Quran. The Arab Christians of Palestine are in an especially unenviable position. Looked down upon by their Arab brethren, they are also despised by Zionist Israel. This, the author maintains, is because of their biblical "loyalty to the Hebrew scriptures as part of the Christian heritage and the actualities of contemporary Israel with its enmity to Palestinianism *per se*" (p. iii).

The last chapter, entitled "The Future with Islam," addresses the future of Arab Christians. In general the author maintains that their fate in the Middle East is, for better or worse, wedded to that of Islam. The Arab national movements have certainly not changed their status, and there is no reason to believe that there will be any change in the near future. More specifically, the answer as to whether Arab Christians have any future in a predominantly Muslim society depends, in the final analysis, on the Arab Christians themselves and the integrity of their religious institutions.

Arab Christians have coexisted for generations under different Muslim regimes. There is no reason why they should not do so in the future. They remain Arabs, but Arabs who have identified for centuries with Christianity (p. 299). Cragg seems to believe that if Arab Christians remain cohesive and strong their faith will prevail. It is in the cultural context of the contribution of the Arab Christian, from the rise of Islam to the present time, that Cragg's book can best be read and appreciated.

Matti Moosa, Professor of History, Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania

The Euphrates Expedition, by John S. Guest. London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1992. Distrib. Routledge, Chapman & Hall, New York. xiv + 156 pages. Refs. to p. 169. Bibl. to p. 174. Index to p. 182. $87.50.

Reviewed by John H. Waller

The 19th-century "Great Game," pitting Great Britain and Russia against each other from Turkey to Tibet, where the two empires veered toward collision, inspired imaginative gambits by which one country hoped to steal a march against the other, or at least to resist its rival's "forward thrusting"—to use Great Game jargon of the day. One such gambit is described by author John Guest in his interesting and well-researched *The Euphrates Expedition*, an account of a little-known British East India Company scheme conceived in 1829 to test the feasibility of introducing paddle-wheeled steamboats on the Euphrates River to ply the strategically placed waterway from Anatolia to the Persian Gulf in an effort to discourage Russian expansion in that direction.

Imperial Russia had seized Georgia from its Iranian suzerain in 1801, defeated Iran again in 1828 and annexed Armenia and part of Azerbaijan, and captured Turkish Adrian-

ople (Edirne), only 150 miles from Istanbul, in 1829. Russian occupation of the area around Erzurum, where one branch of the Euphrates rises in Anatolia, once again alerted the British to the threat posed by Moscow in the Near East, its lifeline to India. A Euphrates steamboat service, which could be linked with the Mediterranean by a short overland journey across the desert from Iskenderun, would also provide a pre-Suez Canal route to India infinitely shorter than the long ocean voyage around the Cape of Good Hope.

Even more interesting than the trials and errors in carting two disassembled steel-hulled steamboats, the *Tigris* and *Euphrates*, across a brigand-infested desert and reassembling them on the uncharted upper reaches of the Euphrates is the cast of characters who were involved. The Euphrates project was the brainchild of Thomas Love Peacock, an East India Company official and an accomplished author. His proposal caught the attention of the East India Company, which had been studying another route to India via the Red Sea that was being promoted by a Thomas Waghorn.

The crew and scientists aboard were an able and colorful lot who, for the most part, bore their triumphs and sorrows well. There were also hitchhikers, a young Austrian adventurer named Johann Wilhelm Helfer and his wife, Pauline, along with two Afghan "princes" who had somehow attached themselves but turned out to be con men out to fleece the couple.

The hero of the story, however, was an intrepid Irishman, Francis Rawdon Chesney of the Royal Artillery, who was made commander of the expedition and its 53-member staff. His mission was to test the practicality of the steamboat route. Despite continually frustrating setbacks, not least of which was the sinking of the *Tigris* in a storm, Chesney completed his test runs only to have the whole idea finally rejected in 1842.

Although the Euphrates project did not prove feasible, its story deserves to be preserved and Guest has done an excellent job of doing this. His narrative moves well, while a good array of illustrations and maps helps the reader to understand the area in which it took place. Little has been written in detail on this subject—almost nothing in this century—making Guest's work particularly valuable.

John H. Waller is the author of Beyond the Khyber Pass: The Road to British Disaster in the First Afghan War *(New York: Random House, 1990), and other books on British history.*

Monk and Mason on the Tigris Frontier: The Early History of Tur Abdin, by Andrew Palmer. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. xxiv + 199 pages. Append. to p. 227. Bibl. to p. 246. Indices to p. 265. $65.00.

Reviewed by Sidney H. Griffith

Until relatively recent times, in that mountainous corner of the Middle East where Iraq, Syria, and Turkey meet, a vigorous community of Christians survived, whose Syriac language and pre-Chalcedonian faith set them off from both Muslims and many of their fellow Christians. The local inhabitants call the area Tur Abdin, or the "mountain of God's worshippers," because of the flourishing monastic life that has been at home there for centuries. In the present century, and particularly since 1918, there has been a great exodus of Christians from this area, fleeing persecution and seeking economic and social betterment, first in Istanbul and Aleppo, and now increasingly in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Andrew Palmer's book, including the archive of historical materials that he has published, furnishes readers with the most important documentary materials now available for the historical reconstruction of the story of the core institution of the Christian presence in Tur Abdin, the monastery of Qartmin, now usually called simply Mor Gabriel.

Palmer's volume has two component parts—it is both a conventionally printed book and a microfiche edition and English-language translation of an important collection of Syriac texts bearing on the history of

Tur Abdin. The two microfiche cards (500 printed pages) come in their own envelope glued to the back board of the binding. They contain editions of the *Qartmin Trilogy* and the *Book of Life*, along with English-language translations, apparatus, notes, and indices.

The *Qartmin Trilogy* includes the *Lives* of two of the 4th-century founders of the monastery of Qartmin, Samuel of Estin and Simeon of Qartmin (d. 433), as well as the *Life* of Gabriel (d. 648), abbot of Qartmin and bishop of Tur Abdin. The *Book of Life*, which, as Palmer writes, "might be called a Book of Suggestions to the Recording Angel" (p. 18), may have served somewhat the same function as liturgical diptychs. It included lists of benefactors and benefactions to the monastery, commemorations of local individuals, and incidental information about events in the monastery and the neighboring village of Beth Svirina where the *Book of Life* was later transferred. Dated records in this text range from the 11th century to 1853. Much of Palmer's book comments directly on these texts, which should be read side by side with it. An appendix reviews the evidence of inscriptions from Tur Abdin.

In addition to the wealth of literary (hagiographical, historical, liturgical) and non-literary (largely epigraphical) sources studied by Palmer, the author makes use of the architectural monuments and archeology of the site to explore the early history of the monastery and its relationship over time with the neighboring village communities. Maps, photographs, line drawings, chronological tables, indices, and a detailed bibliography add to the book's value. *Monk and Mason on the Tigris Frontier* is an almost indispensable reference source for anyone seriously interested in the history and archeology of the early Christian areas of southeastern Turkey.

Sidney H. Griffith, Institute of Christian Oriental Research, Catholic University of America

The Social Origins of Egyptian Expansionism during the Muhammad Ali Period, by Fred H. Lawson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. xiii + 171 pages. Notes to p. 206. Gloss. to p. 209. Index to p. 215. $40.00.

Reviewed by Michael J. Reimer

As its title suggests, this book is a boldly revisionist study of Muhammad Ali's rule, which contends that the political elite of early 19th-century Egypt had "no choice but to use military expansion as a way of maintaining their collective dominance over domestic society" (p. 2). The work seeks to show that internal social conflict between and within classes determined the fact, timing, and direction of the conquests undertaken by Muhammad Ali's regime. It is germane to note that the author, a political scientist by training, regards this as a case study in aggression, and concludes the book by using the "domestic political conflict" model to explain Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Conventional historiography has stressed the personalist and structuralist determinants of Muhammad Ali's policies, and these interpretations are not really refuted. The personalist paradigm is rejected *a priori*; and as the author excludes an examination of why Egypt's armies overran neighboring regions with relative ease, his evaluation of the structuralist paradigm—with its emphasis on the differential distribution of power—is made without considering essential evidence. Rather, the author critiques this paradigm by comparing the structural position of Egypt and allegedly similar polities that did not expand. Comparisons of this sort must take into account a variety of relevant factors to be useful or credible; the comparisons offered here ignore Ottoman political culture and overlook crucial differences between Egypt and other provinces and states.

The author implies that, as a result of developments in the 18th century, 19th-century Egypt was on the verge of a social revolution led by a militant artisanate in Cairo and the provincial towns. This thesis is open to question, although a variety of popular uprisings did occur at this time. More questionable are the supposed causal links between these outbreaks of domestic unrest and the military conquests that, it is argued,

restored the unity of the ruling elite and made possible the suppression of social conflict. Moreover, domestic crisis is presented as an entirely sufficient explanation for military expansion. The Hijaz campaign, for example, is discussed without mention of the Ottoman sultan's appointment of Muhammad Ali to expel the Wahhabis, or of Egypt's longstanding responsibilities with respect to the sanctuaries in the Hijaz. This is not to suggest that economic calculations, including those of Cairo's merchants (strongly accented in this study) can be discounted. But, even on the assumption that economic considerations were paramount, it does not follow that conquest was a response to internal instability. Why, for instance, did Ali Bey al-Kabir follow a pattern of expansion similar to that of Muhammad Ali, several decades before the eruption of the social forces that are supposed to have actuated the latter's regime?

It should be added that the work is based largely on secondary literature. The author has made interesting use of this literature to suggest new views on the sources and results of provincial disorder, but little fresh documentation is adduced in support of these ideas. The book thus offers an imaginative but unconvincing interpretation of at least one case of military expansionism.

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WOMEN

Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt, by Sherifa Zuhur. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. ix + 134 pages. Appends. to p. 142. Notes to p. 180. Bibl. to p. 199. Index to p. 207. $15.95 paper.

Reviewed by Barbara K. Larson

This book examines self-images and self-imaging processes of contemporary women in Egypt. The author, an historian, seeks to gain an understanding of how women, both veiled and unveiled, perceive themselves, their identity, and the changing political and social environment in which they live. Adopting a Jungian framework, the author is particularly concerned with the use of archetypes in shaping personal consciousness through a process of "syzygy," a conjoining process that may influence the recipient to dramatize or internalize historical or mythological events.

To achieve that understanding, the author weaves into her analysis material from a variety of sources. She has formally interviewed some 50 women in Cairo, representing a variety of different age and class categories, about their views of themselves, of women, and of Islam and society. Much of the book is devoted to a summary and analysis of her results. In addition, Zuhur also provides considerable historical background on the role of women in Islam and surveys much of the recent work that has been done on women, Islam, and the contemporary Islamist movement in Egypt.

Unfortunately, the net result of all this effort is mixed. There is an abundance of interesting, pertinent material here, but much of it seems undigested. The total effect is somewhat disjointed because the author includes too much information and throws it at the reader without systematically developing any clear line of analysis. The book seems more a survey of existing literature and a report of survey results than a coherent and convincing analysis in its own right. Thus, for example, one is left with an awareness of the complexity and multiplicity of views concerning women and Islam, but one cannot clearly remember which category of women thought what and why, or which of the competing explanations for the Islamist appeal the author finds most valid and why. Similarly, the process of self-imaging is not brought clearly into focus—syzygy and the use of archetypes are more asserted than demonstrated—and one comes away unconvinced and uncertain about whether women's self-images are indeed shaped by these archetypes, or what meanings are attributed to them by what groups or individuals in what circumstances and why. It is not that the

author does not confront some of these questions, but rather that she addresses them by examining so many points of view and raising so many speculative queries that in the end one is either not certain what her conclusions are or is not convinced that they have been adequately demonstrated.

Although there is much useful information here, the book as a whole does not present a clear and convincing analysis of either women's self-images or of the Islamist movement. The specialist and reader particularly interested in the topic will find the results of her interviews interesting, and the bibliography and some of her summaries of the literature useful. For students and general readers, however, the work is too disjointed and unfocused to serve as a good introduction to the topic.

Barbara K. Larson, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of New Hampshire

Veiled Half-Truths: Western Travellers' Perceptions of Middle Eastern Women, ed. by Judy Mabro. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991. Distrib. St. Martin's Press, New York. x + 264 pages. Bibls. to p. 275. $34.50.

Reviewed by Caroline Williams

This anthology concentrates on the image of woman in the Middle East and North Africa. It depicts her as imprisoned by the folds of her veils and by the walls of her harem. For the editor, this is the way Western travelers, women as well as men, primarily British and French, described her in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Judy Mabro includes an occasional contemporary observation to show that this stereotype continues today.

At a time when the culturally sensitive world is trying hard to do away with stereotypes, this is a difficult book to assess objectively. On the one hand, as a "continuous illustration of European misogynist, racist, elitist attitudes" (p. 255), the book tends to become another footnote in the growing body of writing that decries Orientalism as an epiphenomenon of imperialism; in which the West, because it desired to exploit, chose not to understand what it saw, and described the East in degrading or accusatory terms. Mabro points out that European travelers, although curious to learn about "other people," did so only at a level that would confirm their belief in the superiority of their own culture. Hence their reactions to the "other" or the "different" were ambiguous, hostile, and Eurocentric (p. 2). Further, the authors of these excerpts ignored the similarity of women's position in their own emerging middle-class industrial society, with its own concepts of public/male and private/female spaces, and with its own double standards.

Even as a compendium of disobliging remarks this book has documentary value. It will provide background for those interested in the history of European women and of Europe's relationship with the Middle East. It also provides some vivid descriptive imagery. For example, this reviewer does not find the simile "like an antique galley with a silken sail" (p. 61) demeaning to describe the approach of a Tunisian woman, nor "groups of young girls, walking arm in arm like links in a chastity belt" (p. 63) puzzling.

On the other hand, the excerpts provide rather limited insights into the realities of distaff life in the Middle East. Mabro states that her selections are taken from "travel books by little known authors" (p. 3) and is "highly personal and subjective" (p. ix). She gives few identifying credentials to her sources, and it is hard to assign true documentary value to their observations. Many of these pieces fall simply into the "I-was-there" category of reportage. Women admitted to harems, some on commercialized visits, reacted as Europeans rather than as women, and described what they saw in Eurocentric and colonialist terms. Gertrude Bell, Kathlyn Rhodes, Edith Wharton, C.S. Sonnini, A.W. Kinglake, E.W. Lane, Michael Asher, la Princesse de Belgiojoso, and others are all jumbled together from Morocco to Iran, from 1800 to 1985.

It is hard not to become irritated with this patronizing, nonanalytical, myopic view of a society whose positive values—the harem as

an institution to safeguard family values, and as an area of female power and interchange—are completely overlooked. The main thrust of Mabro's argument, that men and women, skilled interpreters and casual novelists, all saw Middle Eastern women in the same terms also runs counter to the argument in another recently published book[1] that Europe's attitude toward the Middle East was not unified or monolithic, and that there existed in the writings of women travelers to and resident in the Middle East an alternative view.

Veiled Half-Truths is an apt title for this anthology because for both societies, the described and the describing, the realities are only partially rendered.

Caroline Williams, College of William and Mary

Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, by Leila Ahmed. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1992. viii + 248 pages. Notes to p. 279. Index to p. 296. $30.00.

The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam, by Fatima Mernissi, tr. by Mary Jo Lakeland. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1991. xii + 195 pages. Notes to p. 213. Sources to p. 222. Chron. to p. 225. Index to p. 228. $24.95.

Reviewed by Sherifa Zuhur

These two volumes critically explore new directions in women's history and gender issues in Islam. Leila Ahmed's *Women and Gender in Islam* is a broad yet complex treatment of women's experience from pre-Islamic Mesopotamia to the contemporary Middle East. The author delves into the rise of male dominance and misogyny in the region and its gradual integration into Muslim culture through the process of conquest. In covering the rise of Islam, Ahmed also notes the power of the chroniclers who could omit, suppress, or emphasize historical details affecting the later reading of events. She ably portrays the circumstances of women from the medieval period into modern times by synthesizing various materials. The outcome will allow the general reader a far richer notion of women's society as a whole.

The author focuses on Egypt in discussing the premodern period, and the debates over gender emerging in the 20th century. Ahmed argues that women hardly wished to hold onto a social order that repressed them with a combination of regional traditions and Islam practiced in a misogynist manner. But the shifting of the social order took place at a time when colonialism wielded a picture of Muslims as an inferior people. The Victorian establishment, Ahmed writes, "appropriated the language of feminism" (p. 152) to attack Muslim culture, especially in the battle over veiling, thereby fundamentally affecting future considerations of gender, power, and the state in the public mind. These chapters deserve more than one reading. Those who are familiar with the sources will appreciate their skillful use even if they differ with Ahmed's arguments concerning the biculturalism of various figures.

Fatima Mernissi's *The Veil and the Male Elite*[1] is an exciting, probing, and readable work. (The translator, Mary Jo Lakeland, should be commended for her clarity and lively tone.) Mernissi argues that Muslim sensibility is basically ahistorical, and that to understand more fully the misuses of religious philosophy, one must closely examine the *hadiths* involving women and gender. The implications are profound for students of women's history, and for women who hope to reconcile their faith and heritage with their belief in women's rights. Mernissi represents Muhammad as a man who sought to undo superstition and to limit hierarchy, including that of gender, and as one who allowed sexuality its place in the new religion. This

1. Billie Melman, *Women's Orients: English Women and the Middle East, 1718–1918* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

1. Originally published as *L'harem politique* (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1987).

work goes beyond the author's earlier efforts to delineate the submission of women within Islam to a more comprehensive picture of the power of historical experience. Of particular interest is Mernissi's treatment of the gendered division of space, the appearance of the *hijab* in the Verse of the Curtain, Islam's resistance to defining women as polluted beings, and her discussions of Umar and Sukayna.

Yet one wonders why Sa'id al-Afghani's derision of A'isha[2] is so important to Mernissi when it is not echoed *en masse* by that male elite, the *ulama*. Why does Mernissi make A'isha into the leader of the *fitnah* (sedition), when the real leaders were Talha and Zubayr? Is it not perhaps more significant that A'isha did influence hadith science? A'isha is an extremely important figure to women's history, generally utilized as an example of women's influence in Islam. She had some less than admirable moments, however, as detailed by certain biographers.

Mernissi begins her book by noting a hadith that people who vest power in a woman will never know prosperity. Readers may realize that it might be heretical but more appropriate to question Muhammad's motives for making the comment concerning the daughter of the king of Iran who claimed her father's throne when he died.[3] Instead she spends much time questioning the paternity, social status, and motives of Abu Bakra, a companion of Muhammad. Certain omitted details are troubling—Mernissi claims Abu Bakra is unsuitable as a source of hadith for he was punished for false witness, although in the case in question another witness said he was uncertain "of having seen everything." That was Ziyad whose view of the fornication in question was obstructed by a curtain. The punishment for slander may have been imposed, but one cannot say that Abu Bakra bore false witness, nor that Abu Bakra should bear the blame for a "misogynistic" saying of the Prophet himself.[4] As much as one may admire Muhammad and his mission, the failing of the male elite was not to create that hadith, but to believe in it, and to uphold many other more objectionable challenges to women's rights and potential.

Sherifa Zuhur, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley

2. Sa'id al-Afghani, *'A'isha wa al-siyasa* (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1971).

3. Mernissi finds the reference in al-Tabari, but readers may also wish to see Nabiah Abbott, *A'ishah: The Beloved of Mohammed* (London: Al-Saqi, 1985), p. 175.

4. Sherifa Zuhur, *Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 37.

BIOGRAPHY

Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution, by Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1992. xxvii + 362 pages. Notes to p. 383. Bibl. to p. 390. Appends. to p. 396. Index to p. 407. $24.95.

Reviewed by John K. Cooley

If Yasser Arafat should fail to achieve the place he wants in history as the man who would lead five million Palestinian Arabs to freedom and statehood, that failure might arise from not taking his own advice to himself and colleagues—keep outside the conflicts and rivalries dividing the Arab regimes.

The weakening of the Palestinian national movement, and of Arafat personally, through Arafat's colossal misperception of Iraq's president Saddam Hussein as an ally and benefactor of the Palestinians, comes clear in this best of the numerous recent political biographies of Arafat in various languages. Its authors—Andrew Gowers, an editor of the *Financial Times*, and Tony Walker, a Cairo-based broadcaster and correspondent for the same newspaper—deserve much credit for meticulous research and careful separation of myth and reality.

There is conflicting, second-hand information on record about Muhammad Abd al-

Ra'uf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Hussayni, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader's full name. Gowers and Walker, using many original sources, have well researched and corrected the record: from birth in Cairo to a well-off Palestinian emigré family down to Arafat's present role as the much-maligned holder of a position few of his associates covet—PLO chairman and holder of the semimythical title of President of the State of Palestine, proclaimed in 1988 by the Palestine National Council (PNC). Arafat is a self-styled chief executive without sovereignty or control over a single square inch of pre-1948 mandated Palestine.

The five-part book is well illustrated and includes useful maps, showing Israel's various configurations from 1948 to the present and the locations for the various acts of Arafat's personal drama—founding of the PLO in 1964, Al-Fatah's bases in Jordan and Lebanon, and Arafat's Lebanese headquarters until his final removal from Tripoli in 1983. Part one establishes the background of the man who became "Mr. Palestine," from his early life through the bloody period of Black September. Although the PLO's armed confrontation with King Hussein of Jordan in 1970 was provoked by others, it was fateful for Arafat.

Part two traces the gradual implantation of the PLO in Lebanon and Arafat's own organization, Al-Fatah, which took control of the PLO in 1968. It was in Lebanon where Arafat gradually began to shed his own romantic cloak of guerilla fighter and assume a diplomatic role. There also, in Beirut, the PLO became a multinational economic enterprise and began to generate a self-propagating and stultifying bureaucracy, contrary to the mobile, even mercurial personality of its creator. In part three, the authors examine Israel's unsuccessful attempt through its 1982 invasion of Lebanon to destroy the PLO and Arafat. President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria and other foes also failed to destroy Arafat after 1982.

Parts four and five describe how Arafat and his two senior aides, Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad (Khalil al-Wazir and Saleh Khalaf respectively), reached for a negotiated peace with Israel in 1988 through renouncing terrorism and recognizing the Jewish state, as successive US administrations had urged. The prior assassination of Abu Jihad and subsequent murder of Abu Iyad, Arafat's two most thoughtful and effective aides, followed by his ill-starred support for Saddam Hussein, were severe, if not fatal setbacks—before the hopeful start of peace talks in Madrid in 1991. Arafat's latest escape from death in a plane crash in early 1992, resulting brain surgery, and marriage at 62 to an intelligent, loyal Palestinian woman many years his junior, all happened after publication. The book covers many milestones in an often-caricatured life, but it provides for better understanding of Arafat's life and his cause, both of which are still unfulfilled.

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LITERATURE

Stories from Iran: A Chicago Anthology, 1921–1991, ed. by Heshmat Moayyad. Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1991. 555 pages. Gloss. to p. 568. Bibl. to p. 571. Translator Append. to p. 573. $35.00 cloth. $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by M.R. Ghanoonparvar

Although now the dominant vehicle of literary expression in Iran, and perhaps a more readily accessible means of intercultural communication with Western audiences, modern Persian-language fiction still remains relatively unknown in the English-speaking world. In recent years a number of Persian-language novels have been translated and published in English, but short story collections are still scarce. For this reason, the present volume is a timely response to a most urgent need for students of Persian, Middle Eastern, and world literatures and cultures.

Stories from Iran includes 35 stories by 26 authors along with an introductory essay by the editor and a glossary of Persian terms and names. Heshmat Moayyad's introduction adequately prepares readers unfamiliar with the history of modern Iranian fiction for a smorgasbord of short stories that includes the work of such veteran writers as M.A. Jamalzadeh and more recent authors such as Hushang Ashurzadeh, as well as writers as diverse in style and approach as Hushang Golshiri and Mahshid Amir-Shahi. The selections by and large are representative of the majority of the writers whose works have appeared in anthologies and the totality of 20th-century Persian-language fiction. The writings examine the most common social, political, economic, and cultural concerns of Iranians.

Although the volume spans seven decades of short story writing—from 1921, the year of Reza Shah's coup, to 1991, and the period since the Islamic revolution—readers will find that many issues addressed by earlier writers do not differ significantly from those found in more recent Iranian fiction. Nevertheless, the relatively large number of stories from numerous writers and the variety of the selections provide a good overview of the history and development of the short story in Iran.

On the whole, the selections represent well the various historical, thematic, and stylistic trends of the totality of modern Iranian short stories. Sadeq Hedayat's "Abji Khanom," Beh'azin's "The Snake Stone," Sadeq Chubak's "The Gravediggers," Ebrahim Golestan's "Esmat's Journey," Ahmad Mahmud's "The Little Native Boy," and Gholam Hosayn Sa'edi's segment from "Mourners of Bayal" portray characters from the lower classes and examine such social themes as poverty and religious superstition. Other works, including Bozorg Alavi's "Mirza," Simin Daneshvar's "The Half-Closed Eye," Jamal Mir-Sadeqi's "Through the Veil of Fog," Bahram Sadeqi's "The Trench and the Empty Canteens," and Mahshid Amir-Shahi's "Brother's Future Family," focus on upper-class Iranians and intellectual characters who reflect the social and psychological dilemmas of the individual in a society in transition.

Readers of this anthology will find modern Iranian writers for the most part conscious and critical of their society and committed to ameliorating its conditions. The chronological order of the stories also shows increasing technical sophistication in the art of Persian-language fiction. In the course of the seven decades spanned by this anthology, Persian short story writing has advanced from the simple anecdotal tales of Jamalzadeh to the technically and symbolically complex works of Golshiri and Moniru Ravanipur.

With the exception of a few literal translations that could be somewhat puzzling or odd to English-speaking readers (for example, p. 54, "room of five doors"), the translations are smooth and quite readable. As the first comprehensive collection of Persian-language short stories, *Stories from Iran* should find its place not only on the lists of university textbooks and on academic library shelves, but, one hopes, in the homes of a more general audience as well.

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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in Alfarabi, by Shukri B. Abed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xxv + 173 pages. Appends. to p. 180. Bibl. to p. 186. Index to p. 201. $16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Majid Fakhry

Al-Farabi's standing in the history of Aristotelian logic is best illustrated by the fact that he was the first major Aristotelian logician during the period separating Boethius (d. 525) and Abelard (d. 1142). He wrote extensive commentaries on and paraphrases of the complete Aristotelian logical cycle in Arabic, in addition to independent writings of his

own. It is significant for the purposes of the present review that most of these writings dealt with the analysis of logical terms, the most important of which being *The Utterances Used in Logic* and *The Book of Letters*.

The focus of the book under review, however, is the relation of Aristotelian logic to the Arabic language, although a third of the book actually concerns al-Farabi's linguistic philosophy and the logical problems it entailed, such as the copula. This problem was endemic and al-Farabi deserves credit for struggling with it so valiantly. His problem was to find an Arabic equivalent to the Greek *estin*, regarded as a necessary connective in all declarative statements (or propositions). He vacillated, the author explains, between *yujad* (exists), *mawjud* (existing), and *huwa* (he), as most Arab logicians did. Under the impact of Aristotle, none of those logicians appears to have understood that the copula is a feature of Indo-European languages and is not really necessary, as modern symbolic logic has shown. In Arabic, at any rate, predication is indicated by inflection and the copula is entirely unnecessary.

On the whole, both the logical and linguistic parts of this book are informative and discursive enough to make it the most serious contribution to Farabian logical studies since F.W. Zimmerman's *Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's De Interpretatione*.[1] Two serious omissions, however, are the Stoic influence on al-Farabi's logic and the Neoplatonic component of his theory of intelligibles. On page 107, for instance, the author cites as an example of "material opposition" two disjunctive arguments and comments on the material-formal aspects of the problems they raise; but this is true in an Aristotelian, not a Stoic context, and it is significant that the two examples cited are taken from a logical treatise of al-Farabi, namely *Kitab al-Qiyas al-Saghir*, which is marked by a deliberate departure from Aristotle's analytics and is supposed to accord with the method of the theologians, who are known to have been influenced by Stoic logic in their dialectical debates.

The second omission is the Neoplatonic component in al-Farabi's epistemology. Thus in his discussion of prototypes or archetypes, the author does not fully develop the way in which those primary intelligibles are abstracted by the "acquired intellect," which is their repository at the human level, whereas the "active intellect" is their repository at the cosmic level. The first principles of demonstration, for instance, are apprehended, according to Aristotle, directly or intuitively, whereas, for al-Farabi and the other Arab Neoplatonists, they are apprehended through "conjunction" with the active intellect. In a similar manner, the concept of essence, which is of definite Platonic and Neoplatonic extraction, played a decisive role in the epistemology and metaphysics of those philosophers, but this term, contrary to the interpretation of the author in Appendix I, has no place whatsoever in Aristotle's vocabulary.

From a textual point of view, there are few misprints, but assigning *zabaniyah* in the Quran to the category of relative substantives is a mistake (p. 156); the term is the plural of *zibniyah*, which meant originally a policeman, the *zabaniyah* being actually the policemen of Hell. Otherwise, the book is full of useful and accurate information.

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Judaism, Human Values and the Jewish State, by Yeshayahu Leibowitz, tr. by Eliezer Goldman. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1992. xxxiv + 262 pages. Notes to p. 279. Sources to p. 282. Index to p. 291. $39.95.

Reviewed by Kenneth Cragg

This publication of 27 essays, translated from Hebrew, gives access to a lively interpreter of modern Jewry and a sharp critic of the policies of Israel. It is an incisive, yet arrogant book—incisive in its sense of the issues

1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

latent in Jewish statehood, arrogant in its sometimes cavalier dismissal of perceptions the author finds uncongenial and in its less than careful scholarship.

The text is divided into four parts; almost half the book is taken up with the first part, entitled "Faith." The focus here is on *halakhah*, or Judaic Torah obedience to the exclusion of the prophetic themes of divine "pathos" and messiahship—a most significant exclusion. The oral law has priority over written scripture on behalf of "a permanent habit of performing one's duty" for no other reason than divine ordination. All is *praxis*, sustained "like a housewife persisting in her work which has ever to be done anew."

The question is not raised, except to be dismissed, as to whether it is intellectually proper or ethically mature to be occupied only with Torah for its own sake, irrespective of the implications for "human values" responsibly assessed. The open question here is illustrated when Leibowitz moves to the position of women in Judaism and invokes what he calls "*meta-halakhah*," that is, a deliberate "discretion" to be attained by reflection on time, change, and climate and adjusting mere "conformity."

There is a similar ambivalence in the treatment, in parts two and three, of "Religion, People, State" and "The Political Scene." Trenchant in opinion, Leibowitz is not always consistent in thought. He is a "Zionist" in the sense that he does not want to live his Jewish life in the framework of the Gentile world, yet he sees as "no religious thing" the statehood that, on every realistic count, Zionism has judged indispensable to that desire. For *qua* state that haven from the Gentiles can never be governed by Torah.

Leibowitz argues for an urgent Israeli resolution of the rights of Palestinians. He is aware of the futility of the original Zionist dream of some innocent statehood or of any righteous perpetuation of it. He considers that Judaism would cease to be a religion if it were ever deemed actualized in statehood. Yet the Jewish nationalism that strives after such statehood remains, in some sense, defined by, and constituted in, its Judaism. Must one conclude that Judaism must be nationalist in order to exist and at the same time be disqualified by the price of that "salvation," namely inevitably being secularized?

In part four on "Judaism and Christianity," Leibowitz' perspective is governed by his elimination of the entire messianic dimension. He is consistent, therefore, in disavowing any "Judeo-Christian" tradition. He believes Christianity is inherently anti-Judaic. That sentiment (the essay dates from 1968) ignores the degree to which Christian theology has sought to relate its decisive Christology with the ongoing actuality of Judaism. This position may be forgiven in view of his register of the issue in "right to the land," of the need for partition, and of the impasse in which any possibility of it is trapped. Perhaps there is much to be said, after all, for *praxis* in obedience. How much more apposite it would be if undergirded by a more inclusive sense of divine auspices than Leibowitz allows.

Kenneth Cragg is the author of The Arab Christian: A History in the Middle East *(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991).*

Shorter Notices

David Ben-Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State, by Allon Gal. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; and Jerusalem, Israel: Magnes Press, 1991. 217 pages. Appends. to p. 259. Gloss. to p. 262. Bibl. to p. 270. Index to p. 280. $29.95.

In the light of later history, it seems perhaps a foregone conclusion that in the critical years from 1938 to 1942—the years from the Arab Rebellion to the Saint James Conference, the White Paper, and the Nazi conquest of continental Europe—the Jewish leadership in Palestine should have reached out to the United States for the sustenance the *Yishuv* needed for survival. This thoroughly researched and informative work makes clear that, at the time, no such conclusion was inevitable. The leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine were sorely divided over where to turn.

Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the rightwing Revisionist leader, first looked for salvation to the doomed Jewry of his native Poland, then to the chimera of an armed Jewish uprising against Britain. Chaim Weizmann, the man who two decades earlier had engineered the Balfour Declaration, propounded hopelessly unrealistic schemes to lure Turkey and Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud into the Zionist camp. Weizmann counted on the British and was aghast at the thought of offending them. He balked at the idea of bringing public pressure to bear on the British government even after it promulgated the 1939 White Paper and restrictive land regulations. The leaders of the *kibbutz* movement put their faith in the "Motherland of Socialism," the Soviet Union. The United States was deeply isolationist, and its Jewish community emitted only faint stirrings of Zionist ardor. Little was expected from that distant quarter.

It was David Ben-Gurion, and a few others around him, who had the vision to realize that the United States was truly the coming great world power. They saw that Britain, the Mandatary authority for Palestine, would find US support essential in its struggle against Nazi Germany and could therefore be influenced through the United States. The key not only to the survival of the Yishuv, but also to the creation of a Jewish state, was to be found therefore in America.

The book is, essentially, the story of how Ben-Gurion made that vision a reality; how he outmaneuvered and overcame Weizmann and members of MAPAI—his own party—and coaxed, cajoled, and pressured a reluctant American Jewry into publicly taking up the cause that was to become Israel. Although the author's detailed accounts of Ben-Gurion's debates with Weizmann and American Jewish leaders who resisted his activist approach sometimes make for tedious reading, they convey, as little else could, just how difficult and uncertain the enterprise was.

David A. Korn is the author of Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970 *(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).*

Sira' al-Ajnihah fi al-'A'ilah al-Sa'udiyyah al-Malikah: Dirasah fi al-Nidham al-Siyasi wa Ta'sis al-Dawlah (Factional Struggle within the Saudi Royal Family: A Study of the Political System and the Formation of the State), by Fahd al-Qahtani. London: Al-Safa, 1988. 535 pages. Appends. to p. 562. £19.80.

It is hard to classify this book. Although it is not a scholarly work, the author endeavors to approach the subject with some degree of scholarly documentation. The book is distributed and promoted by the Saudi opposition, and the author does not try to hide his disdain for the Saudi royal family and its practices and policies. Fahd al-Qahtani quotes from a variety of Arabic and English-language sources, including documents from the British Foreign Service. The documentation is often weak, however—as when the author quotes a Syrian Nasserist paper (p. 90) or a Lebanese communist magazine (p. 192)—and in most cases the documentation is lacking altogether. Al-Qahtani maintains that King Khalid was poisoned, but provides no evidence for that assertion.

Despite the problem of documentation, particularly with regard to allegations of corruption and scandal within the Saudi royal family, given the dearth of materials on all aspects of life in Saudi Arabia, this is a highly useful book, particularly on internal politics. Al-Qahtani is far more knowledgeable concerning details of factionalism within the Saudi royal family than any author on Saudi Arabia writing in English or French. The book is recommended for the rich information it contains, although one should approach it with caution, given the lack of clear source materials.

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Recent Publications

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Arab Regional Organizations, ed. by Frank A. Clements. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 1992. xxxiii + 198 pages. Indices. $49.95. Contains 749 annotated citations; access is by author, title, or subject. Citations are grouped primarily in three major chapters, "Regional Organizations" (including the Arab League, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the Gulf Cooperation Council); "Arab Aid" (including the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development and the Saudi Fund for Development); and "International Organizations" (including the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the United Nations). (SG)

Middle East Bibliography, by Sanford R. Silverburg. Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1992. xxxi + 564 pages. Index. $69.50. Contains 4,435 citations; access is by subject heading and an author index. Each citation lists author, title, publisher, and city and year of publication. (SG)

Nile Notes of a Howadji: A Bibliography of Travelers' Tales from Egypt, from the Earliest Time to 1918, by Martin R. Kalfatovic. Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1992. xxxvi + 425 pages. Indices. $49.50. Presents 1,150 short annotated entries in chronological order by date of travel, beginning with Herodotus. An introduction offers a brief history of travelers' accounts, highlighting the observations of some well-known travelers. Access is by name and title indices. (BJF)

Sudan: A Country Study. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992. xxxiii + 333 pages. Append. Bibl. Gloss. Index. n.p. This fourth edition contains chapters on "Historical Setting" by Thomas Ofcansky, "The Society and Its Environment" and "The Economy" by Robert O. Collins, "Government and Politics" by Eric Hooglund, and "National Security" by Jean R. Tartter. (SG)

DOCUMENTS

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, vol. 15: Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989. xxiii + 943 pages. Index. n.p. Contains 511 documents relating to "Continued US Consideration of Funding the Aswan High Dam and the Anderson Mission, January 1-March 12, 1956" and "US Decision to Withdraw Support from the Aswan High Dam and Egyptian Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, March 13-July 26, 1956." Includes transcripts of telegrams from US embassies in the Middle East to the State Department; memoranda of conversation between US and Middle Eastern officials; and letters from Middle Eastern leaders to US president Dwight Eisenhower. (EE)

DICTIONARIES

Historical Dictionary of Israel, by Bernard Reich. Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1992. lxv + 351 pages. Bibl. $47.50. A dictionary of persons, terms, organizations, concepts, and places. Listings of persons who Hebraicized their names give the former name in parentheses; terms not used in Israel (for example, "June War" or "October War") are cross-referenced to terms commonly used in Israel ("Six-Day War," "Yom Kippur War.") Also contains a detailed chronology; tables listing present and former prime ministers, cabinet ministers and military officials, and immigration and population figures; and an extensive bibliography. (SG)

Historical Dictionary of the Sudan, by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban *et al.* Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1992. 2nd ed. cvii + 408 pages. Appends. $59.50. Contains dictionary citations as well as an extensive bibliography noting works on the culture, society, history, politics, and economy of Sudan. Also contains a detailed chronology and appendices listing historic and contemporary rulers, main language groups, and current facts and figures. (SG)

The Middle East: A Political Dictionary, by Lawrence Ziring. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1992. x + 401 pages. Index. $56.50 cloth. $29.95 paper. Contains 271 entries, grouped in seven chapters: "Political Geography and Geopolitics," "Islam," "Ethnicity and Political Culture," "Political Parties and Movements," "Israelis and Palestinians," "Diplomacy," and "Conflict." Each entry contains a subsection, "Significance." (SG)

BIOGRAPHY

Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey from Her Father's Harem through the Islamic Revolution, by Sattareh Farman Farmaian and Dona Munker. New York: Crown Publishers, 1992. xii + 404 pages. Index. $22.00. An autobiographical account of a 20th-century Qajar princess, spanning her childhood at court, her student years in the United

Annotations have been prepared by the book review editor, with the assistance of **Laura Abrahams, Jane Ann Burdick, Elisa F. Coghlan, Eleni Eleftheriou, Betsy J. Folkins, Kristen L. Kelly, Doug Nelson, Mary N. Sebold, Ranya C. Sihweil, and Roxanne Varzi.**

States, and her return to Iran, where she founded the Tehran School of Social Work. The narrative concludes with the author's flight from Iran during the 1979 revolution. (BJF)

EGYPT

Behind Closed Doors: Torture and Detention in Egypt. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992. A Middle East Watch Report. x + 219 pages. Appends. $15.00 paper. Report of a Middle East Watch mission to Egypt to examine abuses of human rights by that country's General Directorate for State Security Investigation. Six chapters address "The Process of Arrest," "Incommunicado Detention," "Interrogation and Torture during Incommunicado Detention," "Government Investigations of Torture Complaints," "Long-Term Detention of Political Prisoners without Charge or Trial," and "Scrutiny of Egypt's Human Rights Record." The latter chapter includes a critical examination of US and EC assistance to Egypt. (JB)

IRAQ

Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath. New York: Middle East Watch, 1992. x + 66 pages. $7.00 paper. Places accounts of post-Gulf war human rights violations in the context of prior abuses by the Baghdad regime; contends that the 1991 war revealed how "the world community had underestimated the regime's brutality" (p. 5). The focal areas of the study are the treatment of the Shia in southern Iraq and the Kurds in the north, during and after the March 1991 uprisings. The report strongly critiques the contradictions in US policy toward Iraq, including the lack of significant support to those taking part in the uprisings. (LA)

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Beyond Partnership: The Jewish Agency and the Diaspora, 1959–1971, by Ernest Stock. New York: Herzl Press; and Jerusalem, Israel: HaSifriya HaTziyonut, 1992. viii + 259 pages. Appends. Notes. Bibl. Index. n.p. paper. A history of the Jewish Agency, this volume is a companion to *Chosen Instrument*, published in 1988, which addressed the years 1948–1959. Analyzes new initiatives for settling immigrants and fund raising; principal source material includes the minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive. (EE)

Plowshares into Swords? Israelis and Jews in the Shadow of the Intifada, by Colin Shindler. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991. Distrib. St. Martin's Press, New York. xvi + 270 pages. Notes. Gloss. Bibl. Index. $29.50. Focuses on the reactions of various elements of Israeli society—including the military, religious groups, peace groups, and the press—to Israeli government policy toward the *intifada* and toward Palestinians in the decades preceding the intifada. The reactions of Jewish communities abroad and relations between the Israeli government and American Jewish organizations are also discussed. (BJF)

KUWAIT

A Victory Turned Sour: Human Rights in Kuwait since Liberation. Washington, DC and New York: Middle East Watch, 1991. 63 pages. n.p. paper. Contends that human rights violations in Kuwait since the 1991 Gulf war have been abundant; includes sections on prison conditions, martial law trials of suspected collaborators, and summary expulsions. Concludes with recommendations for Kuwait, the United Nations, the United States, and other Middle Eastern countries, designed to avoid similar human rights violations in the future. (LA)

LEBANON

Birds of Ill Omen, by Marie Seurat, tr. by Dorothy S. Blair. London and New York: Quartet Books, 1990. 170 pages. £10.95. A personal narrative of the events surrounding the kidnapping of Michel Seurat from Beirut in 1985, as told by his widow. She relates her frustrations in her contacts with the French government, the media, and the families of other hostages. (KLK)

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Britain and the Middle East: An Economic History, 1945–87, by Frank Brenchley. London: Lester Crook, 1989. Distrib. St. Martin's Press, New York. xiv + 391 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. n.p. A detailed account, in 32 chapters, of the economic relations between Great Britain and the Middle East since World War II. Individual chapters discuss the economies of Great Britain and the Middle East, bilateral and multilateral trade relations, and effects of major political developments on economic relations. (KLK)

Conflict Resolution in the Middle East: Simulating a Diplomatic Negotiation between Israel and Syria, by J. Lewis Rasmussen and Robert B. Oakley. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992. ix + 60 pages. Notes. Refs. $6.95 paper. The results of a 1991 simulation held at the US Institute of Peace, designed to explore scenarios of actual Israeli-Syrian negotiations. The participants are not identified; the exercise included imagined del-

egations from Israel, Syria, the United States, and the former Soviet Union. (RV)

Do Economic Sanctions Work? by Makio Miyagawa. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xi + 240 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $65.00. Discusses forms of economic sanctions, methods by which such sanctions are applied, and their aims and efficacy. Provides a case study of the US-Iran hostage crisis, effect and limitations of sanctions against Iran, and factors contributing to the crisis' solution. Concludes that sanctions are effective only when the target is part of "a fabric of international economic transactions" (p. 204). (EE)

Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim, by W. Howard Wriggins *et al.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. xiv + 338 pages. Bibls. Index. $40.00. Explores the international politics of four regions, including the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa; examines the security systems of these regions through a study of the relationship among the states within the region, considering regional structure and interactive processes; discusses characteristics of regional systems that limit leaders' actions. Also considers how local states contribute to and are affected by activities of major outside powers; speculates on the ways the end of the Cold War may alter regional systems. (EE)

The Gulf between Us: The Gulf War and Beyond, ed. by Victoria Brittain. London: Virago Press, 1991. Distrib. Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT. xx + 186 pages. Contribs. $13.95 paper. Includes "The Unnecessary War" by Alexander Cockburn and Andrew Cohen, "Roots of an Adventure—The Invasion of Kuwait: Iraqi Political Dynamics" by Faleh Abd al-Jabar, "Victory in the Desert: Superior Technology or Brute Force?" by Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., "Tales of War: Arab Women in the Eye of the Storm" by Fadia Faqir, "The Deepening Tragedy of the Palestinians" by Abbas Shiblak, and "Poisoned Sand and Seas" by John Vidal. An epilogue, "Making Sense of an Earthquake," is written by Roger Owen. (SG)

The Gulf War and the New World Order, ed. by Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991. 293 pages. Append. Index. $55.00 cloth. $19.95 paper. Contains 22 chapters, divided into four parts: "The Global Context," "The Middle East Protagonists," "The Issues," and "The Left Debate." Chapters include "The US and the Gulf Crisis" by Noam Chomsky, "From Emperor to Policeman: Britain and the Gulf War" by Barney Dickson, "The Iraqi-US War: A Conspiracy Theory" by Sami Yousif, "The Role of Iran in the Gulf War" by Maryam Poya, "Politics and the Gulf Crisis: Government and Popular Responses" by David Seddon, "The Arab Grassroots Response to the Gulf Crisis" by Yezid Sayigh, "Oil and the New Helots of Arabia: Increased Dependence and Political Vulnerability for the Arab World" by Pandeli M. Glavanis, "The Neopatriarchal State in the Middle East: Development, Authoritarianism and Crisis" by Val Moghadam, "The Gulf War and Ideology: The Double-Edged Sword of Islam" by Falih Abd al-Jabbar, "Operation Desert Disaster: Environmental Costs of the War" by Joni Seager, and "The Left and the War: Four Underlying Questions" by Fred Halliday. (SG)

The Middle East Military Balance, 1990–1991. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1992. Distrib. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 479 pages. Tables. Gloss. Chron. Abbrevs. Maps. $74.50. Contains 10 chapters in two parts, "Gulf War" and "Additional Strategic Developments;" assessments of "Regional Military Forces" of Iran, Israel, 17 Arab states, and "Palestinian Military and Paramilitary Forces;" and "Comparative Tables and Figures," containing maps, a glossary of weapons systems, and a chronology of "key strategic events" from July 1990 to December 1991. Chapters include "CENTCOM's Major Test: Operation Desert Storm" and "Israel, the US and the Gulf War" by Dore Gold, "Strategic Implications of the Immigration of Soviet Jewry to Israel" by Yehuda Ben Meir, "Syria Tightens Its Grip on Lebanon, 1988–1991" by Reuven Avi-Ran, and "The Palestinian Struggle" by Anat Kurz. (SG)

Moscow and the Middle East: New Thinking on Regional Conflict, by Galia Golan. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; and New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992. vii + 102 pages. Notes. $14.95 paper. Describes the development of Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev, which stressed global interdependence and a more cooperative superpower role. The policy is examined with specific reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. (DN)

Nationalism and Internationalism in Liberalism, Marxism and Islam, by Tahir Amin. Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1991. xxxii + 106 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. n.p. paper. Examines the traditions of liberalism, Marxism, and Islamism in order to define their positions toward the concepts of nationalism and internationalism, via analyses of their major theorists' ideas, historically and contemporarily. Tables and diagrams fortify the text. (EFC)

Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East, ed. by Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991. vii + 340 pages. Contribs. Index. $49.95 cloth. $22.95 paper. Contains 14 chapters, including "Changing Patterns of Peasant Protest in the Middle East, 1750–1950" by Edmund Burke, III, "Rural Unrest in the Ottoman Empire, 1830–1914" by Donald Quataert, "Violence in Rural Syria in the 1880s and 1890s: State Centralization, Rural Integration, and the World Market" by Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, "War, State Economic Policies, and Resistance by Agricultural Producers in Turkey, 1939–1945" by Şevket Pamuk, and "Peasant Pro-

test and Resistance in Rural Iranian Azerbaijan" by Fereydoun Safizadeh. (SG)

Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, ed. by Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. vii + 242 pages. Contribs. Index. $35.00 cloth. $14.95 paper. A collection of 11 articles, some based on a 1990 conference on "Privatization in Egypt and the Middle East" held at Northeastern University. Chapters include "Privatization in Egypt: The Regional Dimensions" by Abdel Monem Said Aly, "Labor as an Obstacle to Privatization: The Case of Egypt" by Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Divergent Modes of Economic Liberalization in Syria and Iraq" by Fred H. Lawson, "Economic Liberalization in Oil-Exporting Countries: Iraq and Saudi Arabia" by Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "Economic and Political Liberalization in a Rentier Economy: The Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" by Laurie A. Brand, and "Breaking with Socialism: Liberalization and Privatization in Algeria" by Dirk Vandewalle. (SG)

The Soviet Breakup and US Foreign Policy, by Allan Lynch. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1991. Headline Series, no. 297. 72 pages. Append. Bibl. $4.00 paper. Examines the collapse of the Soviet Union; emphasizes its multiethnic composition and the emergence of nationalism as factors that warrant a cautious US approach. Suggests that US policy should seek to aid development from within. (DN)

War and Peace in the Gulf: Domestic Politics and Regional Relations into the 1990s, by Anoushiravan Ehteshami *et al.* Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991. Distrib. Paul and Company, Concord, MA. xv + 287 pages. Notes. Bibl. Maps. About the Authors. Index. $50.00. The domestic regional and political agenda in the Gulf region, particularly Iraq, during the 1980s is discussed in its relationship with military defense and investment. Includes an extensive chronology of events for the period. (RCS)

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, by Anthony H. Cordesman. London and McLean, VA: Brassey's, 1991. xv + 224 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $44.95. Analyzes the proliferation of weaponry throughout the region; covers eight case studies of arms development in individual states as well as the use of weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Useful tables include listings of weapons by country, predictions of future trends, and types of biological weapons and their effects on population centers. (BJF)

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Beg, Borrow or Steal: Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, 1991. 35 pages. Appends. n.p. paper. An account of the establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Detailed information on Israeli government support for the settlements, financial incentives for settlers, and plans for infrastructure development are addressed. Maps and photographs highlight the text; appendices include data on "Appropriation of Palestinian Land in the Occupied Territories, February 25-August 31, 1991;" "Mortgage Loans Available to Israelis;" "Proposed Expansion by Settlement;" and "Living in the Occupied Territories: A Comparison [between Palestinians and Israeli Settlers]." (BJF)

A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, by Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991. x + 276 pages. Index. n.p. paper. Establishes an historical framework for the conflict, accentuating major events that contribute to its prolongation. Chapters begin with chronologies and other useful aids, including texts of documents, UN resolutions, communications between leaders, and statements issued by political parties and groups. Maps depicting population distribution and military strategy accompany the text; suggested reading lists follow each chapter. (BJF)

Grasping the Nettle of Peace: A Senior Palestinian Figure Speaks Out, by Khaled al-Hassan. London: Saqi Books, 1992. 166 pages. Appends. Notes. Index. £18.95 cloth. £8.95 paper. Proposes a peace plan modeled on a Swiss-style confederation; offers five variants on the model. These include a confederation of Jordan, Palestine, and Israel; a cantonal division of historic Palestine; Israel within its 1947 UN-proposed borders, a Palestinian state within the post-1967 occupied territories, and the remaining territory given to municipal authorities, with residence open to Palestinians and Israelis; the implementation of Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, with minor changes, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and a clause in a peace agreement advocating confederation at some future date; and reference of the conflict to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. Includes 40 appendices, containing maps, charts, and texts of UN resolutions. (DN)

Transition to Palestinian Self-Government—Practical Steps toward Israeli-Palestinian Peace: Report of a Study Group of the Middle East Program, Committee on International Security Studies. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1992. Distrib. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN. 160 pages. Contribs. $27.50 cloth. $10.95 paper. Contains three sections, "Civic and Political Institutions," "External and Internal Security," and "Economic and Resource Issues." Each section contains subsections that address "The Status Quo," "Negotiating Phase," "The Interim Period," and "The Long-Term Status." The principal author of the report is Ann Mosely Lesch; other authors include Naomi Chazan, Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Ruth Klinov, Everett Mendelsohn, Fouad Moughrabi, Salim Tamari, Shibley Telhami, and Mark Tessler. (SG)

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, by M. Fuad Köprülü, tr. and ed. by Gary Leiser. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. xxviii + 155 pages. Notes. Gloss. Bibl. Index. $12.95 paper. A translation of lectures presented at the Sorbonne in 1935. The author challenges Western interpretations of the creation of the Ottoman Empire in the 13th-14th centuries that portray a newly created entity; emphasizes the continuation of political, social, and cultural elements in the growth of the empire. (BJF)

Ottomans, Turks, and the Jewish Polity: A History of the Jews of Turkey, by Walter F. Weiker. Lanham, MD: University Press of America; and Jerusalem, Israel: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1992. xvi + 368 pages. Bibl. Append. Index. $47.50. Describes the history of Turkish Jews through four periods: the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire through the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Young Turk era and the Turkish republic of the 20th century. Addresses a general history of the state and its relationship to Jews, Jewish communal organization, economic status of Jews, and Jewish culture, for each period. The author concludes that the Jewish community in Turkey has maintained its religious beliefs and practices, has resisted assimilation, and generally has coexisted with and effectively participated in the larger society. (DN)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Egypt: Alleviating Poverty during Structural Adjustment. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991. A World Bank Country Study. xxvi + 242 pages. Appends. Bibl. n.p. paper. A study of Egypt's economic condition, beginning with an evaluation of the causes and dimensions of Egyptian poverty, including income distribution and transfers and taxation. An assessment of the social costs to be incurred during structural adjustment is followed by a conclusion that addresses future prospects for Egyptian growth in the context of a "Poverty Alleviation Strategy." An extensive compilation of tables and graphs supplement the text. (LA)

Human Development Report 1992. New York: United Nations Development Program; and Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. ix + 216 pages. n.p. paper. Emphasizing the importance of examining "global markets from a human perspective" (p. 1), this analysis focuses on hindrances to development that are felt by the poorest in the world as a result of the current system of global market interaction. The report elucidates "the widening gap in global opportunities" (p. 34) and discusses the challenge of "sustainable human development" (p. 34), identifying political freedom as one precursor to growth. A "human development index" as well as an abundance of illustrative charts and tables are employed for statistical support. (LA)

Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1991. vol. 22. xi + 405 pages. Sources. n.p. paper. Examines issues of development—including GNP per capita and population—on a global scale; focuses on regional studies of developing Asian and Pacific countries, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. Extensive numerical data and charts, illustrating composition of trade, food production, growth rates, and structure of debt, as well as other development indicators, are included. (LA)

The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: Egypt and Turkey, by Bent Hansen. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. A World Bank Comparative Study. xvii + 572 pages. Bibl. Index. n.p. A comparison of economic growth and development strategies in these countries from 1923 to 1985, taking into account the influence of changing political ideologies and varying degrees of state control. Historical conditions in each country are described, followed by comparisons of growth patterns and the development of political and economic institutions. Tables are interspersed throughout the text, addressing productivity, income distribution, GDP, and exports and imports. Also includes an extensive bibliography and index. (BJF)

The Transnational Management of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes, by Ella Louka. New Haven, CT: Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, 1992. Occasional Paper no. 1. ix + 54 pages. Notes. n.p. paper. Concentrates on the repercussions of toxic wastes; proposes reform measures and presents suggestions for further economic development while preserving the environment. (RCS)

MEDIA AND EDUCATION

Sociology in Iran, by Ali Akbar Mahdi and Abdolali Lahsaeizadeh. Bethesda, MD: Jahan Book Company, 1992. 141 pages. Append. Bibl. Index. $8.00 paper. Reviews the development of the discipline of sociology in Iran through an examination of the growth of university programs and enrollment, research and publications on the subject, and trends in the field, from its introduction in Iran in mid-century to after the Islamic revolution. Tables supplement the text. (EFC)

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Mysticism and Language, ed. by Steven T. Katz. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. vi + 262 pages. Contribs. n.p. A study of

mysticism through the status of language. Contains 10 essays, including "Reification of Language in Jewish Mysticism" by Moshe Idel, "Mystical Language and the Teaching Concept in the Early Lexicons of Sufism" by Carl W. Ernest, "The Language of Love in Christian and Jewish Mysticism" by Bernard McGinn, and "Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience" by William P. Alston. (RV)

Striving Together: A Way Forward in Christian-Muslim Relations, by Charles Kimball. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991. xv + 132 pages. Notes. $10.95 paper. Explores methods of fostering interreligious dialogue and understanding between peoples of the two faiths in six chapters: "Obstacles and Opportunities in Christian-Muslim Relations," "Toward Understanding Islam," "The History of Christian-Muslim Relations: An Overview," "Christian Particularity and Religious Pluralism: Biblical and Theological Options," "The Dialogue Movement," and "A Way Forward in Christian-Muslim Relations." (KLK)

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, ARTS

The Ambiguous Compromise: Language, Literature, and National Identity in Algeria and Morocco, by Jacqueline Kaye and Abdelhamid Zoubir. London and New York: Routledge, 1990. ix + 141 pages. Bibl. Index. $66.00. Citing francophone examples of literary and oral traditions of Algeria and Morocco, the authors argue that there are radical differences and conflicts between the two traditions. They illustrate the dilemma of language defining national characteristics and question why postcolonial writers continue to utilize the language of their oppressors. (RCS)

Egyptian Earth, by Abdel Rahman al-Sharqawi, tr. by Desmond Stewart. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990. xi + 251 pages. $24.95 cloth. $12.95 paper. A 12-year-old boy narrates a modern epic drama about the trauma of the nationalist struggle and revolution. The author's portrayal of Egypt during the 1930s illustrates the life of the peasants and villagers, and both political and personal passions. (RCS)

Iranian Drama: An Anthology, ed. by M.R. Ghanoonparvar and John Green. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1989. xxix + 302 pages. Bibl. $24.95. A collection of 10 plays written in the 1960s and 1970s, typical of a period of literary experimentation and political and social commentary by Iranian playwrights. Includes works by Gholamhoseyn Sa'edi, Sadeq Chubak, Bahram Beyza'i, Nader Ebrahimi, Mohsen Yalfani, Mahmud Rahbar, and Faramarz Talebi. (KLK)

Milk for the Orange Tree, by Gisèle Halimi, tr. by Dorothy S. Blair. London: Quartet Books, 1990. xii + 367 pages. £19.95. An autobiography of a Tunisian-born Parisian lawyer, who was active in representing members of the Algerian FLN during that country's war of independence. The author portrays her efforts to combat racism and sexism in North Africa and in France, her legal victories in defense of women's rights, and her friendships with Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, and François Mitterand. The narrative offers an extensive personal account of the Algerian war of independence. (EE)

WOMEN

The Rights of Women in Islam, by Asghar Ali Engineer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. vi + 188 pages. Append. Index. $39.95. A reassessment of women's rights in Islam; argues that overlooked verses in the Quran stress the fundamental importance of women's rights. (RV)

EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH

Iran: A Precollegiate Handbook, ed. by Charlotte Albright. Bethesda, MD: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 1992. 130 pages. $24.95. Nine units on physical geography, history, language and literature, art and architecture, religion, cuisine, holidays, peoples, and music are followed by a reference section. Articles for instructors are included in each chapter, along with an audio tape, a folding map, and 20 slides. (MNS)

Make a Model Mosque and Four Related Lessons for Teaching about Islam, by Sandra Kelly. Oakley, CA: Oakley Union School District, 1991. 11 pages. $10.00. Four lessons survey the architecture of the mosque; the significance of Bilal, the first muezzin in Islam; the structural similarities and differences between mosques and Christian churches; and the *hadith*, or traditions of the Prophet. Suggestions for activities follow each lesson. Includes an audio tape and three slides. (MNS)

The Seven Voyages of Sindbad: An Introduction to the Thousand and One Nights, by Sandra Kelly. Oakley, CA: Oakley Union School District, 1990. 73 pages. $20.00. Informally produced unit designed to introduce the concept of the frame story through the adventures of Sindbad. The kit, intended for use in middle schools, includes reproducible handouts, lists of suggested classroom and homework activities, a resource list, and a one-page directory of outreach centers in the central and western United States. (MNS)

Women of the Middle East: A Handbook for Secondary Schools, ed. by Fatma Müge Göçek *et al.* Ann Arbor: Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan, 1992. 69 pages. $8.00. A handbook of six chapters designed for high school students. Selections, primarily by Middle Eastern women, cover childhood, marriage, motherhood, working women, women's participation in war and revolution, and poetry. (MNS)

Bibliography of Periodical Literature

Note: The Bibliography is intended to present a selective listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the beginning of Islam. The material included covers Muslim Spain and the Ottoman Balkans, the Arab states, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded. The list of periodicals reviewed is published annually in the Autumn issue.

Send copies of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

Abbreviations

A./a., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., America, American, etc.
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics Economie, économique, etc.
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Histoire, historique
IBLA, Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst., Institute, Institut, etc.
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
J., Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Med./Méd., Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc.
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc.
Probs., Problems
Quart., Quarterly
Rel., Relations
Rep., Report
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Société, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
US, United States
Z., Zeitschrift

The Bibliography of Periodical Literature has been prepared by the book review editor, with the assistance of **Jane Ann Burdick, Eleni Eleftheriou, Betsy J. Folkins, Kristen L. Kelly, Doug Nelson, Ranya C. Sihweil, Roxanne Varzi, and Nancy Wood.**

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Communications

The JOURNAL *welcomes comments from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in these columns. When a comment is received regarding an article or review published in the* JOURNAL, *and we feel it merits serious consideration, the author will be given the option to respond in kind. As a matter of policy, such exchanges are normally limited to one round. In addition to letters of comment, communications on other information of interest will be printed as space is available.*

To the Editor:

It was with concern that I read Dr. Vernon Egger's review of my book, *The Creation of a Medical Profession in Egypt, 1800–1922* (Syracuse University Press, 1991), in your Autumn 1992 (vol. 46, no. 4) issue. My concern does not stem solely from the reviewer's lack of involvement with the arguments I presented in my book but also because his attitude is reflective of an unfortunate trend among reviewers of books and manuscripts today who seem either to be looking for their own paradigms in the works they are reviewing, or else are intent on limiting the field to these same paradigms. This somewhat insidious limitation and refusal to "allow space" for various approaches is practiced mainly through "dismissal" and/or "labeling."

For the last three decades, the most important paradigm through which the area's history has been studied, whether we are talking about the political left or right, is a political-economic approach that applies a coming of the West or modernization paradigm. In such approaches the colonial experience is usually regarded as a clear demarcation point, and since most of those espousing this approach (including Western and Middle Eastern scholars) are necessarily positivist in their approach, they are mainly interested in seeing how far the societies they are studying have succeeded or failed in Westernizing. Many political economists focus on the subject of development, and their research and analysis is directed toward explaining how and why countries of the area succeeded or failed in their development efforts and what can be done for them to develop further. The excellent studies of this genre left a gap which is today being filled by newer scholarship and approaches: in analysis that presupposes the modernization paradigm, society appears as a recipient of change introduced from above or from outside. The "people" seen as "masses" are hardly ever considered as actual participants in the historical process occur-

ring around them. The nature of the state becomes the focus of analysis. For example, the recent focus of emphasizing Ottoman history has been directed toward determining whether the state was dominated by Turkish or national elites. Such a focus clearly illustrates political agendas, and may have more to do with the eventual shape of Middle East political geography than it does for understanding the actual historical process.

Models of what the state should be or should not be, how society should be expected to be structured, and the changes necessitated by the specificities of the society so as to make the model fit better, have continued to mold historical studies. Interestingly, in the various countries of the Middle East and in Europe, scholars are undergoing a transformation in their approach and trying to apply more indigenous methodologies that could illustrate the realities of the state and society. In the United States, however, we are still grappling with Marxist and Weberian approaches, not in order to learn methods of theorizing given the particular conditions of societies focused on, but to see how these models can be trimmed and fitted to societies that these theorists were neither interested in nor familiar with. It is almost a form of ideological fundamentalism, a kind of orientalism linked to a modernization paradigm in which the West or Western thought and experience *must* constitute the central focal point of the argument, whether it is pro- or anti-West. It is no wonder that most works that purport to discuss the state and society have ended up by focusing on the state and its impact on society, or society's response to state-induced change. Scholars interested in society are really looking for "clones" of Western civil society. By trying to show that such clones exist they are "dismissing" the specificities of the cultures as well as the social and power relations indigenous to the societies they study.

My book on the Egyptian medical profession addresses directly the question of modernization and indirectly the whole approach to the role of society in the historical process. Since this was a monographic study focusing on a microstructural level, it was not the place to take up other questions. What Dr. Egger missed, or chose to miss, was the debate regarding how modernization took place in Egypt and how the historical process unfolded, given pre-existing medical practices and other cultural traditions, including the needs of the population, the fact that Western medicine was being introduced, and the specificities of Egyptian history.

His review focused on details and their validity to his idea of what a profession constitutes and on whether the title to my book fit the data presented. It is thus not surprising that Dr. Egger dismissed the main arguments of the book by concluding that "surely the emergence of a medical profession in Egypt actually took place in the period after 1922, rather than before." He builds the conclusion on what he considers to be "inferential rather than demonstrative" evidence, that the evidence may provide some "legitimate indicators" but that those are insufficient for imagining that "a professional identity for Egyptian physicians [existed] between 1882 and 1922." What the reviewer is saying is that there have to be so-called "legitimate indicators" corresponding to a Western conception of what constitutes a profession for a professional identity to exist which, in turn, implies that a genuine professional experience cannot exist outside a Western cultural framework. Thus, if the "government, not the doctors themselves, remained the arbiter of who became doctors," then that would mean that the criteria are not met. Incidentally, modern medical doctors in all countries are licensed to practice medicine by governments; that is not unique for Egypt. The reviewer seems to insist that professionalism has to be the same all over the world, and is in fact questioning the possibility that a profession could have come into existence before the colonial experience under other than Western tutelage.

This attitude pervades the whole approach to the field: undermining the importance of culture as an actual ingredient in the historical process. Let me illustrate my meaning: the reviewer finds my argument that part of the proof for the existence of a medical profession can be found in the fact that doc-

tors' pensions were to be paid in cash rather than in the traditional form of a land-grant to be "inferential" rather than "demonstrative" evidence. This is serious because it means that the way by which society perceives itself and the relations that tie different social classes and orders, as well as state-societal relations, is to be labeled as "inferential" and hence wanting. The fact that this is a real departure from long-held traditions does not constitute proof; what the reader seems to infer is that to be a profession, Egypt's doctors had to demonstrate that they were as "good" as any in Europe.

As I was writing the book, I was aware that a comparison with the Western experience would be required from those espousing the dominant modernization paradigm. I therefore used European professions as models to test against the one coming into existence in Egypt. Evidence for the existence of the profession included passing exams organized by peers, establishing a medical journal and publication of medical treatises of Egyptian doctors, private practice, society's recognition of doctor's exclusive knowledge of a particular science, the necessity of a medical certificate before an individual could practice medicine, swearing the Hippocratic oath, the active administrative and educational role played by the doctors through the Qasr al-Aini Medical School, and the fact that in 1922 it was Egyptian doctors who undertook the prerogative of including the medical school into Egypt's newly formed Fuad I University against the strong opposition of the British. Unfortunately, Dr. Egger dismisses this evidence, even though such criteria were the ones expected from medical schools in the West at that time.

What I tried to show is a profession coming into existence due to government activity but also due to the activities undertaken by members of the profession who sought to institutionalize it and, through social and political recognition, differentiate it from other medical practitioners. Dr. Egger never understood this, rather he saw my attempts as emphasizing the benevolence of Muhammad Ali Pasha. What he is really perpetuating is the stereotypical image of the modernization paradigm of the need for an autocratic ruler to bring about any form of change. This is an underlying approach to non-Western societies that are studied through "oriental" or some other form of despotism. Indigenous culture is hence described as the "traditional," the residue of backwardness and the reason for slow development. Historical continuity that gives validity to the role of precolonial, or pre-"coming of the West" cultural inputs in the historical process are seen as "bizarre" or dismissed because they would put the whole paradigm into question. Westernization has become a form of ideological nationalism for many scholars who continue to apply the development or modernization paradigm without making allowances for indigenous transformations, cultural continuity, and other than elite history.

My book is a study of the historical process by which a medical profession was brought into existence in Egypt, with particular emphasis on the attributes of this profession and the ways in which it combined traditional modes together with Western science to bring about a hybrid profession. While showing how the profession was brought into existence before the arrival of the British, it also discusses how the characteristics of the profession were further molded and shaped by British imperial rule, which made the country into a dependency and thereby contributed to the fact that modern medicine as a discipline combining practice and scientific research never fully materialized in Egypt. By the time of Egypt's independence, which was beyond the scope of this study, there was a great gap already existing between Egyptian research and that of the West, where medical technology was making great progress during the very same period of the captivity of the Egyptian profession.

The period I focused on was the formative period of that profession, when the future shape of the profession was molded. The introduction discussed traditional medical practice with particular emphasis on historical continuity. The intent was to show that the introduction of a modern science did not mean the elimination of traditional patterns and practices.

Chapter one discusses Muhammad Ali's reforms and, drawing on my findings, drew conclusions that were in contrast to previous studies of the subject. For example, widely accepted conclusions about the pasha's total preoccupation with building an army were conclusions that were not supported by the facts. The wide-ranging services provided and the efforts aimed at creating a medical profession show a much different picture. Providing medical services and building the profession unfortunately fell short of the intentions of both Muhammad Ali and Clot Bey, the actual architect of the reforms. The reasons were manifold, poverty and general educational standards being central ones.

The following three chapters discuss in detail the step-by-step process through which students were recruited, "polished," and educated. The various problems faced by the Qasr al-Aini Medical School in its efforts to teach young peasant boys a science that in many ways conflicted with general religious beliefs, and by professors who were imported from Europe and who could speak only European languages, are described. It was a difficult operation and the book shows how modernization is actually imparted under such conditions. The book follows the footsteps of the graduates of the school, the missions sent to Europe, the exams they were given, the dissertations they wrote, and the degrees they were awarded. It deals with the different disputes involving the school and its students, who were a source of great controversy even then, for (as now it seems) it was not believed that Egyptians could in fact manage to bring about a professional success.

Most important to this study is the growth of the profession during the rule of Abbas Pasha and Sa'id Pasha when government support was all but withdrawn. That was not the end of the profession; on the contrary, it allowed the doctors to expand their work into independent medical practice. When the medical school was revamped it was fully staffed by Egyptian doctors and Clot Bey, who was recalled from France, found that there was really not much for him to do. Since the age of Abbas and Sa'id is usually dismissed as a period of decline due to the lack of government initiative, my findings pointed to a different dynamic for that period, which was located in society rather than the state. My purpose was to show the historical role played by indigenous forces, a role often overlooked by historians concentrating on the introduction of change from above or outside.

By the time the British took over the school in 1892, it was completely staffed by Egyptian doctors. About 200 doctors were graduated yearly, besides the pharmacists, veterinarians, and *hakimas* (women doctors). Many of these went into private practice, others were sent to Europe to perfect their education and on their return became teachers for future doctors. Still others went into government services. The medical school was the center of this activity; it acted as the association to which all doctors belonged, and through which they actively sought the legal changes recognizing doctors as belonging to a profession separating them from others by their knowledge of a science that was their domain alone. Their salary scales, pensions, laws, and professional responsibilities were all recognized by the state while their abilities and specializations were becoming widely accepted and respected.

The British remolded the profession, but they did not put an end to it. If anything this study emphasizes historical continuity, and showed how British policies molded Qasr al-Aini to fit with their colonial needs very much as Muhammad Ali Pasha introduced reforms to fit with his. That is how the state usually acts. British actions included curtailment of scholarships, shortening the curriculum, cancelling specialization, and the requirement of school fees, as well as other measures which would provide them with medical assistants rather than doctors. They closed the school of *hakimas* and replaced it with one that graduated female nurses. The sons of rich Egyptians, however, continued to travel abroad for a medical education and the British allowed any foreign doctor to come and practice in Egypt. The results were quite devastating to Egyptian society since the gap between rich and poor became a

virtual chasm. When the medical school became part of the new Fuad I University (now Cairo University), this was done at the initiative of Egyptian doctors. Medical history, like educational history, did not begin in 1922. Such assumptions are ahistorical no matter how we justify them. The medical profession, no matter how it had been molded or scarred, did exist long before 1922.

The book as a whole was meant as a concise, and hopefully articulate study of social change in modern Egypt. It attempted to present a methodology by which such studies would be encouraged. Historical continuity was at the center, the complexities of the process of modernization were a take-off point. In studies that emphasize the modernization paradigm, the "coming of the West" is the take-off point for change, and nothing that occurred earlier really mattered. Such paradigms turn society into a static object; indigenous social groups are outside of history, waiting to be moved around either by a rational West or by a despotic ruler. This study presented a case in which not only were rulers involved in reforms and colonial policies played an important role, but historical continuity played as important a role, and members of social groups were important players in such dramas. It is my hope that more microstructural-level studies of this type will be undertaken, so that our understanding of the Middle East will grow.

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To the Editor:

As scholars, we should find intellectual debate exciting and pleasurable. Responding to Dr. Sonbol's letter, however, is not a pleasure, for it is not a matter of defending what I wrote in the review, but rather of defending myself against what I did *not* say. (I request of the readers to obtain a copy of the review to compare with our letters.) In sports a good offense can be the best defense, but in intellectual discourse it can be mere evasion; in this case Dr. Sonbol's attack even sinks to the level of casting aspersions on the character of the reviewer. I am critical of two major features of Dr. Sonbol's book. I take objection to many features of her letter.

One of the two major weaknesses that I saw in Dr. Sonbol's book was her periodization. The period 1800–1922 was either too short or too long for her purposes, for while she does a good job of adducing evidence that great strides were being made toward the creation of a medical profession before 1882, she then convincingly argues that the 40-year period of formal British occupation decimated any professionalism that the corps of Egyptian physicians had gained. On the eve of the British invasion, budget cuts imposed on the medical school by the Dual Control forced the only Egyptian medical journal to cease publication (pp. 95–6); the British completely took over the Qasr al-Aini medical school (p. 106); British policy limited the growth of the medical profession in Egypt "by confining its membership to a narrow margin of society, that of the well-to-do and foreign residents of the country" (p. 108) and by cutting enrollment at the medical school by as much as 90 percent (p. 109); British-made laws favored foreign physicians over Egyptian ones (pp. 110–12); the British ended educational missions to Europe by cutting stipends for Egyptian medical students in Europe (p. 113); and British administrators changed the curriculum of the medical school with the result that "the School did not prepare the students to function at a level higher than that of a simple assistant" (p. 114).

The end result of British policy, argues Dr. Sonbol, was catastrophic for Egyptian physicians and for Egyptian society: "it was British policies that were turning the medical profession into a trade, one that was practiced for gain rather than as a scientific pursuit" (p. 115); the ban on specialization made the graduates of Qasr al-Aini "into little more than 'clerk-doctors,' that is, low-level bureaucrats" (p. 112); and, finally, "The short- and long-term results of such a policy cannot be overestimated. Not only did Egypt suffer from the lack of medical personnel until the middle of the twentieth century, but even today the gap between the country's urban

and rural areas has yet to be bridged" (p. 132). After sketching the devastating impact of British policies on Egyptian physicians and society, Dr. Sonbol summarizes in one paragraph some of the policies initiated by the school of medicine in the years *after* 1922-to roll back the British policies (p. 140).

Thus, the book's chronological scope is puzzling. The author aspires to treat the creation of a medical profession in Egypt between the years 1800 and 1922. The evidence that Dr. Sonbol presents seems to me to argue for something quite different, namely, that after making great strides toward the creation of a medical profession, particularly during Ismail's reign, Egyptian physicians suffered an overwhelming setback at the hands of the British during the last third of the period covered by the book. In her letter she glibly protests that "historical continuity" allowed the doctors to pick up where they had left off in 1882, but that *deus ex machina* will not do. She wants us to believe that the profession arose, phoenix-like, after the period of occupation, but she has argued convincingly that Egyptian doctors under the British had become "clerk-bureaucrats" and "simple assistants." It is up to her to show how they made the deliberate, painful attempts over a period of years after 1922 to recover what they could from the shambles and to continue to develop. Why did Dr. Sonbol not continue the story? Had she extended the study into the interwar years to treat the policies of the Egyptian administration of the medical school and of the nominally independent state, the reader could have been convinced that during the interwar period a profession had at last emerged from the devastation wrought by foreign occupation.

A major problem, then, of the book is the author's curious choice of the period within which to examine the growth of an Egyptian medical profession. A second problem is that of theory. Dr. Sonbol charges that I am imposing my own paradigm on her work, and she identifies it with "modernization." I share her outrage at the reviewer who cannot accept a book on its own terms and who castigates it for not treating topics the reviewer is interested in, or who, in her or his commitment to certain theoretical models, denigrates any other approach. Truth is larger than any of our specialized fields or theoretical models. The problem in this case, however, is not an attempt on my part to impose a particular theory on Dr. Sonbol's book. My review neither insists nor implies that "the West or Western thought and experience must constitute the central focal point of the argument," as her letter states, and her charge that I emphasize the "coming of the West" as the take-off point for change is startling, for that is not my argument—it is hers. She begins her discussion of the emergence of a medical profession in Egypt with the work of Clot Bey, the first director of the School of Medicine. It is precisely European curricula, practices, medicines, and technology which Dr. Sonbol identifies as the matrix within which an Egyptian medical profession emerged, and it is formal British imperial control beginning in 1882 which, she argues, brought about a wrenching change in the status of Egyptian physicians. The "coming of the West" is a central theme of the book. (And this is why historical *discontinuities*, as much as continuities, stand out from her treatment of the subject.) Moreover, contrary to what her letter suggests, I never use the word "traditional" to describe indigenous culture, but she does, numerous times. I also neither use the word "bizarre" nor imply its meaning to describe "the role of pre-colonial, or pre-'coming of the West' cultural inputs in the historical process." Once again, she is projecting onto my review value judgments found throughout her book: the book reports that, upon Clot Bey's arrival in Egypt in 1825, the only men practicing medicine were "either barbers or charlatans" (p. 35), that "In Egypt . . . there had been no medical training worth the name since the late seventeenth century" (p. 36), and that despite Muhammad Ali's efforts at educational reform "the country was still steeped in ignorance in the mid-nineteenth century" (pp. 50–1). Invidious comparisons between "modern" and "traditional" features of Egyptian history abound in the book, *pace* her letter.

No, the problem of theory in this case is not my imposition of a pet theoretical model upon a book under review, but the book's lack of theory. I acknowledged in the review that Dr. Sonbol had adduced several "legitimate indicators" for the existence of a medical profession in Egypt by the 1870s, but I argued that the proof was "inferential" rather than "demonstrative." Dr. Sonbol misconstrues this criticism to reflect the ethnocentric bias that "a genuine professional experience cannot exist outside a Western cultural framework." She implies that I coined the term "indicators," but once again I am only taking her argument on her own terms: on page 85 she says that "Certain indicators are evidence for the existence of a profession, one of them being laws that govern education and practice in that profession."

I agree that many of the "indicators" that she offers are "legitimate," but they do not prove her case that an Egyptian profession had emerged at that time. I'll try again: her "indicators" are "necessary, but not sufficient." Her explicit argument is that, because the Egyptian medical establishment met many of the criteria of the European medical profession, it should be called a "profession" despite the fact that it lacked an autonomous professional association that would reflect its professional solidarity and consciousness. She points out that a major difference between the Egyptian experience and its European counterpart was that "in Egypt it was governmental action that began and guided the process by which the profession came into existence" (p. 85). Moreover, even on the eve of the British invasion, "the profession was still dependent on the government for its growth and security. The government continued to finance Qasr al-Aini and to set the policies of the school. Since no other independent medical school was formed at the time, and since the government continued to be the provider of health services and medical education, both the medical profession and the health services remained instruments of government policy" (p. 105).

Dr. Sonbol suggests that, since she has shown that there is a difference between the European and Egyptian experience, she has demonstrated sensitivity to cultural specificities. What she has done instead is to define her task—which is to explain how the term "profession" applies in Egyptian society—but then she fails to accomplish it. "Profession" is a Western sociological term, and to apply it to the Egyptian case without concern for theoretical considerations results in a messy affair, just as the uncritical use of concepts such as "social class," "political party," "church," "state," and "religion," to name a few, has resulted in decades of misunderstanding in cross-cultural studies. The profound obstacles faced by Egyptian physicians in their professional odyssey require Dr. Sonbol to evaluate carefully whether the gains they made before 1882 actually establish her claim that they attained professional status. Apart from the citation of a handful of works on the history of the Western European medical profession, her book betrays a lack of familiarity with the vast literature on the theory of professions, allowing her to select arbitrary, and insufficient, criteria for what constitutes a profession.

At least two major problems are not addressed as a result of this theoretical innocence. One is the dependence of the Egyptian medical establishment on the government, whether Egyptian or British. A defining characteristic of a profession in Western societies is the combination of power and independence that derives from autonomy. This attribute was made possible due to a strong, centuries-long tradition of autonomy for corporate groups. In those areas of the world that lack such a tradition, the creation of a professional identity has been much more difficult to achieve, and it has had to be done on other terms. For example, in 19th-century Russia (an autocratic, newly industrializing, and overwhelmingly rural society), physicians aspiring to professional status had to confront an array of obstacles remarkably similar to those of their contemporaries in Egypt. Although they were not able to attain the autonomy of their peers in the West, they did manage to develop a strong professional consciousness by means of a medical associ-

ation and a number of journals in which they could share information and advocate their views. Moreover, they managed actively to develop a mystique for themselves as public servants who worked selflessly among the *zemstvos*. This public image not only won them public support, but also gave them leverage with the authorities, enabling them to work for greater autonomy.[1]

Dr. Sonbol paints a very different portrait of Egyptian physicians. Not only were they heavily dependent on the Egyptian government before the British invasion, but by the time of the invasion they had no journal and no medical association. Dr. Sonbol portrays them as astonishingly passive in the face of the successful efforts of the British government's conversion of them into "simple assistants." Is this an accurate account? If so, Dr. Sonbol must deal with this problem of uncharacteristic weakness and passivity on the part of a "profession."

Egyptian physicians did not achieve the mystique that the Russian doctors gained from their work in the zemstvos, and that handicapped their efforts to gain recognition as a profession. An occupation may have all the other attributes normally associated with a profession, but if it is not sanctioned by the community it will not be considered, and cannot operate as, a profession. A major problem for 19th and early 20th-century Egyptian physicians was that the public did not support them in their efforts to be recognized as a profession. Dr. Sonbol at one point asserts that "As early as the 1860s, the new graduate doctors of Qasr al-Aini were seen in a completely different light from the traditional healers" (p. 81). Notable here is the use of the passive voice, for she provides no information on who is seeing the doctors in a new light, other than Ali Pasha Mubarak, who certainly did not represent the views of the majority of Egyptians. A recurring theme in her book is that Egyptian doctors had to compete with herbalists and spiritual healers well into the 20th century: her evidence supports the view that Egyptian doctors did not receive community sanction. Noteworthy in this regard is an important topic that Dr. Sonbol did not address because of the limited chronological scope of her study. During the interwar years the nationalists repeatedly complained that Egyptians who could afford medical treatment typically went to foreign doctors rather than to Egyptian doctors. It is clear from the literature of the time that wealthy Egyptians considered (groundlessly, we can argue) the foreign doctors to be more "professional" than were the Egyptian doctors. Egyptian physicians were handicapped by the weakness of community sanction as late as the 1930s.

A second major difficulty arising from Dr. Sonbol's lack of concern with the theoretical aspect of this question is the status of the foreign doctors in Egypt. She notes their presence in Egypt throughout the period 1800–1922, and points out the favoritism which they received at the hands of the governments, both Egyptian and British. In fact, "A majority of the doctors licensed to practice in Egypt from 1892 to 1914 were foreigners . . . " (p. 110). Were foreign doctors part of the Egyptian medical profession that Dr. Sonbol asserts came into being during the period in question? She repeatedly counterposes "Egyptian" and "foreign" doctors, but consistently refers only to an "Egyptian medical profession." Did foreign doctors, then, fail to develop a professional identity, or did they belong to a foreign medical profession? Or can we speak of both foreign and Egyptian doctors as constituting the Egyptian medical profession? This is highly unlikely, given the nature of the author's argument. Were there, then, two medical professions in Egypt? This is not the sense in which we use the term "profession," but Dr. Sonbol leaves us wondering how she would answer the question.

Dr. Sonbol charges that, because I take this line of argument, I am insisting that Egyptian cultural development conform to a Western norm. Not at all. I am not insisting on cultural imperialism, but rather on conceptual precision. A corps of doctors trained


1. Nancy Mandelker Frieden, *Russian Physicians in an Era of Reform and Revolution, 1856–1905* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

in scientific medical practice is, undeniably, set apart from herbalists and spiritual healers, but until the public accepts them as superior to the other healers, they are not regarded as professionals, and they cannot act as professionals. They remain as weak as Dr. Sonbol describes them. They certainly practice modern medicine as an "occupation," and they may even constitute a medical "establishment," but they are not a "profession" in the sociological meaning of the term. The field of comparative history has taught us that anyone who studies a sociological phenomenon in another culture must deal with it on its own cultural terms. In other words, it is Dr. Sonbol who is employing the procrustean bed, not I. She objects that my review "focused on details and their validity to [my] idea of what a profession constitutes and on whether the title to [her] book fit the data." I think that that is what I was "professionally" obligated to do.

There are several other, secondary, features of the book that could be discussed, were there space. Some are details, such as erroneous dates, and some are conceptual in nature. There are, as well, several sections of her letter that beg to be addressed. For example, her assertion that the review, by mentioning the book's treatment of Muhammad Ali, "is really perpetuating . . . the stereotypical image of the modernization paradigm of the need for an autocratic ruler to bring about any form of change" is breathtaking in its imaginative leap.

Editorial constraints on the length of this essay, however, leave room only for a final observation. In her book Dr. Sonbol discusses several of the obstacles facing Clot Bey when he began his project of organizing a medical school. One was the colonial, racist idea that "Arabs had neither the intelligence nor the capacity of other peoples" (p. 31). In her letter, Dr. Sonbol refers to this problem when she writes, "[The book] deals with the different disputes involving the school and its students, who were a source of great controversy even then, for (as now it seems) it was not believed that Egyptians could in fact manage to bring about a professional success." The parenthetical phrase, of course, refers to my review. I find it troubling that a public charge of racism is directed at a reviewer who is pointing out weaknesses in a particular book's argument, but who is not questioning the intelligence or the abilities of any people.

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